Summary & Insights
0:00:10 tax or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed
0:00:14 at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund.
0:00:19 For more details, please see A16Z.com/disclosures.
0:00:20 I’m Frank Chen.
0:00:26 Today I’m here with Scott Cooper and we are now in part three of three of our de-mystifying
0:00:28 Silicon Valley.
0:00:31 This part is all about living with your investor.
0:00:35 As Scott will point out, the average length of time that you will work with a venture
0:00:42 investor, 8, 10, 12 years, is longer than the average marriage, terrifying statistic.
0:00:46 And so you want to make sure that you understand how to work and pick with an investor that
0:00:49 you can live with over a long period of time.
0:00:53 And so we’re going to talk about ways that you can think about getting the most out of
0:00:59 your venture investor and board member and how to handle situations from the bad situations
0:01:04 where you have to wind down the company to the awesome situations where we hope you find
0:01:07 yourself, which is you’re doing an IPO for your company.
0:01:09 So let’s dig right into it.
0:01:13 Let’s talk a little bit about, fundamentally, what do I want from my investor?
0:01:16 And usually they’ll live basically as my board member.
0:01:17 Yeah.
0:01:18 Right?
0:01:19 Like what are the big things I’m looking for?
0:01:20 Yeah.
0:01:21 So look, I think, you know, certainly you want a board member and all the things that a board
0:01:25 member entails, which is hopefully they are a good coach, a good mentor, a good sounding
0:01:29 board for you, hopefully they’re good stewards of corporate governance and help you kind of
0:01:31 think through important strategic decisions for the company.
0:01:35 But then I think more importantly, you know, and this extends beyond often just the general
0:01:40 partner who’s sitting on your board, you want some value from them that allows you to help
0:01:41 you accelerate the growth of the business.
0:01:46 I mean, ultimately, you and the venture capitalists are along for the same ride, which is you’re
0:01:51 both trying to achieve an outcome that yields a very important, longstanding, hopefully independent
0:01:52 and publicly traded company.
0:01:57 And so, you know, whatever the venture capitalists can do to help you with that, whether it’s
0:02:01 making customer introductions or helping you understand, you know, how and when to add
0:02:06 a CFO or a head of sales or, you know, how best to kind of navigate, you know, the PR
0:02:09 and marketing world and who are the right press relationships to have.
0:02:13 All those things are, I think, fair game where, you know, kind of good VCs find ways in which
0:02:17 they can be valuable to entrepreneurs in that regard.
0:02:22 So one of the jobs of the board is that they can fire me as the CEO.
0:02:23 Yes.
0:02:24 Okay.
0:02:26 So now I’ve got this weird incentive, which is on the one hand, I want that partnership.
0:02:27 Yeah.
0:02:28 I want to get great advice.
0:02:32 And on the other hand, like if I share too much or like I, you know, too open about my
0:02:35 vulnerabilities or my shortcomings, like I could get fired.
0:02:38 And so how should I think about transparency, trust?
0:02:39 Exactly right.
0:02:42 It’s a little bit like the relationship, you know, probably your youngest has with you
0:02:43 as a parent, right?
0:02:44 Which is okay.
0:02:45 I want to be truthful.
0:02:46 Right.
0:02:48 I want to tell them what I’ve wrong, but I know there’s consequences for doing that, right?
0:02:53 So yeah, look, I think, so you’re absolutely right, which is, look, the fundamental power
0:02:55 the board does, of course, is to be able to hire a private CEO.
0:02:58 Now we talked about this in a different session.
0:03:02 It’s also changing these days, which is often the boards are not controlled by the venture
0:03:06 capitalist, but controlled by the CEO and, you know, kind of, you know, other common shareholders,
0:03:09 in which case the board really can’t, you know, the venture capitalist can’t, you don’t
0:03:10 really do anything.
0:03:14 They would have to actually really generate consensus with a much broader set of folks.
0:03:19 So I think some of those risks of kind of, you know, a VC being, you know, kind of random
0:03:23 or, you know, kind of, you know, not thinking through these things and, you know, and doing
0:03:26 that is much, that risk is much lessened today.
0:03:27 Technically they can’t out-vote me.
0:03:28 That’s exactly right.
0:03:29 Right.
0:03:31 They would have to kind of, you know, co-opt other members of your kind of, you know, constituents
0:03:33 to do so.
0:03:37 But that notwithstanding, I think even in the scenario where that’s not the case, I think
0:03:38 you’re right.
0:03:42 In some cases, look, you have to, you still have to build a relationship, though, where,
0:03:46 you know, you are willing to share enough information to, you know, to kind of, you know, get their
0:03:48 advice and get their help.
0:03:52 Yeah, in some cases, maybe that means you’re vulnerable, but I think in most cases, I think
0:03:56 most VCs would say, hey, look, if there’s, if you can tell us stuff and we can help you
0:04:00 fix it and help you address it, then, you know, there’s no reason, it doesn’t necessarily
0:04:03 mean that every time you do something wrong, you know, you get punished and you basically
0:04:04 find yourself out of a job.
0:04:06 So I think most people are pretty rational about this, but you’re right.
0:04:12 There is this kind of strange dichotomy of kind of, you know, having somebody who’s also
0:04:17 your boss essentially be your consigliary as well.
0:04:23 And then sort of as I build the company, I’m going to basically grow the board from, you
0:04:24 know, people who invest in money, right?
0:04:27 So I have a Series A investor who takes a board seat, then the B investor takes a board
0:04:28 seat.
0:04:32 So now I’ve got like a whole cat herding exercise to go through.
0:04:37 And there are situations in which the economic interest of my investors, A’s and B’s and
0:04:38 C’s, can diverge.
0:04:39 Absolutely.
0:04:42 Like I might get into a situation where somebody’s heading into a fundraise.
0:04:43 They need a liquidity event.
0:04:44 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
0:04:48 They need to put up some dollars and so like now they’re pressuring me to sell the company.
0:04:49 Yeah, yeah, yeah.
0:04:50 Right?
0:04:53 Whereas the A and B investors might be like, no, no, no, we’re like, let’s go for a bigger
0:04:54 outcome.
0:04:55 Yeah.
0:04:56 So how do I manage these situations?
0:04:59 Those are tough issues in managing, I think, again, as a CEO, it’s really important for
0:05:02 you to kind of understand exactly what those incentives are.
0:05:06 And you mentioned it, hey, maybe I, as the VC, need to go fundraise a new fund and so
0:05:10 I need to show my LPs that I’m smart and I’m making some money and we get an acquisition
0:05:11 offer for your company.
