a16z Podcast: Entrepreneurs, Then and Now

AI transcript
0:00:03 – Hi, and welcome to the A16Z podcast.
0:00:05 I’m Amelia Salyers.
0:00:07 Today’s episode is a special one,
0:00:09 since it’s the 10th anniversary of Andreessen Horowitz,
0:00:12 which was founded in late June, 2009.
0:00:14 So we decided to turn the tables
0:00:17 by asking Stuart Butterfield, founder and CEO of Slack,
0:00:20 to interview our founders, Ben Horowitz and Mark Andreessen.
0:00:22 The three of them discussed the differences
0:00:24 between founders in 2009 and today,
0:00:28 the business model of VC in A16Z’s history,
0:00:31 and technology trends then, now, and into the future.
0:00:32 And they also throw in a few good
0:00:35 summer book and TV recommendations at the end.
0:00:36 Please note that the content here
0:00:38 is for informational purposes only,
0:00:40 should not be taken as legal, business,
0:00:41 tax, or investment advice,
0:00:44 or be used to evaluate any investment or security,
0:00:45 and is not directed at any investors
0:00:48 or potential investors in any A16Z fund.
0:00:52 Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to,
0:00:53 or described in this podcast
0:00:56 are not representative of all A16Z investments,
0:00:57 and there can be no assurance
0:00:59 that the investments will be profitable,
0:01:01 or that other investments made in the future
0:01:03 will have similar characteristics or results.
0:01:05 A list of investments made by A16Z
0:01:08 is available at a16z.com/investments.
0:01:13 For more details, please see a16z.com/disclosures.
0:01:15 – One question I wanna ask is,
0:01:18 has the nature of the entrepreneurs or the founders changed?
0:01:22 So 2009, you have raised some money, you have some LPs,
0:01:24 now you’re out there looking for ways to invest.
0:01:26 Who are you meeting, where are they coming from,
0:01:27 and what are they like?
0:01:31 – Yeah, well, you know, I really feel like in retrospect,
0:01:35 that class of 2009 entrepreneurs were some of the most
0:01:38 special ones that we’ve met in the entire history
0:01:40 of the company, and when we see that again,
0:01:42 we always say like yourself,
0:01:45 Todd McKinnon, Martine, Brian Chesky.
0:01:47 You know, the thing all of you had in common
0:01:51 is you had gone through something like just unbelievable
0:01:53 to get to the position you were to start the company.
0:01:55 You know, earned your stripes.
0:01:59 Like everybody in 2009 seemed like they pay their dues,
0:02:03 like in a pretty serious way to get into position.
0:02:05 And I think, you know, one of the great things
0:02:07 that’s happened over the last 10 years
0:02:09 is it’s just become easier to start a company.
0:02:13 But as a result, you don’t have, you know,
0:02:16 people who know exactly what it is and what that means
0:02:21 and what they’re about to face, and still wanna do it,
0:02:25 which is, you know, that’s a very special thing,
0:02:26 but that’s an unusual person.
0:02:28 And then I had two categories of entrepreneurs
0:02:30 who have really risen in the last decade.
0:02:32 So one is, you know, we, Alex, our partner,
0:02:34 Alex kind of coined this term, O2O, you know,
0:02:39 kind of B2B, B2C, now O2O, and O2O is online to offline.
0:02:40 So it’s this whole broad category.
0:02:43 It’s, you know, Airbnb and Lyft and Uber
0:02:44 and many of these postmates in DoorDash and all these,
0:02:46 it’s sort of these companies that you have an online
0:02:48 experience that culminates in something happening
0:02:49 in the real world.
0:02:53 And so those founders are much more,
0:02:55 I would say, operationally focused maybe
0:02:56 than the previous generation, right?
0:02:57 Which is, it’s not just software,
0:02:59 but even beyond that, just being software, you know,
0:03:01 those companies have a big real world, you know,
0:03:04 logistical infrastructure operations component.
0:03:06 And so that has turned out to be different kind of founder,
0:03:08 which is really interesting.
0:03:09 Almost actually even a little bit of a throwback model.
0:03:12 There, those people arguably are a little bit more like
0:03:14 the semiconductor founders from like 30 years ago.
0:03:16 They’re like, they’re harder core.
0:03:17 They’re grouchier.
0:03:18 They’re dirt under the fingernails.
0:03:21 Yeah, and they have to worry about more real world stuff.
0:03:23 Yeah, stuff can go wrong, you know, people can die.
0:03:24 Like, you know, all kinds of, you know,
0:03:25 all kinds of stuff can happen.
0:03:29 So that’s been a particularly interesting kind of rise
0:03:30 of a new kind of founder, which has been super interesting
0:03:31 to work with those people.
0:03:33 And then the other on the bio side is we’ve gotten more
0:03:35 involved in bio and in healthcare.
0:03:38 The other is the rise of the deep domain expert
0:03:40 in a science like biology.
0:03:41 So somebody might come, you know,
0:03:43 biology PhD or chemistry PhD or something
0:03:45 where, you know, 10 years ago,
0:03:48 if you met a newly minted biology PhD out of Stanford or MIT,
0:03:50 they really wouldn’t know that much about computers.
0:03:51 It was kind of an afterthought
0:03:53 and they wouldn’t really know, you know,
0:03:54 they know a little bit how to code, but not much.
0:03:57 And now you meet a newly minted biology PhD out of Stanford.
0:04:00 They basically have a dual PhD in computer science.
0:04:02 Like they basically, you know, it’s kind of the story.
0:04:04 They’ve been programming since they were little kids
0:04:06 in most cases and then they kept current.
0:04:08 And in fact, a lot of the research that they did
0:04:10 to get their bio PhD often had to do with computer science
0:04:13 and math and algorithms and machine learning, right?
0:04:14 A lot of that stuff’s happening now.
0:04:17 And so you’ve got these kind of dual discipline founders
0:04:18 for the deep science stuff.
0:04:22 So dual discipline, biology CS, mechanical engineering CS,
0:04:24 physics CS, chemistry CS.
0:04:27 And that’s a real, like that those,
0:04:28 those people are like super enticing.
0:04:30 ‘Cause those are, you know, it’s like two superpowers.
0:04:32 Like, you know, he can, you know, he or she can fly
0:04:33 and they’re vulnerable.
0:04:35 Like is a really good combination.
0:04:37 And so a lot of the companies we’re seeing on the bio side
0:04:39 and in the harder sciences is that kind of founder.
0:04:40 I think that’s new.
0:04:41 – Yeah.
0:04:44 – Or like Satoshi economics and computer science.
0:04:45 – Actually, it’s funny.
0:04:46 There’s actually a revolution happening
0:04:48 even apart from crypto in the field of economics.
0:04:51 There’s a wrote in the, in the actual academic field
0:04:52 of economics, there’s a revolution happening
0:04:54 towards what’s called empirical economics,
0:04:56 quantitative economics in which a lot of the new economists
0:04:58 who are kind of 40 and below are very focused on data
0:04:59 and machine learning.
0:05:01 And, you know, the economists that are in their fifties
0:05:02 and sixties were more inspired by physics
0:05:04 and they’re, they’re much more into formulas
0:05:05 and they’re, they’re much more abstract about what happens
0:05:06 in the real world.
0:05:08 And so there are actually, there are actually,
0:05:10 there are companies increasingly driven by, started by,
0:05:12 or, you know, new invent, new inventions being created
0:05:15 by economists with a very strong CS background.
0:05:16 – That’s true. That’s true.
0:05:18 So from the beginning, I’m not sure if this was intentional
0:05:21 or not, but certainly the positioning in the press was,
0:05:24 this was different, like you’re going to blaze a new trail,
0:05:25 kind of a different model.
0:05:28 And right out of the gate, there was the investment in Skype,
0:05:30 which was not a thing that VCs normally did.
0:05:32 How, how intentional is that?
0:05:33 – Yeah, a lot of it was intentional.
0:05:35 So there, there was a big kind of throwback element
0:05:37 to what we were doing, which was basically,
0:05:38 we wanted to work with the best founders
0:05:39 to build the most important companies.
0:05:41 And there’s, we could talk a lot about kind of the history
0:05:43 of venture and the art and science of the whole thing,
0:05:45 but there is a rich tradition there
0:05:47 that we definitely drew from.
0:05:48 And we actually, we spent a lot of,
0:05:50 we, we, to get Ben and I leading up to this,
0:05:52 spent a lot of time really digging into the history
0:05:54 of kind of where all this stuff comes from
0:05:55 and kind of what made it work across various areas.
