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Summary & Insights
0:00:06 Democracies do survive when people who were in positions of power have to account for gross
0:00:12 violations of the law. And in fact, one of the things that is true about democracies is that
0:00:18 they only really survive when no one is above the law, right? If there’s a particular political
0:00:23 class, there are sort of dual legal systems where there’s one group of people that constantly
0:00:28 benefit and one group of people who are constantly disadvantaged in the way that the law treats
0:00:34 them. It’s very hard to argue that is a system that is going to persist as a qualitative democracy.
0:00:42 Good morning. I’m Guy Kawasaki. This is the Remarkable People podcast. And as you know,
0:00:50 we scour the world looking for remarkable people to inform and inspire you. And we found another
0:00:59 great, remarkable person. Their name is Erica Chenoweth. And I have been pursuing Erica for a long time
0:01:08 because I read all these references with their names. Erica is a political scientist and a leading expert
0:01:15 in civil resistance and nonviolent movements. Erica is a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School
0:01:24 and co-directs the nonviolent action lab. Erica’s groundbreaking research shows that nonviolent
0:01:33 campaigns are more effective, more morally compelling, and strategically superior. Welcome to Remarkable
0:01:39 People, Erica. Thank you so much, Guy. Delighted to be here. Well, you know, through the genius of Madison’s
0:01:51 scheduling for this interview, it’s now a few days after the No Kings Saturday. So I suppose I’m the first
0:01:58 person to ask you this question. Just like no one’s ever asked me what it was like to work for Steve Jobs.
0:02:06 But anyways, give us your analysis of the No Kings Day, the number of people, the activity,
0:02:11 the reaction, all that kind of stuff. What is Erica’s analysis of No Kings Day?
0:02:17 Thank you. Great question. I will say my team at the Crowd Counting Consortium is still tallying
0:02:25 our own count of how many people turned out on October 18th around the country. But what seems clear
0:02:31 is that there were thousands of locations where people gathered to engage in this coordinated single
0:02:39 day of protest against Donald Trump’s administration and its many policies, and that the crowds were
0:02:46 massive in most major cities, and extremely impressive even in very small towns all around
0:02:54 the country. So we are talking about a massive day of protests around the country, possibly one of the
0:03:02 largest ever in single day U.S. history, incredibly geographically diffused, perhaps record-breaking
0:03:09 ways as well. And what I really want to point out is two notable aspects of that, because a single day
0:03:16 of protest, even with very large numbers on its own, can be an impressive show of people’s opinions
0:03:23 about something. But what’s really distinctive about what we’re seeing today in the United States is that
0:03:29 October 18th came on the heels of multiple prior days of mass mobilization associated with the same
0:03:37 movement, and a growing volume in number of protests happening since Trump was inaugurated. So far more protests
0:03:43 than had taken place by this point in the first Trump administration, with far more people, according to our own
0:03:52 tallies. The second thing that’s really notable is that this movement has been overwhelmingly nonviolent. And by that, what I mean is that people are
0:04:01 taking very seriously in preparing their communities to engage in what many people in my field refer to as nonviolent
0:04:09 discipline, which means even when armed counter-protesters come, or when the government decides to say that it’s a group of
0:04:18 criminals and violent people who hate the country and whatever, people are nevertheless turning out using peaceful methods of
0:04:27 of assembly, of assembly, that are lawful, that are protected under the first amendment. And they were reflecting very positive messages in
0:04:35 many respects, almost a joyful kind of spirit of seeing others gathering and knowing that they weren’t alone and standing up for the basic values and
0:04:44 principles that they want the country to uphold. I just think that if you think about it, having that many millions of
0:04:51 people doing something at the same time, and for it to be overwhelmingly nonviolent is itself a remarkable
0:04:53 fact. Like that doesn’t
0:05:00 happen too often in world history, where you see millions upon millions of people across an enormous expanse of land
0:05:07 engaging in a coordinated action nonviolently. Like we just don’t see that much. And I think it’s worth noting that is what we saw on Saturday.
0:05:16 Now, if it had gone violent, what would be the ramifications? This is like Kent State
0:05:20 four without the violence. What is the meaning of violence?
0:05:28 Yeah, I think that the field that I’m in really tries to study the observable aspects of this and how
0:05:32 the politics changes when people use
0:05:39 physical violence toward other people, whether they’re bystanders, protesters, police, or other security forces,
0:05:46 or whether there’s even just violent rhetoric, like dehumanizing rhetoric and things along those lines,
0:05:52 or more radical ideologies, which is not violent, but can sometimes cue in people’s minds a more
0:05:59 threatening political movement. And then there’s also cases where we can see instances of property damage,
0:06:06 sometimes deliberate and very controlled, and other times looking more chaotic. And all of those different
0:06:13 forms of tactics and sort of contentious politics have different effects. But I think that the main thing
0:06:21 to know is that once people who are engaged in oppositional protest of any kind are seen to engage
0:06:26 in violence of sort of across a wide range, direct violence against people or property is generally the
0:06:32 way that that this is measured in my field, it becomes much more difficult to control the trajectory of the
0:06:38 movement. Among other things, it often alienates people within the movement, so the movement fractures
0:06:44 along the lines of disagreement around tactics, it often repels people who are drawn to the movement, but
0:06:51 are not willing to engage in that type of behavior and don’t want to be associated with a movement that
0:06:58 does. It repels potential third parties that might be persuaded ultimately by the movement, but become very
0:07:05 very close minded to it as soon as they witness that type of activity. And then there’s also the difficult issue that
0:07:11 elite behavior often changes quite dramatically toward a movement if it if it engages in violent activity.
0:07:18 So that means that most kind of even political opposition leaders, business leaders, even faith leaders and
0:07:24 things like that become much more tepid in their support or even shun the movement entirely and that
0:07:30 cuts off possibilities of influence around the politics as well. So there’s just a lot of reasons why
0:07:35 engaging in violence can be counterproductive for the type of political power that movements are trying to
0:07:41 build and it becomes more difficult for movements to control that or recover from it. The other possibility is that
0:07:47 violence is directed at the movement and the movement is maintaining nonviolent discipline. And so that
0:07:53 is a situation and a circumstance that many nonviolent movements, especially those that are actually
0:08:00 getting traction and becoming more powerful, eventually encounter. And in those circumstances,
0:08:05 there has been in the past sort of generalized pattern around the world and in the United States,
0:08:12 that when movements maintain nonviolent discipline, when they are faced with repression, violent
0:08:18 repression, that the movements are more likely to elicit sympathy and support. If they are met with
0:08:26 repression and respond with kind of disarray or chaos or whatever, they are less likely to elicit sympathy
0:08:32 and support. So that’s just a general pattern. There’s some caveats, of course, but that’s a process we call
0:08:38 backfire, which is that state repression against unarmed protesters tends to backfire for the state,
0:08:45 whereas state repression toward armed or those who are perceived to be using violence as they’re
0:08:52 protesting tends not to backfire. I would make the case that if you think about it, there is no single
0:09:01 like leader or there’s no centralized controlling organization. So basically, I don’t know, 7 million or 10
0:09:06 million or whatever the number is, people came to their own conclusion kind of separately and
0:09:12 independently. It wasn’t like there was some charismatic revolutionary leader telling everybody to
0:09:19 behave or lay down their arms or anything like that, right? I do think that there has been a growing
0:09:26 infrastructure supporting and preparing communities to engage in mass mobilization and doing so in part by
0:09:33 training them about the theory of nonviolent action methods for de-escalation, the importance of
0:09:39 nonviolent discipline. And certainly those who organized at least the nationwide organizers around
0:09:46 No Kings have very clearly channeled that this is a peaceful protest and that people should come and protest
0:09:51 if they want to. And here are the parameters for what we expect people to do. And they were very clear,
0:09:56 for example, on their website and in their public communications, not to bring weapons and to walk
0:10:03 away from provocateurs and basically don’t take the bait, don’t give the administration the headline they
0:10:10 want. And again, the fact that that happened, that the millions of people were able to coordinate,
0:10:14 whether they were directly engaged in the sort of local chapters of these organizations or not,
0:10:18 is a remarkable feat in and of itself.
0:10:23 Wow. I’ve seen Super Bowl celebrations that are more violent than that.
0:10:36 Let’s back up. And I would like you to explain why God is so interested in having you. And it’s this
0:10:43 cross you’re going to have to bear, Erica. I hate to tell you, but you gotta explain your findings about
0:10:50 the three and a half percent. I don’t know if we should call it a rule because that implies that it
0:10:55 is prescriptive, not descriptive, but like whatever you want to call it, talk about the three and a half
0:11:03 percent Erica Chenoweth phenomenon. Sure. Okay. So to do that, let me back up and first talk about
0:11:08 my collaboration with Maria Steffen, which you mentioned at the top when you talked about our book,
0:11:14 Why Silver Resistance Works. Maria and I teamed up to do this study where what we did is we gathered data
0:11:23 on 323 mass movements from 1900 to 2006. The 2006 end date is simply because that’s when we paired up
0:11:29 and started collecting the data. It’s an arbitrary cutoff date. That’s the reason why it’s that time
0:11:33 period. And what we did is we looked at every country in the world in that time period and looked at every
0:11:40 mass movement that had mobilized at least a thousand observed participants and over a duration of time
0:11:46 demanding the removal of the incumbent national leader. So usually the overthrow of a dictator or
0:11:51 territorial independence through anti-colonial actions, self-determination, or an independence
0:11:57 movement of some kind. And the reason we looked at those campaigns is because we were going to try to compare
0:12:07 the effectiveness of people power unarmed resistance movements with armed insurgencies. And to do a