0:05:14 And for me, it’s a good outcome, but maybe it’s not a good outcome for you and others.
0:05:20 Now the good news is, as a board member, you are a fiduciary to those shareholders.
0:05:24 And so you do have legal constraints on your ability to be completely self-serving.
0:05:26 But still, even within that, you have to think about it.
0:05:31 And so this is, you know, oftentimes you’ll see, you may have heard of this term called
0:05:35 a waterfall analysis, which is oftentimes it’s a mechanism by which often the lawyers
0:05:39 will do it for you for the company and they’ll say, hey, look, if you sell the company at
0:05:42 this price, here’s what the A people will get, here’s what the B people get, here’s what
0:05:44 you and your employees get.
0:05:48 And it’s good in those situations to look at that because that will help you understand
0:05:51 if you do have this kind of divergence of interest among folks.
0:05:55 You know, again, I think, as with all things, look, the best thing you can do is hopefully
0:05:58 you’ve stacked your board with good people who are rational and who respect things like
0:06:00 fiduciary duties.
0:06:03 And you can have a meaningful conversation around that.
0:06:04 Yeah.
0:06:08 In theory, the board is supposed to be exercising duty of care.
0:06:15 In theory, they’re not supposed to put their own interests ahead of all of the, but there
0:06:19 are situations where you will get this sort of self-serving behavior.
0:06:25 Yeah, well, you kind of find this weird situation and is often times when company, we talked
0:06:29 about liquidation preference in one of our prior sessions, where a company is getting
0:06:31 sold for at or around the liquidation preference.
0:06:34 This is where you tend to kind of get these issues that come up, right?
0:06:39 Because the VCs are, you know, if they’ve got $30 million of liquidation preference,
0:06:44 they’re probably indifferent between a $30 million sale and a $35 million sale and a
0:06:46 $40 million sale because, you know, I’m just making up these numbers.
0:06:49 But let’s assume in those cases, they’re still going to get the same amount of their
0:06:53 liquidation preference because the price isn’t high enough to actually cause them to convert
0:06:55 and take their normal equity ownership.
0:06:57 And so you do get these weird scenarios.
0:07:01 Now, again, as I said, the good news is most of the time, you know, people still act rationally.
0:07:05 There are a couple cases, though, that we’ve seen where the courts have kind of said, “Hey,
0:07:08 we don’t like the behavior we’re seeing from the VCs because you kind of didn’t take
0:07:12 care of the common shareholders, which is really your main job here.”
0:07:18 And so, you know, I don’t want to put everybody to sleep on this webcast here, but, you know,
0:07:21 there’s a whole chapter on this in the book which kind of helps you understand how we
0:07:22 got there.
0:07:24 And then, importantly, what are the kinds of things that you can do to make sure that
0:07:27 you don’t run afoul of those problems?
0:07:31 So the take home message for me as the startup CEO is like, “I need to understand all of
0:07:37 the incentives and the timeframes of the people who are on my board so I can try to understand
0:07:38 why are you saying what you’re saying?”
0:07:39 That’s exactly right.
0:07:41 Yeah, and look, it goes, again, you know, it goes back to, you know, where we started
0:07:42 the conversation.
0:07:46 Our first session when we started talking was, you know, incentives drive behavior for
0:07:47 better or worse.
0:07:48 Right?
0:07:52 You know, you know, we, again, you and I spent time in the enterprise world where, look,
0:07:55 if you want to change the way you sell your product, the best thing to do is change the
0:07:57 quota structure for your sales reps, right?
0:08:00 And that’s not, you know, a denigrating statement.
0:08:03 It’s just the way that, look, incentives may have a matter and people respond to incentives.
0:08:06 And just like that, you know, venture capitalists are people, too.
0:08:09 And so, they respond to the incentive structure they have, and the more you understand that,
0:08:14 the more I think you can finally cut through and actually have a rational dialogue.
0:08:15 Great.
0:08:19 Now, I want to do some sort of play acting with you on three scenarios.
0:08:23 So scenario one is things aren’t going well, we’re going to have to do something tough
0:08:27 like raise a down round or a bridge, and then a scenario where, hey, yeah, we’re getting
0:08:30 acquired and, you know, we’re going to clear the liquidation preferences.
0:08:31 It’s going to be happy.
0:08:32 Yeah.
0:08:34 And then the super happy scenario where we’re going public.
0:08:35 All right.
0:08:36 So let’s, advice for each one of those.
0:08:37 All right.
0:08:38 Tough times.
0:08:39 Yeah.
0:08:40 It’s not going the way I expect.
0:08:41 I have to raise a bridge.
0:08:42 Yeah.
0:08:43 Maybe I have to raise a down round.
0:08:44 How should I think about this?
0:08:45 Yeah.
0:08:46 This is hard.
0:08:49 I talk about this in the book a lot, but I’d say the most important thing I think to think
0:08:52 about here is, and this is where I do think having good relationship with your VC is critically
0:08:55 important, is having a real open, honest discussion, right?
0:08:59 So sometimes, unfortunately, despite your best efforts and, you know, despite our best
0:09:03 efforts, hopefully to be supportive of you, maybe the market’s just not there or the product’s
0:09:07 not taking, you know, for whatever reason, you know, look, you gave it 110% and it’s
0:09:08 just not there.
0:09:13 And, you know, it’s interesting when I’ve had those conversations with entrepreneurs,
0:09:16 I was kind of, I was, you know, dreading going into that conversation because I was worried
0:09:18 that, you know, it was going to be a contentious discussion.
0:09:21 And more times than not, they actually come out and they say, you know what, I’m kind
0:09:25 of relieved because I was thinking the same thing you were, which is I was doing this
0:09:31 because I thought my job to you as the VC was to just run through walls no matter what.
0:09:34 And honestly, I don’t know that spending another three, four years doing this is likely to yield
0:09:35 a better outcome.
0:09:38 It doesn’t always happen that way, but more often than not, I’d say that happens.
0:09:42 And so I think in those cases, look, it’s perfectly respectable to say, hey, look, we
0:09:44 all gave it our best and it didn’t work.
0:09:47 And the right thing to do is let’s wind it down in a reasonable fashion so that we can
0:09:51 hopefully, you know, take care of our employees and take care of our vendors and do all the
0:09:53 things we can.
0:09:57 If you still feel like, you know, the alternative is true, which is, hey, yes, maybe we got
0:10:01 the product wrong or maybe the market’s developed more slowly, but you know what, like, I’m committed
0:10:05 as an entrepreneur and I really believe this market is still here in the survival business.