0:05:57 And so, so we were, you know, very inspired
0:05:59 by a lot of the people who came before us.
0:06:01 And then there were a bunch of new ideas.
0:06:03 And so, you know, maybe list several of the new ideas.
0:06:05 And so one of the new ideas was just that we thought
0:06:07 that a lot of the venture firms had lost their way
0:06:09 in the sense that they had been started by founders.
0:06:10 They’d been started by founders and operators
0:06:11 who had built businesses.
0:06:13 And so you would, you know, raise money from, you know,
0:06:15 a firm and you would get, you know,
0:06:17 somebody who’d been a CEO or general manager
0:06:18 of an important business on your board
0:06:20 and they could really help you figure things out.
0:06:21 And then over the years, the, a lot of the venture firms
0:06:23 just quote unquote, professionalized
0:06:24 and they ended up with a lot of GPS
0:06:25 who didn’t have that experience.
0:06:27 And so it started to get,
0:06:28 the advice started to get more abstract
0:06:30 and maybe less helpful.
0:06:31 So that was one difference.
0:06:33 Another difference was, you know, we, we took seriously
0:06:35 the, the, the idea of building the institution.
0:06:37 And then in particular around that building a network
0:06:41 and an ecosystem and making a real long-term systematic
0:06:42 and actually very costly investment in building a,
0:06:44 you know, building a network and that had to do
0:06:46 with the fundamental staffing model of the firm.
0:06:47 And then that, you know,
0:06:49 that’s why we have all these operating functions.
0:06:51 We have all these, all these, all these professionals here.
0:06:53 And then that rippled over even into things like compensation,
0:06:56 like we get paid very differently than most, than most VCs.
0:06:57 And so that was a big difference.
0:06:58 The Skype deal you alluded to,
0:07:00 we did start at the very beginning
0:07:01 with the idea of being stage agnostic.
0:07:03 And that was probably a pretty new idea at the time.
0:07:05 And the idea there basically was
0:07:07 if the priority is to work with the best founders
0:07:09 to help build the most important companies,
0:07:11 it shouldn’t matter that much what stage the company’s at.
0:07:14 I mean, ideally you’d like to start working with people early,
0:07:15 but like, you know, you make mistakes.
0:07:17 And so you miss things.
0:07:18 And we were starting from scratch.
0:07:19 And so there were a bunch of companies
0:07:20 we thought were very impressive
0:07:21 that we wanted to get involved in,
0:07:23 you know, even though they already existed.
0:07:25 And so we kind of had this idea
0:07:26 that there should be multiple entry points
0:07:27 from an investment standpoint.
0:07:28 And then there would be things
0:07:30 that we could actually do to be able to help
0:07:32 and work with the entrepreneur.
0:07:33 And so we kind of put ourselves in business
0:07:36 from the beginning to operate across all the stages.
0:07:37 You know, now that took time to get,
0:07:39 I would say it took time for us to get good at all the stages
0:07:41 and maybe we’re still, we’re still working on it.
0:07:44 But that core fundamental idea was in there.
0:07:45 – You referenced looking back at history
0:07:50 for some context and thinking about the investment theses.
0:07:52 For us, 10 years doesn’t seem like that long ago,
0:07:55 but then we hire people who have like three or four years
0:07:56 of experience, which means that they were born
0:07:59 even in college, sometimes 10 years ago.
0:08:00 – Yeah, we experienced that a lot.
0:08:02 – Increasingly frequently, yeah.
0:08:04 – But that’s interesting ’cause that was a very
0:08:08 particular moment in history that I have vivid memories
0:08:13 of the 2008 crisis that then like almost immediately
0:08:15 after that, the idea that we were in a tech bubble
0:08:17 and kind of the whiplashing back and forth.
0:08:18 What was that like?
0:08:20 – Well, you know, it was interesting when we started
0:08:23 and we had, we of course had been through
0:08:25 the actual tech bubble.
0:08:26 – The 2000.
0:08:27 – 2001 tech bubble, yeah.
0:08:31 The, you know, the 2008 crisis was a banking crisis,
0:08:33 not a tech crisis, it was a debt crisis,
0:08:34 not an equity crisis.
0:08:37 So it was very different in nature for startups.
0:08:39 So a big advantage we had was,
0:08:43 it really did not bother us at all.
0:08:46 And so walking in, one, like everybody said,
0:08:49 you can’t possibly raise a fund in 2009,
0:08:50 you can’t raise a venture capital fund.
0:08:53 So the only two new funds were raised that year,
0:08:56 us and COSLA, and because we, you know,
0:08:57 we didn’t know any better.
0:08:59 We were like, come on, like this isn’t bad.
0:09:02 This is like not bad at all.
0:09:04 And then like the, the other thing that really helped us
0:09:07 was the just grouchiness of a lot of the other VCs.
0:09:10 I remember I’ll go unnamed venture capitalists
0:09:12 ’cause I remember it so well
0:09:14 ’cause I ran back to tell Mark, you know,
0:09:15 he asked me, he’s like, well, like,
0:09:16 what are you interested in?
0:09:17 And I was telling him about OCTA
0:09:19 and how like important it was gonna be
0:09:20 in a SaaS world and so forth.
0:09:22 And he gave me like a 30 minute lecture
0:09:24 that SaaS was a bunch of BS.
0:09:26 It was never gonna happen
0:09:29 that the only successful SaaS company was Salesforce.
0:09:32 And that was ever gonna be the only SaaS company
0:09:34 was gonna be Salesforce and all this stuff.
0:09:35 And so it was just like that kind of,
0:09:38 like everybody was just like pretty grouchy
0:09:41 and like crusty and we were, you know, new.
0:09:44 So we were excited to invest in all that stuff.
0:09:47 – So thinking back to that point,
0:09:48 I don’t remember the exact year that everyone started.
0:09:51 Obviously, my company started in 2009.
0:09:54 I think Airbnb was like maybe that same year or year later.
0:09:56 Something’s happened a couple of years earlier
0:09:58 like AWS came out in 2006.
0:10:01 iPhone and nominally in 2007 or really 2008.
0:10:03 But a lot of those things hadn’t actually picked up.
0:10:05 So certainly my recollection is
0:10:08 none of that was really visible at that time.
0:10:09 But we were at this, in retrospect,
0:10:11 was an incredible inflection point.
0:10:13 To what degree do you think that worked to your advantage?
0:10:14 ‘Cause you hear you are starting to fund,
0:10:16 people are skeptical.
0:10:18 But meanwhile there’s these massive secular trends
0:10:21 which were pretty much invisible to everyone at that time.
0:10:22 – I think the two things that are true.
0:10:24 So one is the big secular trends do drive
0:10:25 a lot of what happens in this industry.
0:10:27 And so like it is absolutely the case in the last decade
0:10:29 that mobile and cloud in particular
0:10:31 like drove just giant growth and social as well.
0:10:35 So they made a lot of people look like geniuses,
0:10:36 including a few actual geniuses.
0:10:37 So that’s also true.
0:10:39 But I think it’s also true what Ben mentioned
0:10:40 is like super important underline,
0:10:42 which is like people don’t think these things
0:10:43 are obvious in the beginning.
0:10:45 Like they’re only obvious after the fact.
0:10:46 They really don’t look that obvious in the beginning.
0:10:48 And so you like you mentioned the iPhone came out.
0:10:50 Like I remember the iPhone in 2009,
0:10:51 it was like a cool gadget,
0:10:53 but like it couldn’t hold a phone call.
0:10:55 Like that was the era in which like it wasn’t even,
0:10:57 was it on 3G at that point?
0:10:59 It was like a big- – No it wasn’t, it was pre-3G.
0:11:01 – The original iPhone was actually pre-3G, right?
0:11:02 It had like edge data connection
0:11:04 and then the 3G iPhone was a big upgrade,
0:11:05 but then you couldn’t hold a phone call on the thing.
0:11:07 And that was in the era when Steve was telling people
0:11:08 that you were holding the phone wrong.
0:11:10 – Yeah. – If it was dropping
0:11:11 phone calls, you need that.
0:11:12 – And they built that crazy room
0:11:14 to prove it to the journalists.
0:11:16 – Exactly, and then they shipped everybody the bumper, right?
0:11:19 And so it’s like, okay, to squint from that to like,
0:11:20 okay, now it’s the mobile boom of all time
0:11:22 and we’re gonna be sitting here 10 years later
0:11:23 and they’re gonna have, you know, whatever it is now,
0:11:25 a billion and a half of these things, you know,
0:11:26 in the field and it’s gonna be kind of the defining,
0:11:28 you know, device and interface for a generation.