0:12:13 comparison that was sort of a hard test of whether nonviolent resistance was really up to the task,
0:12:19 we decided to limit the sample to those very challenging kind of revolutionary cases, right? Cases like
0:12:27 Poland during the Solidarity Movement and East Timor and the East Timorese Liberation Movement and the Burmese
0:12:33 pro-democracy movement compared to the Algerian Revolution or the Chinese Revolution, etc. And what
0:12:40 Maria and I did was we basically compared side by side the outcomes of these movements that relied primarily
0:12:47 on unarmed people power, nonviolent resistance, and armed insurrection. And we found that the nonviolent
0:12:52 campaigns were more likely to have succeeded than the armed campaigns. Part of the reason for that was
0:12:58 related to our observation that the nonviolent campaigns just got bigger, meaning they got more
0:13:04 people in them for a variety of reasons than the average armed campaign, and that that then supplied the
0:13:09 movement with all kinds of different political, economic, social, and cultural levers that weren’t
0:13:15 available to the armed campaigns. And that led to defections within the elites that were upholding the regime,
0:13:22 etc. So after we published that book, Maria and I, sometimes together and sometimes separately,
0:13:28 were talking a lot with activists about the findings. And in one case, I was at a workshop and an activist
0:13:34 asked me, if participation is important, is there a particular critical threshold that is kind of
0:13:40 guaranteed to lead to success? And I said, I actually don’t know, but let me open up the data set
0:13:44 literally right now while we’re talking and I’ll look. And and I opened my computer and looked at
0:13:50 the data and said, Well, I’ll be there’s a pretty low kind of threshold, it’s three and a half percent
0:13:56 that when one of these campaigns at its peak participation rate is mobilized that many people,
0:14:01 it looks like none of the campaigns above that threshold failed. And, you know, what’s really
0:14:05 important to know about that is exactly what you said, Guy, which is that it’s a descriptive historical
0:14:11 observation. It’s something that was particular to that sample of data over that time period.
0:14:18 And that means that it’s neither predictive of what happens outside that sample and neither is
0:14:26 it prescriptive about, say, what movements might aim for as a magic number or a guarantee of success going
0:14:32 forward. So how can these things all be true at the same time? They can be true because there is
0:14:38 learning that goes on right on the autocrats side. And they learn that, you know, one of the
0:14:43 things movements will do is to assemble very large numbers of people and try to generate mass and
0:14:48 generate the political pressure that comes from that. And that if they wait that out, they might,
0:14:54 in fact, be able to withstand very large, but brief challenges. The other thing is that the reason why
0:15:00 those movements tended to succeed is not just because they got those numbers. It’s because they’d maybe done
0:15:07 years of organizing, planning, strategic leadership development, building the capacity to really shift
0:15:14 the sort of political power away from the autocrat. And ultimately, they were able to get defections
0:15:19 from the security forces, from the inner entourage, from the civil service, from labor, from lots of
0:15:25 different pillars. That is what led to their success, not just that they put a lot of feet in the streets and
0:15:33 that automatically resulted in something changing. And then it’s not prescriptive in the sense that,
0:15:38 like, if movements are aiming for that number, we don’t actually know how that changes the threshold.
0:15:44 Because in the historical observation, what we saw was movements that didn’t know there was a threshold.
0:15:51 They just happened to hit it and succeeded after that. Whereas if movements are informed about it
0:15:55 and deliberately aim for it without doing the other things that movements need to do to build power,
0:16:01 we just don’t know about the impacts of it going forward. So this is all to say,
0:16:06 the thing to know about the three and a half percent rule is that it’s a historical observation that speaks
0:16:13 to the fact that it’s rarely the case that a mass movement for democracy needs to actually mobilize
0:16:19 like huge, huge, huge numbers of people. So it’s within reach for most countries most of the time
0:16:27 to mobilize a movement that can create significant political, social, economic, and cultural leverage
0:16:33 with a surprisingly, you know, small proportion of the population. So that’s what I would take from
0:16:39 it. But I wouldn’t necessarily use it as a guide poster, a sort of silver bullet or magic number going forward.
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0:17:46 Just for clarity sake, I have two simple questions. So yeah, when you say three and a half percent, three and a half percent of what is it the total population, the adult population, the total population?
0:17:54 Yeah, it’s like basically based on whatever the census or the UN population statistic was for that country in that peak year.
0:18:01 And what qualifies you for being in the three and a half percent? What kind of action do you have to take?
0:18:13 Yeah, so that’s another really important point, Guy, because in our study, we were looking at peak mobilization, which usually meant observed participation in a mass street demonstration throughout the country.
0:18:23 So like a single day demonstration that was nationwide would be an example of that. But that, of course, doesn’t speak to how many people might be sympathetic to a movement, right?
0:18:34 Right. So it may be that in places where three and a half percent of the population historically were participating actively in kind of frontline protest, like 70 percent of the population was on side.
0:18:44 And we can’t observe that. So we just don’t know, like what the sort of latent level of popular support for the movements were, whether there’s a lot of variation across the cases and that figure, etc.
0:18:54 So now let’s say I’m the sitting guy or gal that the three and a half percent or more are protesting.
0:19:06 So I’m watching this on Fox and I’m saying, all right, so three and a half percent of three hundred and fifty million, I see 11 million people, that probably means three hundred and thirty nine million people still love me.
0:19:07 Why should I do? Why should I step aside?
0:19:10 I mean, it’s like it’s only three and a half percent.
0:19:11 The rest of the people love me.
0:19:14 Obviously, I’m being a little bit simplistic.
0:19:20 Why would it bother me so much that I would step aside for a mere three and a half percent?
0:19:27 Yeah, I think you’re onto something, which is to say if somebody feels like it’s genuinely a tiny minority in opposition to them,
0:19:38 they feel like they can absorb that challenge issue is that opposition is usually a way bigger figure than the number of people actively participating in protests, right?
0:19:48 So the protest participation is a signal of a pretty high commitment and resolve to speak one’s mind in opposition.
0:19:52 It’s even more of a powerful signal if opposition is dangerous.
0:20:01 That is to say that people will pay a price for it, whether that’s a political price or whether they’re put in prison or facing violent repression or something like that.
0:20:05 The more costly protest becomes, the more powerful the signal it is when people participate.
0:20:15 All of those signals are information about the proportion of the population that might actually be opposing the government.
0:20:21 The other thing that comes into play is that, you know, three and a half percent sounds like a small number.
0:20:24 It usually speaks to a much larger body of discontent in a country.
0:20:31 And you can look at things like popular, you know, approval ratings or other things like that as examples of the moving target there.
0:20:55 But the biggest threat comes when the autocrats can no longer rely on their pillars of support because they start to become affected by the obvious growing discontent and wonder if it’s in their own interest to continue supporting or maybe they should either oppose or just stand out of the way and watch as things unfold.
0:21:08 What a lot of people who look at how these movements unfold are paying attention to is what we call defections, but really just means shifts in behavior by people who are in influential positions.
0:21:21 For example, the US Chamber of Commerce, which has been, I’d say, largely on the sidelines, last week filed suit against the Trump administration for its H-1B policy.
0:21:32 And what was interesting about the suit wasn’t just that it said this will have material harms on all kinds of industries, small business, large corporations, you name it.
0:21:47 But also that suit that they filed said that the president doesn’t have the right to do this, that it’s actually Congress that makes the laws around this and congressional oversight and review is required for a change like this.
0:22:06 And even though they were coming at it from a relatively non-adversarial stance in the suit, they were basically saying, we want to be able to make Congress responsive to us and we want Congress to exercise its constitutional authority on this issue.
0:22:21 To me, that is an example of a pillar business, the Chamber of Commerce, basically taking a stand on a particular issue in a way that does trouble the administration’s plans around immigration, right?
0:22:28 And it’s attempts to do these things unilaterally, which is the main concern for many who are worried about rule of law issues, etc.
0:22:41 The CEO of Salesforce had to back off and backtrack right last week and apologize for inviting the National Guard to San Francisco because of public resignations from his board.
0:22:52 There are airports that were refusing to share Kristi Noem’s statement that, you know, that the shutdown was because of Democrats and that they owned it.
0:23:06 And so a bunch of airports were simply showing the video on mute with no captions or were literally putting up signs that said this airport does not endorse this video and that we’re a nonpartisan airport.
0:23:17 And so these are really important indicators of opposition within institutions that the administration basically needs to go along with what’s happening in order to pull it off.
0:23:30 And that is why protest is so important, because it gives permission to people in those pillars and buoys them sort of like, there are still lots of people in this country that will come to your aid, be on your side, etc.
0:23:37 If you stand up to if you do the right thing, if you follow the oath of office, if you, you know, uphold the law.
0:23:40 And so that is why these movements work.
0:23:48 It’s because they begin to interfere with the autocrat’s ability to get his way, even if he only thinks it’s a minority.
0:23:55 Do you think that the newfound attitudes of Marjorie Taylor Greene qualify as a defection?
0:24:03 She’s certainly defecting around a couple of key policy domains, but I also think that she has such strong anti-left credentials that she can afford that.
0:24:24 I think the ones that are more vulnerable are people like Representative Massey, who, as a relative newcomer to Congress, hasn’t yet proved the sort of anti-left credentials and so is staking out a very particular position around the Epstein files and calling out and punitive behavior from the president for this.
0:24:32 But the Congress right now is not particularly filled with GOP representatives who are defecting from the party.