0:10:08 Then, you know, kind of, I talked about this in the book, but things like what you call
0:10:11 like a recapitalization, which is kind of almost a reset, right?
0:10:14 Which is we say, hey, look, we raised a bunch of money, we spent it, it didn’t yield what
0:10:18 we want, but we’re all still believing this thing and I want to go spend the next 10 years
0:10:20 of my life trying to do this.
0:10:22 Then let’s set the company up for success, right?
0:10:26 And it’s unpleasant, the word recap is obviously has such a negative connotation, but in that
0:10:30 respect, it’s actually a positive thing, which is we’re going to figure out, okay, how do
0:10:34 we kind of make the company attractive for potentially new investors to come back in
0:10:38 by cleaning up some of these things like liquidation preference we’ve talked about, resetting the
0:10:42 price to a point that actually reflects the progress of the business.
0:10:44 But importantly, and this is where I think entrepreneurs need to make sure they’re aligned
0:10:49 with their VCs, for you as an entrepreneur and your employees to also make sure that
0:10:50 you get reset as well, right?
0:10:55 So there’s no sense in any of us putting more money in the company if it turns out all of
0:10:59 your stock options are underwater and you’ve got no financial incentive and then tomorrow
0:11:01 everybody’s going to walk away from the business, right?
0:11:04 So this requires kind of give and take on both sides, which is, you know, the VCs will
0:11:07 give up a lot of the rights that they otherwise had.
0:11:11 But importantly, the give that the VCs, you know, need to do to make this successful is
0:11:15 to kind of re-insent the team as well and make sure that you all are, you know, shooting
0:11:18 for the same ultimate outcome.
0:11:21 So there’s a lot of emotional freedom, just sort of listening to you talk, right?
0:11:26 Because even if we have to wind it down, we can have the conversation and then realizing
0:11:29 that like half your portfolio is going to go belly up anyway, right?
0:11:32 I don’t have to feel like, oh my god, I’m like the world’s biggest failure, right?
0:11:34 Which is like you’re kind of expecting this.
0:11:35 I think that’s right.
0:11:36 Yeah.
0:11:39 But it’s, you know, it’s more, obviously look, it’s more emotional and more personal
0:11:41 for you as the entrepreneur, of course, right?
0:11:45 Because you’ve, you know, this has been your life’s dream.
0:11:46 But you’re right.
0:11:47 So you shouldn’t feel sorry for the VCs, right?
0:11:51 And I certainly never, would never suggest that you should feel sorry for the VCs because
0:11:52 you’re right.
0:11:54 We expect that that kind of risk is what’s inherent to the business.
0:11:57 The more important question is really, do you still believe in the market?
0:12:01 Do you still want to pursue this or also do you feel like, hey, it was a good idea, but
0:12:05 just for a variety of reasons, didn’t materialize in the way we thought and the more rational
0:12:07 thing to do is go do something else?
0:12:08 Got it.
0:12:09 Great.
0:12:10 Let’s move on to scenario two.
0:12:11 Right.
0:12:14 So we’re getting an acquired and an attractive price, yay, it’s not quite an IPO, but it’s
0:12:15 not a wind-down.
0:12:16 Yeah.
0:12:17 It’s not a recap.
0:12:21 So what are things that are important to think about as we’re going through this process?
0:12:24 So maybe let’s start with sort of how, you know, how are we getting value?
0:12:27 Is it cash or private stock or public stock?
0:12:28 Yeah.
0:12:29 Yeah.
0:12:30 So there’s lots of things to think about, right?
0:12:32 One is you’re right, which is look, what’s the economic interest we’re getting here?
0:12:36 And, you know, sometimes, as you said, that could be you might be getting paid in cash,
0:12:38 sometimes you might get stock of the other acquirer.
0:12:42 And so depending on the scenario, right, you may want to do some homework if you’re getting
0:12:45 stock to understand what do I think about that stock, what do I think about the prospects
0:12:49 of that company, because your economic future is now going to be tied to the success of
0:12:51 that business as well.
0:12:54 I think the most important thing, though, to think about, obviously price is important,
0:12:56 so I don’t want to belittle that.
0:13:01 But the next most important thing to think about is what is the go-forward business going
0:13:02 to look like, right?
0:13:05 Are you being acquired because they really love your product and love your vision and
0:13:09 now you’re going to go be the general manager of some new unit in the company and have the
0:13:13 ability to affect the vision that you had hoped you would affect as a standalone company,
0:13:17 but now inside of a bigger, you know, better resource, better capitalized company?
0:13:18 That’s wonderful.
0:13:21 Obviously if you’re signed up to do that and your employees are signed up for that, or
0:13:25 are they saying, hey, you know what, we really like those engineers, but all these sales guys,
0:13:27 all these product guys, you know, we don’t need them.
0:13:31 And so like we’re going to, you know, incent the engineers to stick around, but quite frankly,
0:13:34 we want you to lay off everybody else before you kind of, you know, come over.
0:13:37 So those are, I think those are the most important things, which is kind of, you know, what is
0:13:38 going to happen to the employees?
0:13:40 What does the go-forward business look like?
0:13:44 And you know, again, I know we all get excited and we like to talk about the price because
0:13:48 of course it’s a lot more fun and sexy to talk about money, but it’s, I think, I think,
0:13:52 you know, managers and CEOs make their reputations quite frankly in these types of situations
0:13:55 where, you know, they are thinking first and foremost about kind of the prospects for their
0:14:01 employees and their team members, you know, kind of, you know, not secondary to the actual,
0:14:02 you know, value of the company, right?
0:14:03 So who’s getting a job?
0:14:04 Who’s not getting a job?
0:14:05 That’s right.
0:14:07 What are the terms of the stock options?
0:14:08 That’s exactly right.
0:14:10 What’s the financial incentive look like, right?
0:14:12 Are they going to give you new stock options in the new company or are they just going
0:14:15 to take the ones you had and move them over?
0:14:18 Sometimes people do what are called retention bonuses, right, where they say, hey, you know
0:14:22 what, like, for the first two or three years of the deal on each of the one-year anniversaries
0:14:25 of the deal, if you’re still here, we’re going to give you maybe a cash bonus or we’re going
0:14:27 to give you a stock bonus.
0:14:30 So all those things that kind of allow you to kind of get a better sense of what is that
0:14:34 go-forward structure going to look like and is that something that you as a CEO believe
0:14:39 you can sell to your employees to say, hey, look, you know, we gave it a shot, we did well,
0:14:42 and now here’s an opportunity for you to both enjoy financial reward as well as feel like
0:14:47 you’re enjoying the reward of being in a bigger company and having access to more resources.