0:11:30 Like that wasn’t super obvious.
0:11:32 And then cloud, you know, cloud, I just, you know,
0:11:36 there were lots and lots and lots of companies of that era
0:11:37 that were incredibly powerful,
0:11:40 that were in the server business or networking business
0:11:41 or storage business or software business
0:11:44 where this whole cloud thing like AWS, like it’s a toy,
0:11:46 it’s a gimmick, like it’s never gonna make any money.
0:11:47 It is really interesting.
0:11:49 There is a big leap that has to happen
0:11:51 even when they are the really big megatrends.
0:11:54 Like it’s not, I had this in the early, the internet,
0:11:56 like a lot of people in the early 90s,
0:11:57 a lot of people in the press,
0:11:58 a lot of people in the investment community,
0:11:59 a lot of entrepreneurs.
0:12:01 – Well, the entire, actually you should tell the story
0:12:02 about like when you went to raise money,
0:12:04 you and Jim went to raise money
0:12:06 from all the magazines and the newspapers.
0:12:08 – Yeah, so we started in Escaping early ’94
0:12:10 and we went out and pitched all the media companies
0:12:11 to become customers, partners, investors
0:12:13 and every single big media company.
0:12:14 And in fact, at that point, they said,
0:12:16 no, no, the future is AOL
0:12:18 because AOL pays us for our content.
0:12:20 And on the internet, we have to spend money
0:12:20 to put our per content.
0:12:21 So that’s never gonna work.
0:12:22 And of course they all knew
0:12:24 that normal people wouldn’t use the internet
0:12:25 if it didn’t have Time Magazine on it.
0:12:26 Right, ’cause Time Magazine
0:12:28 would obviously be the killer for the internet.
0:12:29 You know, and by the way, it’s like,
0:12:31 a friend of mine says that this thing is happening.
0:12:32 It’s going to fundamentally change the world
0:12:33 and people poo poo it.
0:12:35 Like that might actually be the logical response
0:12:37 because there are many new things to come along
0:12:39 where people claim it’s going to change the world.
0:12:41 And then most of those things don’t change the world.
0:12:43 And so maybe, you know, on average,
0:12:46 the correct response is no, this thing is stupid.
0:12:48 And then maybe our lot in life as founders and VCs
0:12:50 is to, you know, be the fringe element
0:12:52 that like, that bucks that.
0:12:53 – Who’s wrong 97% of the time.
0:12:54 – Right, right, exactly.
0:12:55 And by the way, you know,
0:12:56 we looked dumb a lot of the time except, you know,
0:12:59 during the times we looked, you know, really, really smart.
0:13:01 And you know, and the reality is we’re probably neither, right?
0:13:02 We’re probably neither super dumb or super smart.
0:13:04 We’re probably just willing to take the risk
0:13:05 at a time when other people aren’t.
0:13:07 – So let’s fast forward a couple of years,
0:13:10 kind of like the middle era, 2012, Facebook went public.
0:13:12 But I think that, I don’t remember what year that happened,
0:13:14 but we started talking about unicorns
0:13:16 and there was another round of this is a bubble.
0:13:17 What was that like?
0:13:20 And what do you remember about the investment?
0:13:21 Like basically the partner meetings
0:13:24 after I would leave the room
0:13:26 and the debate was happening.
0:13:29 How much did, is this too expensive factor
0:13:30 into the conversations?
0:13:33 – Yeah, you know, we have in the entire time.
0:13:35 And I can say we’re totally consistent on this.
0:13:37 And I think it’s because of our history,
0:13:41 never thought it was a bubble in our entire time
0:13:42 doing the job.
0:13:44 And I think a lot of it has to look,
0:13:48 prices of companies are always incorrect,
0:13:49 like always, always, always incorrect
0:13:52 because they’re valued on like future performance,
0:13:53 which nobody knows what that is.
0:13:55 So most people are optimistic,
0:13:56 the prices go a little higher.
0:13:58 Most people are pessimistic.
0:14:00 At that time, the prices go a little lower.
0:14:01 But to get to a bubble,
0:14:03 everybody’s got to be optimistic.
0:14:07 And that’s what happened kind of in the 99, 2000 era.
0:14:08 And like in our whole time,
0:14:10 we never signed anything close to that.
0:14:13 Like they never went anywhere,
0:14:15 anywhere like within an order of magnitude
0:14:18 to what it did in 99, 2000
0:14:20 for similar kinds of companies.
0:14:22 And so we were always, no, there’s no bubble.
0:14:23 Like, what are you talking about?
0:14:24 There’s no bubble.
0:14:27 But people want to believe there’s a bubble so badly.
0:14:30 I think 2011, I was in a debate
0:14:32 with Steve Blank and the economist,
0:14:34 and I argued it wasn’t a bubble.
0:14:38 And he argued it was in 2011 tech bubble, right?
0:14:41 And at the end of the debate, he called me
0:14:44 and he said, Ben, like, I voted for you.
0:14:45 You won.
0:14:49 The economist readers voted 78%, 22% for him.
0:14:51 ‘Cause like that’s how much people wanted to believe
0:14:52 we were in a bubble.
0:14:53 – That still do.
0:14:55 – Yeah, there’s a, I’m not sure if it’s quite
0:14:58 a cognitive bias, but I feel like there is a predisposition
0:15:00 that a lot of people have to take the cynical bet.
0:15:03 So how that seems smarter, ’cause either way,
0:15:04 there’s a payoff.
0:15:06 And the payoff, if you said that’s bullshit,
0:15:08 and then it turns out you are right,
0:15:11 seems greater to people than the opposite.
0:15:11 And also there’s a little bit
0:15:13 that you can’t prove a negative,
0:15:16 popper, the valid hypotheses and stuff like that.
0:15:19 – Plus you get the victory as the most smug person
0:15:20 in the room too.
0:15:23 – Yeah, so you’re generally betting against the cynicism
0:15:24 in your business.
0:15:26 Is that like something you can actually take advantage of?
0:15:27 Or is that something that works in your favor,
0:15:29 that cynicism?
0:15:30 – Oh, 100%.
0:15:33 In fact, like we have this thing that our friend came up
0:15:35 with, which is the East Coast, West Coast arbitrage,
0:15:38 which is anything that the people in the East Coast
0:15:41 think is ridiculous in a toy and people in the West Coast
0:15:44 think is the next big thing, that’s the thing to bet.
0:15:46 – And we said, you just keep flying back and forth.
0:15:48 – Yeah, and you find out what those things are,
0:15:50 and then you just invest all your money in that.
0:15:53 – That really suggests a question for today.
0:15:56 There are some big things happening today
0:15:57 that aren’t obvious.
0:16:00 What kind of energy do you put in to find that?
0:16:02 Are there like specialist researchers?
0:16:06 Is it just every partner’s kind of contribution?
0:16:07 How much time do you spend looking
0:16:09 for what isn’t obvious today,
0:16:11 but will be obvious in retrospect?
0:16:14 – Yeah, I think that ends up being like half the job
0:16:18 is trying to understand like,
0:16:21 what is the next big platform?
0:16:22 Where are things going?
0:16:25 What’s going to be the user interaction model
0:16:27 after the iPhone?
0:16:29 That’s a big open question right now.
0:16:31 Like what’s the next platform?
0:16:33 What is AI really going to mean?
0:16:37 Is this whole crypto thing real?
0:16:41 These are all like VR and AR, like at what point?
0:16:42 It’s hard to imagine.
0:16:44 20 years from now, it’s not working.
0:16:47 So like how many years from now will that take?
0:16:51 – Yeah, and these are the kind of fundamental questions
0:16:54 always in the venture capital business, I think.
0:16:56 – And you might add genomics, you might add CRISPR,
0:16:58 you might add synthetic biology.
0:16:59 – Absolutely.
0:17:00 – It’s three of the big new frontiers
0:17:01 on the biological front.
0:17:02 They all have that characteristic.
0:17:04 – CRISPR seems like one to me
0:17:06 that is going to have really dramatic impact.
0:17:09 Obviously there’s big moral debate to be had
0:17:11 and policy debate to be had.
0:17:13 How do you take something like that
0:17:15 and try to look for the opportunities?
0:17:17 – Yeah, so the big thing is we default into thinking,
0:17:18 okay, this is going to happen.
0:17:21 We don’t spend a lot of time on, okay, will this happen?
0:17:23 Like is this going to be a thing?