0:24:50 I think the defections that we’re seeing are more coming from prominent institutions within civil society and less so within business, but increasingly so in business that demonstrate that they are willing to stand up and even pay a price for standing up to the president so that they can maintain their independence, etc.
0:25:04 So let’s say, not that I’m obsessed with her, but let’s say that Marjorie Taylor Greene continues on this anti-big-beautiful bill because of the impact on healthcare costs, right?
0:25:08 Which is clearly not exactly the party line.
0:25:17 So now if she gets reelected, you could interpret that as you can defy the party.
0:25:23 If she doesn’t get reelected, it means you cannot defy the party.
0:25:25 So I don’t know what I’m hoping for anymore.
0:25:28 Should I be hoping that she gets reelected now?
0:25:30 Because it shows you can defy the party.
0:25:31 It’s a defection.
0:25:33 It’s a crack in the dam.
0:25:36 Yeah, I’m not sure where I come down on that.
0:25:42 To me, as somebody who’s mostly just interested in the health and well-being of our democracy,
0:25:48 the outcome that I’m interested in is representatives being responsive to their constituents
0:25:54 and actually just being responsive to their constituents rather than to the head of their party necessarily.
0:26:00 I think that that’s an important indicator of a healthy democracy.
0:26:02 It is natural to have policy differences.
0:26:06 It’s important and expected to have them in a democracy.
0:26:12 And the best thing to have is healthy parties that have candidates and representatives
0:26:16 who are more interested in what their constituents are interested in than what
0:26:21 a particular extreme party leader is interested in them doing and saying.
0:26:25 OK, if we could go back in history a little bit.
0:26:31 So to help me understand what you mean by nonviolent, would you say that the American
0:26:37 civil rights movement in the 50s and 60s, would you call that nonviolent?
0:26:44 Or when the Black Panthers who did a lot of nonviolent kind of things like daycare and stuff,
0:26:46 but there was some violence.
0:26:50 So would you call the American civil rights movement nonviolent or violent?
0:26:56 Yeah, I think the standard way of answering this in my field is that it was a primarily
0:26:57 nonviolent movement.
0:27:05 And there were certainly some radical elements associated with it over its long duration.
0:27:07 It’s kind of generations long duration.
0:27:16 And nevertheless, the primary method of resistance when it came to policy change and the end of Jim
0:27:24 Crow was definitely like civil resistance, nonviolent action and a very important legal and
0:27:25 political strategy on top of it.
0:27:28 Right. So it was not just sit ins and things.
0:27:29 It was also litigation.
0:27:35 It was winning very consequential lawsuits, including in the Supreme Court, and it was
0:27:42 dealing in the sort of inside game sense with the White House and using federal power to basically
0:27:45 leverage over Southern segregationists power.
0:27:50 I think that there was really a multi-pronged approach to this one.
0:27:55 But certainly, if you talk about the campaign to desegregate Nashville, for example,
0:28:03 or the Montgomery bus boycott, or the Freedom Rides, these were definitely campaigns that were rooted in the
0:28:08 theory and strategy of nonviolent action very self-consciously.
0:28:14 For someone like you, Erica, it’s like you’re living in the best time.
0:28:16 That’s a double-edged sword.
0:28:21 But you are living in the best time for the research and expertise you have, right?
0:28:26 You don’t need to go and look up old copies of the Nashville Daily News.
0:28:28 You’re living it right now, right?
0:28:30 Maybe you wish you weren’t living it right now.
0:28:34 Well, I think since Maria and I first published our book, and then
0:28:38 she and I have published other things later, and I’ve worked with lots of other
0:28:44 collaborators over the years building on lots of different aspects of the dynamics of nonviolent
0:28:47 action and trying to update our knowledge about this.
0:28:54 I’ve been able to really interact with so many activists from around the world and in the United
0:29:01 States, and I just think that really we’re all living through what is a global experience.
0:29:08 What the U.S. is going through now is something that’s deeply familiar to many other places
0:29:09 around the world right now.
0:29:14 And I’m having old conversations with activists kind of flooding back into my memory about things
0:29:19 that they’ve noticed and said about their own struggles that are so deeply applicable here.
0:29:23 I just think that we are living through a very interesting moment in world history,
0:29:27 and the United States is certainly not immune to the sort of broader global trends that we’ve
0:29:35 witnessed and that have accelerated really in the last 15 years around the rise of far right populism,
0:29:41 a strong anti-incumbent orientation to many different parties and movements, and just the
0:29:44 way that’s upended a lot of kind of liberal democracies around the world.
0:29:52 From your academic and historical perspective, do you believe that today, which is, let’s call it
0:29:59 November 2025, do you believe that the U.S. is now a fascist state or a performative
0:30:06 democracy with a constitution, separation of powers, et cetera, as theories, but we’re really not that
0:30:09 that anymore. How deep is the ship is what I’m asking you.
0:30:15 I think that we are in an acute backsliding episode for sure. So there are lots of independent
0:30:21 observatories that try to classify whether countries are democratic or non-democratic or somewhere in
0:30:28 between. And among those that I follow, I’ve seen the sort of project leaders of these
0:30:33 institutes kind of go on record to say that they expect to downgrade the United States into
0:30:41 a non-democracy in their next updates. And part of the reason is just because the institutions that
0:30:46 are the minimal defining characteristic of whether a country is a democracy or not, for example,
0:30:52 separation of powers, judicial independence, freedom of the press, different civil rights and liberties
0:31:00 being respected and applied equally, rule of law and the free and fair elections happening on a predictable
0:31:08 and routine basis are all being challenged really significantly right now. And a major reason for
0:31:15 that is because the person that was elected to office as the president kind of views them as not
0:31:20 constraints. So his approach to it is that he’s going to do what he wants and expects legal challenges
0:31:25 and is willing to have things challenged legally. And as far as I can tell, the strategy is basically
0:31:30 to allow some to be won and some to be lost. But if a couple of really consequential ones are
0:31:37 successes, then that can completely reshape the sort of social contract between the government and the
0:31:43 population. And that’s sort of like the political project underway. One of my colleagues, Steve Levitsky,
0:31:49 wrote a book with Dan Ziblatt called How Democracies Die. And in it, what they said is that the most
0:31:55 important thing for a country to remain a democracy is that we elect people who are small d Democrats,
0:32:02 right? Like people who actually respect the rule of law, the institutions. They’re willing to step aside
0:32:07 if they’re not reelected. They respect the constitution. They understand things like term limits if they’re
0:32:13 there and they’re not going to challenge those. And they just don’t try to break everything. They basically
0:32:19 allow themselves to be restrained. And that their argument is that many countries are just actually
0:32:26 pretty lucky that they managed to elect people who are not trying to break the institutions. But if you
0:32:32 happen to elect somebody who’s very happy to break the institutions, like democracy is fragile, right? And
0:32:39 can be very vulnerable to those characters. And so, you know, I’d argue that we’re in a moment right now that
0:32:46 looks a lot like what they warned about in their book. And as I said, a lot of different observatories
0:32:52 have already said they’re going to downgrade the US to a non-democracy. And that was before National Guard
0:32:59 troops were deployed to numerous cities around the country. It’s very hard to wrap my mind around the
0:33:06 fact that the United States could be declared not a democracy. I mean, if you had told me this five
0:33:10 or 10 years ago, I would have told you you’ve been reading too many Margaret Atwood books. Like,
0:33:17 how did we get to this point? We’ve been here before in different respects. There are a lot of people in
0:33:22 my field actually who say that the United States couldn’t even really be considered a full liberal
0:33:28 democracy until 1965. Because that’s when we had the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act
0:33:37 together that were actually finally ending segregation legally and enforcing it. The legal end of segregation
0:33:44 and genuinely extending the franchise and equal rights to people regardless of race. And I just think
0:33:51 that if you think about it that way, we along with every other country that’s been a democracy on this
0:33:57 planet of ours, we’re always in a sort of constant experiment of moving farther toward democracy or
0:34:04 further away from it. And it’s not like a project that completes itself. Every generation has to
0:34:11 live up to and improve the values that are expressed in our own constitution and renew them and make sure that
0:34:19 they’re still working. I think that it’s easy to take them for granted. But in fact, there’s no destination.
0:34:25 It’s just always a process that’s underway and being perfected and improved by every generation. So that
0:34:30 also suggests it can be regressed by different actors too. And so we’re in one of those periods
0:34:37 of a pendulum swing. It’s also the case that in the 20th century, there have been many cases of close call,
0:34:42 backsliding episodes and things along those lines. And there are a couple of political scientists named
0:34:48 Bob Kaufman and Steph Haggard who wrote a book called Dictators and Democrats. And they looked at a lot
0:34:54 of these close call episodes where the backsliding had started. There was, you know, in a lot of cases,
0:35:01 an elected authoritarian who was beginning to dismantle rule of law and democratic institutions and norms.
0:35:08 And then what happened is that civil society mobilized and they mobilized to defend democracy
0:35:16 and defend the institutions. And in some cases persuaded these autocrats to resign. And again, it’s not like they just woke up
0:35:23 one day and thought, you know what, that movement is right. I should resign. It was more that the movement just made it impossible
0:35:29 for them to continue getting the collaboration of their own inner entourage who basically abandoned them.
0:35:35 And so if the inner entourage abandons an elected autocrat, that’s how the resignations take place.
0:35:41 There are a handful of countries around the world in which this happened in the 20th century and into the 21st.
0:35:48 And what’s really in a more recent study by Jonathan Pinckney and one of his collaborators,
0:35:53 they found that in backsliding episodes more recently, so like in the last 25 years or so,
0:35:59 that in about half of them where a civil resistance movement mobilized to try to defend democracy,
0:36:05 those movements won. So they were able to defend democracy and even improve the quality of the democracy