0:14:52 I hear that sometimes in these cases and also with the recaps or the down rounds, there
0:14:54 are these things called management carve-outs.
0:14:55 Yes.
0:14:56 What are they?
0:14:57 Yes.
0:14:58 Should I be looking for one?
0:14:59 Is that a good thing, a bad thing?
0:15:01 Yeah, sometimes you’ll see, yeah, management carve-out, management buyout, MBO sometimes
0:15:02 is what they’re called.
0:15:07 Yeah, so the basic idea is typically sometimes what happens is, and it goes back a little
0:15:10 bit to this liquidation preference discussion we’re having, is the company might be doing
0:15:15 well, but there may be so much money invested in the company that even in a nice acquisition,
0:15:19 a lot of that money ends up going towards people like me, the VCs, as opposed to you
0:15:22 and the people who are going to actually go have to run this business now.
0:15:26 And so oftentimes what the VCs will do is say, “Hey look, we want to incent you to kind
0:15:30 of be motivated to try to find a buyer for this business if we all agree that that’s
0:15:32 the right outcome for the company.”
0:15:35 And so essentially the VCs will say, “Look, let’s carve out some of the money that might
0:15:40 have otherwise gone to the VCs or in some cases other common shareholders and make a
0:15:44 pool that effectively becomes a bonus pool for the executives and/or the people who are
0:15:46 responsible for the acquisition.”
0:15:49 And that’s a perfectly fair and reasonable thing to do.
0:15:52 We do it, you know, in many cases in that scenario.
0:15:56 And then in addition, on top of that, sometimes the acquire themselves will also put an additional
0:16:01 incentive pool in place and say, “Okay, as we talked about post the acquisition, maybe
0:16:05 on the first and second and third year anniversaries or something, we will also contribute to a
0:16:08 pool that will inset longer term retention for people.”
0:16:09 Got it.
0:16:16 So the management carve out pre the transaction is about, “Look, this is the way the waterfall
0:16:17 would have worked.”
0:16:18 That’s right.
0:16:20 And that’s the portion of it and basically giving it a choice.
0:16:21 That’s exactly right.
0:16:22 Yeah.
0:16:23 So think of the just time periods, right?
0:16:26 Which is kind of, you know, let’s reallocate some of the dollars to the existing shareholders,
0:16:29 you know, and then post and post, you know, acquisition as we talked about.
0:16:33 It’s just an incentive structure to kind of create a long-term, it’s like new options.
0:16:34 That’s exactly right.
0:16:35 Yeah.
0:16:36 Got it.
0:16:37 Good.
0:16:38 Well, let’s talk about the happy scenario.
0:16:39 We’re going public.
0:16:40 All right.
0:16:41 We don’t want to end on a depressing note.
0:16:42 Yeah, of course.
0:16:43 Exactly.
0:16:44 Here we go.
0:16:45 This is what Silicon Valley does, is create IPOs.
0:16:53 So maybe talk a little bit about picking an investment bank and what are some of the incentives
0:16:54 they have.
0:16:55 Yeah.
0:16:56 And they bring the bear.
0:16:58 And are they always aligned with my existing investors or can they be?
0:16:59 Yeah.
0:17:00 Yeah.
0:17:01 Sort of differently.
0:17:02 Yeah.
0:17:04 The investment banks, you know, you’ve heard of these names, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan
0:17:05 Stanley.
0:17:08 You know, their main job is to kind of, you know, help you prepare for the IPO and make
0:17:10 sure all the documentation of things ready.
0:17:13 And then to basically kind of shepherd you through the process by introducing you to
0:17:17 all the relevant institutional investors who will hopefully go on to kind of, you know,
0:17:19 be the long-term shareholders for your business.
0:17:21 And so, you know, they do that.
0:17:22 They’re professionals.
0:17:23 They do this all the time.
0:17:25 So, you know, you certainly generally don’t go through that process without an investment
0:17:26 banker.
0:17:31 Where the conflicts potentially come up is, you know, they’ve got kind of two clients,
0:17:36 right, which is you’re their client for this transaction, but, you know, a firm like Fidelity
0:17:42 or T-Row Price or BlackRock, who is a institutional investor who buys, shares all the time in lots
0:17:47 of IPOs and also trades, shares through the desks that the firms have.
0:17:48 They’re also a client of the bank, right?
0:17:49 And so, there’s this tension.
0:17:54 You see this in the pricing for when IPOs are priced, where your incentive as the entrepreneur
0:17:58 is I want the price to be as high as possible because that means I raise more money for
0:18:01 less dilution, right?
0:18:04 But I don’t want to be too high where obviously the stock trades, you know, kind of poorly
0:18:05 the next day.
0:18:08 And, you know, the financial investor has the opposite incentive, of course, which is
0:18:12 I’d like to buy it as cheap as possible so that I have the maximum amount of upside in
0:18:13 the stock.
0:18:16 And so, this is where I think sometimes, you know, sometimes fairly and sometimes unfairly
0:18:21 I think that bankers, you know, are accused of potentially kind of favoring the institutional
0:18:25 investors because they are the repeat players for the business at the expense sometimes of
0:18:26 the company.
0:18:30 Having done this once, you know, I was a banker, you know, earlier in my career and having
0:18:34 seen the process, I, you know, there’s always some, you know, I think true to that, but
0:18:38 I think more likely these are just more art than science, quite frankly, and it’s really
0:18:42 hard to know based on the demand signals that they get exactly where to price the stock.
0:18:46 And so, you know, sometimes they get it right, sometimes they don’t, I think it’s probably
0:18:49 a little bit unfair to assume that there’s all kind of nefarious, you know, activity
0:18:51 at work here.
0:18:53 And what do I want to get out of my board in this situation?
0:18:56 Are they basically sort of at this point not that important?
0:19:00 Yeah, the board really starts to shift as you go public from being kind of, you know,
0:19:03 more active and probably more, you know, in some cases, more valuable in the business
0:19:07 to more of, quite frankly, a governance and a legal board in that sense, right, which is
0:19:11 making sure that the process is good, making sure that you’re doing your audit committee
0:19:12 and all the other things.
0:19:16 So it’s not that boards are irrelevant as a public company, but I would say the nature
0:19:20 of where boards spend their time starts to shift towards more compliance related activities
0:19:24 versus kind of, you know, potentially forward business looking activities.
0:19:25 Great.