0:17:25 We try, in fact, I tried one of my things,
0:17:26 I tried it at the firm, it started very hard
0:17:28 to actually kind of prevent us from having the discussion
0:17:29 of like, okay, is this going to happen?
0:17:30 It’s more a question of like, okay,
0:17:32 let’s assume it does happen, right?
0:17:34 And so then there’s kind of two really critical questions
0:17:35 that follow from that, which is like, okay,
0:17:37 if it does happen, then where does it go?
0:17:39 And so the financial version of that question
0:17:41 is kind of how, we call how high is up,
0:17:43 which is like, okay, how big could it get, right?
0:17:45 Which is sort of a very interesting question
0:17:46 for venture capitalists, because it’s like,
0:17:47 if you make an investment in something,
0:17:49 even if it happens, it turns out to be small,
0:17:50 then it’s still not worthwhile.
0:17:51 And so you’re looking for the things
0:17:52 that could get really, really big.
0:17:53 And then you’re obviously looking for,
0:17:55 you know, you’re then looking for the founders
0:17:56 and looking for the specific ideas
0:17:57 and applications that you spend a lot of time on that.
0:17:59 The other thing you think a lot
0:18:00 about in this business is timing.
0:18:02 And so like my observation is basically,
0:18:04 basically everything happens,
0:18:05 like my entire history in this industry,
0:18:07 and at least for 25 years is basically everything
0:18:09 that people said was going to happen happened at some point,
0:18:11 up to an including online pet food delivery,
0:18:13 like it all actually happens.
0:18:15 – All the things they made jokes about
0:18:19 in all the early 2000s movies are all actually.
0:18:19 – They’re all actually happening,
0:18:21 but it’s like, okay, when is it going to happen?
0:18:23 And like, is it ready now?
0:18:24 You know, is it going to be on this cycle?
0:18:25 And then how do you bet this?
0:18:28 Like sometimes these things take three, four, five cycles,
0:18:30 right, for the founders to really figure things out
0:18:32 for the technology to kind of fall into place.
0:18:33 So it’s kind of like, what are the exploratory bets?
0:18:36 How are you kind of vetting whether the stuff is real?
0:18:37 And then there’s this kind of multi-dimensional question
0:18:39 of like, you know, kind of to your point,
0:18:40 there’s this multi-dimensional question of like,
0:18:42 okay, is the technology ready?
0:18:44 And then you got to kind of cross that with like,
0:18:45 do you think the market’s ready?
0:18:47 Like, do you think people are going to want this?
0:18:48 And then you might have to cross like,
0:18:49 in CRISPR, you might have to cross other issues
0:18:51 like regulatory issues,
0:18:52 like are the regulators going to buy into this?
0:18:55 And so, and that’s where I think you have to kind of explore
0:18:56 as you go, right?
0:18:58 Which is you have to kind of feel your way through it.
0:19:00 Like it’s often not the first company in a category
0:19:01 that ends up being the winner, right?
0:19:03 Well, this is a Peter Thielism that we quote a lot.
0:19:05 It’s not the first company that gets all the money.
0:19:06 It’s the last company in the market
0:19:07 that gets all the money, right?
0:19:08 In other words, it’s the company
0:19:09 that actually takes the market, right?
0:19:11 It ends up actually being the dominant company
0:19:13 and forecloses the opportunity for there
0:19:14 to be new startups behind it.
0:19:17 And so sometimes that’s a pioneer, sometimes it’s not.
0:19:19 And so you’re kind of having this constant discussion
0:19:21 about timing.
0:19:23 And then, at the end of all that,
0:19:25 we kind of try to park that to a certain extent
0:19:26 and just start talking to entrepreneurs
0:19:28 and figure out who is the person
0:19:30 who’s got this the most decoded,
0:19:32 how much time and effort has that person put into it?
0:19:34 How qualified are they to pursue this?
0:19:35 What’s their personality?
0:19:36 And can they build a company around it?
0:19:39 Yeah, that’s what I was gonna actually go right there
0:19:42 because knowing you, as I do, I can’t imagine it’s ever,
0:19:44 we have a thesis that this thing is going to work out,
0:19:46 now we’re going to look for the entrepreneurs
0:19:47 who are doing this thing.
0:19:50 It’s much more gonna be the confluence of who you’re meeting,
0:19:53 who you get to talk to, what people are up to,
0:19:56 and these background theses that give you the opportunities.
0:19:57 Yeah, that’s right.
0:19:58 Yeah, I think that’s right.
0:20:00 And actually, I mean, I think for a while,
0:20:04 it was always like started with the entrepreneur
0:20:06 in the early days of it, just ’cause they were allowing
0:20:08 the two of us and we couldn’t cover all the spaces
0:20:10 and enough depth to do it any other way.
0:20:14 But the other thing kind of related to that
0:20:18 is the platforms that kind of we think
0:20:19 are getting proximate from a timing standpoint
0:20:22 are the ones where like the smartest entrepreneurs
0:20:24 are all working.
0:20:27 So if we see 20 genius entrepreneurs all working on crypto,
0:20:30 that makes us pay attention, for example.
0:20:30 Right.
0:20:33 So Mark, you’ve talked about five-year cycles in tech.
0:20:36 Is that something that you think is a good way
0:20:40 to imagine what’s going on or to picture it in context?
0:20:42 So I would say there’s two big sites.
0:20:43 It’s hard to, you know, the stuff is just,
0:20:44 these are just general frameworks.
0:20:46 And so they vary a lot in practice,
0:20:47 but they’re two big general concepts.
0:20:51 And so like I would say, one is the big technology changes,
0:20:52 like the ones we’ve been talking about,
0:20:54 like they’re generational changes,
0:20:54 like they’re quite literally,
0:20:56 they’re human generational changes.
0:20:59 So it’s like the typical cycle in those is like 25 years.
0:21:02 And the reason literally is because a lot of the time,
0:21:04 you just, the people who are in positions of power
0:21:06 and decision and influence when the new thing comes out,
0:21:08 they just will not accept it.
0:21:10 They won’t accept it, they won’t adapt to it.
0:21:11 They won’t recalibrate to it.
0:21:15 And fundamentally they need to age out of the cohort
0:21:16 that has the power, right?
0:21:18 Purchasing authority and all the decision-making authority
0:21:19 and all these other things.
0:21:21 And so they, and then you need a new generation
0:21:22 that like takes the stuff seriously
0:21:23 ’cause they grew up with it, right?
0:21:25 And you need them to age into the cohort, right?
0:21:27 So it’s like, it’s literally a generational turnover.
0:21:29 And so you see these, and that’s why you get these things.
0:21:31 You’ll see these, you know, some of these new things
0:21:32 that’ll grow for 25 years.
0:21:33 And I’m convinced like a big part of it
0:21:35 is just simply that generational effect.
0:21:37 So that’s the good news is like when they work,
0:21:39 you can have literally decades of growth
0:21:43 off of enormous skepticism from day one.
0:21:46 You know, the bad news is, as you’re well aware as a founder,
0:21:48 no individual company gets 25 years, right?
0:21:49 To prove something, right?
0:21:50 (laughing)
0:21:53 Nope, in fact, something well short of that, let’s say.
0:21:57 And so like our basic mental model is a company on average
0:21:59 gets maybe five years to prove something,
0:22:00 to prove the hypothesis.
0:22:01 Like, and you can kind of like,
0:22:03 if you’re a top end founder and you’re super credible,
0:22:04 you could probably raise the seed around,
0:22:06 you know, series A, series B,
0:22:07 you can get yourself five years of runway,
0:22:09 you can get engineers to some product people
0:22:11 to sign up for that and you can prove it or not.
0:22:12 But after five years, if it’s not working,
0:22:14 like you start to have a problem and,
0:22:16 or I should say you have two problems.
0:22:18 One is you start to have a morale issue
0:22:19 where people start to lose faith
0:22:21 and they spin off and go to other things.
0:22:23 You can also end up with an architecture issue, right?
0:22:25 Which is like, even if you’re right,
0:22:26 even if it starts to happen,
0:22:28 you’re built on the prior architecture, right?
0:22:30 And so, you know, imagine being a mobile developer
0:22:33 that started in, you know, 2002, right?
0:22:36 And even if they were still around when the iPhone came out,
0:22:37 you know, they’d built their entire, you know,
0:22:38 system on brew and, you know, Java
0:22:40 and all these technologies that were now archaic.
0:22:42 And so, so you kind of have this,
0:22:45 this kind of aging in place thing that happens.
0:22:47 And so each company kind of has a five year shot.
0:22:48 So then what happens is-
0:22:49 – There are exceptions.