0:36:12 in the aftermath of the movement. In cases where there wasn’t a civil resistance movement that mobilized,
0:36:18 they found that only seven percent of those cases were able to survive as democracies.
0:36:25 And so this just speaks to the fact that a mobilized civil society and a well-organized civil society
0:36:32 is the beachhead for democracy. Because once the institutions are challenged in the way that our institutions
0:36:39 are being challenged, they can’t hold it up on their own. They need help from the population to do that.
0:36:41 Up next on Remarkable People.
0:36:48 One of the things that is true about democracies is that they only really survive when no one is above
0:36:53 the law, right? If there’s a particular political class, there are sort of dual legal systems where
0:37:00 there’s one group of people that constantly benefit and one group of people who are constantly disadvantaged
0:37:05 in the way that the law treats them. It’s very hard to argue that that is a system that is going to
0:37:12 persist as a qualitative democracy. And in fact, this is part of the reason why so few political
0:37:19 scientists who study kind of democratic regime type would call the United States a democracy until 1965.
0:37:29 It’s because of the incredible differences in the way that the legal system would operate depending on one’s race.
0:37:34 Become a little more remarkable with each episode of Remarkable People.
0:37:39 It’s found on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.
0:37:43 Welcome back to Remarkable People with Guy Kawasaki.
0:37:53 You mentioned several times that there have been recent historical examples of backsliding and close calls.
0:38:01 So could you actually name names and tell us about them in case people are not familiar with what actually
0:38:03 happened in these recent close calls?
0:38:11 Sure. So in the Kaufman and Haggard book, they talk specifically as an example about Peru, where in the
0:38:18 90s there was a self-coup attempt by Fujimori, who was the president at the time, and he tried to sort of become
0:38:26 the president for life. And civil society mobilized and demanded that he resign, and he ultimately did depart office.
0:38:35 More recently, there was a coup attempt in South Korea just this past December. The incumbent president tried to declare
0:38:42 martial law and install himself with emergency powers, and civil society mobilized in your immediate response to that
0:38:48 declaration of martial law, even though it happened in the middle of the night. And within 24 hours or so,
0:38:56 he called off martial law and the coordinated union efforts and other civil society groups basically said it’s too late.
0:39:00 You’ve already showed that you want to be a dictator. You cannot stay in office as our president.
0:39:08 And they impeached him and he was removed from office. In Brazil, several years ago, there was a broad anti-authoritarian
0:39:17 movement to try to prevent Jair Bolsonaro from being reelected after he made quite plain that his aspirations were to become
0:39:23 a dictator in the country. And that movement elevated Lula to an electoral victory. Even though it was a
0:39:31 quite narrow one, they were able to pull that off. And right now, Bolsonaro is facing conviction for crimes
0:39:40 related to that coup attempt. I think there are lots of cases around the world where we can see the fragility of
0:39:47 democratic institutions, but also the ways in which an empowered and mobilized and well-organized civil
0:39:54 society response can really protect those institutions when they’re having trouble defending themselves.
0:40:04 I hesitate to ask you to do this, but can you explain to us what goes through those people’s minds when they
0:40:11 decide, “I think I’ll be president for life. I’ll just have a coup.” What’s the line of reasoning that makes
0:40:13 you believe you can pull that off?
0:40:19 To be honest, I just don’t know. I don’t have that orientation myself, but I would say there’s some
0:40:23 political scientists who a couple of years ago published a book called The Dictator’s Handbook.
0:40:29 This is Alistair Smith and Bruce Buena de Mesquita. And their starting assumption was that basically
0:40:34 people, once they’re in power, want to stay in power. And that’s just their starting point. And then
0:40:40 the question is how to organize the inter-entourage, engage in purges and other things to stay and grow
0:40:45 one’s power. And if that’s the orientation, then that’s the orientation. But like I said,
0:40:49 I don’t know what goes through their minds. I think in our case, Donald Trump is quite plain
0:40:56 in public about the things that go through his mind. And I think he often says, “I alone can fix it,”
0:41:03 right, is one of the famous lines. And he just views it as his destiny to be the president
0:41:07 of the United States and to stay the president of the United States.
0:41:16 : In these close calls for these Bolsonaro and South Korea and Peru, Fujimori and stuff,
0:41:26 did the Christie gnomes and the Stephen Millers of those organizations, how did they come out? Because
0:41:33 in the United States, apparently, Donald Trump has absolute immunity. But does this apply to everybody
0:41:38 else inside that tent? Is it going to be bad for them if this happens?
0:41:45 : It’s interesting. My guess is that would be something that they would use to defend themselves,
0:41:50 is the fact that presidential immunity also should mean immunity for the people who are just following
0:41:55 orders, et cetera, et cetera. And I’m sure that there would be many different attempts to use that as a
0:42:02 legal defense for any kind of accountability that was brought against them in the future. I simply don’t
0:42:06 know. I don’t know the kind of legal landscape that we’re going to inherit after this, what the
0:42:14 precedents are going to be. I just literally have no idea. I’m not sure how deep it goes in terms of
0:42:20 the levels of accountability that are being sought. But one thing is clear that in other countries,
0:42:26 including just today in France, Nicolas Sarkozy is starting a five-year sentence for breaking the law.
0:42:32 And as I saw somebody post about this, democracies do survive when people who are in positions of power
0:42:40 have to account for gross violations of the law. And in fact, one of the things that is true about
0:42:48 democracies is that they only really survive when no one is above the law, right? If there’s a particular
0:42:53 political class, there are sort of dual legal systems where there’s one group of people that
0:42:58 constantly benefit and one group of people who are constantly disadvantaged in the way that the law
0:43:05 treats them. It’s very hard to argue that is a system that is going to persist as a qualitative
0:43:12 democracy. And in fact, this is part of the reason why so few political scientists who study kind of democratic
0:43:20 regime type would call the United States a democracy until 1965 is because of the incredible differences
0:43:26 in the way that the legal system would operate depending on one’s race. And we should say that’s
0:43:32 still true in a lot of respects, but there are more safeguards, at least on paper, for those types of
0:43:38 things than there were earlier in our country’s history, for sure. The main point I’m trying to make is that
0:43:45 for countries to be sustainable democracies, they need to deal with the inequities and the way that
0:43:50 the rule of law is applied over time. It needs to get better and better, not worse and worse, where there’s
0:43:55 increased stratification around to whom the law applies and who is immune from it.
0:44:05 All righty. My last question for you is, let’s just suppose that magically you are now empowered to
0:44:13 preserve democracy in America, right? So Erica, you’re on the hot seat, you can pull all the levers,
0:44:19 you can do whatever you can do, you can give advice to people. If you’re chartered with the goal of
0:44:27 preserving democracy, what does Erica do? What does Erica recommend? I would want to start by trying to draw
0:44:35 together all of the non-violent elements of our civil society and pulling them into the broadest formation
0:44:42 we could possibly create and articulate a few minimal points of agreement
0:44:49 that binds that group together and then move ahead with the confidence that a group that is committed to
0:44:57 making American democracy work for everyone and is committed to a couple of core principles about
0:45:03 what that means and what’s required in terms of our institutions to do that, that we could take
0:45:09 comfort in knowing that we constitute the vast majority of Americans, represent the vast majority of Americans
0:45:18 and begin to build a strategy with that kind of a group that could begin to articulate a new future for
0:45:27 the country that is irresistible and that attracts a new energy and a new enthusiasm for engaging in our
0:45:35 democracy and that makes people understand that the things that they care about the most are directly
0:45:40 linked to whether or not we get to live in a democracy and so that’s what I would do. I would
0:45:48 try to really boost participation and engagement in the democratic experiment in the United States across all
0:45:53 corners of the country with the confidence a sort of formation like that like a united alliance like
0:45:58 that would be like one of the most powerful coalitions that could ever be built here and
0:46:06 would basically be unstoppable. Can I say that what you just said is it’s not to align the Democrats or the
0:46:13 Republicans behind a particular political philosophy but to align everybody behind the philosophy of
0:46:21 participating in a democracy yeah which is different right it’s totally different I think that my interest
0:46:28 right now is along the lines of is is not partisan because you can think about our typical approach to
0:46:33 politics as being you’re this party or that party I’m more like you’re a small d democrat or not right you
0:46:39 believe in democracy and you believe in the things that democracy can deliver in terms of prosperity and
0:46:44 quality of life and everybody getting their fair shot and being treated fairly and like all of the good
0:46:51 things that people want in life can come through their participation in our democracy and it can be messy and
0:46:56 it can involve compromise but the most important thing is for democracy is a function of government that
0:47:03 allows us to live at peace with our neighbors and that’s the future I want to engage people in realigning our
0:47:08 politics along the lines of those that believe in that democratic experiment and want to see it fulfilled
0:47:14 versus those that don’t that’s an overpowering majority in this country it would be an unstoppable force
0:47:22 I thank you for being on the remarkable people podcast and you know we discussed some depressing
0:47:29 frankly and heavy issues but I think that you have offered some really tactical and practical things and
0:47:37 really a lot of hope actually I think that’s my takeaway from your message it’s a lot of hope here you know
0:47:45 there’s a lot of work to do but there is hope here so I thank you Erica and yeah wow I want to thank
0:47:54 my team too so that’s Madison Neismar who’s the co-producer with Jeff C and Tessa Neismar who is doing our research and
0:48:03 Shannon Hernandez on sound design so just quite a few people behind me Erica who’s making this podcast but
0:48:09 right up front you’re the star of this episode thank you very much for the information and hope that you
0:48:14 provide it thank you so much guy and thanks so much to everyone on your great team
0:48:20 this is remarkable people

