0:00:05 The content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business 0:00:10 tax or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed 0:00:14 at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. 0:00:19 For more details, please see a16z.com/disclosures. 0:00:21 Hi and welcome to the A16Z podcast. 0:00:22 I’m Hannah. 0:00:26 The advent of new gene and cell therapies are beginning to approach that holy grail of 0:00:31 medicine, that of a possible cure, but they are also more expensive than any medicines 0:00:32 ever sold before. 0:00:37 In this episode, MIT economist Andrew Lowe and A16Z general partner on the biofund Jorge 0:00:43 Conde discuss how exactly we place an economic value on a cure, the questions we still need 0:00:47 to figure out, like who should pay for what and how, and how we need to start thinking 0:00:51 about handling the coming influx of highly priced medicines like this into our healthcare 0:00:52 system. 0:00:57 Jorge and Andrew also talk about the economics and risk of drug discovery and development 0:01:02 overall and how our markets might just function more like biological systems than anything 0:01:03 else. 0:01:06 So what does an economist know about healthcare? 0:01:08 Yeah, that’s a good question. 0:01:12 I probably should start with a disclaimer, kind of like the disclaimer that you find 0:01:14 on drugs. 0:01:20 This podcast could cause confusion, irritability, and drowsiness, but it should all pass within 0:01:21 a few minutes. 0:01:22 That’s the black box warning. 0:01:23 Right. 0:01:24 Exactly. 0:01:25 My background’s really in financial economics. 0:01:29 I got interested in this because friends and family were dealing with cancers of various 0:01:33 different types, and so the more I learned about what they were going through, the more 0:01:37 I got curious about the underlying economics of cancer drug development. 0:01:42 A lot of the work that you have done as an economist has been around thinking about value. 0:01:46 We have one approved gene therapy that sparks therapeutics, gene therapy for a rare inherited 0:01:48 form of blindness. 0:01:51 There are many, many more in the clinic. 0:01:55 There are many engineered cells or cell therapies that are also in the clinic. 0:02:01 These therapies have one great promise that has been an all too short supply in our industry, 0:02:03 which is the promise of a potential cure. 0:02:08 How do we think about the value of a cure in a system, and specifically how do we think 0:02:14 about pain for cures in a system that really isn’t designed for that? 0:02:16 Yeah, that’s a really interesting challenge. 0:02:20 That challenge, by the way, is only going to grow because although we only have one gene 0:02:26 therapy right now on the market, there are over 300 gene therapy clinical trials registered 0:02:28 at clinicaltrials.gov. 0:02:32 My guess is that within the next three years, we’re probably going to see somewhere between 0:02:35 five and 10 gene therapy approvals. 0:02:40 We’re talking about a pretty significant impact on payers and patients. 0:02:45 Just to give people a sense of scale, so look, Sterna, the spark therapeutics, gene therapy 0:02:48 for blindness, what’s the sticker price on that? 0:02:55 The list price right now is $850,000 for both eyes, $425,000 per eye. 0:02:59 We’re talking about some really expensive therapies, and that’s not even the most expensive. 0:03:05 People are talking about therapies for, say, hemophilia A, that if it gets approved, a 0:03:09 price tag could be well north of a million and a half dollars. 0:03:13 When you think about these kind of numbers, it’s really shocking, but the way I think 0:03:20 about it as an economist is, is it justified given the kind of value that it creates for 0:03:21 consumers? 0:03:25 Typically, the way I think about value is very much the way that someone would think 0:03:28 about value from any kind of a commodity purchase. 0:03:35 If you buy a home, the price of the home should be related to some degree to the housing services 0:03:41 that the home will provide you over the course of your lifetime and beyond. 0:03:46 We typically think about a house is not simply what is going to provide you in terms of shelter 0:03:48 for the next month. 0:03:51 That would be an apartment that you would rent one month at a time. 0:03:56 When we buy a house, as opposed to renting an apartment, we’re buying a stream of future 0:03:58 housing services. 0:04:01 I think about that the same way that I think about gene therapies. 0:04:07 When you are cured of a disease, you’re basically getting a lifetime of health, as opposed to 0:04:13 renting health one pill at a time with a chronic manageable condition. 0:04:18 When thinking about that framework, it stands to reason that if you’re going to get value 0:04:23 from a particular cure over a period of your life, you ought to be able to amortize your 0:04:26 payments over that kind of a period. 0:04:32 If you think about the idea behind a mortgage for a home, we can also apply that to thinking 0:04:35 about a mortgage for drugs, drug mortgages. 0:04:37 To mortgage for a cure. 0:04:38 Yeah. 0:04:39 Who pays that mortgage? 0:04:41 Well, that’s a good question. 0:04:47 In my view, insurance companies should pay for it because that’s why we have health insurance. 0:04:51 There are challenges, though, with the current system in getting insurance companies to pay 0:04:56 for it simply because they’re going to have a hard time in terms of balancing the cost 0:05:00 of the insurance with the payouts that they have to make. 0:05:05 Typically the way insurance works, if you join an insurance plan, you pay premiums 0:05:09 every year and in the event that you get ill, they cover your cost. 0:05:13 And the idea is that the amount that you’re paying every year, on average, should roughly 0:05:18 equal the cost that they’re paying out, maybe a little bit less so that they can make a 0:05:21 profit from their business. 0:05:26 That economic calculus becomes very difficult when you’ve got patients that can leave a 0:05:28 plan after two or three years. 0:05:36 So imagine a health insurance company, A, paying for a cure for you and with the expectation 0:05:39 that now that you’re healthy, you’re going to be able to pay premiums for the rest of 0:05:42 your life and that will make up for the cost of the cure. 0:05:48 But suppose that after three years, you leave plan A and move to plan B. Now, plan B has 0:05:52 the benefit of your health and the premiums that you’re going to be paying for the rest 0:05:57 of your life, whereas plan A is stuck having paid for your therapy. 0:06:04 So the solution to this is to allow plan A to amortize, to space out the payment of your 0:06:07 therapy over the course of many years. 0:06:12 And if you leave after three years, the remaining payments, the remaining drug mortgages that 0:06:18 the health plan A was supposed to pay, that moves to plan B. And in a way, that creates 0:06:23 a level playing field for all insurance companies so nobody is disincentivized to provide those 0:06:24 cures to their patients. 0:06:30 So that’s a fascinating concept because one of the things when people think about insurance, 0:06:35 when they think about people moving around from plan to plan, and we have now legislation 0:06:41 around this, is, well, what’s the obligation of the payer to pay for a pre-existing condition? 0:06:45 We’ve always assumed a pre-existing condition as a disease, but what you’re describing 0:06:50 is in some cases in the future, the pre-existing condition might actually be a cure. 0:06:54 And so there’ll be a liability not associated with the treatment of a disease, but a liability 0:06:56 associated with the treatment for a cure. 0:06:57 Exactly. 0:07:02 And so we can actually fix the system with one stroke of a pen by changing in the Affordable 0:07:09 Care Act the sentence that prevents insurers from refusing to serve a planned participant 0:07:14 because of pre-existing conditions to change that to pre-existing financial conditions as 0:07:16 well. 0:07:20 And if we do that, then this whole issue about mobility is not a problem. 0:07:23 But good luck trying to get legislators to do that right now. 0:07:25 I think it’s going to be a challenge. 0:07:30 Do we know that debate has even taken place because it does feel like a logical solution? 0:07:35 As far as I know, the debate has not yet taken place, largely because there’s no need. 0:07:40 But if we institute these payment plans for one-time therapies and we’re able to start 0:07:46 developing cures for some of the larger prevalence diseases, for example, we’re on the verge of 0:07:50 developing a cure for sickle cell anemia, well, there are 100,000 patients in the United 0:07:55 States with sickle cell, and that’s going to hit health plans pretty hard. 0:08:00 A few weeks ago in the UK, a group announced the launch of a clinical trial for applying 0:08:04 gene therapy to deal with age-related macular degeneration. 0:08:09 There are 600,000 AMD patients in the UK, 2 million patients in the US. 0:08:13 If we have a gene therapy for AMD that succeeds, that’s going to be a real problem for our 0:08:15 health care system. 0:08:21 The concept of a drug mortgage or a cure, a mortgage for cures, it’s a fascinating one. 0:08:27 But when we use the analogy of a home, does it start to break down in the sense that I 0:08:34 know how much I’m going to pay for my mortgage because the value of the house is agreed upon 0:08:37 and determined when I buy that house. 0:08:42 And in some ways, the equity I get in my home is the difference between what the value was 0:08:48 when I bought it versus the value when I sell it and I end up paying off the mortgage at 0:08:49 that point in time. 0:08:57 In the case of the cure, how do we get agreement on what the value of the cure is at the moment 0:08:59 of treatment? 0:09:05 Because I would imagine that for a patient, they’re going to put one value on it, society 0:09:08 may put a different value on it, the payer may put a different value on it. 0:09:14 So how do we get to agreement on value so we can from there determine the mortgage payments? 0:09:17 Well, different countries answer that question differently. 0:09:22 For example, in the United Kingdom, their process for determining what the price of 0:09:28 a drug should be or what an acceptable price is is a group of individuals that do pharmacoeconomic 0:09:31 analysis to try to calculate cost effectiveness. 0:09:34 This is an organization called NICE, N-I-C-E. 0:09:39 And this organization does economic studies to try to determine whether or not at a given 0:09:43 price it’s worthwhile for their society. 0:09:48 And not everybody agrees with what NICE comes up with, but the bottom line is that the National 0:09:52 Health Service in the United Kingdom will take the recommendations of NICE and follow 0:09:53 through. 0:09:59 Now, in our country, we would call that a death panel and it’s a politically loaded term, 0:10:02 but effectively that’s unfortunately what it is. 0:10:05 You have to make trade-offs between money and lives saved. 0:10:08 Now, in the United States, we have a very different system. 0:10:10 It’s a multi-payer system. 0:10:15 And at first I thought, oh, that just means it’s a free market, but in fact, the complexity 0:10:21 of the regulation surrounding the pharma industry is anything but a free market. 0:10:26 There are all sorts of incentives in certain cases that cause drug prices to be higher than 0:10:30 usual and in other cases to force them to be lower than usual. 0:10:35 I think that the best way to think about it is to start back and ask the question, what 0:10:37 do patients get out of it? 0:10:39 What is the value to a patient? 0:10:44 We can layer on top of that all sorts of other considerations, but to me, the patient should 0:10:46 be the first consideration. 0:10:48 And there are economists who study that all the time. 0:10:51 They come up with the notion of quality-adjusted life years. 0:10:54 And they ask the question, if you’re going to save a patient’s life, if you’re going 0:11:00 to literally cure the patient of an unfortunate early death, you can actually calculate the 0:11:04 number of quality-adjusted life years you’ve given back to that patient. 0:11:07 And that’s the beginning of where value comes from. 0:11:13 The other argument would be, if you cure a disease, you avoid the cost of treating that 0:11:15 disease over the lifetime. 0:11:21 So one other argument for pricing or giving value to a cure is to say, well, let’s take 0:11:25 the net present value of all of the avoided costs. 0:11:28 And so I’m going to ask you an overly simplified question. 0:11:36 Would a way to price these cures be, let’s take the value of the qualities, the quality-adjusted 0:11:43 life years, and add to that the net present value of the costs avoided? 0:11:48 Well, that’s certainly a consideration that people have used in making an argument one 0:11:50 way or the other for pricing. 0:11:53 But I think that you have to be careful because there are many other factors then that you 0:11:55 might want to also bring in. 0:12:01 For example, if a patient is now going to live a natural life, that patient will pay taxes 0:12:03 for the rest of his or her life. 0:12:06 Should we factor that into the calculus? 0:12:10 That patient, on the other hand, will be consuming other aspects of society. 0:12:15 And for example, if that particular patient ends up becoming unemployed, then they’ll 0:12:17 be drawing unemployment insurance. 0:12:21 So you can go down this rabbit hole of all sorts of costs and benefits that you have 0:12:23 to do the math for. 0:12:28 And unless we’re really set up to do that, it’s very easy to cherry-pick the particular 0:12:33 statistic that makes your case look stronger than the opposing side. 0:12:37 So I think that the approach that we seem to be gravitating towards is to try to come 0:12:42 up with an objective notion of value, and there’s an organization called ICER. 0:12:47 It’s a nonprofit organization that’s job is to focus on developing the cost-effectiveness 0:12:53 studies, maybe using that as a starting point, and then going from there to try to see whether 0:12:58 or not we can come up with a rational pricing model that basically all stakeholders can 0:12:59 live with. 0:13:03 As ICER looked into the spark therapeutic struggle, I believe they have. 0:13:08 I know that they did a study on gene therapies in general, and they were very positively 0:13:13 inclined, particularly given the cost of many of the diseases without the gene therapy. 0:13:16 Hemophilia is a good example, even at a price of, say, one and a half million. 0:13:19 We don’t actually know what the price will be. 0:13:23 One and a half million is actually a bargain relative to what it costs to deal with a current 0:13:30 hemophilia patient, which can be anywhere from 300,000 to 500,000 a year for the rest 0:13:32 of that patient’s natural life. 0:13:37 So at one and a half million, that seems to be a bargain from that kind of calculus. 0:13:40 So it’s a fascinating conundrum. 0:13:46 If we look at the history of the biotechnology industry, we’ve seen a small-scale version 0:13:50 of this challenge with rare genetic diseases. 0:13:55 So to pick one sort of well-known example, when Genzyme comes onto the scene, the founder 0:14:02 and CEO of that company, Henry Tirmier, pioneered the idea of, you know, we can develop and 0:14:08 commercialize therapies for these patients that have these rare diseases. 