0:22:50 – Yes, there are particular founders
0:22:51 who can, who can, who can get through this,
0:22:53 but it does tend to be the exception.
0:22:55 And so, but, but then you think about it,
0:22:56 then there’s sort of the psychological thing
0:22:57 that happens as a consequence,
0:22:59 which is if the founder starts the company
0:23:00 in the first cycle, runs for five years
0:23:02 and it doesn’t prove the hypothesis,
0:23:03 that founder usually ends up,
0:23:06 so bitter about the whole experience
0:23:07 that they become cynical about that category
0:23:09 for the rest of their lives, right?
0:23:11 And then, and then somebody else in sort of, you know,
0:23:13 cycle to generation two, three, four does figure it out.
0:23:15 And like, you know, that, by the way,
0:23:17 I’m speaking out of also myself out of experience,
0:23:18 like talk about upset,
0:23:19 the fact that you couldn’t get it to work
0:23:22 in this other person did, it’s just like absolutely maddening.
0:23:23 And that’s just human nature.
0:23:25 The part of it that really bites the VCs
0:23:27 is the VCs do that too.
0:23:29 If you as a VC make a bet and go on a board
0:23:31 and you’re in the board meetings for five years
0:23:32 and it doesn’t work and the company shuts down
0:23:36 and then a new kid shows up, you know, three weeks later
0:23:38 and says, hey, I’ve got an idea.
0:23:40 Why don’t we do that, right?
0:23:41 And of course, what really makes you frustrated as a VC
0:23:43 is that kid half the time isn’t even aware
0:23:44 of the previous failed experiments
0:23:47 ’cause like they literally weren’t paying attention, right?
0:23:49 And so what happens is actually the VCs will free,
0:23:52 it’s actually, the VCs will actually freeze themselves out.
0:23:54 And so, and it’ll be VCs who are much more naive
0:23:56 and much less aware of the previous failures
0:23:57 that will actually make the bet.
0:23:59 And so that puts you in this very weird spot.
0:24:00 If you think about being a VC
0:24:01 or running a venture capital firm,
0:24:03 which is you would like to say that the person
0:24:04 who knows the most about the domain
0:24:06 is the person who should make the investment decision.
0:24:07 But it may also be the case,
0:24:09 the person who knows the most about the domain
0:24:10 has the most scar tissue
0:24:11 and has the most followed up psychology.
0:24:14 And so a big part, exactly to your comment,
0:24:16 like a big part of this job, just like being a founder,
0:24:18 is like you have to suppress your natural instincts
0:24:20 to get bitter and resentful and envious and upset.
0:24:22 And it goes to even a more fundamental question is,
0:24:24 like, can you learn lessons, right?
0:24:26 Like what do you learn, like in this business,
0:24:27 what do you learn from a failure?
0:24:29 And maybe the answer is you should learn a lot
0:24:31 from a failure ’cause like it’s those are all hard-won lessons
0:24:33 and maybe the answer is you should learn absolutely nothing.
0:24:35 Maybe all the lessons are wrong, so.
0:24:37 – Yes, it is a lesson to just, that didn’t work.
0:24:38 – Yeah.
0:24:41 – That’s something that I spent a lot of time trying to,
0:24:44 to convince people on the team of that,
0:24:46 it’s the right brothers or Thomas Edison.
0:24:49 It’s just every day, what’s the best idea we got?
0:24:50 That didn’t work.
0:24:51 All right, what’s the next best idea we got?
0:24:55 And the characterization of celebrating failure
0:24:58 sometimes misleads people to characterize that as a failure.
0:24:59 ‘Cause if this plane didn’t fly
0:25:00 or this light bulb didn’t light up
0:25:02 or it blew up or whatever, is that a failure?
0:25:04 Or is that just the process of getting to the light bulb
0:25:06 that works, that they are playing that flies?
0:25:09 – Yeah, Edison tried 3000 compounds, I think,
0:25:10 for the light bulb.
0:25:11 – Yeah.
0:25:11 – Before he figured out the filament.
0:25:15 – That is a level of persistence I would like to hire.
0:25:18 So Mark, you just mentioned a little bit of like control
0:25:20 over your own emotions or your reactions, the cynicism.
0:25:22 Ben, that’s something that you talked a lot about
0:25:23 in the hard thing about hard things,
0:25:24 just like the power to overcome.
0:25:26 To what, I mean, obviously you’ve seen a lot of this,
0:25:29 you’ve experienced it yourself, to what degree
0:25:32 do you think you’ve been helpful and let me just say,
0:25:34 you have been helpful to me personally
0:25:36 in helping entrepreneurs through some of that.
0:25:38 Whether it’s the overwhelming emotional reaction
0:25:40 to a bunch of good stuff happening
0:25:42 or a bunch of bad stuff happening.
0:25:44 – Yeah, so I think, I mean, that’s probably
0:25:47 that the number one kind of consistent thing
0:25:49 that I get back on that book is like,
0:25:52 you know, what I’m feeling is so intense
0:25:55 and there’s nobody to talk to about it.
0:25:58 And then the book kind of goes like,
0:26:01 this is what it feels like, this is what it looks like.
0:26:05 And I think that just knowing that you’re not
0:26:07 the stupidest entrepreneur of all times
0:26:10 is like really valuable.
0:26:11 And it’s something that I always wish that I had.
0:26:13 It’s a lot of the reason I wrote the book
0:26:17 ’cause I used to go around, you know, and I, you know,
0:26:21 and I was like in the kind of horrible period of 2001
0:26:24 and I would talk to other founders and I’d be like,
0:26:25 you know, how’s it going?
0:26:27 And they’d be like, it’s amazing.
0:26:30 I can’t, this is the greatest experience of my life.
0:26:32 And I’d just be like, wow, I am like
0:26:34 the stupidest motherfucker of all times.
0:26:37 Like, ’cause my business is in horrible trouble.
0:26:38 And it just seems so bad.
0:26:40 But then like, you know, as because I’ve lived long enough
0:26:43 to see like most of those guys went bankrupt.
0:26:44 So they were all going through it.
0:26:45 I was going through.
0:26:46 They just like nobody would tell each other
0:26:48 ’cause it’s so embarrassing.
0:26:50 So it was, you know, one of those, those kinds of things.
0:26:53 But it’s been, you know, it’s been great help to me
0:26:57 in the work because when I sit down with an entrepreneur,
0:27:00 they go, okay, yeah, I know, you know what I’m talking about.
0:27:03 So we can talk about the real like horrible shit
0:27:06 and not just, you know, the happy stuff.
0:27:08 – I feel like there’s an obligatory question here
0:27:10 to talk about the things that you guys tried
0:27:12 that didn’t work and the failures.
0:27:14 But before we get there, just on the way,
0:27:15 there’s a bunch of things that obviously did work.
0:27:20 So building up a bunch of capabilities in the firm
0:27:21 and in the partnership with something
0:27:23 that is now pretty widely emulated,
0:27:26 like having those services that the companies can call on,
0:27:28 being a little bit more stage agnostic
0:27:32 and even like industry technology vertical agnostic
0:27:35 has been something that’s worked out really well.
0:27:38 When you look back before we get to the failure question,
0:27:40 what do you think the best decisions you made are
0:27:42 in the way that you set up the firm?
0:27:44 – Yeah, so it’s a great question.
0:27:49 I think, you know, at the core, I think just this belief
0:27:54 that a venture capital firm has got to be able
0:27:57 to help the technical founder grow into a CEO.
0:28:00 It’s just so, you know, in retrospect,
0:28:02 that turned out to be profound
0:28:04 and just differentiating and important.
0:28:06 And it really is the work.
0:28:08 So when we think about what do we do
0:28:11 and why are we here, that’s it.
0:28:13 And then kind of backing that up,
0:28:15 the thing that helped us the most
0:28:19 is just taking what Michael Ovitz had done at CAA.
0:28:22 And that jump started us, I mean,
0:28:24 we probably saved five years by copying his model.
0:28:27 So that, and I can’t even believe how well it worked,
0:28:29 like every aspect of it worked.
0:28:32 So, you know, those are probably the two things.
0:28:34 – What was it from Michael Ovitz that you were copying?
0:28:35 – He has censor it in the book.
0:28:36 And so there’s a great book.
0:28:38 – Yeah, he finally revealed some of it.
0:28:40 – Some of it’s in the book, not all of it’s in the book,
0:28:42 but it’s the book is called “Who is Michael Ovitz?”
0:28:45 And it’s a highly entertaining book and we recommend it.