Ý tưởng cho rằng chỉ cần 3,5% dân số tích cực tham gia vào các cuộc kháng cự bất bạo động cũng có thể trở thành chất xúc tác gần như chắc chắn dẫn đến thay đổi chính trị là một con số đáng kinh ngạc, thách thức những giả định của chúng ta về quyền lực và cách mạng. Con số này xuất phát từ phân tích của nhà khoa học chính trị Erica Chenoweth về hàng trăm phong trào trong suốt một thế kỷ, đóng vai trò như một điểm tựa mạnh mẽ cho một cuộc thảo luận rộng hơn về điều gì tạo nên hiệu quả cho kháng cự dân sự. Nghiên cứu của Chenoweth đúc kết thành công xuống bốn yếu tố then chốt: sự tham gia đông đảo và đa dạng, khả năng chiến lược nhằm kích động sự đào ngũ từ những trụ cột hỗ trợ then chốt của đối phương (như lực lượng an ninh hay giới tinh hoa kinh doanh), năng lực chuyển đổi giữa các chiến thuật biểu tình và xây dựng thể chế thay thế, cùng việc duy trì kỷ luật bất bạo động trước sự đàn áp.


Áp dụng khuôn khổ này, cuộc thảo luận đánh giá các phong trào đương đại, đặc biệt là các cuộc biểu tình “Không Vua” tại Mỹ. Chenoweth nhận xét rằng họ cho thấy động lực đầy hứa hẹn, phát triển từ 7 lên 9 triệu người tham gia và thể hiện kỷ luật đáng chú ý. Tuy nhiên, thành công cuối cùng của họ phụ thuộc vào việc vượt ra ngoài huy động quần chúng để chủ động tạo ra sự đào ngũ bên trong các cấu trúc quyền lực đang duy trì hiện trạng. Trong lịch sử, đây là rào cản khó khăn nhất, khó hơn nhiều so với việc chỉ lấp đầy các đường phố. Cuộc thảo luận đối chiếu điều này với các phong trào ở Iran và Bahrain, nơi bất chấp sự tham gia ồ ạt, việc thiếu sự đào ngũ—đôi khi được đảm bảo bằng cách nhập khẩu lực lượng an ninh nước ngoài—cùng với sự phân mảnh trong lãnh đạo phe đối lập đã dẫn đến thất bại.