0:14:12 And there’s a lot of value associated with treating them and alleviating the conditions 0:14:14 to the extent that we can. 0:14:18 And as a result, we can charge, we can price it based on that value. 0:14:23 So those therapies were on the order of $100,000 and above. 0:14:29 Well, oh my gosh, how can we possibly pay $100,000 for a therapy? 0:14:35 And part of the rationale for doing it was, well, these are rare diseases, so collectively 0:14:42 the probability that you would have many patients in any given plan that are going to have this 0:14:49 therapy in general, on scale, these were going to be very much one-off events for most plans, 0:14:54 and therefore they could shoulder that kind of payment. 0:14:58 What’s fascinating about what we’re describing here, and you’ve given a lot of great examples, 0:15:06 like SMA, hemophilia, AMD, these are all diseases that even if they were individually rare, which 0:15:11 many of these are not, collectively this is going to be a common condition. 0:15:16 And so we’re going to see another reckoning, I think, across the industry in having to 0:15:23 think through this problem that Gensheim tackled from the micro scale, at the more macro scale. 0:15:26 And my take on this is, I’m an optimist. 0:15:31 My assumption is that the innovation is going to lead the regulation, the policy, the coverage 0:15:36 here, and that we will get to an answer on how to actually make sure that patients get 0:15:37 these cures. 0:15:42 Well, I’m absolutely optimistic that we’ll come up with an answer, but I don’t believe 0:15:46 we’re going to get to that answer until the system is forced to deal with this issue in 0:15:48 a direct way. 0:15:53 And maybe that ends up being when we develop a gene therapy for a really big indication 0:15:55 like Alzheimer’s. 0:15:58 There are currently 5 million patients that have Alzheimer’s. 0:16:03 If we develop a gene therapy to stop the progression of the disease or to be able to delay the 0:16:08 onset, that’s going to create tremendous pressure on the healthcare system. 0:16:11 And at that point, we’re really going to have to confront this as a nation. 0:16:14 And it’s complicated because you’re dealing with life and death issues. 0:16:19 When we think about pricing things like a car, it’s not a big deal because, well, if you 0:16:22 can’t afford a car, maybe you’ll get a cheaper car. 0:16:25 But if you need a drug, you can’t afford to get a cheaper drug if there’s only one drug 0:16:27 that cures your disease. 0:16:31 So I think that’s one of the reasons why economics, as much as I love the subject and feel that 0:16:34 it’s critical, these are not just economic considerations. 0:16:39 We have to bring in all of the relevant stakeholders to make these decisions, and that’s really 0:16:41 what our policymakers are trying to do. 0:16:46 It’s clear we’re on the cusp of a new age in medicine, and it’s going to be fascinating 0:16:48 to see how all of this plays out. 0:16:51 One of the things that I found most surprising about your work is what the work you’ve done 0:16:57 around trying to develop risk metrics for drug discovery. 0:17:00 Can we talk a little bit about some of the conclusions that you drew from that and how 0:17:01 we can apply them? 0:17:05 That’s a really interesting aspect of the healthcare industry that puzzled me for the 0:17:07 longest time. 0:17:11 When I first started looking at the way drugs were developed, I couldn’t understand why 0:17:17 it was the case that so many amazing breakthroughs have been made over the years while at the 0:17:21 same time, I kept hearing about the fact that there’s this valley of death and there’s not 0:17:25 enough funding at the early stages of drug discovery. 0:17:30 The more I looked into it, the more I realized that these incredible breakthroughs are actually 0:17:34 increasing the economic risks of drug discovery. 0:17:39 When I first looked at Eroom’s law, I never heard a professor at Eroom, it took me a while 0:17:44 to realize, “Oh, Eroom is more spelled backwards, the opposite of Moore’s law,” and the idea 0:17:49 that as we get smarter, as pioneers in the drug development field develop all of these 0:17:56 amazing therapies, that it actually gets harder from an investment’s perspective, that was 0:17:57 really counter-intuitive. 0:18:01 Usually, in my field, as we get smarter, typically things get easier. 0:18:06 The more you know about a company, for example, the less risky is an investment in that company. 0:18:07 That’s right. 0:18:08 But that’s not true with drug development. 0:18:12 Thinking about drug development requires thinking carefully about risk. 0:18:17 The more you know about the underlying biology of disease, the riskier it can get from a 0:18:19 financial perspective. 0:18:24 The reason for that is that as we learn more about these various different mechanisms of 0:18:30 disease and how to deal with them, it can actually increase the risk of a drug becoming 0:18:36 obsolete because some young upstart decides to try this new pathway that ends up working 0:18:37 really well. 0:18:40 A good example is combination therapies. 0:18:46 We now know that one or two drugs that don’t work particularly well can work magnificently 0:18:48 well when put together. 0:18:53 The best example is the HIV cocktail, the five antiretroviral therapies that by themselves 0:18:57 don’t do very much, but when you put them together, they can turn a deadly disease into 0:18:59 a chronic manageable condition. 0:19:02 That’s an interesting example, because if you look at HIV cocktail therapy, there was 0:19:08 a theory for why the combination of the compounds that go into the cocktail would work, to some 0:19:13 block the attachment of the virus to the cell, some don’t allow the cell to replicate. 0:19:18 That had a logical basis for the combination therapy, but that’s not always true. 0:19:24 Sometimes the synergy of therapies happened experimentally or they’re observed experimentally. 0:19:26 They’re not sort of a priori known. 0:19:32 But the fact that we now know that combination therapies can work, that means that from a 0:19:37 scientific as well as an ethical perspective, we’re obligated to search for combinations 0:19:38 to come up with new therapies. 0:19:41 In fact, some people say that we don’t need any more new drugs. 0:19:44 We’ve got all the drugs we need of the 2800 drugs that are approved. 0:19:48 All we need to do is to find the right combination to treat all disease. 0:19:51 So now that we are smarter and we know the combination therapies work, what does that 0:19:52 mean? 0:19:57 It means that the drug development landscape has become that much more complex. 0:20:01 And it also means that for existing pharma companies that have drugs that are producing 0:20:07 good revenues, their revenues can be wiped out by a new combination that just comes out 0:20:12 of the blue because some researchers hit upon that just by accident or by theory. 0:20:15 But the flip side of that is there is latency in the system, right? 0:20:21 In other words, it takes, assuming that one could hypothesize or test a combination, the 0:20:27 period of time from which that original hypothesis is tested until it’s actually impacting patient 0:20:29 care can be on the order of years. 0:20:34 It could be, but that just means that we now understand the risks can be drawn out over 0:20:36 a period of years. 0:20:41 And so that really surprised me in that idea that we actually, as we get smarter, things 0:20:43 could get riskier. 0:20:44 That’s fascinating. 0:20:50 So to set the table a bit in terms of the drug discovery and development paradigm, I think 0:20:56 in the U.S. alone, the biopharmaceutical industry spends about $75 billion per annum investing 0:20:57 in R&D. 0:21:00 And a big chunk of that is the D side of the equation, right? 0:21:05 The statistic that gets thrown around a lot is that it takes on average about 10 to 15 0:21:12 years for a new drug to reach approval, to get FDA approval and reach patients. 0:21:17 And when you account for all of the failures along the way, the total amount of investment 0:21:23 to get to that one drug 10 to 15 years later is something on the order of $2.5 billion. 0:21:28 If you just look at sort of the survival statistics, it’s something on the order of 1 in 10,000 0:21:32 compounds actually makes it all the way through this gauntlet. 0:21:35 Are those statistics real? 0:21:37 Have they been born out in the work that you’ve done? 0:21:45 Well, the short answer is no, mainly because what we’re trying to do is to understand how 0:21:48 these statistics change over time. 0:21:53 So the numbers that you cited are accurate when you look at the entire expanse of history. 0:21:57 But the problem with that is that medicine has changed a lot. 0:22:02 In particular, if we think about the fact that it was only since 2003 that the human 0:22:06 genome was sequenced, we’re not even 20 years out. 0:22:11 And nowadays, we understand that sequencing the human genome is fundamental for lots of 0:22:14 diseases and therapies like cancer, immunotherapies. 0:22:19 So we’re in a very different period today than we were even 10 years ago. 0:22:24 So when you take a look at statistics like it takes $2.6 billion to develop a drug or 0:22:28 the probability of success for developing a drug in oncology is 5%, those numbers are 0:22:34 aggregated over a period of time and over a particular sample of firms. 0:22:37 What we’ve done over the course of the last couple of years is to try to come up with 0:22:43 better numbers, numbers that use a larger data set over a longer period of time, but 0:22:47 looking at it through time so that we can actually see what the trends are. 0:22:49 So here’s a case in point. 0:22:55 If you take data from 2000 to 2015, so that’s 15 years of data, the probability of success 0:23:00 in oncology in cancer drugs is actually less than 5%. 0:23:06 But if you look at the last five years, the probability of success is triple the historical 0:23:07 rate. 0:23:12 So just within the last five years, the probability of success in oncology is about 10% to 15%. 0:23:16 Especially if you look at lead indications and you add biomarkers, so when you stratify 0:23:19 the data in that way, you get a very different picture. 0:23:24 Even if the probability of success is 10% to 15%, that obviously means that 85% to 90% 0:23:25 can still fail. 0:23:30 The main reason that drugs tend to fail is either because the target that you’re trying 0:23:36 to hit with your drug, with your molecule, doesn’t necessarily modulate the disease. 0:23:39 That doesn’t have the intended effect. 0:23:44 Or it does modulate the disease, but it’s also important elsewhere, so you get sort 0:23:48 of on target toxicity for that molecule. 0:23:54 Or you made the wrong molecule and the molecule either hits the target, maybe not hard enough 0:23:58 or hits that target and a lot of other targets, and so then you get off target toxicity. 0:24:03 We’re learning a lot more about biology and what confounded you and as you entered in 0:24:05 the space that actually has increased the risk. 0:24:10 How do you sort of connect the dots between that insight with the last data point you just 0:24:13 gave us that the success rates are actually going up and not down? 0:24:16 How do I connect those two thoughts in my mind? 0:24:20 Because I would imagine if the risk was going up, that means success is going down, but it 0:24:22 sounds like you’re saying both are happening. 0:24:25 That’s right, and that’s really a fascinating conundrum. 0:24:31 First of all, when my coauthors and I calculate success rates, what we’re looking at is path 0:24:37 by path success rates, meaning if you start off with a compound at phase one, what are 0:24:41 the chances that that will eventually become a drug? 0:24:44 That is, you can file successfully for a new drug application. 0:24:51 We’re actually following a drug coupled with an indication through the entire process. 0:24:56 It is true that when you look at it path by path, the success rates are going up. 0:25:01 At the same time, what I was talking about was the financial risks of investing in these 0:25:05 things, and that’s also going up. 0:25:06 Here’s the key. 0:25:12 The key is that how many investors do you know that put money in a phase one trial and leave 0:25:16 it there and follow through until NDA? 0:25:17 Very, very few. 0:25:23 Yeah, so they basically may trade out of that investment at a value inflection point, whether 0:25:27 that’s an IPO or an acquisition, and that’s uncoupled with the approval of the drug. 0:25:28 That’s right. 0:25:34 In fact, those are the good events, but more often than not, they get wiped out because 0:25:40 a compound has these off-target effects, toxicity, or it’s not doing what it’s supposed to do. 0:25:45 As a result, they basically get the plug pulled on the project, and they lose all of their 0:25:46 initial investment. 0:25:52 A good example is a drug Velcade, which is a very successful drug, but it probably wiped 0:25:58 out two or three sets of investors before it actually got to approval. 0:25:59 That’s the problem. 0:26:02 Drug development is actually not a marathon. 0:26:07 Actually, I think it’s more of a relay race of marathons, and the problem is that very 0:26:11 often we drop the baton, and that’s the challenge. 0:26:16 That’s the increase in risk, while at the same time, we are also increasing approval 0:26:17 rates. 0:26:20 It’s ironic, but they’re both true. 0:26:25 The work that you’ve done on understanding risk and benefit and drug discovery, does 0:26:27 it hold true across different disease areas? 0:26:32 Because we’ve spent a lot of time talking about cancer and combination therapies. 0:26:37 You mentioned HIV as well, but how universal a truth is this across disease areas? 0:26:41 Well, there are a couple of things that are common across disease areas, and then there’s 0:26:44 certain aspects that are very different. 0:26:50 The commonality is that drug development takes a very long time. 0:26:55 Because of the length, if the funding gets interrupted midway, it really destroys a tremendous 0:26:57 amount of value. 0:27:01 Where there are differences, though, in the risks across the therapeutic areas is that 0:27:03 certain areas are just harder than others. 0:27:08 For example, we now know that Alzheimer’s is probably the most difficult challenge facing 0:27:11 our nation and frankly the world today. 0:27:17 It’s since 2003, the probability of success for Alzheimer’s drug development is zero. 0:27:22 We have had literally no drugs since 2003 to treat Alzheimer’s. 0:27:26 So we need to think about a different approach for that particular area. 0:27:28 Now let me turn to vaccines. 0:27:33 The probability of success for developing a vaccine is north of 30%. 0:27:36 So it seems like vaccines is a slam dunk. 0:27:40 And yet, why aren’t we developing vaccines for lots of the diseases that we need to 0:27:41 deal with? 0:27:44 Because the economics of vaccines- Financial incentives are not in place. 0:27:45 Exactly, they don’t work. 0:27:50 So that’s another area where despite the differences in the probability of success, the economics 0:27:54 are really preventing us from dealing with that terrible set of afflictions. 0:28:00 Going back to the first point you made earlier in terms of the risk going up as we learn 0:28:01 more about disease. 