0:28:46 I mean, it’s actually really funny.
0:28:48 He kind of sat down and described the whole thing.
0:28:50 And it basically was this idea of, you know,
0:28:51 we’re not just going to be a collection of individuals.
0:28:53 We’re going to be an actual true team.
0:28:55 And then it’s not just going to be the principles.
0:28:57 It’s going to be an entire system, right?
0:28:58 It’s going to be an entire operating platform,
0:28:59 an entire infrastructure.
0:29:00 It’s going to be professionals
0:29:02 across all these different domains.
0:29:04 And, you know, we’re going to build this
0:29:06 enduring long run network that’s going to, you know,
0:29:08 it’s just going to constantly compound year after year
0:29:09 and build more and more value.
0:29:11 And then the next client comes longer,
0:29:12 the next, you know, founder comes along
0:29:14 and they can plug into this entire system, you know,
0:29:15 that’s been built, you know,
0:29:17 and we’ve been building the system now for a decade.
0:29:19 And so, you know, a new founder who works for this today,
0:29:21 like they’re walking into a, basically a system
0:29:22 that’s been built for a decade.
0:29:23 So then he said, basically what happens is
0:29:24 then it’s compounding advantage,
0:29:25 which is every year that goes by,
0:29:27 you just get more and more differentiation
0:29:28 off of the status quo.
0:29:30 He was competing at the time with William Morris,
0:29:31 which was this huge talent agency.
0:29:33 And it’s like, well, why wouldn’t they just copy you?
0:29:34 And he’s like, well, they’d have to vote themselves
0:29:36 big salary cuts, right?
0:29:38 Like they’re paying themselves all the money right now, right?
0:29:40 And so they had to go hire, you know,
0:29:41 100 people to go do the stuff that we’re doing.
0:29:42 They’d have to like,
0:29:43 they’d have to free up that money from something.
0:29:45 So they’d have to vote themselves giant salary cuts.
0:29:47 And he’s like, they don’t like each other.
0:29:48 Like they don’t get along to start with.
0:29:50 And so imagine getting into the room.
0:29:50 And they’ve all got like, you know,
0:29:52 they’re like very successful people.
0:29:53 They’ve all got very high personal burn rates, right?
0:29:54 They’ve got all kinds of hobbies, you know,
0:29:56 they’ve got vineyards and yachts and all this stuff.
0:29:59 And so, you know, they’re going to now decide
0:30:01 to give themselves an 80% pay cut, right?
0:30:03 To compete with the startup, like no chance.
0:30:05 And so anyway, that was his explanation.
0:30:07 – Yeah, that’s been a long lasting advantage.
0:30:08 I think so.
0:30:10 – Yeah, but yeah, that continues.
0:30:11 As it actually turns out,
0:30:13 that didn’t just happen in the talent agency business.
0:30:16 What I discovered doing more research after that was that,
0:30:18 it was also exactly what happened for law firms.
0:30:20 It’s exactly what happened management consulting firms.
0:30:22 It’s what happened to ad agencies, accounting firms.
0:30:23 And then also investment banks,
0:30:25 private equity firms, hedge funds.
0:30:26 All these other industries have gone
0:30:27 through this transformation.
0:30:30 They basically professionalized and upleveled.
0:30:31 And it just happens that the venture industry
0:30:33 is doing that now.
0:30:34 And in fact, I think at this stage,
0:30:36 like it’s beyond just us.
0:30:36 – There’s something else there
0:30:38 that I actually hadn’t really realized,
0:30:40 but maybe it was implicit the whole time,
0:30:43 is CA’s investment was to make the people
0:30:44 that are representing more successful.
0:30:47 Smart idea, given that you got points
0:30:49 on their success is a little bit of the same thing.
0:30:51 ‘Cause you can make an investment decision
0:30:54 that it’s just like I’m gonna buy some copper futures
0:30:56 or oil or something like that.
0:30:59 And I can’t do anything about to make oil more valuable
0:31:01 for people or copper more valuable.
0:31:02 I invest in the startup
0:31:03 and there’s a ton of stuff I can do.
0:31:05 I have my connections and I know that personally
0:31:08 I benefited from being able to call on both of you
0:31:11 from John O’Farrell who joined our board,
0:31:14 from Margaret, from Jeff Stump on recruiting,
0:31:16 from the whole team running the EBCs.
0:31:18 There’s more than I can mention here.
0:31:20 And I think that has,
0:31:24 I don’t know what the ROI for you is on that,
0:31:26 on top of the dollars that you put in,
0:31:29 but I would say it’s probably 70% of the value to us
0:31:31 and 70% of the value created came
0:31:33 from that additional support beyond just the money.
0:31:36 – Yeah, and there’s also this little knock-on effect
0:31:37 which you appreciate, I’m sure,
0:31:42 which is part of the trouble with an inventor becoming a CEO
0:31:46 is you just don’t feel like a CEO.
0:31:48 You don’t know the people who CEOs know,
0:31:50 you don’t know how to do the things CEOs know how to do.
0:31:54 And so a lot of what you get out of the firm is,
0:31:55 no, I’m a CEO.
0:31:57 Like if I need to know how to do it, I’ll call Margaret.
0:32:00 Like, you know, I can do that, I can step up.
0:32:03 And so like that’s a lot of what it conveys
0:32:06 at the end of the day is just like that confidence
0:32:08 which is often that little difference
0:32:10 between being able to stay in the job
0:32:13 and having to raise your hand and tap out.
0:32:15 – All right, so I promised that I was gonna ask
0:32:20 about any dumb decisions, mistakes, failures along the way.
0:32:21 What do you got?
0:32:22 – We haven’t made any.
0:32:24 I don’t really know why you would even ask that question.
0:32:26 There’s obviously nothing to talk about.
0:32:29 So we have a very specific philosophy on that
0:32:30 and the book I’d really recommend.
0:32:32 We were lucky enough to have her in the podcast a while ago.
0:32:34 So Annie Duke wrote a book called “Thinking in Bets”
0:32:36 where she talks about basically what is the nature
0:32:39 of a mistake in a probabilistic domain,
0:32:41 you know, with uncertainty of outcome.
0:32:44 And she uses the term in the book “resulting.”
0:32:46 It’s basically the process of looking at a bet
0:32:48 that was made in a probabilistic domain
0:32:49 that did not pan out.
0:32:51 And then concluding that that was a mistake
0:32:53 as compared to a bet that didn’t pan out.
0:32:54 And so basically what she says in the book,
0:32:57 she says the book is basically resulting
0:32:59 is the root of all evil if you’re in a probabilistic business
0:33:00 ’cause you will learn the wrong lessons
0:33:03 and you’ll torture yourself mentally to death by doing that.
0:33:06 And so she says the thing to do is basically
0:33:08 to very clearly separate in your own mind process
0:33:09 and outcome, right?
0:33:11 So you’re in a probabilistic domain,
0:33:11 you don’t know the outcome
0:33:13 of any particular bet ahead of time.
0:33:15 And so you need to design the best possible process
0:33:18 to generate the best possible set of outcomes over time.
0:33:21 And then basically when things go quote unquote wrong,
0:33:23 you don’t second guess the outcome.
0:33:24 You go back and you just make sure the process
0:33:26 was as good as it could have been.
0:33:28 And so, you know, from the outside,
0:33:30 the mistakes of venture firm makes are always like,
0:33:31 well, what’s the investment that you didn’t make
0:33:33 that worked or the investment that you made
0:33:34 that didn’t work inside the firm?
0:33:35 What we try to do is say, okay,
0:33:37 what have we done well in our process
0:33:39 and how can we improve our process?
0:33:41 You know, that’s a much more boring topic to talk about
0:33:42 ’cause it has to do with things like meeting structure
0:33:44 and memo documents and, you know, research
0:33:46 and due diligence and all these topics.
0:33:49 But that is the actual answer to the question, which is,
0:33:51 you know, when we started with a, as Ben said,
0:33:53 we started with a relatively lightweight process
0:33:54 on investments because it was just Ben and me
0:33:57 and then over the time we’ve evolved
0:34:00 to a much more rigorous process.
0:34:01 Today we do a lot more work on the investments
0:34:03 than we used to.
0:34:05 And then the other side of that is to try to keep all that
0:34:06 work from preventing us from making
0:34:07 the controversial investments.
0:34:08 – Getting people to that position.
0:34:11 And I wish I could remember who gave me this analogy,
0:34:14 but if you got super drunk and then you drove home
0:34:16 and you didn’t have a crash,
0:34:18 it’s not that that was a good decision.