Cuộc đối thoại sau đó khám phá vai trò thường bị bỏ qua của giới tinh hoa kinh tế trong kháng cự. Vẽ ra sự song song với sự kết thúc của chế độ apartheid ở Nam Phi, Chenoweth giải thích rằng áp lực kinh tế kéo dài, bao gồm tẩy chay và việc các công ty rút vốn đầu tư, cuối cùng đã buộc giới kinh doanh phải thúc đẩy các cuộc đàm phán chính trị. Điều này làm nổi bật một chiến thuật mạnh mẽ nhưng chưa được tận dụng triệt để trong bối cảnh hiện đại. Ngược lại, ví dụ về mối đe dọa nhanh chóng và đáng tin cậy của một cuộc tổng đình công do các công đoàn thống nhất ở Hàn Quốc thực hiện cho thấy một chiếc ô dân sự được tổ chức tốt có thể ngăn chặn và đảo ngược một cuộc đảo chính chỉ sau một đêm như thế nào, chứng minh rằng quyền lực làm tê liệt hoạt động của xã hội có thể là biện pháp răn đe tối thượng chống lại những cuộc giành quyền lực độc tài.


Những Điểm Sáng Suốt Đáng Ngạc Nhiên



  • “Quy tắc 3,5%” là một quan sát lịch sử mang tính mô tả, không phải một con số kỳ diệu mang tính quy định; các phong trào vượt qua ngưỡng tham gia tích cực này chưa bao giờ thất bại trong giai đoạn được nghiên cứu, nhưng nó không phải là bảo đảm, đặc biệt khi các chế độ độc tài thích nghi.

  • Chỉ riêng việc huy động quần chúng—chỉ cần đưa đám đông khổng lồ xuống đường—thực ra lại là chiến lược kém hiệu quả nhất để thành công. Mấu chốt là tận dụng sự tham gia đó để kích hoạt sự đào ngũ từ những người ủng hộ then chốt của chế độ.

  • Chiến lược thành công nhất về mặt tính toán là mô hình hóa một cách tiếp cận “trụ cột được thông tin”, trong đó các nhà hoạt động đầu tiên nhắm mục tiêu và biểu tình tại các thể chế mà sự trung thành với chế độ đã được biết là không vững chắc, từ đó tạo ra một chuỗi đào ngũ.

  • Tại Nam Phi, giới tinh hoa kinh doanh và kinh tế đã trở thành trụ cột hỗ trợ quan trọng cho chế độ apartheid; phong trào thành công bằng cách khiến đất nước trở nên không thể cai trị và không sinh lợi cho họ, buộc họ phải gây áp lực lên chính phủ để thay đổi.

  • Năng lượng “tích cực” công khai của một phong trào (như các cuộc biểu tình thân thiện với gia đình) có thể cùng tồn tại và tạo điều kiện cho các chiến thuật gây áp lực có mục tiêu hơn, phía sau hậu trường, nhắm vào các trụ cột quyền lực cụ thể.