0:28:08 I think that’s very true in the world where each drug discovery program was its own sort 0:28:10 of bespoke thing. 0:28:16 So you made a target, you made a molecule for a specific target and if that was successful, 0:28:17 fantastic. 0:28:27 But when you had a second program as an innovator, there’s really not a whole lot of knowledge 0:28:33 or value you could take from that first program into the next one. 0:28:36 Value doesn’t really accrue from one program to the next. 0:28:39 And of course, by extension, if there’s a failure, there’s not a whole lot of experience 0:28:44 that you can take from that first program into the second. 0:28:48 But that starts to change when you start to talk about things like gene therapy and cell 0:28:54 therapy in that if we figure out how to deliver genes to specific cell types, in other words 0:29:00 if the vehicles get very sophisticated, that could be used across a number of diseases. 0:29:02 And that was one of the big risk factors for gene therapy. 0:29:07 So if we went back over the last couple of decades as this approach was being developed, 0:29:11 the same as I’m sure going to be very true for things like CAR-T, what follows in terms 0:29:14 of engineered cells, there are going to be built off of some of the innovations, all 0:29:17 of the components that are used in these kinds of therapies. 0:29:19 So value will start to accrue over time. 0:29:25 We’ll have therapeutic platforms that could be very broadly applied and won’t be as bespoke. 0:29:29 Have you given thought as to how that impacts sort of the risk model? 0:29:34 Because in this case, it might be that as we learn more risk actually goes down because 0:29:38 you know if it worked in delivering a gene to one cell, it is more likely to work in 0:29:41 delivering a different gene to a different cell. 0:29:42 So you’re absolutely right. 0:29:46 You give a great example where as we learn more about delivering genes, we’re going to 0:29:49 actually reduce the risk across all gene therapies. 0:29:51 We only have one approved gene therapy, of course, but there are a number of clinical 0:29:56 trials and many of them are using this AAV vector. 0:29:59 What happens if we discover that there are some off-target effects? 0:30:03 That’s going to affect all of these gene therapies at the same time. 0:30:09 So in a way, using these commonly used techniques, that’s a good thing because we’ve learned 0:30:14 that they seem to work, but at the same time they also build certain kinds of common risk 0:30:17 factors across all of these therapies. 0:30:22 So I think we need to be aware of that and we need to assess that kind of risk when we’re 0:30:24 dealing with these types of therapies. 0:30:25 It cuts both ways. 0:30:26 Obviously, we learn more. 0:30:27 I see. 0:30:28 Yes, it’s systemic risk. 0:30:29 But it’s systemic. 0:30:30 Exactly right. 0:30:31 I see. 0:30:32 Yeah. 0:30:34 So you’ve mentioned that one of your early surprises or at least one of your early insights 0:30:39 when you came into the healthcare space is that in many ways it’s not really a rational 0:30:40 market. 0:30:46 There are structurally a lot of impediments to have a sort of truly well-functioning market 0:30:48 in healthcare. 0:30:55 There’s regulation, there’s cross-incentives, there’s general issues around economic feasibility 0:31:00 of being able to run healthcare systems in the first place. 0:31:05 And I read a quote from you where you said, “Markets behave more like biological systems 0:31:07 than physical devices.” 0:31:09 Can you explain what you mean by that? 0:31:14 Well, for one thing, we ought to think about using evolutionary biology as a paradigm for 0:31:18 understanding how markets change over time. 0:31:24 Markets are not immutable objects that are set in a particular path that never changes. 0:31:28 Because we’ve got a variety of different species that are interacting with each other, we actually 0:31:33 understand that now markets can be very different from even one day to the next depending on 0:31:35 who shows up. 0:31:39 And once you understand the kind of paradigm that biologists use to think about various 0:31:43 interactions in their domain, you can see that it applies almost directly. 0:31:44 It’s not even metaphorical. 0:31:50 It is actually literal that markets are biological adaptations to dealing with certain challenges 0:31:52 that we face every day. 0:31:57 And through that lens, all sorts of behaviors that we’re puzzling from a pure traditional 0:32:00 economic perspective become a lot more understandable. 0:32:06 Take for example, how stock markets have these incredible booms and busts. 0:32:10 We think that that’s irrational because, well, either you’re overvaluing stocks during the 0:32:15 boom or you’re dramatically undervaluing them during the bust. 0:32:19 But that doesn’t take into account the fact that at the early stages of innovation, nobody 0:32:22 knows whether or not that’s going to have any value. 0:32:23 Gene therapy is a good example. 0:32:27 The first gene therapy was a big leap of faith. 0:32:31 And in fact, even before that first gene therapy, there was an example in Philadelphia of a 0:32:35 gene therapy trial that went awry and a patient died. 0:32:36 The Jesse Gelsinger. 0:32:37 Exactly. 0:32:43 We need to develop an understanding about these kinds of therapeutics and technologies. 0:32:48 And in order for us to do that, we have to take these kinds of leaps of faith. 0:32:53 And as these leaps of faith turn out to work out, we become eventually over enthusiastic 0:32:56 and the market overshoots. 0:33:01 And once we realize that they’ve overshot, we then start to unwind and correct and the 0:33:03 market sometimes crashes. 0:33:08 So that kind of feast and famine, the boom and bust cycle, that may not be rational 0:33:14 from a strictly physical perspective, but from a biological perspective, it’s actually 0:33:15 expected. 0:33:17 Truly evolutionary landscape. 0:33:18 Red and tooth and claw. 0:33:19 Biology, economics. 0:33:20 Absolutely. 0:33:21 Thank you, professor. 0:33:21 Thank you. 0:33:31 [BLANK_AUDIO]
with Andrew Lo (@AndrewWLo) and Jorge Conde (@JorgeCondeBio)
The advent of new gene and cell therapies are beginning to approach that holy grail of medicine—that of a possible cure. But they are also more expensive than any medicines ever sold before. In this episode, MIT economist Andrew Lo and a16z General Partner on the Bio Fund Jorge Conde discuss how exactly we place an economic value on a cure; the questions we still need to figure out, like who should pay for what and how; and how we need to start thinking about handling the coming influx of highly priced medicines like these into our healthcare system.
If we think about these payments as a kind of ‘mortgage for a cure,’ what happens when your gene therapy mortgage defaults? How would payment plans like these move between insurance plans? Lo and Conde also discuss the broader context in our healthcare system, the economics and risk of drug discovery and development overall – and finally, how our markets might just function more like biological systems than anything else.
0:00:05 Hi and welcome to the A16Z podcast. Today’s episode is a special conversation with Lorraine 0:00:10 Powell Jobs, founder and president of the Emerson Collective, a firm she founded in 2004 to drive 0:00:15 social impact through investments across a broad range of areas such as education, immigration, 0:00:21 and the environment. Lorraine Powell Jobs is interviewed by A16Z co-founder Ben Horowitz, 0:00:25 and their discussion covers everything from Lorraine’s childhood in mountainous rural New 0:00:31 Jersey and how it shaped her to what the Emerson Collective is driven by and does and why it’s a 0:00:38 collective for that matter. For more about Lorraine Powell Jobs’ work, see www.emersoncollective.com. 0:00:43 This conversation originally took place at our most recent summit event in November 2018. 0:00:48 Welcome, everybody. I’m Ben. This is Lorraine. Coming in, I was just talking to Lorraine. 0:00:54 I was saying it’s really hard to introduce her because she’s not like our other co-investors 0:01:01 like at all in a good way, but she’s got a much more complex thing that she does and background. 0:01:05 So I could read the read. I could say, well, she’s a media mogul. She’s a tech investor. 0:01:11 She’s an education reformer and so forth. But you won’t even know really who she is if I just did 0:01:16 it like that. And none of them would be really honest. I don’t think anybody would call me a 0:01:22 media mogul except you. Or what you are a media mogul, technically. I’m so excited to be here, 0:01:28 to be having this conversation because there is nobody else like this. And so you’re in for a treat. 0:01:32 Why don’t we start at the beginning back in West Milford, New Jersey, where you grew up. 0:01:37 You didn’t have the whole Silver Spoon. No, we were solidly middle-class family. 0:01:46 Yeah. And what was that town like? West Milford, New Jersey is about 20 miles west of the George 0:01:52 Washington Bridge and then another 10 miles north. If people don’t know New Jersey, there is a 0:01:59 mountainous part of New Jersey. And in fact, one can go skiing and one can ice skate. And so we 0:02:04 did all of those things. We were just in the beginning of the mountainous parts. And so now 0:02:12 as an adult looking back, it’s lovely. It’s wooded. It’s wild. I grew up with three brothers who were 0:02:19 very wild. So we had sort of this connection to nature in the natural world that we would all 0:02:25 hope for our children. However, growing up there was also gritty. And it had a lot of 0:02:32 Jersey in it. Yeah, Jersey. Like, what is Jersey? It really did. It was kind of hard to scrap all. 0:02:41 People had big hearts, but also big edges. And so you learn really quickly, as a child, 0:02:48 where the boundaries are and which boundaries one shouldn’t cross. We were all of us 0:02:56 put to work really early, which was great. So we developed an extraordinary work ethic. 0:03:02 As kids, you know, they were in the end, my mom remarried, and then we had a mix of blended 0:03:08 family. My dad died when I was three in a playing crash. And so we ended up with six kids, 0:03:13 like the Brady Bunch, three girls and three boys. But in order to have controlled chaos, 0:03:21 we all had chores. And we had very set times for eating and sleeping. And I shared a room my whole 0:03:27 life. And I shared a bathroom. There were six of us that shared one bathroom. And if you can imagine 0:03:34 what it was like getting to school on time, it was a mess. That was sort of my childhood. I was 0:03:40 always trying to eke out a little bit of privacy. And so now I can empathize with those in social 0:03:48 media who would like to regain their privacy. Get out of my bathroom, Facebook. It’s a joke. 0:03:55 It’s a joke, people. Anyway, I think a lot of what shaped me from that experience in West 0:03:59 Melbourne, New Jersey, and then, you know, our big trip each year was going down the shore. We’d 0:04:07 rent a little house and drive down there and get terribly sunburned. We were probably five blocks 0:04:12 back from the ocean, but it was our favorite time. And then we’d drive back up in our station wagon 0:04:19 back up to Northern New Jersey. That sort of circumscribed our life. Chores. And then one 0:04:28 vacation and get sunburned. But we were steeped in core values of real dedication and a sense that 0:04:35 there was always a way out. And that was through education. And that was communicated early on to 0:04:45 me. And luckily, I loved books and I love school. And I think I sought out teachers and tried to 0:04:51 ingratiate myself and just, you know, find a little place where I could excel and where I could feel 0:04:57 that there was a reward for the work that also gave me joy, which was, you know, doing school. 0:05:02 Right. It wasn’t just a chore. It was work with the benefit. That’s right. That’s a great inspiration. 0:05:06 And you went to University of Penn which is like a super prestigious school. 0:05:12 I did. I did. Yeah. I was the first person in my high school to go to an Ivy League school. 0:05:18 West Milford Township is massive and stretched all the way up to New York State. Probably 20% 0:05:24 of our graduating class went on to any further schooling. Certainly not all four years. A lot 0:05:28 of them went on to trade school. Yeah. I was reading something that you said that I thought was 0:05:34 very interesting. So when you were a kid, I guess you donated like $20 to the Southern Poverty 0:05:43 Leadership Law Center. Yeah. And they would send you letters. And the thing that you were very focused 0:05:49 on was who got the opportunity and who didn’t. Yes. Because I was focused on it because they 0:05:57 were focused on it. Yeah. SPLC had a huge impact in my young life because I read about them in, 0:06:02 I think, the reader’s digest. I think that’s where I read about them. There was a profile on 0:06:09 Morris D’s. So I saved up some newspaper money and I sent them for me, which was a lot of money 0:06:15 at the time, $20. I think I was either in late middle school or high school. Yeah. I don’t know 0:06:20 if you remember. I don’t know if you remember when you’re a kid getting mail with such an exciting 0:06:26 thing. That’s the only place that ever sent me any mail, that in one of my grandmas. So they would 0:06:33 send me mail reliably, probably every quarter. Of course, it was a beautiful form letter, but it 0:06:40 always told a story of justice meeting injustice and opened my eyes to things that were going on 0:06:48 in the world in the early 70s that I otherwise wasn’t privy to. So I really hung on there everywhere. 0:06:54 I remember saving all the letters from Morris D’s in actually one of my most wonderful moments, 0:06:59 and it only just happened a couple of years ago at Emerson Collective. We do all of our 0:07:08 philanthropic giving anonymously, but we had been funding SPLC and we decided that we wanted to do 0:07:13 some teaching tolerance curriculum in partnership with them. And so one of our team members was 0:07:19 actually talking to Morris D’s who still works there. And so I said to her, “Can I get on the phone 0:07:25 with Morris D’s?” I got to tell him that he was the one. He planted that seed in me that individual 0:07:34 people could pay attention and engage and maybe do something about injustices that seem intractable 0:07:41 or far away or impenetrable. Oh, that’s a great story. And coming from your Big Bruce Springsteen 0:07:46 fan, and it’s really interesting that in his work, even though he’s Bruce Springsteen, 0:07:51 it’s still all about New Jersey. And do you feel that way about your work, where that 0:07:58 a lot of the inspiration is still from that time? A lot of inspiration. Yes, although I don’t find 0:08:06 that the work is necessary all about New Jersey, but a lot of how I see the world and how I think 0:08:14 about basic fairness comes from New Jersey. I think people actually want to know what’s going on. 0:08:20 And they have clearly held opinions. This is what I recall and work hard, but also are open 0:08:28 to hearing from other people because New Jersey was certainly a melting pot in the first wave 0:08:33 of immigrants from Europe. And so they had to accommodate. It’s not a glamorous place to be 0:08:40 from. And so people were distracted by glamour or coolness in any way. Lyrics of Bruce Springsteen 0:08:47 still echo through my head. It’s one of the soundtracks of my life, I think. So he pops up 0:08:53 when I do not expect him to pop up when I’m observing a situation. But to your point, 0:09:01 a lot of the work that I do references something that I learned a little over 20 years ago from 0:09:07 College Track. And I think it’s true to say that all of the work that we do at Emerson Collective 0:09:14 now is informed and certainly influenced and shaped by what was learned at College Track. 