0:19:26 Fantastic.
0:19:28 Well, Scott, thank you for spending so much time demystifying this entire process.
0:19:32 I appreciate it and I hope this is helpful and I hope people will find, you know, they
0:19:35 can go buy the book and, you know, dig deeper into a lot of these topics.
0:19:39 Yes, there’s one big takeaway from having written the book and then been on the circuit
0:19:40 promoting it.
0:19:42 Like, what’s the big takeaway you would want entrepreneurs to take?
0:19:46 Yeah, look, I think the biggest thing, and we hit on a lot of this, is, you know, look,
0:19:49 understand, you know, who your partner is, as I mentioned, you know, somewhat facetiously,
0:19:51 but it’s true, you know, these are marriages, right?
0:19:55 You’re going to be with these companies for eight, 10, 12 years.
0:19:58 And so, you know, I don’t want to over strain the analogy, but the concept of dating and
0:20:02 understanding them really is relevant here, which is, you know, you wouldn’t get married
0:20:05 without really understanding your spouse and who they are and what makes them tick.
0:20:09 And I think in many respects, that is the equivalent of the dating process in the venture capital
0:20:13 game is know what their incentives are, know what they’re interested in, and, you know,
0:20:14 make sure you’re aligned.
0:20:15 Great.
0:20:16 All right, congratulations.
0:20:21 You’ve made it to the very end of part three of our three-part series with Scott Cooper.
0:20:25 Hopefully, you’ve got a really good sense of what goes on inside our heads when you meet
0:20:30 with us because you understand what our incentives are, how we work, and how we’re trying to help
0:20:34 you build a big, great, durable software business.
0:20:40 We hope that this encourages you to continue your entrepreneurial journey, that it demystifies
0:20:41 part of the process.
0:20:44 Look, we’re in this together.
0:20:47 Entrepreneurs and investors are here to change the world together.
0:20:49 And yeah, there’s going to be tension on the line.
0:20:51 There’s going to be times when we disagree.
0:20:56 But fundamentally, we need to be about being side by side entrepreneur and investor because
0:20:59 that’s the way that we get to change the world.
0:21:02 So, we encourage you on your entrepreneurial journey.
0:21:07 And if you’ve got a company that you’re building that seems like a good fit for the types of
0:21:10 investments we make, the house is open, and we’d love to meet.
0:21:18 [BLANK_AUDIO]
Las empresas de biotecnología más visionarias están empezando a verse no como desarrolladoras de fármacos tradicionales, sino principalmente como empresas de ciencia de datos —un cambio fundamental de mentalidad que redefine todo, desde su tecnología hasta su modelo de negocio. En una discusión entre los socios del equipo de biología de Andreessen Horowitz, la conversación gira en torno a los desafíos únicos que enfrentan los fundadores que combinan innovación tecnológica con biología, especialmente en el ámbito de los tratamientos terapéuticos. Un tema central es la dificultad de “hablar un nuevo idioma”, donde los emprendedores expertos en tecnología deben traducir avances computacionales a términos que resuenen con socios farmacéuticos, reguladores e inversores inmersos en los ciclos convencionales de desarrollo biológico.
Una trampa importante identificada es la tentación de caer en la “muerte por mil pilotos”. Las empresas en etapa inicial a menudo buscan múltiples colaboraciones a pequeña escala con grandes farmacéuticas para demostrar su plataforma, pero estos acuerdos frecuentemente vienen con pagos iniciales bajos, expansión del alcance y plazos prolongados que consumen recursos sin aportar una validación decisiva. El panel advierte que este enfoque de modelo de servicio rara vez construye una empresa sostenible y valiosa. En cambio, los fundadores deben ser excepcionalmente selectivos con los socios piloto, eligiendo a aquellos que realmente están comprometidos con el éxito de la tecnología y que ofrecen un camino para capturar valor a largo plazo mediante hitos y regalías.
El camino para capturar valor obliga a una decisión estratégica crítica: ¿debería una empresa de plataforma seguir siendo un proveedor de herramientas o desarrollar sus propios activos farmacológicos? La historia muestra que las empresas a menudo se sienten obligadas a hacer la transición al desarrollo interno de fármacos para capturar más valor económico, pero este es un giro difícil que muchas no están estructuradas para ejecutar. Estructuras corporativas innovadoras, como crear LLC separadas para activos farmacológicos individuales financiados por inversores específicos, pueden permitir que la plataforma “matriz” siga innovando mientras reduce el riesgo del desarrollo de su primer candidato principal. Esto es crucial porque en biotecnología, el primer activo a menudo lleva la doble carga de demostrar tanto su propio valor como el de la plataforma subyacente.
Más allá de los tratamientos terapéuticos, existen peligros similares en el diagnóstico y la bioingeniería en general. Para el diagnóstico, el riesgo principal no es la aprobación regulatoria sino el reembolso; los fundadores deben tener en mente desde el primer día la estrategia de comercialización y la economía de los pagadores. Para las bioplataformas (como bacterias modificadas genéticamente), el desafío es definir y lograr una prueba de concepto clara y temprana —una “prueba de rechazo”— que demuestre de manera definitiva la funcionalidad central. En todos los subsectores, una naturaleza híbrida crea complejidades de financiamiento, ya que las empresas pueden necesitar atraer tanto a inversores tecnológicos (atraídos por la escalabilidad de la plataforma) como a inversores de biotecnología (que comprenden los hitos clínicos), lo que requiere una cuidadosa construcción de sindicatos.
Ideas Sorprendentes
- El concepto de la “prueba de rechazo”: El experimento más importante para una startup de biología es aquel que podría demostrar definitivamente que la idea no funcionará. Los fundadores deberían identificar y ejecutar este experimento existencial lo antes posible, en lugar de retrasarlo por trabajos más convenientes.
- Los acuerdos piloto suelen ser trampas: Los acuerdos de colaboración pequeños y tempranos con grandes empresas (“pilotos”) son engañosamente fáciles de conseguir pero pueden ser fatales, llevando a la “muerte por mil pilotos” debido a su bajo valor, expansión del alcance e incentivos desalineados, en lugar de ser un peldaño hacia el éxito.
- La estructura corporativa como arma estratégica: Usar un modelo de LLC para separar activos farmacológicos individuales en entidades financiadas de forma independiente está surgiendo como una forma de preservar y financiar el motor central de innovación de una empresa plataforma, desafiando el enfoque estándar de una sola entidad tipo C-corp.