Những Điểm Cốt Yếu Thực Tiễn



  • Để một phong trào thành công, cần chuyển trọng tâm từ chỉ tăng số lượng sang nhận diện và gây áp lực lên những “trụ cột hỗ trợ” dao động nhất cho đối phương, chẳng hạn như một số lĩnh vực kinh doanh hoặc lực lượng thực thi pháp luật địa phương, để kích hoạt sự đào ngũ.

  • Xây dựng sự đa dạng chiến lược vượt ra ngoài biểu tình: tổ chức các mạng lưới hỗ trợ lẫn nhau, chuẩn bị cho các hình thức bất hợp tác như đình công hoặc tẩy chay, và phát triển các bước đi tiếp theo rõ ràng để chuyển hóa năng lượng biểu tình thành quyền lực chính trị và cộng đồng lâu dài.

  • Đầu tư vào đào tạo và cơ sở hạ tầng cho kỷ luật bất bạo động, quan sát pháp lý (ví dụ: ghi nhận hành động của cảnh sát) và truyền thông nhanh để duy trì khả năng phục hồi và kiểm soát câu chuyện khi đàn áp leo thang.

  • Cân nhắc rằng thuyết phục riêng tư có thể hiệu quả hơn làm nhục công khai trong việc thuyết phục các tổ chức doanh nghiệp và thể chế trung lập hoặc do dự từ bỏ việc ủng hộ một chế độ độc tài.

  • Nghiên cứu các mô hình lịch sử như liên minh hình ô ở Hàn Quốc, cho thấy rằng khả năng đã được tổ chức trước một cách đáng tin cậy để thực hiện một sự đình trệ trật tự của xã hội (như tổng đình công) có thể là một biện pháp răn đe mạnh mẽ chống lại các cuộc giành quyền lực độc tài.


人口中僅有3.5%積極參與非暴力抵抗就近乎保證能推動政治變革——這個驚人的數據挑戰著我們對權力與革命的認知。該數字源於政治學家艾麗卡·陳諾維對一個世紀以來數百場運動的分析,為「公民抵抗何以有效」的廣泛討論提供了強力支點。陳諾維的研究將成功歸納為四個關鍵要素:大規模且多元的參與、能動搖對手關鍵支持支柱(如安全部隊或商業精英)的策略能力、在抗議戰術與建立替代機構間靈活轉換的應變力,以及面對鎮壓時維持非暴力紀律的韌性。


以此框架審視當代運動,特別是美國的「無王運動」,陳諾維指出其展現出令人鼓舞的勢頭——參與人數從700萬增至900萬,且紀律嚴明。然而,其最終成功關鍵在於超越群眾動員,積極促成維持現狀的權力結構內部叛離。歷史顯示這是最艱難的關卡,遠比單純佔領街道更困難。討論中對比伊朗與巴林的運動:儘管參與規模龐大,但因缺乏內部叛離(有時甚至通過引進外國安全部隊來確保忠誠)及反對派領導層分裂,最終導致失敗。


對話進一步探討經濟精英在抵抗運動中常被忽視的角色。陳諾維以南非終結種族隔離為例,解釋持續的經濟壓力(包括抵制運動與企業撤資)最終迫使商業社群推動政治談判,這凸顯了現代語境中一種強效卻未被充分利用的策略。反觀韓國經驗:工會聯盟迅速形成可信的全國罷工威脅,幾乎一夜間阻止並逆轉了政變,證明「讓社會運轉停擺的能力」可成為威懾專制權力擴張的終極武器。


顛覆性洞見



  • 「3.5%規則」是歷史經驗的觀察性結論,而非必然的魔法數字——在研究時段內,超過此活躍參與門檻的運動從未失敗,但這非絕對保證,尤其當專制政體不斷適應新形勢時。