0:09:19 And so maybe College Track is my New Jersey. Yeah, interesting. And so tell us about 0:09:24 College Track and how what you learned, what you tried to do, and then what you learned, 0:09:30 and then how you moved it to be the entire Emerson Collective. Sure. It’s sort of a beautifully 0:09:35 long and winding story because it all took place probably starting about 22 years ago. 0:09:42 After graduate school, I was running a natural foods company. And per chance, I met the California 0:09:48 Teacher of the Year. She was teaching at a local high school. And I had not ever visited a high 0:09:53 school in California because I had moved just for graduate school. She asked me if I could come and 0:09:59 talk to her students, that all of her students in this one class were from East Palo Alto. And this 0:10:03 was at Carlemont High School, which is where all of the East Palo Alto students stood out. And that’s 0:10:07 when East Palo Alto was super dangerous, right? That’s right around the time of the murder capital. 0:10:13 Yeah, right around that time. I jumped at the opportunity because when I was at Stanford, 0:10:20 I found it really odd to have the juxtaposition of Palo Alto and East Palo Alto because I had moved 0:10:26 to Palo Alto from New York City, where all the demographics are right on top of each other. And 0:10:31 so you can have one block of rich and one block of poor, and people really mix. And it felt really 0:10:37 awful and awkward to have one-on-one dividing this socioeconomic group from this socioeconomic 0:10:41 group. So I said to her, “Yes, I’d love to. I’d love to come and talk to them.” She told me they 0:10:46 were seniors. It was September of their senior year, and they were all going to college. So I 0:10:50 said, “Well, what do you want me to say?” And she said, “Just tell them about what college is like, 0:10:54 and what it’s like to go to graduate school, and what it’s like to start your company.” So I said, 0:11:01 “Easy, okay.” So I went and I started talking to them about college and just wondering if they were 0:11:07 excited and where they had visited and who they knew. And I could tell I was starting to get some 0:11:12 blank dates, and I thought, “I’m losing my audience.” So I said, “Okay, guys, help me out here. How many 0:11:17 of you have visited a college? Maybe a few. How many of you know somebody that’s in college? Maybe 0:11:21 one or two. There were 35 students in this class.” And I said, “Okay, how many of you have already 0:11:26 taken your SATs?” And it was no one. And I said, “Okay, how many of you are going to take your SATs? 0:11:32 It’s already September, so you must be studying.” No one. And then I said, “Do you guys know that you 0:11:36 have to take your SATs and you have to do these standardized tests in order to go to college?” 0:11:41 And they said, “Well, we heard about it.” And the teacher said, “You know, we were going to talk 0:11:48 about this.” I thought, “Well, this is a bizarre lack of information to give to college-bound 0:11:54 seniors.” So I said, “Guys, how many of you have visited with the college counselor to talk this 0:12:03 through?” No one. As a result of Prop 13, California started cutting all nonessential portions of their 0:12:10 education system, which included arts and drama and PE and college counselors in addition to science 0:12:16 labs and higher mathematics. And it is amazing on that Proposition 13 was like in the late 70s. 0:12:25 Yeah. Exactly. And we were living with that legacy today. So I told the students I would come back 0:12:32 every Friday afternoon, and I would be their college counselor. And so I did that for the next 0:12:39 eight weeks. And what I discovered was of all the students, the 35 students, only two students 0:12:45 had actually taken the courses that they needed to take in order to apply to a four-year college. 0:12:54 So 33 students had missed a year of English or math passed Algebra I, or no one had taken a 0:13:02 lab site. No one ever told them what classes they needed to take. They were all graduating, 0:13:07 so they all had sufficient credits, but they didn’t have the credits that lined up 0:13:12 to apply to a four-year college. So for them, we got them to apply to a two-year college, 0:13:17 but it was such colossal waste, and it was just such an awareness that I had immediately that 0:13:24 this is actually a solvable problem. This is lack of access to the kind of information and guidance 0:13:30 that can be provided for all of these students. So I met with subsequently juniors and sophomores 0:13:35 and freshmen, and then I talked to parents at back to school night, and I just did this 0:13:40 as a volunteer because I thought this is something I can do. I can address this problem. I know this 0:13:46 stuff. But then there were layers of issues that I started to become aware of with a friend of mine, 0:13:53 Carlos Watson. We started visiting in the community. Yeah, exactly. He now runs Aussie. Just in the 0:14:00 communities, the families and understanding what happens actually when you’re first in your family. 0:14:04 What happens when you’re first in your family to graduate high school? What does that mean for 0:14:08 the information that you get from your family? What happens when you’re first to want to go to 0:14:13 college to apply and to thrive and to complete college? What happens when you’re first in your 0:14:17 family if you’re a college grad? Sometimes they resent you when you’re first. Many things. But 0:14:23 also to have that aspiration. You’re a leader in your family and you’re a problem solver in your 0:14:28 family. That’s a wonderful thing, but it also means you get sucked back into all problems because 0:14:34 you’re a good problem solver. And sometimes if you’re a child of immigrants and you’re the translator 0:14:40 for the family, the family relies on you for that. So there are all sorts of really interesting 0:14:43 issues that were just in this one community. And that’s when I decided to start 0:14:51 College Track to do a more holistic support for students and families so that we could 0:14:58 seriously prepare students for college and make sure that they persisted and completed college 0:15:04 and work with their families to solve problems within the family so that the individual didn’t 0:15:09 have to be the problem solver. And so that’s how we started College Track and we started it with 0:15:18 25 high school freshmen at Kalman High School and I would go to the lunch times and I’d find the 0:15:22 ring leaders because I had a sense that everyone has to come with a friend because that would be 0:15:27 a reinforcing mechanism. And some people came with whole groups of friends and that was even better 0:15:33 because they would hold each other accountable. So we built out a cohort and so they were responsible 0:15:38 for and to each other as well as to the adult. So we started in East Palo Alto this year. 0:15:45 We have grown. We have 3,000 high school students. We have 1,000 college students and we have 550 0:15:52 college grads. Wow, that’s amazing. I’m listening to you and it’s so different than normally in 0:15:57 Silicon Valley. People go to a fancy dinner. Somebody gives a presentation. They put some 0:16:03 money on it. Here you are. You go and you go. I want to go teach this class and then from there 0:16:08 build it all the way out into College Track. It seems like your philosophy. I think that’s 0:16:14 probably how entrepreneurs work, right? You see a problem and you actually think this is something 0:16:19 that I can bring some energy and some problem solving and some smarts and maybe a little bit 0:16:26 of innovation to this problem, to this issue. Really, really amazing. So then take us from that to 0:16:33 Emerson Collective, which is like the world like now you’ve really expanded your horizons. 0:16:39 And we’ll maybe start with the name because the name is so unusual. Emerson, which I know from 0:16:43 reading about it is Ralph Waldo Emerson and then tell me about that and then also about 0:16:48 Collective because like there’s no other like VCs we work with called Collective. 0:17:02 In Brooklyn, there’s the cheese board collective. That’s funny. So I’ll tell you what we’re not. 0:17:06 We’re not the cheese board collective. We are not a group governance organization, 0:17:15 which actually makes it much better. We’re more of a collective of leaders and innovators 0:17:21 across different sectors. And we see the connectedness of every issue. So just in the simple 0:17:30 college track story, we talked about educational inequities and access and the need for enhanced 0:17:39 and robust curriculum, but also good immigration laws and fair immigration practices so that that 0:17:46 actually could be a foundation instead of because that’s essential to the education agenda. 0:17:52 Of course, of course. And so many of our first generation college bound students 0:17:58 are recent immigrants to America. And certainly in California, many of our recent immigrants 0:18:04 are undocumented. And so understanding what it means to be undocumented as a child growing 0:18:09 up in the United States, you cannot access any state or federal funding for your education. 0:18:14 And so you might be the valedictorian of your high school and you can’t get state or federal 0:18:19 funding. And in fact, there are only a handful of states that would allow you to pay in state 0:18:25 tuition. But for undocumented families, even in state tuition at $17,000 a year, when you can 0:18:31 get generally no scholarships, no loans to fund it, that’s out of reach too. So that’s another 0:18:37 issue that we learned about firsthand environmental toxicity in low income neighborhoods. So the 0:18:42 access to clean air, water and soil and access to food and access to financial services and 0:18:48 banking services, all of these things you learn about in one community. And they’re all connected 0:18:54 because these are all systems and experiences that touch the individual’s life. And so you pull one 0:18:59 thread, the whole fabric follows. We were pulling one thread and we made it a really tough thread 0:19:07 around this educational support in our own way. But we understood we can’t just solve 0:19:14 the education issue without looking at the holistic issues of what actually are the, 0:19:20 what are all the touch points to an individual’s life? And how do we make sure if we can help 0:19:27 remove obstacles in all of these different systems or even better redesign these systems 0:19:34 so that an individual can just have access to the opportunity that they’re qualified for, 0:19:40 that will be the whole work. So that’s why it’s a collective because we actually collectively wrap 0:19:47 around problems and understand that complex problems require complex problem solving and 0:19:52 complex solutions. Yeah, really complex. So it’s interesting, Arnie Duncan had a quote where he 0:19:58 said, “Well, you know, Lorraine said to me, you’re trying to solve these really intractable 0:20:03 problems, so why don’t you let me help?” And he said, “You know, I think she was attracted to the 0:20:07 degree of difficulty.” It was like the harder it was, like that’s what she wanted to do. Is that 0:20:18 true? Yeah, I mean, for me, it’s so exciting and invigorating to think about devoting my life 0:20:24 to solving the problems of our day. You know, these are intractable problems. They’re not 0:20:28 problems that no one has worked on before, quite the opposite. These are problems that people have 0:20:34 worked on. And now they pass the baton to us. We have the great privilege of trying to make a dent 0:20:39 in them and trying to maybe redesign the system a little more elegantly and make things a little 0:20:44 more fair and more just. And we’ll work on them for 20, 30 years. And then someone else is going 0:20:49 to come up and we get to pass the baton to them. So that’s how we think about it. And it’s joyful 0:20:58 work. If you can, at one point, be part of that inflection point in another person’s life. If 0:21:04 you can, for one person, know that for you, that person has opportunities they otherwise wouldn’t 0:21:10 have had, it’s the most intoxicating feeling. And you want to do it again and again and again. 0:21:14 So you do it, you try to change the world, but you do it for the individual. 0:21:19 So the intractable-ness of the world doesn’t bother you at all. Yes. That’s how I can think about 0:21:25 it. And that’s how I can actually, and I think for all of us, we understand where we’re trying to go 0:21:30 and then we backwards map it. So most everything we’re working on, we have a 10-year time horizon. 0:21:36 Some things we have a 10-year and then we’ll renew it for another 10 years. For Arnie, he’s hoping 0:21:43 to put a dent in gun violence and specifically in the number of homicides that are gun-related 0:21:49 deaths in Chicago in 14 specific neighborhoods. And he wants to see impact within the next few years. 0:21:58 Yeah. When you go after education, immigration, gun violence, environmental issues, you end up with a 0:22:05 pretty unusual kind of diverse team. So you’ve got Mark Echo, Arnie Duncan, Steve McDermott, 0:22:11 my old friend Steve McDermott. Did you put all those? I can’t even imagine all those three in a 0:22:18 meeting. That just seems so wild. How does that work? How do you? Every Monday, including today, 0:22:24 we have all staff meetings. And because we have five different offices around the country, so we 0:22:30 have on the screen, like Hollywood Squares, generally a three-by-three matrix with different 0:22:37 teams populating in the nine squares. And we have different teams report out. Sometimes we have 0:22:42 guests who come and speak who are either in the philanthropic portfolio or the for-profit portfolio 0:22:50 or who are policy advocates or policy writers or just brilliant people that happen to be passing 0:22:57 through one of our cities that we bring to the table to listen to and learn from. And then we have 0:23:03 follow-up. So it’s sort of like every single Monday, we set the stage and we know where we are, 0:23:07 we give a report back and look forward and then we keep going. And then you want everybody out 0:23:12 in the field? Then you want everybody out in the field. Yeah. If people sat in an office more than 0:23:17 five, six days in a row, that would be bad. And that’s because all the knowledge is out in the field? 