0:34:18 The result was good.
0:34:21 And we really, it’s a tough thing to build structures
0:34:23 inside the company to celebrate.
0:34:26 That was a great idea to change the homepage
0:34:28 so that whatever, and it turned out that it was wrong,
0:34:30 but you still got a bonus.
0:34:32 You get a bonus, you get a promotion,
0:34:35 you get recognition, even though it didn’t have the result
0:34:37 ’cause people do get super result fixated.
0:34:40 – Yeah, Bisa says real good thing where he says,
0:34:42 “We rate people on the inputs, not the outputs.”
0:34:45 – One of the last questions I wanted to get to
0:34:47 is the nature of the entrepreneurs.
0:34:48 Now it’s been long enough.
0:34:51 You’ve seen some two-time, three-time entrepreneurs
0:34:53 and you’ve backed some of them.
0:34:55 What kind of difference do you see between that,
0:34:56 the first time and the second time?
0:34:59 – So for top-end venture, basically the rule is
0:35:00 if you’re a first-time fund,
0:35:01 to get funded by a top-end venture firm
0:35:03 as a first-time founder, you have to have something working.
0:35:04 You have to have a product.
0:35:06 You have to have some of a product market fit.
0:35:08 Google.com already existed.
0:35:09 Facebook already existed.
0:35:11 Airbnb already existed when they raised money.
0:35:13 So that’s the general pattern.
0:35:15 And then the question of the first-time founders is,
0:35:16 do they know what they’re doing, right?
0:35:19 Can they then do the job of being a founder CEO
0:35:22 of a scaling company and some can and some can’t?
0:35:24 The second-time founders are like a huge relief
0:35:25 to deal with on the one hand
0:35:27 because it’s like, okay, they’ve been through it before.
0:35:28 Now they know what they’re doing, right?
0:35:30 They’ve got some experience and some gray hair
0:35:32 and some operational experience.
0:35:34 The problem with the second-time founders,
0:35:37 they can raise money before they have something working.
0:35:40 And then there’s this question of like, okay, what’s the idea?
0:35:41 And then we talk a lot about like,
0:35:44 is it an organic idea or is it like a synthetic idea?
0:35:45 Was the process, I have a great idea there
0:35:46 for I’m going to start a second company
0:35:48 or was the process, I want to start a second company
0:35:50 and therefore I have to come up with an idea.
0:35:52 And what you often find is they want to start
0:35:55 a second company so badly that they come up
0:35:58 with basically a fragmentary idea, partial idea.
0:36:00 It’s a conceptually interesting idea,
0:36:02 but with nothing underneath it.
0:36:03 And we have this other concept
0:36:06 we use called the idea maze, which basically is the process
0:36:08 that a founder uses to figure out what the actual idea is,
0:36:09 which is like a hundred-step process
0:36:11 to work your way through all the different permutations
0:36:12 of the idea before you actually finally figure out
0:36:13 the real thing.
0:36:15 And the second-time founders often just haven’t gone
0:36:17 through the idea maze, but it’s really bizarre as a VC
0:36:19 because it’s like, here’s this founder who you love
0:36:21 and like they’ve showed incredible persistence
0:36:22 in the last company and like you so badly
0:36:24 want to work with them again and you can just tell like,
0:36:26 for the idea has almost become interchangeable.
0:36:28 Right, and it’s just like, that’s a super bad sign.
0:36:30 And so that’s what tortures you on those.
0:36:32 – Yeah, from the entrepreneur side, I can tell you,
0:36:33 having a whole bunch of money does take away
0:36:36 a very critical forcing function, which is like,
0:36:38 I’m about to find out of money, I better figure this out.
0:36:41 So we added overcorrect for that.
0:36:42 – What’s the job of the founder?
0:36:45 Is the job of the founder to figure out the product,
0:36:47 figure out the market and get the idea nailed?
0:36:49 Or is the job of the founder to staff
0:36:51 an executive team and an employee base, right?
0:36:54 And those are two like, they’re overlapping responsibilities,
0:36:55 but there’s a lot of-
0:36:57 – The first one turns out to be a lot more important.
0:36:58 – Yeah, it’s like the startups where it’s like,
0:37:01 they’re doing all the outward facing things
0:37:03 involved with being a startup, but like there’s nothing there.
0:37:05 – Well, you know, and you always kind of know it
0:37:09 because the founding team is all vice presidents
0:37:10 and no engineers or something like that.
0:37:13 It’s just like, okay, what are you doing?
0:37:16 You can’t execute your way through like no ideas.
0:37:18 – 10 people in the company, they’ll have a chairman,
0:37:20 they’ll have a CEO, they’ll have a CEO, they’ll have a president,
0:37:21 they’ll have a VP of sales, a VP of marketing
0:37:23 and a VP of engineering.
0:37:25 That’s not a good, yep.
0:37:27 – A little bit of a pet peeve for me too.
0:37:30 So the first time that I met Ben, it was with Mark
0:37:32 and it was at the Creamery in Palo Alto.
0:37:34 And I think you were about probably about six months away
0:37:36 from starting the fund.
0:37:40 I never would have predicted how things would have turned out.
0:37:42 Did you predict how things would have turned out?
0:37:47 – You know, no, I think we dreamed that we would kind of
0:37:48 get to where we got to,
0:37:51 but it was a much longer timeframe on the dream.
0:37:54 I mean, things worked out way, way better
0:37:58 than I think either of us set out and expected.
0:38:01 And, you know, we had a lot of good luck along the way.
0:38:03 And then a lot of, you know, great help
0:38:07 from a lot of people, you know, people like actually starting
0:38:08 with like people like Jim Breyer,
0:38:13 who kind of taught us what it meant to like create an LP base
0:38:16 and how to think about investors and those kinds of things.
0:38:19 And then, you know, we ended up getting like very lucky
0:38:21 on the hiring, I think our first hire was Scott Cooper,
0:38:25 who we probably kind of built the firm with that.
0:38:28 And then, you know, our first consultant was Margaret.
0:38:31 And, you know, there’s no way we would have like
0:38:32 pulled off the marketing thing without her.
0:38:35 So a lot of, a lot of really great luck
0:38:36 and a lot of really great help.
0:38:38 Oh, and Andy Rackliffe, yeah, he helped us understand
0:38:39 what venture capital was.
0:38:41 – It turns out to be.
0:38:43 – Neither of us had any experience.
0:38:44 – Then obviously all the partners who have joined us
0:38:47 and so about 150, 150 people now,
0:38:49 by definition numerically, they get almost all the credit.
0:38:52 – So one thing I definitely want to get to is the transition
0:38:57 from a VC firm to a financial advisor for whatever that means.
0:38:59 And you were a little bit iconoclastic and different
0:39:00 from the beginning.
0:39:04 This also seems, we’ll see looking back at iconoclastic,
0:39:05 but definitely different.
0:39:06 What was the idea there?
0:39:08 – Yeah, so, you know, kind of the thing that catalyzed it
0:39:10 was actually crypto.
0:39:14 There’s a rule that exempts VCs from having to do
0:39:17 a bunch of kind of regulatory compliance stuff.
0:39:21 And part of the thing that keeps you as a VC
0:39:26 is you can’t invest more than 20% of your funds
0:39:30 and things that aren’t like primary equity investments.
0:39:33 So crypto would fall into that category secondary
0:39:34 and so forth.
0:39:37 And look, we believe crypto is going to be important.
0:39:39 Now there’s a lot of VCs who do,
0:39:41 who won’t take the step that we did to become regulated
0:39:43 in the way that we have.
0:39:46 But, you know, like this is kind of another advantage
0:39:49 from our background is we’re not afraid of governance
0:39:50 or regulation or these kinds of things.
0:39:52 And that, you know, it’s something that we understand
0:39:54 pretty well from being a public company.
0:39:55 We’ve done it before.
0:39:57 And it opens up a lot of opportunities
0:39:59 that we can now think about
0:40:02 because, you know, we’re in another category.
0:40:05 – Yeah, so this changed the categorization
0:40:06 and then the regulatory environment,
0:40:07 but you’re still a V-serfer.
0:40:08 – Yes, yeah.
0:40:11 Now we still are in the exact same business we always were.
0:40:13 – Mark, I gotta also do TV shows that you recommend
0:40:17 ’cause you are a source of excellent viewing.
0:40:18 – There we go, good.
0:40:19 All right, well, I’ll struggle.
0:40:20 So I can’t help myself.
0:40:23 Deadwood is the best TV show of all time.
0:40:24 And it’s actually very relevant for founders.