  • 單純的群眾動員(僅讓人潮湧上街頭)實際上是成功率最低的策略,關鍵在於利用參與規模觸發體制關鍵支持者的叛離。

  • 最高效的策略採用「智能支柱」計算模型:活動家首先針對並抗議那些已知對體制忠誠度動搖的機構,從而引發叛離連鎖效應。

  • 在南非,工商經濟精英曾是種族隔離制度的關鍵支柱;運動通過使國家對該群體「難以治理且無利可圖」,迫使他們向政府施壓求變。

  • 運動公開的「正向」能量(如適合家庭參與的抗議)可與針對特定權力支柱的幕後施壓戰術共存並相輔相成。


實踐啟示



  • 運動成功需將重心從單純擴大規模,轉向識別並施壓於對手最搖擺的「支持支柱」(如特定商業領域或地方執法機構),以觸發叛離。

  • 建立超越抗議的戰略多元性:組織互助網絡,預備罷工或抵制等不合作行動,規劃清晰後續步驟以將抗議能量轉化為持久政治與社區力量。

  • 投資於非暴力紀律培訓、基礎建設、法律監察(如記錄警方行動)與快速通訊系統,以在鎮壓升級時維持韌性並掌握話語權。

  • 對於勸說中立或猶豫的企業與機構背離專制政體,私下勸說可能比公開羞辱更有效

  • 研究歷史範例(如韓國傘式聯盟):預先組織、能有序實現社會停擺的可信能力(如總罷工),可成為威懾專制奪權的強大力量。


La noción de que solo el 3.5% de una población participando activamente en la resistencia no violenta puede ser un catalizador casi garantizado de cambio político es una estadística asombrosa que desafía nuestras suposiciones sobre el poder y la revolución. Esta cifra proviene del análisis de la politóloga Erica Chenoweth de cientos de movimientos a lo largo de un siglo, sirviendo como un poderoso ancla para una discusión más amplia sobre qué hace efectiva a la resistencia civil. La investigación de Chenoweth destila el éxito en cuatro factores críticos: una participación amplia y diversa, la habilidad estratégica para desencadenar deserciones de los pilares clave de apoyo del oponente (como fuerzas de seguridad o élites empresariales), la capacidad de alternar entre tácticas de protesta y la construcción de instituciones alternativas, y mantener la disciplina no violenta frente a la represión.
Aplicando este marco, la conversación evalúa movimientos contemporáneos, particularmente las protestas “No Kings” en EE.UU. Chenoweth señala que muestran un impulso prometedor, creciendo de 7 a 9 millones de participantes, y demuestran una disciplina notable. Sin embargo, su éxito final depende de ir más allá de la movilización masiva para activamente ingeniar deserciones dentro de las estructuras de poder que sostienen el statu quo. Históricamente, este es el obstáculo más difícil, mucho más duro que simplemente llenar las calles. La discusión contrasta esto con movimientos en Irán y Bahréin, donde, a pesar de una participación masiva, una falta de deserciones—a veces asegurada importando fuerzas de seguridad extranjeras—y un liderazgo opositor fragmentado condujeron al fracaso.
El diálogo explora luego el papel, a menudo pasado por alto, de las élites económicas en la resistencia. Trazando un paralelismo con el fin del apartheid en Sudáfrica, Chenoweth explica que la presión económica sostenida, incluidos boicots y desinversiones corporativas, finalmente obligó a la comunidad empresarial a forzar negociaciones políticas. Esto destaca una táctica potente y subutilizada en contextos modernos. Por el contrario, el ejemplo de una amenaza rápida y creíble de huelga general por sindicatos unificados en Corea del Sur muestra cómo un paraguas cívico bien organizado puede disuadir y revertir un golpe de Estado casi de la noche a la mañana, demostrando que el poder de detener el funcionamiento de una sociedad puede ser el disuasivo definitivo contra las tomas de poder autoritarias.
### Perspectivas Sorprendentes
– La “regla del 3.5%” es una observación histórica descriptiva, no un número mágico prescriptivo; los movimientos que superaron este umbral de participación activa *nunca fracasaron* en el período estudiado, pero no es una garantía, especialmente a medida que los regímenes autoritarios se adaptan.
– La movilización masiva por sí sola—simplemente llevar grandes multitudes a las calles—es en realidad la estrategia *menos efectiva* para el éxito. La clave es aprovechar esa participación para desencadenar deserciones de los partidarios clave del régimen.
– La estrategia más exitosa modela computacionalmente un enfoque de “pilar informado”, donde los activistas primero apuntan y protestan frente a instituciones cuya lealtad al régimen ya se sabe que es débil, creando una cascada de deserciones.
– En Sudáfrica, los empresarios y la élite económica se convirtieron en el pilar crítico de apoyo al apartheid; el movimiento tuvo éxito al hacer que el país fuera ingobernable y no rentable para ellos, obligándolos a presionar al gobierno para cambiar.
– La energía pública “positiva” de un movimiento (como protestas familiares) puede coexistir con y habilitar tácticas de presión más específicas y discretas dirigidas a pilares concretos del poder.
### Conclusiones Prácticas
– Para que un movimiento tenga éxito, cambie el enfoque de solo aumentar números a **identificar y aplicar presión sobre los “pilares de apoyo” más vacilantes** de la oposición, como ciertos sectores empresariales o fuerzas del orden locales, para desencadenar deserciones.
– Construya **diversidad estratégica** más allá de las protestas: organice redes de apoyo mutuo, prepárese para la no cooperación como huelgas o boicots, y desarrolle pasos claros siguientes para canalizar la energía de la protesta hacia un poder político y comunitario duradero.
– **Invierta en formación e infraestructura** para la disciplina no violenta, la observación legal (p.ej., documentar acciones policiales) y la comunicación rápida para mantener la resistencia y controlar la narrativa cuando la represión se intensifique.
– Considere que **la persuasión privada** puede ser más efectiva que la denuncia pública para persuadir a actores corporativos e institucionales neutrales o indecisos de que dejen de apoyar a un régimen autoritario.
– Estudie modelos históricos como la coalición paraguas de Corea del Sur, que mostró que **una capacidad creíble y preorganizada para lograr un paro social ordenado (como una huelga general)** puede ser un poderoso disuasivo contra las tomas de poder autoritarias.

A noção de que apenas 3,5% de uma população participando ativamente da resistência não violenta pode ser um catalisador quase garantido de mudança política é uma estatística surpreendente que desafia nossas suposições sobre poder e revolução. Esse dado vem da análise da cientista política Erica Chenoweth sobre centenas de movimentos ao longo de um século e serve como uma poderosa âncora para uma discussão mais ampla sobre o que torna a resistência civil eficaz. A pesquisa de Chenoweth resume o sucesso a quatro fatores críticos: participação ampla e diversificada; a capacidade estratégica de provocar deserções dos pilares-chave de apoio de um oponente (como forças de segurança ou elites empresariais); a capacidade de alternar entre táticas de protesto e a construção de instituições alternativas; e a manutenção da disciplina não violenta diante da repressão.


Aplicando essa estrutura, a conversa avalia movimentos contemporâneos, particularmente os protestos “No Kings” nos EUA. Chenoweth observa que eles mostram um impulso promissor, crescendo de 7 para 9 milhões de participantes, e demonstram uma disciplina notável. No entanto, seu sucesso final depende de ir além da mobilização em massa para ativamente forjar deserções dentro das estruturas de poder que sustentam o status quo. Historicamente, este é o obstáculo mais difícil, muito mais duro do que simplesmente encher as ruas. A discussão contrasta isso com os movimentos no Irã e no Bahrein, onde, apesar da participação maciça, a falta de deserções — às vezes garantida pela importação de forças de segurança estrangeiras — e a liderança fragmentada da oposição levaram ao fracasso.


O diálogo então explora o papel frequentemente negligenciado das elites econômicas na resistência. Traçando um paralelo com o fim do apartheid na África do Sul, Chenoweth explica que a pressão econômica sustentada, incluindo boicotes e desinvestimento corporativo, acabou forçando a comunidade empresarial a pressionar por negociações políticas. Isso destaca uma tática potente e subutilizada em contextos modernos. Por outro lado, o exemplo de uma ameaça rápida e credível de uma greve geral por sindicatos unificados na Coreia do Sul mostra como uma organização cívica unificada pode deter e reverter um golpe quase da noite para o dia, demonstrando que o poder de paralisar o funcionamento de uma sociedade pode ser o maior impedimento contra tentativas autoritárias de tomar o poder.


Visões Surpreendentes



  • A “regra dos 3,5%” é uma observação histórica descritiva, não um número mágico prescritivo; os movimentos que ultrapassaram esse limiar de participação ativa nunca falharam no período estudado, mas isso não é uma garantia, especialmente porque os regimes autoritários se adaptam.

  • A mobilização em massa por si só — simplesmente colocar grandes multidões nas ruas — é, na verdade, a estratégia menos eficaz para o sucesso. A chave é aproveitar essa participação para provocar deserções dos apoiadores-chave do regime.

  • A estratégia mais bem-sucedida modela computacionalmente uma abordagem de “pilar informado”, na qual os ativistas primeiro visam e protestam em instituições cuja lealdade ao regime já se sabe que é instável, criando uma cascata de deserções.

  • Na África do Sul, a elite empresarial e econômica tornou-se o pilar crítico de apoio ao apartheid; o movimento teve sucesso ao tornar o país ingovernável e não lucrativo para eles, forçando-os a pressionar o governo pela mudança.

  • A energia pública “positiva” de um movimento (como protestos familiares) pode coexistir e possibilitar táticas de pressão mais direcionadas e discretas sobre pilares específicos de poder.


Aprendizados Práticos



  • Para um movimento ter sucesso, mude o foco de apenas aumentar números para identificar e pressionar os “pilares de apoio” mais vacilantes da oposição, como certos setores empresariais ou forças policiais locais, para provocar deserções.

  • Construa diversidade estratégica além de protestos: organize redes de ajuda mútua, prepare-se para não-cooperação como greves ou boicotes e desenvolva próximos passos claros para canalizar a energia do protesto em poder político e comunitário duradouro.

  • Invista em treinamento e infraestrutura para disciplina não violenta, observação legal (por exemplo, documentando ações policiais) e comunicação rápida para manter a resiliência e controlar a narrativa quando a repressão aumentar.

  • Considere que a persuasão privada pode ser mais eficaz do que a humilhação pública para persuadir atores corporativos e institucionais neutros ou hesitantes a desertar do apoio a um regime autoritário.

  • Estude modelos históricos como a coalizão unificada da Coreia do Sul, que mostrou que a capacidade crível e pré-organizada de realizar uma paralisia social ordenada (como uma greve geral) pode ser um poderoso impedimento contra tentativas autoritárias de tomar o poder.


When democracies falter, it’s easy to lose hope. Harvard’s Erica Chenoweth reveals how organized, nonviolent resistance has repeatedly restored freedom where violence failed—and why democracy endures through the courage of ordinary people. Listen now to learn how courage—not violence—changes the course of history.

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