0:23:24 Yeah, exactly. And so when we decided to bring a big idea forward in education, for example, 0:23:31 with the ExQ Institute, Ruslan Alley, who was running our education practice at the time, 0:23:36 came out of the Obama administration. She was the assistant secretary of education. She ran 0:23:42 the office of civil rights. I love that we have these extraordinary people who have a body of work 0:23:46 and a network and there’s something big that they want to accomplish that maybe they didn’t get to 0:23:53 do in government or in business or in the social sector. And so we say, okay, come, do you think 0:23:58 we can do this in 10 years? And what does it look like? What kind of team do you need? And so we 0:24:07 build out like that. So we’ve built our organization from these individuals who come in this extraordinary 0:24:13 way. And then the newer hires, the more junior people hear about the fact that they might get 0:24:17 to work with some of these amazing people. And so it’s become kind of this really nice 0:24:27 giant magnet for talent in that way. I was telling you about Ruslan and ExQ. So we both 0:24:32 had worked in the Ed sector for over a decade and we both had a sense of the brokenness of the 0:24:39 design of the system and the fact that students who come to school needing the most receive the least 0:24:47 in all educational resources. And you just have to wrap your head around that. Students who come in 0:24:55 who are already behind in hearing just the number of words, let alone the quality of words 0:25:03 at home actually are behind in kindergarten and they rarely catch up. And the students who are 0:25:08 slow to learn to read by the end of the third grade, every school in this country shifts from 0:25:13 learning to read to reading to learn. So then when you enter the fourth grade, if you’re not a really 0:25:19 good reader in the third grade, all of your learning comes from reading text. And so you’re 0:25:26 further and further behind. And whoever came up with the idea that humans learn best by sitting 0:25:31 still for six to eight hours. Especially little kids. Yeah, especially little kids. That’s not how 0:25:38 synapses are formed. We came with all of this frustration about how we’re just ruining the 0:25:44 humans and the massive potential that’s in every single person’s skull. You know, the brains that 0:25:53 we carry around can solve any problem, any person. The talent and the IQ that is randomly distributed 0:26:00 does not meet up with opportunity. Opportunity is siloed. So we decided, well, we want to flip the 0:26:07 system. We want to flip the system from measuring learning in the high school. So we’re both also 0:26:11 fixated on the high school as a fulcrum for what happens after high school and what happens before 0:26:19 high school. So K8 shifts when high school shifts and obviously access to higher ed and career 0:26:25 also is influenced by what happens in high school. So if you change high school, you can actually 0:26:33 change the whole system. But you get a high school degree by sitting through 120 hours of a list of 0:26:39 subjects, mathematics and English and some history and some science. And the reason for that is because 0:26:48 in 1906. 1906. I’m sorry. Right. Good thing there’s been no technological change since 1906. 0:26:56 1906. And if you walked into high school in 1906, you’d feel, if you time traveled to 2018, you’d 0:27:03 feel very much at home. It’s still the same. Still the same life. Awesome. In 1906, they decided that 0:27:09 what they wanted to do was systematize. Great for Rip Van Winkle. Yeah, that’s right. That would be a 0:27:16 good movie. What they wanted to do was bring the learnings of industrial revolution and productivity 0:27:23 into the school setting. It was actually a really good idea that we would standardize schools because 0:27:31 schools at that point had only been generally for young men and they wanted to have universal access 0:27:37 to high school. And they also wanted to standardize the lessons across the country. So this was smart 0:27:44 and this was innovative for its time in 1906. Unfortunately, that system that got set up 0:27:49 is still the system today. That’s still how you get your high school diploma. Not to mention 0:27:55 the fact that you actually don’t need a proxy for learning. You don’t need for time to be the 0:28:00 standard. You actually need content mastery to be the standard and time should be the variable. 0:28:07 And we can do that. We actually know how to measure what you know about anything at any time 0:28:14 in any classroom. We also know a lot more about neuroscience now and we know how the brain develops 0:28:22 when it’s actually engaged in a task and we also know that you don’t learn things in silos, isolated 0:28:27 silos. You don’t learn math and then leave math and then start to learning this and leave it. It’s 0:28:34 actually much more robust and sticky when things are integrated and connected. And so we decided 0:28:42 that we wanted to change high schools in America and we started it a few years ago and we started 0:28:47 it with a competition across America and we wanted to put students in the center. And so we 0:28:53 crisscross the United States. I think we’re on our fifth trip across the United States and we visit 0:29:02 communities and we hold student roundtables and we hold civic leader and business leader and parents 0:29:08 and teacher roundtables and we sit and we talk to people and we listen to them. So then by the time 0:29:13 we issued this challenge for communities across America to redesign high schools in their own 0:29:18 community that mapped on to the workforce demands in their communities, that repurposed assets in 0:29:23 their communities, we had already talked to thousands and thousands of people. And they were 0:29:28 able to pick this up and there were no who you always hear about all they do and there are so many 0:29:32 inhibitors in terms of changing how things are done and you know between the you know structure and 0:29:37 the unions and this and then that but people were able to pick it up and redesign these high schools. 0:29:44 We weren’t sure. We weren’t sure. We definitely were stepping into unknown territory. We weren’t 0:29:50 sure how many people would actually take this up. We had designed the we used a design thinking 0:29:58 set of modules. We had 13 modules that every team had to go through. We made these kits with posters 0:30:04 and workbooks and cards that you could use and you had to have on your team students, parents, 0:30:11 business leaders, designers of any sort and even in small communities. In the end, 0:30:18 it was a seven month process to go through this whole thing. So communities really had to dig in. 0:30:28 We had 700 full applications for brand new high schools in all 50 states over 10,000 people participated 0:30:34 for what we’re going to be 10 schools that we funded and built. Oh wow. Yeah. It was amazing. 0:30:43 And after the competition, so we awarded our 10 and then after our competition, we followed 0:30:49 about 140 that we’re continuing on and building their own even though they didn’t win. Oh wow. 0:30:57 And since then, we’ve awarded another nine the XQ Super School moniker because their models 0:31:03 are so inspiring and breakthrough. And so they’re part of this cohort of super schools and we bring 0:31:10 them together. And so now 17 of the 19 are open. The other two will open next August. And of course, 0:31:16 along the way, we’re learning all sorts of wonderful things and they’re teaching each other and they 0:31:20 have professional learning communities. And of course, they have to break from the Carnegie 0:31:26 unit, which is time as a proxy for learning. So they all have to have competency based learnings. 0:31:34 We have a standardized learner outcome. And so all of the students in all of the schools can tell 0:31:39 you the XQ learner outcomes are about being a synthesizer and a collaborator and a creative 0:31:46 problem solver. They happen to know that for them 65% of the jobs that they will hold haven’t been 0:31:52 created yet. And so they understand they have to be agile nimble thinkers. They have to be creative 0:31:57 problem solvers. They have to understand critical thinking skills. And these are schools that are 0:32:02 not skimming. These are schools that exist in communities and they’re open enrollment public 0:32:07 schools. Yeah, so with the kids who actually need to help. But they actually bring the answers. 0:32:12 They bring the answers and the teachers are heroically scrambling to catch up and design 0:32:18 new curriculum. And it’s really exciting journey to be on. Because you have Arne Duncan on the team. 0:32:25 How do you think about taking that those models and changing policy and, you know, kind of 0:32:33 We do think that. So in many of the sectors where we work, policy is the tip of the spear. So certainly 0:32:40 for immigration reform policies at the tip of the spear and there’s work that we can do, each of us 0:32:46 can do to be welcoming to immigrants. And there are individual policies that municipalities can 0:32:54 instill around drivers licenses and not using local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws. 0:33:00 On the other hand, with education, it’s very, very layered. And so we do have a policy team 0:33:08 that is mapping out specific state and federal policies that we advocate for. So part of the 0:33:16 beauty of being an LLC or a series of LLCs is that we can be policy writers, policy advocates, 0:33:22 right? We can do whatever you want. We can be investors and we do do all those things. We use 0:33:27 every possible tool that we missed out on some tax breaks. That’s right. That’s right. So if you 0:33:32 don’t care about tax preference, there’s a whole heck of a lot that you can do. A lot more flexibility. 0:33:38 You get ultimate flexibility. That’s really great. Yeah. When we were really digging in on the work 0:33:45 about six years ago, I was contemplating what structure we should have. And most people start a 0:33:52 foundation so that they migrate, pretext either any dollars or stock into that generally, whatever 0:34:00 asset they’re going to be using, and then use that foundation construct. They use kind of the 0:34:06 5% payout to do the work that they’re going to do. Well, first of all, I felt that if I really 0:34:12 care about impact, if I actually really care about solving problems and I don’t care about 0:34:20 increasing wealth, then I would be foolish to close off any avenues by which change happens. 0:34:25 And a lot of change happens in brilliant for-profit companies. So I wouldn’t want to close that off. 0:34:30 And a lot of change happens at the policy level. And so we wouldn’t want to close that off. 0:34:35 So then so I thought, well, why doesn’t everybody do this? I don’t understand money. 0:34:39 But if people have taken the giving pledge and they plan to give away all their money, 0:34:45 why does they even care about a tax break? I still actually don’t understand it because 0:34:51 I’m hoping we go through as much of the wealth as we possibly can. I mean, that’s the purpose of it. 0:34:59 And we’re living in times of urgency and extreme crisis. I don’t understand what the 95% of the 0:35:03 corpus is waiting around for because it’s not going to get worse than we’re in right now. 0:35:06 So I hope people put more work, more money to work. 0:35:10 Let’s talk a little bit about profit because you invest in tech companies. 0:35:15 And there are a lot of tech companies here who I’m sure, and a lot of them ask me, 0:35:20 how do I get money from Amherst and Collective? What are you looking for on the for-profit side? 0:35:24 Almost all of our investments are mission aligned. We have an environmental practice. 0:35:31 So within the environmental practice, there’s a robust portfolio. We have an ed tech portfolio 0:35:37 that’s obviously aligned with our education practice. We have cancer companies that we’ve 0:35:42 invested in because we invest in oncology research and some policy there as well. 0:35:48 We started in immigration incubator. There isn’t a lot of technology that’s migrated into the 0:35:54 immigration sector. So we’d love to encourage that, but we would love to invest in people who 0:36:00 are bringing differentiated thinking or new thinking to old problems in this way. 0:36:08 And so there’s a lot of wonderful opportunity for entrepreneurs to marry their passion and 0:36:13 their purpose with their company. Those are the entrepreneurs that we get super excited by. 0:36:20 So one last question, and you’ve kind of answered this, but there’s another answer that I’m looking 0:36:25 for. So how do you know when you’re succeeding? On the micro level, I definitely get it and you’re 0:36:31 changing lives. But on these big agendas that you have, how do you know when you’re kind of on the 0:36:37 track and getting there? Yeah, we collect data on everything that we do so we can understand 0:36:44 if we’re trending in the right direction. In education around XQ, I’ll just use that as an 0:36:51 example because I’ve been talking about that. In addition to the schools, we now have the 0:37:00 district of Tulsa and the state of Rhode Island, which want to have kind of a complete redesign 0:37:04 of all of their high schools. So in Rhode Island, they have 45 high schools. So you can do experiments 0:37:10 in Rhode Island or at least use it as a laboratory for other states. So all 45 of their high schools, 0:37:14 they want to become XQ super schools. So we’re working with them on a statewide competition 0:37:22 in that way. So that’s moving in the right direction. In Chicago, there’s very good data on 0:37:31 both fatal and non-fatal gun violence. And so we have really good metrics there. But we also see 0:37:37 success in smaller ways, in anecdotal ways, which I think are very powerful as well, 0:37:44 where people come back to us and they tell us no one has ever talked to us before. No one’s 0:37:49 ever taken a shot on me. No one’s actually ever listened to me and then given me the chance 0:37:56 to try a big hairy idea. And so that to me is also success. And that’s moving things forward. 0:38:02 I think there are also other more subtle ways. We didn’t even talk about, you know, how do you make 0:38:07 sure that you’re part of the cultural narrative and how do you make sure that some of our most 0:38:13 imperiled and important institutions, like the media, like high quality journalism, are supported 0:38:19 and sustained. But seeing how many people are going into those disciplines is actually another 0:38:25 measurement of success. Seeing where IQ is migrating is really important measure of success. 0:38:28 We see that in the ed sector. We’re seeing that in other sectors as well. 0:38:33 That’s great. Well, thank you so well. We all appreciate you being you and fixing the world. 0:38:40 So everybody, please join me in thanking Maureen. Thank you so much.
with Laurene Powell Jobs (@LaurenePowell) and Ben Horowitz (@bhorowitz)
Laurene Powell Jobs is, among many other things, founder and President of the Emerson Collective — the social impact firm she founded to drive change and reform through philanthropy, investing, and policy solutions. In this episode of the a16z Podcast, Ben Horowitz interviews Powell Jobs on everything from what made her who she was, growing up in the working class rural hills of New Jersey, to how the Emerson Collective does what it does (and why it’s a collective, for that matter). What motivates the investments the Emerson Collective makes—and what do they all share in common, across such a broad range of areas, from education to immigration to media?
This conversation originally took place at our annual innovation a16z Summit in November 2018 — which features a16z speakers and invited experts from various organizations discussing innovation at companies small and large.