- El reembolso, no la regulación, es la primera barrera en diagnóstico: Para las empresas de diagnóstico, el enfoque inicial principal no debería estar en la aprobación de la FDA o CLIA, sino en diseñar una prueba y un modelo de negocio que serán reembolsados por los pagadores, lo cual es un obstáculo comercial más fundamental.
- Los sindicatos de inversores híbridos son una estrategia deliberada: La tabla de capitalización ideal para una empresa híbrida de bio-tecnología podría mezclar intencionalmente inversores tecnológicos tradicionales y capitalistas de riesgo de biotecnología tradicional desde las primeras etapas, para que cada uno pueda educar al otro sobre los riesgos y hitos que respectivamente comprenden mejor.
Conclusiones Prácticas
- Sea ferozmente selectivo con los pilotos tempranos: Elija socios de colaboración en función de su creencia estratégica en su plataforma, no solo de su disposición a hacer un pequeño acuerdo. Busque socios que ofrezcan un camino claro para capturar un valor significativo a largo plazo y que puedan servir como un caso de referencia genuino.
- Defina y ejecute su “prueba de rechazo” inmediatamente: Identifique el experimento único más crítico que probaría que su tecnología central no es viable. Ejecútelo lo antes posible para validar su premisa fundamental o pivotar antes de perder años y capital.
- Articule su posición en la cadena de valor: Defina claramente si el valor principal de su tecnología está en el descubrimiento temprano (por ejemplo, identificación de objetivos) o en etapas posteriores y más costosas del desarrollo (por ejemplo, predecir el fracaso en la Fase 3). Su modelo de negocio y estructura de asociación deben alinearse con donde capture el valor económico más significativo.
- Planifique su sindicato de inversores para el viaje: Al recaudar una ronda, considere qué inversores son los más adecuados para los hitos actuales (tecnología vs. biología) y planifique activamente cómo atraerá al siguiente tipo de inversor en la ronda siguiente, construyendo potencialmente un sindicato híbrido desde el principio.
Escalar una startup es como activar un cohete de segunda etapa: has alcanzado el encaje producto-mercado y ahora enfrentas un conjunto completamente nuevo de desafíos que pueden hacer o deshacer el futuro de la empresa. Elad Gill, basándose en sus experiencias en Google, Twitter y como inversor, describe el viaje de 10 a 10.000 personas como un cambio fundamental en la complejidad. Mientras las startups en fase inicial se obsesionan por no quedarse sin dinero y encontrar el encaje producto-mercado, el escalado exitoso exige dominar habilidades totalmente nuevas: reformular la comunicación para una organización distribuida, contratar líderes ejecutivos para funciones que el fundador nunca ha manejado e implementar procesos ágiles para la estrategia y asignación de recursos. El núcleo de la discusión gira en torno a esta transición de una estructura simple y plana a un organismo complejo donde la comunicación se rompe, los roles se especializan y el fundador debe aprender a delegar y gestionar a una escala nunca antes experimentada.
Una parte significativa de la conversación desmitifica el arte de contratar un equipo ejecutivo, un paso crítico y peligroso. Los fundadores, especialmente aquellos con formación técnica, a menudo no tienen un modelo de “excelencia” para roles como CFO, VP de Ventas o Director de Producto. El consejo no es reinventar la rueda, sino buscar calibración: reunirse con los mejores profesionales en esos campos, aunque no sean candidatos al puesto, para comprender cómo es la excelencia. Este proceso ayuda a los fundadores a redactar una especificación de trabajo precisa y alinear a su equipo de entrevistadores, evitando errores comunes como contratar a un “ingeniero para 500 personas” para gestionar un equipo de 20 o aplicar filtros incorrectos, como buscar un vendedor que sepa programar. El equipo ejecutivo debe verse como una balsa salvavidas con pocos asientos, reservados exclusivamente para candidatos “excelentes”, no simplemente “buenos”.
El diálogo luego se expande más allá del escalado interno para examinar el panorama general del mercado y el entorno de financiación. Se discute cómo las financiaciones en etapas tardías han creado un mundo donde el abundante capital privado puede apuntalar empresas, y Gill estima que aproximadamente la mitad de los unicornios no valen realmente sus valoraciones de mil millones de dólares. Esto lleva a una exploración prospectiva de las principales tendencias tecnológicas: la continua evolución del móvil y la nube (con oportunidades en SaaS impulsado por APIs), la actual ola especulativa pero fundamental en cripto, el hardware especializado para aprendizaje automático y la creciente ciencia de la biotecnología de la longevidad. Gill argumenta que la longevidad, respaldada por evidencia biológica tangible (desde la restricción calórica hasta fármacos específicos), es una frontera a corto plazo con profundas implicaciones sociales, que podría redefinir carreras, relaciones y estructuras sociales.
Perspectivas Sorprendentes
- Contrata para los próximos 18 meses, no para los próximos cinco años: Un error común es contratar a un ejecutivo con experiencia en gestionar 500 personas cuando solo tienes un equipo de 20. Se aburrirá y probablemente fracasará; necesitas a alguien adecuado para la fase de escalado inmediata que viene.
- El método de “calibración” para roles desconocidos: No puedes contratar para un rol que no comprendes. La mejor práctica es reunirse con tres profesionales destacados en esa función (por ejemplo, CFOs) no para reclutarlos, sino para aprender cómo es la verdadera excelencia y qué problemas resolvería una gran contratación.
- La mitad de los unicornios están sobrevalorados: Se estima que el 50% de las empresas valoradas privadamente en más de mil millones de dólares en realidad no valen esa cantidad, y el día del ajuste de cuentas se retrasa por el enorme volumen de capital disponible en etapas tardías.
- La ciencia de la longevidad se basa en biología establecida: Este campo a menudo se ve como ciencia ficción, pero está fundamentado en décadas de evidencia, desde genes que extienden la vida en gusanos hasta fármacos aprobados por la FDA como la rapamicina que alargan la vida en ratones, lo que la convierte en una oportunidad biotecnológica tangible y a corto plazo.
- Tu rol se reducirá antes de expandirse: Para los primeros empleados (“veteranos”) durante el hipercrecimiento, su alcance e influencia se contraerán temporalmente mientras la empresa contrata expertos. Si se centran en ayudar a la empresa en lugar de proteger su territorio personal, sus responsabilidades se expandirán enormemente más tarde.
Consejos Prácticos
- Para contratar ejecutivos en funciones que no comprendes, primero “calibra” reuniéndote con varios profesionales destacados en ese rol para aprender cómo es la excelencia y qué debes buscar.