0:40:27 It’s basically, it’s the story of the American frontier
0:40:29 through kind of a modern lens.
0:40:31 And it’s just astonishingly high quality.
0:40:32 And it’s basically the creation of a city.
0:40:33 It’s basically the creation of a city
0:40:34 and ultimately the creation of a state,
0:40:36 the state of North Dakota.
0:40:39 And it is, you know, in the face of just like, you know,
0:40:41 horrifying obstacles.
0:40:42 You know, and by the way, you know,
0:40:44 many ethical issues along the way and everything else.
0:40:45 If you think starting a tech company is hard,
0:40:47 you wanna watch a couple of seasons of Deadwood.
0:40:48 It’ll put you in the right frame of mind.
0:40:50 – And then the movie that it got canceled,
0:40:51 it gave us a decade ago
0:40:52 and it got canceled after three seasons
0:40:54 and it really should not have been.
0:40:56 And so they did a very rare thing.
0:40:56 They went back 10 years.
0:40:59 And all these other people in the movie became huge stars
0:41:00 afterwards in the show.
0:41:01 So they got them all back
0:41:03 and made the fourth season into a movie.
0:41:04 – Wow.
0:41:05 All right, can’t wait to see it.
0:41:06 – Yep.
0:41:07 You can give me two books if you want, two books.
0:41:09 – Yeah, give me two books, give me five books.
0:41:11 – Favorite two books of the year.
0:41:14 Book number one, “Why History is Always Wrong?”
0:41:18 is not written by a historian and it is basically,
0:41:19 if you’ve read Nassim Taleb,
0:41:21 he talks about something called the narrative fallacy,
0:41:24 which basically is, okay, why did something happen?
0:41:25 And then there’s some story as to why it happened.
0:41:27 And then it usually turns out,
0:41:28 like if you talk to the principles involved,
0:41:29 it wasn’t that story at all.
0:41:31 It was something much more complex.
0:41:34 And so this is like the next level of that theory
0:41:36 that basically says all of recorded history
0:41:37 is the narrative fallacy.
0:41:39 And so everything that we think we understand
0:41:41 about why the American revolution happened
0:41:44 or why Rome fell, right, or why Christianity emerged
0:41:45 or like any of these stories that we,
0:41:47 all the, any of these things that we teach you,
0:41:50 we’ll take 12 years of history class in school
0:41:51 and all this stuff, like it’s all wrong.
0:41:53 Like it’s worse than wrong
0:41:55 because it’s not like it could be corrected.
0:41:57 You couldn’t actually make a bunch of edits
0:41:59 to the book and make it correct.
0:42:00 You can’t do that at all.
0:42:02 And the reason why it’s worse than wrong
0:42:03 and you can’t ever get it right
0:42:06 is because reality is so complicated, right?
0:42:07 Reality is a complex adaptive system
0:42:09 when you’ve got human agents involved in everything.
0:42:12 And so you’ve got, and anything big that happens,
0:42:13 you’ve got thousands or millions of people
0:42:15 who are making all kinds of random decisions every day
0:42:16 for all kinds of random reasons
0:42:19 and it just happens that things result in a certain way.
0:42:21 – Is this wrong in the same way to think that
0:42:22 it didn’t rain because God was mad
0:42:24 or it did rain because we performed the ritual
0:42:27 in the right way, like puts some agency into a system
0:42:29 that there isn’t anyone making decisions.
0:42:30 It’s just the emergence.
0:42:31 – Yeah, exactly, in reality, the weather system.
0:42:33 I mean, you know, this is after 100 years
0:42:33 of meteorological science
0:42:35 and they still can’t predict it’s gonna rain tomorrow.
0:42:37 And it’s ’cause the atmospheric system
0:42:38 is a complex adaptive system
0:42:40 is too complicated to model.
0:42:42 And just like, and you can keep throwing supercomputers at it
0:42:44 and it’s still too complicated to model.
0:42:46 So, by the way, it’s the same thing, the human body.
0:42:47 Like we don’t, it’s actually,
0:42:48 we think about this a lot in the bio fund.
0:42:49 It’s like, we don’t understand.
0:42:50 Like we don’t even, there’s not even settled
0:42:51 in traditional science.
0:42:53 Like we still don’t know, like there’s still,
0:42:55 and there’s no, a whole new category revision of science
0:42:58 now questioning this whole, the whole protein fat,
0:42:59 you know, the whole protein fat thesis.
0:43:02 And so like it’s, the example he uses in the book
0:43:04 at the fall of Rome is like the, you know,
0:43:06 the single most studied kind of historical story
0:43:07 is like the rise and fall of Rome.
0:43:09 And it’s like, and basically what happens is like,
0:43:10 if like a science is working properly,
0:43:12 you converge on the correct answer.
0:43:13 Like you converge on Newton’s law.
0:43:15 So you converge on quantum mechanics
0:43:16 or something like that.
0:43:18 He’s like, the problem in history is that
0:43:19 the more time goes, Pat,
0:43:21 the more explanations they come up with,
0:43:23 the more new explanations they come up with.
0:43:24 And there’s like historians have documented,
0:43:26 there’s like 250 now different causes
0:43:28 for the fall of Rome, right?
0:43:30 And so like, it just, it leaves you with nothing.
0:43:33 And so it’s, it’s, it’s a, it’s a disconcerting theory
0:43:34 ’cause it basically says getting a handle
0:43:37 on cause and effect in the world is impossible.
0:43:38 It’s a very convenient theory
0:43:41 ’cause it means you can just ignore history.
0:43:42 That saves you a lot of time.
0:43:43 It saves you a lot of time.
0:43:45 And then it’s an inspiring story.
0:43:48 Our theory, I find, ’cause it’s like, okay,
0:43:49 things can change.
0:43:51 Like nothing is actually carved in stone,
0:43:53 like not even a little bit.
0:43:55 And who knows what’s going to be the next person
0:43:56 who’s going to make the decisions
0:43:56 that’s going to cause everything
0:43:57 to go one way or the other.
0:43:58 And that could be you.
0:43:59 And so I find that inspiring.
0:44:03 And then the other book I love to tell people about
0:44:06 is David Goggins, who’s a, the only guy in history,
0:44:08 he’s a triple qualified as an ABCL and army ranger
0:44:11 and what’s called an Air Force tactical air controller,
0:44:13 which is a special forces unit of the Air Force.
0:44:15 So triple qualified special forces.
0:44:18 He wrote a book called “Can’t Hurt Me.”
0:44:19 And it is one of the most amazing stories
0:44:20 that anybody has ever written.
0:44:23 His story is really amazing.
0:44:25 He’s one of the only African-American Navy SEALs
0:44:29 in history and just manages incredible accomplishments
0:44:30 both inside and outside the military.
0:44:32 And it’s the book.
0:44:34 Like if Ben’s book is about like the struggle in business,
0:44:36 like David’s book is about the struggle in life.
0:44:39 And so anytime anybody feels mopey.
0:44:43 About what’s happening in their startup or in their life.
0:44:44 This is the book to read,
0:44:46 to kind of reset all the expectations.
0:44:46 All right, great.
0:44:48 Well, thank you so much.
0:44:51 It was a pleasure and an honor to be able to do this with you.
0:44:52 All right, Stuart, thank you so much.
0:44:53 Thank you, Stuart.

with Marc Andreessen (@pmarca), Ben Horowitz (@bhorowitz), and Stewart Butterfield (@stewart)

A lot in technology — and venture — happens in decades. New cycles of technology come and go, including some secular shifts; a new generation of founders matures; and so much more changes. So when Andreessen Horowitz (dubbed with the numeronym ”a16z”) was founded a decade ago as of this month, the tech landscape looked very different between then and now: Not only had the global economy just seen a recession, but trends like mobile and cloud and even social were just taking off.

Now, 10 years later, what’s changed — not just in tech, but in profiles of entrepreneurs? And what’s changed in the firm itself, given that Marc and Ben — the Andreessen and the Horowitz — were yet again entrepreneurs in founding the firm too? As another repeat entrepreneur from then to now, guest host Stewart Butterfield, CEO of Slack, interviews the a16z co-founders in this special episode of the a16z Podcast to commemorate our 10th anniversary.


The views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation.

This content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly as well as unannounced investments in publicly traded digital assets) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.

Charts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. The content speaks only as of the date indicated. Any projections, estimates, forecasts, targets, prospects, and/or opinions expressed in these materials are subject to change without notice and may differ or be contrary to opinions expressed by others. Please see https://a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.

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