0:00:05 The content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business 0:00:10 tax or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed 0:00:14 at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. 0:00:19 For more details, please see a16z.com/disclosures. 0:00:22 Hi everyone, welcome to the A6NZ podcast. 0:00:26 I’m Sonal and I’m here today with David Yulovich, one of our new general partners who covers 0:00:30 all things enterprise, but honestly, that can mean so many different things to so many 0:00:31 different people. 0:00:36 So we briefly discussed what enterprise products really mean today for entrepreneurs, companies 0:00:42 and users, especially given the latest shifts driving SaaS beyond the cliche of consumerization 0:00:44 of the enterprise. 0:00:48 We also cover specific advice on the topics of pricing and packaging, how to balance being 0:00:53 a product visionary with being a product manager, when and how to scale out and hire 0:00:57 your leadership team, and how do you know that’s working or not, plus how to best manage 0:01:02 your own time and your own psychology as a leader while doing all this. 0:01:06 For context, David founded OpenDNS, where he actually went through a rough period in 0:01:12 going from CEO to CTO in 2009 and then back to CEO again, in a company that itself pivoted 0:01:14 from consumer to enterprise. 0:01:18 We discuss how did he make a comeback, I mean it’s not like he changed instantly overnight, 0:01:20 so what and how were the lessons learned? 0:01:25 In 2015, Cisco later acquired OpenDNS and David ran their security business where he 0:01:27 also led the acquisition of three companies before coming here. 0:01:31 So he’s seen startups from all sides, from being acquired to being the acquirer, from 0:01:36 small to big to small to big again, from on the inside and from on the outside. 0:01:40 But the real theme of this episode is the journey many founders make, from technical 0:01:42 to product to sales CEO. 0:01:47 And while we end with the story of OpenDNS and the most important lesson learned there, 0:01:51 we begin with what is the one piece of advice David has for founders? 0:01:55 So I think that there’s not usually like one, I’m not a big fan of the platitudes where 0:01:59 you just like say one thing that applies to everyone, because there’s never one thing 0:02:02 that makes the difference between success and failure. 0:02:05 As a founder, generally you’re at different stages in the company building journey. 0:02:08 Sometimes you’re a technical CEO trying to build a product to make sure it actually 0:02:09 is feasible. 0:02:13 Then you’re constantly in the market with customers doing customer discovery, making 0:02:17 sure that you are solving the problems you’re trying to solve, you end up becoming sort 0:02:19 of a product CEO, making sure that you have product market fit. 0:02:22 Then you end up becoming a sales CEO on the enterprise side, where you’re trying to generate 0:02:26 revenue and figure out how you can go acquire more customers. 0:02:29 And then if that works out, you become this really general sort of manager, go to market 0:02:32 CEO, and you’re thinking about how do you scale and accelerate a business. 0:02:37 And so I like to think about those different journeys as where there’s like the right decisions 0:02:41 for the right time, and really trying to help founders understand like what time is it and 0:02:43 where are they in that journey and where do they want to go. 0:02:47 Is it possible to be all four at once, or is it really tied to the stage of the company? 0:02:50 So generally you want to be more focused than less focused, and the reason I think you’re 0:02:55 probably also not all those things at the same time is like a company is a set to me 0:02:59 of like these like interconnected little knobs, and you can never just like optimize one and 0:03:01 then forget it and not come back to it. 0:03:04 You end up going to another knob, like if you fix pricing and packaging, then you’re 0:03:05 going to control panel. 0:03:06 Yeah, it’s like a control panel. 0:03:08 Then you’re going to move to demand gen to try to like increase the top of the funnel. 0:03:11 And if you fix that, then you want to make sure that your SDRs and salespeople are like 0:03:15 making sure they’re converting all the marketing leads into qualified leads, then you’re closing, 0:03:16 then you’re doing customer success. 0:03:20 And like once you tighten one of those knobs, it just creates slack in one of the other 0:03:21 knobs. 0:03:24 So you might switch those hats from time to time, but I think you’re rarely going to 0:03:26 be wearing more than one of those hats at the same time. 0:03:30 So I have to ask this then, since we’re going with this theme of let’s not do the platitudes. 0:03:33 A lot of people say it’s about the customer and the customer journey and understanding 0:03:34 the customer. 0:03:37 Honestly, when I hear that, I’m like, they can pull you in a million different directions. 0:03:39 You don’t even know what to do, especially if you’re a technical founder. 0:03:41 You don’t know to sell the Fortune 500. 0:03:43 Like there’s a bit of a chicken egg. 0:03:47 So how do you sort of figure out how to sell to the right customer? 0:03:50 It’s okay for a company in the early stages not to know exactly who they want to go after, 0:03:54 but they do have to understand the consequences of the customers that they’re targeting. 0:03:59 I think we’re living today in one of the best times to be an enterprise software startup. 0:04:04 And to me, one of the reasons is that because so many companies today are SaaS and subscription 0:04:08 software companies where there’s a recurring revenue component, it’s better for the customer 0:04:11 because they know that the customer experience is going to be good or they’ll stop paying 0:04:12 for the subscription. 0:04:13 It’s a repeat business. 0:04:14 It’s not a runtime sale. 0:04:15 That’s a repeat business. 0:04:16 Right. 0:04:17 I never think about the first sale when I look at a business. 0:04:19 I always think about like, what are you going to do in year two, year three to make sure 0:04:21 you renew the account, to grow the account? 0:04:25 It’s actually, it’s a way of peeling back the onion to figure out like how confident 0:04:27 are you and where your product is today? 0:04:30 Because if you say, oh, we’re only doing three-year contracts, well, is that because 0:04:34 it’s really hard to implement and tough to get customers onboarded until you need runway 0:04:35 to get them happy? 0:04:38 Or is it because you think you’re overselling your capability set and you just don’t want 0:04:41 the customer to figure it out within a year and not renew? 0:04:46 But if the startup I’m talking to says, oh, well, we did a couple three-year contracts, 0:04:49 but we realized that we were priced really low. 0:04:52 And so now if a customer wants a three-year contract, we’re actually going to charge them 0:04:53 more in the out years. 0:04:56 Well, that tells me your product is really good and getting better. 0:04:57 That’s fascinating. 0:05:00 Another way to think about that is that what used to just be like a product experience is 0:05:02 now much more of a customer lifecycle experience. 0:05:07 It starts before you sell, building a Vangelis, then there’s an onboarding part, then there’s 0:05:09 making sure the customer is really happy. 0:05:11 How do you market to your existing customers to make sure they’re getting full utilization 0:05:12 of your product? 0:05:17 And so that customer lifecycle makes it much easier as a startup is getting started to 0:05:21 start to really identify who is the target customer and then thinking about does that 0:05:23 actually map to the business I want to build? 0:05:26 Is it the big Fortune 500, the Global 5000? 0:05:27 Is it SMBs? 0:05:29 Because it has all these downstream effects. 0:05:32 So a lot of startups will come in here and in my first six months here, I’ve now met 0:05:37 with over 200 companies and a lot of them, they really have this ambition to go after 0:05:38 SMBs. 0:05:42 And one of the cool things about SaaS is that SaaS can take something that in the olden 0:05:46 days of enterprise computing, you’d have to buy the biggest server, the biggest box 0:05:47 to get the best solution. 0:05:51 But with cloud and with SaaS applications, you can now have the power to get this massively 0:05:54 great CRM system or this massively great HR system. 0:05:57 I actually like to think about it as SaaS is very democratizing. 0:05:58 SaaS is totally democratizing. 0:06:02 Because it enables smaller and medium-sized companies to have the accesses to big company 0:06:03 resources. 0:06:07 They don’t have the in-house engineers, but they can essentially as a service it into 0:06:08 their company. 0:06:09 Absolutely. 0:06:10 Small companies have unlimited compute. 0:06:11 They have unlimited storage. 0:06:13 They have unlimited bandwidth now. 0:06:17 And so when I meet with startups, they often want to like, ambitiously and altruistically 0:06:21 want to go satisfy this pain for SMBs, but it turns out that the reality is if you want 0:06:26 to charge a high price point, if you want to pay an expensive sales force, then you’re 0:06:28 going to realize that your average sales sizes have to be higher. 0:06:32 If I really want to go after a target market where the price point is going to be lower, 0:06:36 then I have to think about bottoms-up sales, about self-serve offerings, because I might 0:06:40 not be able to afford to have a sales force or a huge customer success engine. 0:06:43 And so I love when I see startups that think not just about who they want to go after, 0:06:46 but then they build that into their whole sort of customer experience model and like 0:06:50 marketing programs, pricing and packaging, renewals, sales, and the whole business model. 0:06:55 I mean, nowadays, think about how many emails you get where it reminds you of a new feature 0:06:57 that you may not have even known existed. 0:07:01 For instance, like I’m using an email product called Superhuman, and every week I basically 0:07:05 had an email from the team saying, “Did you know that you could use this functionality? 0:07:09 If you press Apple I, it’ll automatically route someone to BCC in their reply, or you 0:07:11 just press Apple C, it’ll copy the whole email. 0:07:12 You don’t have to select it first.” 0:07:16 Actually, I saw this awesome tweet from Patrick Cullis and the CEO of Stripe where he said, 0:07:20 “I feel like Rahul Vora, the CEO of Superhuman, is essentially inventing new user experience 0:07:23 interaction paradigms that will eventually cascade into other products, much like Steve 0:07:27 Jobs did with letting us learn new behaviors, like how to touch a phone.” 0:07:32 Patrick’s tweet was right on, and Rahul’s weekly marketing email to existing users, 0:07:34 it helps teach me these new things that they’ve unlocked. 0:07:35 They become very intuitive. 0:07:37 You still have to learn about them. 0:07:40 One of the best things about building a company today is it’s easier than ever to get close 0:07:45 to customers, to get constantly get iterative real-time feedback, both from an analytical 0:07:49 standpoint and just from customer surveys, MPS scores, all these kinds of things. 0:07:53 They have all this telemetry through SaaS products where you actually see how people 0:07:54 use the product. 0:07:58 But the second thing that’s happened is people talk about this bottoms-up SaaS motion, but 0:07:59 it’s not always just that. 0:08:02 It’s really about making sure they understand that there are evangelists in the company 0:08:06 that you have to win over before you’re going to get signed off from the CFO, the CIO, the 0:08:07 CISO. 0:08:10 Whoever he or she is that makes that decision, you’re going to have to get some champions 0:08:12 underneath that person to be your evangelist internally. 0:08:16 So this is a little counterintuitive too though, because the other piece of advice I’ve often 0:08:20 heard from folks is that the number one mistake a lot of consumerization of the enterprise 0:08:24 type of founders make is that they go too heavy on bottom-up to the point of ignoring 0:08:27 the importance of top-down sales. 0:08:28 What’s your view on that? 0:08:29 I like to frame it a little bit differently. 0:08:33 When people talk about the consumerization of enterprise, enterprise customers today 0:08:36 are being bombarded by so many different vendors. 0:08:39 Their attention span is so limited that the products today, like I think when people say 0:08:41 consumer, they mean easy. 0:08:43 They don’t really mean consumer. 0:08:48 The value proposition that I’m hearing when I talk to customers is that the time to value 0:08:49 needs to be short. 0:08:50 There’s actually two parts. 0:08:54 The first is I want value almost immediately, sometimes even before I pay for it. 0:08:57 I want a trial where I want to get up and running on my own, and then I’ll talk to a 0:08:58 salesperson. 0:09:03 So the time to value can either be like T minus zero days, like negative time, or it 0:09:04 has to be very short from hours to days. 0:09:09 And so I always encourage founders, think about the first hour, the first day experience, 0:09:11 the first week experience, the first month experience. 0:09:16 The second part is that enterprise software can get quite complex. 0:09:19 And so Zoom is in the news because they went public. 0:09:23 And Zoom’s a great example of something where they earn the right to be more complicated. 0:09:24 Wait, let’s pause on that for a minute. 0:09:27 Earn the right to be more complicated. 0:09:29 So this goes hand in hand with a short time to value. 0:09:33 So the short time to value gets you in the door, but we know that you and I could download 0:09:37 Zoom on our phones and be in a video conference call, and now we’re like, well, wait a minute. 0:09:39 Maybe all of our conference rooms should have Zoom. 0:09:42 Maybe we should integrate Zoom with our Google Calendar, G Suite. 0:09:45 You’ve earned the right to do that complexity because you’ve already proven so much value. 0:09:49 And not only that, the value you get by doing the integration with G Suite or by adding some 0:09:53 cameras to your conference room so that you can have room-based Zoom rooms, that complexity 0:09:56 is commensurate with the value you’re getting. 0:09:59 And so when people say, oh, consumerization of enterprise just means it has to be easy 0:10:02 or simple, that’s not quite what it is. 0:10:03 To me, it’s two things. 0:10:07 It’s a short time to value, and then the complexity curve is commensurate with the value proposition. 0:10:11 So then I want to ask you more about what needs to go into that time to value. 0:10:13 So let’s be a little bit more specific. 0:10:16 I mean, I get the point that you’re talking about, it’s incredibly competitive. 0:10:19 So you’ve got to differentiate fast and show the value. 0:10:20 But what are the things that drive that? 0:10:26 Is it a great, like a cute little Jiffy that jumps out at you and makes cute, like a clippy 0:10:27 type of thing? 0:10:28 I mean, what is it? 0:10:29 Wait, did you say a Jiffy? 0:10:30 Like a Giff? 0:10:31 Are we going to rumble? 0:10:32 Wait, I don’t know if we can do this. 0:10:33 Are we going to just stop? 0:10:35 I can’t tell if you’re trolling me or not. 0:10:36 We can’t be. 0:10:37 I am not trolling you. 0:10:38 I don’t believe. 0:10:40 I’m one of the people who calls Jiff’s not Giff’s. 0:10:41 I hate that. 0:10:43 You know there’s a world of people that think they should be J. 0:10:47 I don’t know if I would have ever agreed to this podcast if I knew you called him Jiff. 0:10:48 It’s like nail scratching on a chalkboard. 0:10:49 You’re literally right now in my ears. 0:10:51 It’s like someone’s poking pins in it right now. 0:10:54 How have you been so successful in your career this whole time calling him Jiff? 0:10:57 I actually feel like I kind of hate you right now, to be honest. 0:10:58 This is amazing. 0:10:59 Oh my goodness. 0:11:01 You don’t have any friends that pronounce Jiff Jiff. 0:11:02 I don’t think so. 0:11:03 You’re it. 0:11:04 Chris Dixon, is he a friend of yours? 0:11:05 He is. 0:11:07 I’m just shouting him on the podcast because I’m not going to go down on this thing. 0:11:08 I’m not going down on this ship alone. 0:11:11 We might have to edit that part out because I don’t know if that can be out there. 0:11:16 There’s like this dissonance in my brain because you and him are so smart but you also call 0:11:17 it a Jiff. 0:11:20 Like I don’t know what to do right now. 0:11:21 All right. 0:11:22 Okay. 0:11:24 So Slack for instance, they did a lot of really creative things. 