- Redacta una descripción de trabajo detallada y específica para cualquier contratación ejecutiva clave y compártela con todos en el panel de entrevistas para asegurar que todos estén alineados sobre el rol y las preguntas que deben hacer.
- Al escalar, cambia conscientemente tu modo de comunicación desde reuniones generales y charlas ad-hoc hacia procesos estructurados y repetibles que puedan funcionar en múltiples capas y oficinas internacionales.
- Considera tu equipo ejecutivo como una balsa salvavidas con asientos limitados: evalúa constantemente si alguien es simplemente “bueno” y ten un plan para encontrar un candidato “excelente”, ya que tolerar un rendimiento adecuado en este nivel es un riesgo importante para el escalado.
- Para los primeros empleados en una empresa en hipercrecimiento, concéntrate en ser útil y adaptable en lugar de aferrarte a tu dominio original; la empresa cambiará drásticamente cada seis meses, creando nuevas oportunidades para quienes contribuyan de manera amplia.
As empresas de biotecnologia mais visionárias estão começando a se ver não como desenvolvedoras tradicionais de medicamentos, mas como empresas de ciência de dados em primeiro lugar — uma mudança fundamental de mentalidade que redefine tudo, desde sua tecnologia até seu modelo de negócios. Em uma discussão entre os parceiros da equipe de bio da Andreessen Horowitz, a conversa gira em torno dos desafios únicos enfrentados pelos fundadores que combinam inovação tecnológica com biologia, especialmente em terapêutica. Um tema central é a dificuldade de “falar uma nova linguagem”, onde empreendedores com expertise em tecnologia devem traduzir avanços computacionais em termos que ressoem com parceiros farmacêuticos, reguladores e investidores imersos nos ciclos convencionais de desenvolvimento biológico.
Uma armadilha importante identificada é a tentação de cair no “morte por mil projetos-piloto”. Empresas em estágio inicial frequentemente buscam múltiplas colaborações em pequena escala com grandes farmacêuticas para provar sua plataforma, mas esses acordos geralmente vêm com pagamentos iniciais baixos, expansão do escopo e cronogramas prolongados que esgotam recursos sem oferecer validação decisiva. O painel adverte que essa abordagem de modelo de serviço raramente constrói uma empresa sustentável e valiosa. Em vez disso, os fundadores devem ser excepcionalmente seletivos com os parceiros de projetos-piloto, escolhendo aqueles que realmente investem no sucesso da tecnologia e que oferecem um caminho para capturar valor futuro por meio de marcos e royalties.
O caminho para capturar valor força uma escolha estratégica crucial: uma empresa de plataforma deve permanecer como fornecedora de ferramentas ou desenvolver seus próprios ativos de medicamentos? A história mostra que as empresas frequentemente se sentem compelidas a fazer a transição para o desenvolvimento interno de medicamentos para capturar mais valor econômico, mas esta é uma virada difícil que muitas não estão estruturadas para executar. Estruturas corporativas inovadoras, como criar LLCs separadas para ativos de medicamentos individuais financiados por investidores específicos, podem permitir que a plataforma “nave-mãe” continue inovando enquanto reduz o risco do desenvolvimento de seu primeiro candidato principal. Isso é crucial porque na biotecnologia, o primeiro ativo frequentemente carrega o duplo fardo de provar a si mesmo e a plataforma subjacente.
Além da terapêutica, armadilhas semelhantes existem em diagnósticos e bioengenharia em geral. Para diagnósticos, o risco principal não é a aprovação regulatória, mas o reembolso; os fundadores devem começar com a estratégia de entrada no mercado e a economia dos pagadores em mente desde o primeiro dia. Para bio-plataformas (como bactérias projetadas), o desafio é definir e alcançar uma prova de conceito clara e precoce — um “teste decisivo” — que demonstre definitivamente a funcionalidade central. Em todos os subsetores, uma natureza híbrida cria complexidades de financiamento, pois as empresas podem precisar atrair tanto investidores de tecnologia (atraídos pela escalabilidade da plataforma) quanto investidores de biotecnologia (que entendem marcos clínicos), exigindo uma construção cuidadosa de sindicatos.
Insights Surpreendentes
- O conceito do “teste decisivo”: O experimento mais importante para uma startup de bio é aquele que pode provar definitivamente que a ideia não funcionará. Os fundadores devem identificar e executar este experimento existencial o mais cedo possível, em vez de adiá-lo para trabalhos mais convenientes.
- Acordos de pilotos são frequentemente armadilhas: Pequenos acordos de colaboração precoces com grandes empresas (“pilotos”) são enganosamente fáceis de obter, mas podem ser fatais, levando à “morte por mil pilotos” devido ao baixo valor, expansão do escopo e incentivos desalinhados, em vez de serem um degrau para o sucesso.
- Estrutura corporativa como uma arma estratégica: Usar um modelo de LLC para destacar ativos de medicamentos individuais em entidades financiadas separadamente está surgindo como uma maneira de preservar e financiar o núcleo de inovação de uma empresa de plataforma, desafiando a abordagem padrão de uma única entidade C-corp.
- Reembolso, não regulamentação, é a primeira barreira em diagnósticos: Para empresas de diagnóstico, o foco inicial principal não deve ser a aprovação do FDA ou CLIA, mas projetar um teste e modelo de negócios que será reembolsado pelos pagadores, o que é um obstáculo comercial mais fundamental.
- Sindicatos de investidores híbridos são uma estratégia deliberada: A tabela de capitalização ideal para uma empresa híbrida de bio-tecnologia pode intencionalmente misturar investidores tradicionais de tecnologia e VCs tradicionais de biotecnologia desde os estágios iniciais, para que cada um possa educar o outro sobre os riscos e marcos que respectivamente melhor entendem.
Conclusões Práticas
- Seja ferozmente seletivo com os primeiros pilotos: Escolha parceiros de colaboração com base na crença estratégica em sua plataforma, não apenas na disposição de fazer um pequeno acordo. Procure parceiros que ofereçam um caminho claro para capturar valor futuro significativo e que possam servir como um verdadeiro caso de referência.
- Defina e execute seu “teste decisivo” imediatamente: Identifique o experimento único mais crítico que provaria que sua tecnologia central não é viável. Execute-o o mais rápido possível para validar sua premissa fundamental ou pivotar antes de desperdiçar anos e capital.
- Articule sua posição na cadeia de valor: Defina claramente se o valor primário de sua tecnologia está na descoberta inicial (ex.: identificação de alvos) ou em estágios posteriores e mais caros de desenvolvimento (ex.: prever falhas na Fase 3). Seu modelo de negócios e estrutura de parceria devem estar alinhados com onde você captura o valor econômico mais significativo.