0:11:28 I remember I was at Wired and the product that we use was Hip Chat. 0:11:31 And the thing that kind of eventually got me into Slack was the fact that you could do 0:11:34 all these like Jiffs, whatever. 0:11:38 You could do kind of more fun things and even I know that sounds really… 0:11:40 And they had integrations. 0:11:44 Other things could drive information into your Slack channel. 0:11:46 And that was not something that Hip Chat had for a long time. 0:11:47 That’s right. 0:11:48 Like Google documents and… 0:11:49 That’s right. 0:11:50 Dropbox files. 0:11:51 Exactly. 0:11:52 Or even automated updates. 0:11:55 Like if you’re a developer, when somebody would do a push to production, it could notify 0:11:57 people inside the Slack channel. 0:11:58 Right. 0:12:00 But now that’s not a case where IT has to decide the integration. 0:12:01 That’s right. 0:12:02 And they made it easy for individual users. 0:12:06 As long as you could use like Google Auth to authenticate, anybody could basically set 0:12:08 up a Slack channel inside their organization. 0:12:10 After a while, IT says, “Hey, wait a minute. 0:12:13 We have all these teams that are chatting on this thing. 0:12:14 They’re doing integrations. 0:12:15 Files are being shared. 0:12:18 We need to have a little bit more visibility, a little bit more access control. 0:12:22 And even for like security and compliance reasons, it became an enterprise sale that 0:12:23 went wall to wall. 0:12:25 It’s now already entrenched in the organization. 0:12:28 There’s already integrations happening with some of the developer tools and workflows. 0:12:30 And at that point, they were in the right to be more complicated. 0:12:32 I’ve noticed this resurgence. 0:12:36 And I don’t know if it’s just like a zeitgeist thing or just anecdotal evidence of design 0:12:40 focused startups precisely because of the thing you’re saying, because that’s one of 0:12:41 the ways to instantly differentiate. 0:12:46 I think it’s also design thinking is sort of another way of saying, thinking about… 0:12:47 Oh, I hate that phrase. 0:12:48 I know. 0:12:49 Talk about the platitude of all platitudes. 0:12:51 That phrase drives me fucking up a wall. 0:12:54 So here’s a better way to frame it, because I also don’t like that phrase, is it’s really 0:12:58 about that extension of the product experience and really taking that more holistic approach. 0:13:00 It’s not just about the UI. 0:13:03 It’s not even just about the user experience of a particular workflow. 0:13:05 It’s about that whole customer experience. 0:13:07 We’re actually entering a period of time where more and more people in the workforce 0:13:11 are sort of digital natives, and they want to be power users. 0:13:14 Why isn’t there an equivalent to Microsoft Excel on the web? 0:13:15 Like Google Sheets is not Excel. 0:13:21 The current state of collaborative tools in SaaS apps is just so weak and they don’t 0:13:22 let you be a power user. 0:13:25 It’s also, I think, ignoring the realities of organizations today, which used to be so 0:13:29 siloed, and now you have people collaborating cross-functionally in different ways. 0:13:33 You could argue that Google Docs did create a multiplayer mode where you could have collaborative 0:13:37 editing, but it was just such a garbage experience from a functionality standpoint. 0:13:38 It was afterthought. 0:13:40 It wasn’t baked in from natively. 0:13:41 That’s basically my rule of thumb for all of this. 0:13:43 If it’s an add-on, it’s not important. 0:13:47 I think that’s what, well, I mean, all of, I would say, Google G Suite is an add-on. 0:13:50 Google should just shut down G Suite altogether, even though the whole Silicon Valley would 0:13:51 get crazy. 0:13:55 I mean, there are rounding error in their business, and it’s a rounding error to productivity 0:13:56 versus what Microsoft has. 0:14:01 I don’t think they’ll do that, but strategically, it’s just so unimportant for them. 0:14:06 What I would say, though, is that I like software that is easy to use, that has that 0:14:09 short time to value, but allows me to be a power user if I want to be. 0:14:14 In fact, as an investor, when I talk to companies, I always try to figure out what is their pricing 0:14:16 and packaging strategy. 0:14:17 What is packaging? 0:14:18 Actually? 0:14:23 Packaging is usually a convenient bunch of things, but to me, packaging is what set of 0:14:24 features. 0:14:27 Are you going to put into an offering to a customer? 0:14:30 I always try to think that you want to make it easy for your customer to give you money. 0:14:31 That doesn’t matter. 0:14:35 It’s like a foundational principle for me, and so packaging is our way to do that. 0:14:38 We’ve all been to the restaurant where the All Our Cart menu is all over the place, but 0:14:40 sometimes restaurants just say, “Well, here’s the three options.” 0:14:44 It comes with one of these appetizers, you get this main course, and you get this dessert. 0:14:47 If you want to make things easy for people to give you money, generally, people come 0:14:52 up with packages, and the friction is removed to becoming a buyer. 0:14:57 In the SaaS world, sometimes there might be a tier that says, “You’re going to get the 0:15:01 full functionality of the product, but you’re not going to get archiving and logging and 0:15:03 all this detailed reporting and analytics.” 0:15:07 It allows the company that maybe doesn’t want to spend as much or isn’t as big to get the 0:15:12 full functionality of your product, but then there’s a hurdle, and usually when I think 0:15:17 about packaging, usually there’s a key product milestone that happens that forces somebody 0:15:18 to jump to the next tier. 0:15:19 Interesting. 0:15:20 What do you mean? 0:15:21 Give me an example of that. 0:15:22 Sign on is a good one. 0:15:25 You have to generate accounts and use a product, but if you want to tie it to your octa directory 0:15:30 or some other directory service, you’re going to have to jump to a much more expensive tier, 0:15:33 but generally, the customers that have to jump that tier are more enterprise companies. 0:15:34 They have a directory service. 0:15:36 They have a single sign-on service. 0:15:39 They might want two-factor authentication with tokens. 0:15:41 The security person in me doesn’t love that one being a tier. 0:15:45 I always think you want all your customers to be secure, but there are other tiers, so 0:15:46 like compliance. 0:15:50 If you’re in a regulated industry, you might not just be satisfied with 30 days of logging. 0:15:52 You might need 365 days of logging. 0:15:55 You might need to be able to export your logs to another data store. 0:15:58 So far, if I heard that as an entrepreneur, though, I would assume that all packages are 0:15:59 tiered. 0:16:02 Are there untiered packages where it’s just like a different combo that’s all like kind 0:16:03 of horizontal? 0:16:05 I don’t think I’ve seen that. 0:16:09 Generally it’s much more of like a ladder where the next package includes everything 0:16:14 in the previous package, and I think that while there’s usually a number of features 0:16:17 that get unlocked when you go to the next package, to me, there’s always one that has 0:16:19 that forcing function. 0:16:23 In fact, when I think of packaging, it’s oftentimes a way to segment your customer base because 0:16:27 you’re going to say like, “We know SMB and mid-market under 1,000 employee companies, 0:16:28 they’re going to be in this package.” 0:16:32 Everything we do, the product manager in that package is thinking about those features, 0:16:35 thinking about that persona, and then the next package, the person saying, “Wait a minute, 0:16:39 I want to go after the 1,000 to 10,000 employee company,” and this is what they need. 0:16:41 This is how I communicate with them. 0:16:43 This might be how I do webinars to them. 0:16:46 This is how I’m going to do pricing that’s more fits their model. 0:16:48 Maybe you can’t do a three-year contract if you’re on the low-end product. 0:16:53 So all these things are puts and takes that reflect where’s the product, who is the customer 0:16:57 you’re targeting, and then how do you want to market and create demand with that audience. 0:16:59 Is there a balance or a rule of thumb? 0:17:03 I know I’m sure it must vary by business in what the ideal number of packages are or 0:17:07 how many customer segments you should be trying to reach as a startup. 0:17:09 I think generally fewer is better because focus is key. 0:17:10 Less is more. 0:17:11 Yeah, less is more. 0:17:15 Time is always the most valuable currency in an individual’s life and a company life. 0:17:19 And then aligning all that time behind the most important, like putting more wood behind 0:17:22 fewer arrows to me is always much more important. 0:17:26 I think generally like two packages, three packages, when you make it too complicated 0:17:30 for the customer to figure it out, that creates friction to the sales cycle. 0:17:34 Now with that said, one thing that startups often do is they share their pricing publicly 0:17:35 on the site. 0:17:38 And the engineer and all of us, like the pragmatic person and all of us, we’re like, “Well, of 0:17:43 course we want to share pricing because as customers we hate not knowing the price, but 0:17:47 as products get much more nuanced and organizations that are buyers and you actually don’t know 0:17:50 what your pricing discovery looks like, you’re better off not sharing your pricing.” 0:17:51 Okay. 0:17:55 And one way you know you have a great product is when your salespeople are the ones demanding 0:17:58 you remove the pricing because that means that they’re telling you… 0:17:59 You can get more money. 0:18:00 You can get more money. 0:18:05 Maybe you’re a technical CEO who’s becoming a product CEO, who’s becoming a sales CEO. 0:18:08 If you’re listening, you’re going to be like, “Wait a minute, they’re telling me we’re 0:18:09 leaving money on the table.” 0:18:11 It’s generally a very strong signal. 0:18:14 I have a stage question on this though because if you think about the definition of a startup, 0:18:19 a startup by definition is a business under a high condition of uncertainty compared to 0:18:20 more established business. 0:18:22 I wouldn’t even peg it to a particular size. 0:18:25 And given that, a startup is an experiment. 0:18:26 You’re running an experiment. 0:18:29 And the product, you can run multiple experiments at the same time. 0:18:32 We’ve heard of the famous pivot, the dreaded P word, there’s all these different flavors 0:18:33 of this. 0:18:37 How do you run multiple experiments and also strike a balance with focus and the pricing 0:18:38 and packaging strategy? 0:18:41 Well, that is the art of running a business. 0:18:42 Not a science. 0:18:43 Yeah. 0:18:46 And everything is multivariate, but you can generally, if you have smart people paying 0:18:50 attention to the numbers, paying attention to the data, collecting the analytics and giving 0:18:54 yourself enough time to collect that data, the worst thing for a company to do is make 0:18:58 a decision and then not allow there to be enough time to collect the outcome of that 0:19:02 decision and understand the consequences of that decision and then they make another decision. 0:19:06 So the question of how do you make decisions and run multiple experiments, I don’t think 0:19:07 it’s that complicated. 0:19:11 As long as you’re paying attention to what are the outputs from those decisions that 0:19:15 you should be looking for and you should be looking at what’s changing across the business. 0:19:20 We’re living in an era today of running companies where it’s much easier to collect and analyze 0:19:21 data than it ever has been. 0:19:25 You have data lakes where you can bring in product data, your CRM can tie into that product 0:19:26 data. 0:19:27 We’ve never had that. 0:19:28 We have BI tools now that we have open source. 0:19:29 Business intelligence tools, right? 0:19:30 Yeah. 0:19:31 That’s right. 0:19:32 We have open source business intelligence tools. 0:19:34 We actually run complex analytics and say, “Wait a minute. 0:19:38 My West Coast territory is just doing so much better than my East Coast territory. 0:19:39 What is the difference that’s pushing there? 0:19:43 Is it because we actually are running more demand-gen campaigns on the West Coast and 0:19:46 the marketing team on the West Coast is separated or is it just that the West Coast sales reps 0:19:47 are better?” 0:19:48 You need to be able to tease apart those. 0:19:51 You need to be able to tease those things apart, but it’s easier to get access to the 0:19:55 data and analyze it quickly and avoid that sort of analysis paralysis than I think it 0:19:57 ever has been in the past. 0:20:01 So a big part of this, so the big theme I’m hearing from you is a lot of these things 0:20:05 have intentionality, even if you don’t know the outcome, and that you can actually control 0:20:09 that intentionality by kind of being introspective, understanding your decision making, understanding 0:20:10 what works. 0:20:11 That sounds great. 0:20:17 Now, as a leader of the company, how do you, the CEO, figure out what to work on and depending 0:20:18 on what stage you’re at? 0:20:22 This whole journey from technical to product to sales to go to market, that’s not necessarily 0:20:23 perfectly linear. 0:20:24 So how do you figure this out? 0:20:25 It’s not linear at all. 0:20:28 I mean, sometimes in retrospect, we like to look and think that it was linear. 0:20:29 Of course, yeah. 0:20:32 But I think that there’s different ways to figure out sort of how do you prioritize 0:20:33 your time? 0:20:35 Where do you spend your mental calories? 0:20:36 Mental calories. 0:20:37 I love that phrase. 0:20:38 Yeah. 0:20:39 And that’s how I think about my days. 0:20:40 What do I want to, like you only have so many mental calories. 0:20:41 So I think about my day too. 0:20:45 I think of the nutrition density in terms of return on, so I have a phrase that I use 0:20:48 for all my editing, which is ROE, which is return on energy. 0:20:49 Oh, that’s good. 0:20:55 So I refuse to spend time on something that the output is going to be vastly low proportion 0:20:59 outsize win to what the amount of work I put in in terms of energy, creative. 0:21:01 So I have a whole framework for thinking about this. 0:21:02 I love that. 0:21:03 I’m ridiculously productive on this. 0:21:06 Well, hopefully this podcast gets published because I don’t know that it had a high ROE. 0:21:09 So I think figuring out how you spend your mental calories is a really important question 0:21:10 to ask. 0:21:14 And sometimes the act of asking that question itself is just like part of the process of 0:21:18 figuring out how to spend your time and spend it wisely. 0:21:20 And there’s different things that happen along different stages. 0:21:23 If you’re like, I always just look at like, what is the problem in the company? 0:21:26 Is it that we can’t get customers and then figuring out who that right customer is. 0:21:30 But as a company starts to mature, a lot of these companies get to this like $2 million, 0:21:32 $3 million in annual recurring revenue. 0:21:33 That’s a huge milestone. 0:21:35 Very few companies ever get there. 0:21:39 But yet it’s tiny when you should be doing $20 million, $30 million if you aspire to 0:21:40 be there. 0:21:43 Like you can celebrate the milestone, but it’s clearly you have a long way to go to build 0:21:46 an enduring iconic company. 0:21:48 And so at that point though, you start to have a leadership team. 0:21:51 One of the biggest things that we see when we give technical founders advice is they need 0:21:53 to bring on like a VP of engineering. 0:21:55 They need to bring on like a head of sales. 0:22:00 And they keep resisting this thing because they’re kind of attached to their early startup 0:22:01 team. 0:22:05 So how do they figure out when to really, there’s a lot of religious advice and debates 0:22:06 around this actually. 0:22:07 Yeah. 0:22:10 So I think that there’s a bunch of, you know, I always look at questions like, what time 0:22:11 is it? 0:22:12 Like, what is the priority? 0:22:15 Like, are you trying to figure out product market fit or are you focusing on go to market? 0:22:16 Like what time is it? 0:22:18 Are you hiring sales people and ramping up? 0:22:21 Are you like figuring out the customers are churning and you better go fix your product? 0:22:26 This is so important that if you were to ask all your leaders and all the people in your 0:22:29 organization, like what is the most important thing for our company right now, they should 0:22:30 have an answer. 0:22:34 But one of the, just one of the more tactical conversations that I have with leaders, when 0:22:37 they’re, especially when they’re a startup and they have this core founding team. 0:22:38 And then they’re thinking about scaling. 