- Planeje seu sindicato de investidores para a jornada: Ao captar uma rodada, considere quais investidores são mais adequados para os marcos atuais (tecnologia vs. bio) e planeje ativamente como você atrairá o próximo tipo de investidor na rodada seguinte, potencialmente construindo um sindicato híbrido desde cedo.
Escalar uma startup é como ativar um foguete de segundo estágio — você conquistou o fit produto-mercado e agora enfrenta um conjunto totalmente novo de desafios que podem definir o futuro da empresa. Elad Gill, baseando-se em suas experiências no Google, Twitter e como investidor, descreve a jornada de 10 a 10 mil funcionários como uma mudança fundamental na complexidade. Enquanto startups em fase inicial se preocupam em não ficar sem dinheiro e em encontrar o fit produto-mercado, o sucesso na expansão exige o domínio de habilidades completamente novas: reformular a comunicação para uma organização distribuída, contratar executivos para funções que o fundador nunca encontrou e implementar processos leves para estratégia e alocação de recursos. O cerne da discussão gira em torno dessa transição de uma estrutura simples e plana para um organismo complexo, onde a comunicação falha, as funções se especializam e o fundador precisa aprender a delegar e gerenciar em uma escala que nunca vivenciou.
Uma parte significativa da conversa desmistifica a arte de montar uma equipe executiva, um passo crítico e arriscado. Fundadores, especialmente aqueles com formação técnica, muitas vezes não têm um modelo do que seria “excelência” em funções como CFO, VP de Vendas ou Head de Produto. O conselho não é reinventar a roda, mas buscar calibração — encontrando-se com profissionais de alto desempenho nessas áreas, mesmo que não sejam candidatos à vaga, para entender como é a excelência. Esse processo ajuda os fundadores a escrever uma descrição precisa do cargo e alinhar sua equipe de entrevistas, evitando armadilhas comuns, como contratar um “engenheiro para 500 pessoas” para gerenciar uma equipe de 20 ou aplicar filtros errados, como buscar um vendedor que saiba programar. A equipe executiva deve ser vista como um bote salva-vidas com apenas alguns assentos, reservados exclusivamente para encaixes “excepcionais”, não apenas “bons”.
O diálogo então se expande além da escalada interna para examinar o panorama mais amplo do mercado e o ambiente de financiamento. Eles discutem como os financiamentos em estágio tardio criaram um mundo onde o abundante capital privado pode sustentar empresas, com Gill estimando que cerca de metade dos unicórnios não valem verdadeiramente suas avaliações bilionárias. Isso leva a uma exploração prospectiva das principais tendências tecnológicas: a contínua evolução do mobile e da nuvem (com oportunidades em SaaS orientado por APIs), a onda atual especulativa, mas fundamental, das criptomoedas, o hardware especializado para aprendizado de máquina e a crescente ciência da biotecnologia da longevidade. Gill argumenta que a longevidade, respaldada por evidências biológicas tangíveis — desde a restrição calórica até medicamentos específicos — é uma fronteira de curto prazo com profundas implicações sociais, potencialmente redefinindo carreiras, relacionamentos e estruturas sociais.
Insights Surpreendentes
- Contrate para os próximos 18 meses, não para os próximos cinco anos: Um erro comum é contratar um executivo experiente em gerenciar 500 pessoas quando você tem uma equipe de apenas 20. Eles ficarão entediados e provavelmente fracassarão; você precisa de alguém adequado para a fase de escalada imediata à frente.
- O método de “calibração” para funções desconhecidas: Você não pode contratar para uma função que não entende. A melhor prática é se reunir com três profissionais de alto desempenho nessa função (por exemplo, CFOs) não para recrutá-los, mas para aprender como é a verdadeira excelência e quais problemas uma ótima contratação resolveria.
- Metade dos unicórnios está supervalorizada: Estima-se que 50% das empresas avaliadas privadamente em mais de US$ 1 bilhão não valem realmente esse valor, com o dia do acerto de contas adiado pelo grande volume de capital disponível em estágio tardio.
- A ciência da longevidade é baseada em biologia estabelecida: A área é frequentemente vista como ficção científica, mas está fundamentada em décadas de evidências — desde genes que prolongam a vida em vermes até medicamentos aprovados pela FDA, como a rapamicina, que prolongam a vida em camundongos — tornando-a uma oportunidade de biotecnologia tangível e de curto prazo.
- Sua função diminuirá antes de se expandir: Para funcionários antigos durante um período de hipercrescimento, seu escopo e influência se contrairão temporariamente à medida que a empresa contratar especialistas. Se eles se concentrarem em ajudar a empresa em vez de proteger seu território pessoal, suas responsabilidades se expandirão massivamente mais tarde.
Conclusões Práticas
- Para contratar executivos para funções que você não entende, primeiro “calibre-se” reunindo-se com vários profissionais de alto desempenho nessa função para aprender como é a excelência e o que você deve buscar.
- Escreva uma descrição detalhada e específica do cargo para qualquer contratação executiva chave e compartilhe-a com todos no painel de entrevistas para garantir o alinhamento sobre o que a função envolve e quais perguntas fazer.
- Ao escalar, mude conscientemente seu modo de comunicação de reuniões gerais e conversas informais para processos estruturados e replicáveis que possam funcionar em múltiplas camadas e escritórios internacionais.
- Veja sua equipe executiva como um bote salva-vidas com assentos limitados: avalie constantemente se alguém é apenas “bom” e tenha um plano para encontrar um encaixe “excepcional”, pois tolerar desempenho apenas adequado nesse nível é um grande risco na escalada.
- Para funcionários antigos em uma empresa em hipercrescimento, concentre-se em ser útil e adaptável em vez de se apegar ao seu domínio original; a empresa mudará dramaticamente a cada seis meses, criando novas oportunidades para aqueles que contribuem de forma ampla.
In this final of a 3-part series (which originally aired as YouTube videos) on working with venture investors, a16z Managing Partner Scott Kupor shares best practices for working with your board as it grows from just you, your co-founders and first investor all the way through the time when you are recruiting independent board members in preparation for going public.
Want to learn more? Read Scott’s book ”Secrets of Sand Hill Road: Venture Capital and How to Get It” (https://a16z.com/book/secrets-of-sand-hill-road/).
The views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation.
This content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments and certain publicly traded cryptocurrencies/ digital assets for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.
Charts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.
Leave a Reply
You must be logged in to post a comment.