0:22:42 And they say, well, you know, I have this engineering manager, he or she was with me 0:22:43 from the beginning. 0:22:44 And I think, I think they’re doing a great job managing. 0:22:48 One of the things I highlight is like bringing in a world-class VP of engineering, like that 0:22:52 could rock the boat, it could cause issues, but it’s not an indictment of your current 0:22:53 engineering manager. 0:22:54 Like that’s not what’s happening. 0:22:58 Part of bringing on these high performing leaders and these really well respected leaders 0:23:03 that have a cult-like following with the people that have worked with them and for them before 0:23:06 is that they are going to help you accelerate your ability to recruit world-class talent. 0:23:09 And when you deliver that message to that person on your team who’s been there from 0:23:12 the beginning and is doing a great job, like that should resonate. 0:23:13 It’s like, oh, wait a minute. 0:23:14 Yeah. 0:23:15 We can get way better people way faster. 0:23:16 Like, yeah, let’s bring that person on. 0:23:19 Again, you have to be very careful about knowing, like, what are the problems you’re 0:23:21 trying to solve in the organization. 0:23:26 But oftentimes, you know, and I think VCs have a bad rep for this, is it like they shove 0:23:30 in somebody who’s way too senior and comes from way too big of a company. 0:23:33 And so you have to think about, like, what is the right team I need for the right time? 0:23:37 I think Ben wrote this in his book, actually, which is the mistake that people hire for 0:23:39 the future instead of the hire for the thing they need now. 0:23:43 This often comes up with like VP’s of sales hires where somebody maybe has run, you know, 0:23:46 a 10 or 20 person team, but you’re like, well, can they run a 500 person sales team? 0:23:48 Well, you don’t have a 500 person sales team problem. 0:23:51 People often think about the executives that are hiring like, well, is this person going 0:23:54 to be with me for four years or five years, for six years? 0:23:56 I think that’s not always the right question to ask. 0:24:00 In fact, I had a board member once, Dave Strom, who’s a mentor to me. 0:24:02 I think of him as like the Yoda in my life. 0:24:06 And he once said an expression that I’d never heard before, horses for courses. 0:24:07 So have you ever heard of horses for courses? 0:24:08 No, I don’t even know what that is. 0:24:09 Yeah. 0:24:10 So I think it’s like it’s sort of an archaic expression. 0:24:11 Yeah. 0:24:14 And in race, and in horse track racing, you know, there’s like dirt courses, there’s 0:24:15 grass courses. 0:24:16 Oh, I get it. 0:24:17 You know, you run the right horse for the right course. 0:24:18 Oh my God. 0:24:19 That’s a great phrase. 0:24:21 There’s a bad part of this phrase too, though. 0:24:25 There’s a bad connotation, which is that sometimes when horses, they run their few races and 0:24:26 then they’re finished. 0:24:28 They run their course. 0:24:29 That’s where it comes from, that expression. 0:24:30 They’ve run their course. 0:24:32 And do you know what happens to horses that run their course? 0:24:33 No, I don’t want to know. 0:24:34 Are they turned into gelatin? 0:24:35 Something like that. 0:24:36 I always used to joke. 0:24:39 It wasn’t very nice probably, but I would joke with the VP of sales I had to open yesterday. 0:24:43 Like, you know, maybe every quarter was his last quarter because he just constantly out 0:24:44 performed. 0:24:47 And we always wondered when we hired him, like, is this guy going to scale? 0:24:48 Now, he scaled wonderfully. 0:24:49 He’s an incredible sales leader. 0:24:54 He went from, you know, a 20-person sales team to ultimately a 200 or 400-person sales 0:24:55 team. 0:24:57 Then once we got to Cisco, he did wonderfully, but we didn’t know when we hired him and how 0:24:59 far he’d get past 20 people. 0:25:01 You got to hire horses for courses. 0:25:02 The right team for the right play. 0:25:07 This is a good way of really figuring out, like, is my leadership team adding capacity 0:25:08 for me? 0:25:10 Are they helping me understand what’s happening in the business? 0:25:15 Because as a certain point as a CEO, you’re going to start to spend less time on engineering, 0:25:16 less time on product. 0:25:20 Ideally, you’re going to spend more time in the field with customers, with partners, 0:25:21 with customer success. 0:25:25 And as you start to spend less time with any individual function, you’re going to need 0:25:29 to have leaders in place that really are spending all their time really understanding 0:25:31 closer to the medal what is happening. 0:25:35 I love that you said close to the medal because that’s the exact phrase I use when I think 0:25:36 of this. 0:25:37 It’s like bare-metal leadership. 0:25:38 Totally. 0:25:41 And that’s actually the biggest challenge as a product-oriented person or a visionary 0:25:45 for whatever the product is in any field is how do you kind of keep that close to the 0:25:49 medal insight yet you can’t actually be close to the medal if you’re scaling. 0:25:52 So this actually comes up a lot in startups. 0:25:56 This idea that if you are the product visionary, you’re the founder of the company, that means 0:25:59 you are the product manager for the company, but at the same time, you need to scale an 0:26:00 organization. 0:26:05 And I think it’s important to differentiate the product manager from the product visionary. 0:26:06 Oh, great. 0:26:10 As the founder and CEO, you can always be the product visionary, but there is going 0:26:14 to be a time where you’re not going to be able to spend hours of time with the engineers 0:26:18 hearing how they’re working on our product or how it’s technically going to work. 0:26:21 You’re not going to spend hours and hours of time looking at all the NPS survey data 0:26:24 or the customer support tickets that are coming in. 0:26:27 And so like oftentimes I’ll meet these startups are like, oh, I can’t hire a product manager. 0:26:28 I am the product manager. 0:26:29 That’s a common thing for technical. 0:26:30 Totally common. 0:26:32 And it feels like it’s your baby. 0:26:33 You don’t want to let it go. 0:26:36 You’re only going to have five seconds a day to think about different decisions you make. 0:26:40 And so if your engineering team and the rest of the organizations constantly come into you, 0:26:41 you’re going to end up getting paralyzed. 0:26:42 Yeah. 0:26:45 The worst thing for a product visionary is to make some decisions, and then they know 0:26:48 where the wrong decisions because they lack data or they lack the time to be thoughtful 0:26:49 about it. 0:26:52 And then they start to undermine their own thinking about whether or not they even are 0:26:56 a product visionary when the reality is just hire a product manager. 0:26:59 You’re not offloading the product vision to that person. 0:27:05 What you’re offloading is the day-to-day ground war of figuring out what is customer support 0:27:08 telling me, what is sales telling me, what is engineering telling me, what are customers 0:27:14 telling me, synthesizing, analyzing, prioritizing, sorting that data. 0:27:18 And obviously as a founder and visionary you have ultimate say, but you’re going to be 0:27:22 armed with so much more insight information that your intuition, which plays a big role 0:27:24 too, is just going to be that further enhanced. 0:27:29 As a visionary you’re going to have some special secret, some earned power that you have over 0:27:32 the lifetime of your experience, where you’re the domain expert in a problem set, you’re 0:27:33 going to know more about it. 0:27:35 Because you’ve gone through the idea maze, you’ve literally lived and breathed this thing, 0:27:39 you built the company, you started it because you literally have it seeping out of your 0:27:40 pores. 0:27:41 That’s right. 0:27:43 We had a recent podcast at Safi Bakal and he described how Steve Job had both the artists 0:27:44 and the soldiers. 0:27:47 And so not only did he have himself, but he had like Tim Cook and Johnny Ive. 0:27:51 But also when you think about the story of the iPhone, the app store was actually a result 0:27:56 of his team coming up with the point that, hey, you can’t just have Apple apps on this 0:27:58 if you want people to use this. 0:28:01 And so people and your product managers will come to you and they’ll, when they have conviction 0:28:04 on something and they have the data and they have the view, you’ll then be able to make 0:28:05 those bets. 0:28:06 Yeah. 0:28:08 And nobody would say that he wasn’t a product visionary just because he didn’t come up with 0:28:09 the app store. 0:28:12 On that note, just a probe on one bit, because I’ve always wondered about this. 0:28:17 There is a tension between this idea, like I hate this idea of the head and the hand. 0:28:20 You can’t have one person be the head and the other person be the hand. 0:28:21 How do you reconcile that bit? 0:28:25 Like how do you, I guess what I’m asking is how do you calibrate along this line of visionary 0:28:26 to manager? 0:28:30 So I think you want to know what you’re hiring for because there are product managers that 0:28:33 are much more analytical and there are product managers much more visionary and you might 0:28:35 need different kinds of people at different kinds of times. 0:28:39 So I think you have to be sort of self-aware and be really intellectually honest because 0:28:42 if you actually need someone who is more visionary, then you’re going to have to deal with the 0:28:46 fact that you’re going to be going to battle and sitting in a room and duking it out over 0:28:47 ideas. 0:28:51 It leads to a secondary insight, which is that if you’re a CEO of a company and you 0:28:55 do not trust that the information you’re getting from one of your leaders is what’s actually 0:28:57 happening on the ground, that’s a tremendous problem. 0:28:58 That’s a huge red flag. 0:28:59 Massive problem. 0:29:00 Fire and move on. 0:29:01 Fire. 0:29:02 Or it could be you if you’re just not a trusting person. 0:29:03 I think you have to work to resolve these things. 0:29:04 Yeah. 0:29:07 Like you don’t just cut and move on immediately, but you either have to work to understand what’s 0:29:10 actually, like do they understand what’s happening and are they able to communicate it to you 0:29:11 and the rest of your leadership team? 0:29:13 I always like to think of leadership teams. 0:29:17 It’s not just this like, oh, the head of sales reports to the CEO, the head of marketing reports 0:29:18 to the CEO. 0:29:22 And you have these like siloed, you know, sort of pairwise conversations. 0:29:25 So leadership team needs to be working together as a team and communicating with each other 0:29:30 because as a CEO, you don’t want to be, you know, interjecting and intervening in every 0:29:32 conversation, every decision. 0:29:35 And so you want to start to figure out like, are they collaborating? 0:29:37 Are they sharing each other’s experiences? 0:29:39 Do they understand what’s happening in each other’s businesses? 0:29:40 Are they meeting on their own? 0:29:44 I think as a CEO, you actually want your leadership team to meet independent of the CEO. 0:29:45 That’s actually really interesting and counterintuitive. 0:29:46 Yeah. 0:29:47 I think it’s really important. 0:29:51 And I think it does happen in a lot of high-performing teams very commonly, maybe not explicitly, 0:29:52 but it happens. 0:29:56 And then obviously, I think in some places you can do it explicitly and when it’s done 0:30:00 a productive and positive way, not because the CEO is a distraction, but ideally the 0:30:04 CEO is out doing something that’s of high value to the company. 0:30:07 But if you get to this place where you do not have confidence that you are getting the 0:30:12 best information from your leaders, if you don’t resolve that, then you have to find 0:30:13 someone who’s a better fit. 0:30:17 Whenever I hear when I talk to a CEO who’s having a tough time in the company and they’re 0:30:21 telling me about like what’s happening, I’m like, well, like, just tell me, like, do you 0:30:23 really believe that that is what’s happening? 0:30:26 And you either have to go deep and as a CEO, you do get these occasional bullets where 0:30:30 you can cause a little bit of like organizational stress to like go at three levels deep and 0:30:31 really figure it out. 0:30:34 And if you find out what’s happening, it’s not what you are being told, you gotta make 0:30:35 a change in leadership. 0:30:39 By the way, I should just say that all my lessons about leadership and management, I pretty 0:30:40 much learned the hard way. 0:30:43 So I’m just trying to help save other people from making the same mistakes I made. 0:30:44 Yeah. 0:30:46 Well, speaking of that, let’s talk about your stories. 0:30:49 So you’re the founder of a company called OpenDNS. 0:30:51 First of all, what is OpenDNS? 0:30:56 So OpenDNS is a cybersecurity service that delivers a faster and safer internet. 0:31:00 And we really innovated on a 25-year-old technology that used to be a cost center that nobody 0:31:01 wanted to innovate on. 0:31:04 We actually proved that you can actually build a business on top of this like thing that 0:31:05 used to be free if you make it better. 0:31:09 So speed was one part, but then the other part was security. 0:31:13 Let’s say you type in zamazon.com, your meaning to go to amazon.com, that could be a phishing 0:31:15 site trying to steal your credentials. 0:31:19 So we would say, hey, wait a minute, we know that from our, you know, tens of millions of 0:31:23 users, what you really meant to type in was amazon.com, so we’re going to show you a page 0:31:27 that says, hey, you typed in zamazon.com, we think it’s a fraudulent site. 0:31:29 Did you really mean to go to amazon.com? 0:31:30 That may help protect you from getting phished. 0:31:32 It was the first third-party dance provider. 0:31:35 In fact, when we started the company, some of the, like, the gray beards of the internet 0:31:40 who I respected tremendously, they told me, A, what I wanted to do wasn’t possible, and 0:31:43 B, even if it was possible, nobody would want it because they just would get it from their 0:31:44 ISP. 0:31:45 Oh my God, this reminds me of Mark with Netscape. 0:31:49 One of my favorite stories is I saw these old forums that he was on when he was proposing 0:31:50 like a more of a graphical user interface. 0:31:51 Oh, like the image tag. 0:31:52 Exactly. 0:31:55 And the thing that I thought was so funny is the people who are the established kind 0:31:58 of old fogies for lack of a better phrase, they don’t like the change ironically, even 0:32:00 though they were very revolutionary at the time. 0:32:03 So you mentioned a 25-year-old technology. 0:32:06 Why was that almost impossible to them? 0:32:10 So think of the DNS as like a phone book, except that what we wanted to do was not just give 0:32:13 the same phone book to everyone, but we wanted to give a custom phone book to every person 0:32:17 which meant, let’s say you typed in playboy.com, well, for some user over here, they may not 0:32:20 want content filtering, so they want the answer for playboy.com. 0:32:23 But maybe for someone who has small kids at home, they want a different answer. 0:32:27 And doing this at very high speed was thought to be impossible. 0:32:28 That’s fantastic. 0:32:31 But it turned out that it was possible, and we could do it faster than even if you had 0:32:32 no preferences in settings. 0:32:34 I have to ask you, how old were you when you had the insight that you wanted to build 0:32:35 open DNS? 0:32:40 So I had started a DNS company in college that did a different kind of DNS. 0:32:43 And through that, I had gotten super interested in cybersecurity. 0:32:48 And so I met an investor when I moved out to California, who had asked me basically why 0:32:50 I wasn’t doing more with my original company. 0:32:53 Then he and I ultimately came up with the idea for open DNS. 0:32:56 That original business model that I worked on with him was an advertising supported business 0:32:57 model. 0:33:01 We pivoted the business, and then in 2009, having the people that use our service be 0:33:04 the people that pay us for our service, was such a much better alignment of interest. 0:33:06 And so that journey took a long time. 0:33:10 And by the time we pivoted the business, it really was a different business than when 0:33:11 we started in. 0:33:15 Then when we sold it in 2015, the Cisco was really a full blown cybersecurity company. 0:33:16 Why did Cisco want it? 0:33:21 So I think if you looked at what happened between, let’s say 2007 and 2015, the iPhone 0:33:22 came out. 0:33:25 You had more and more people working from coffee shops that all had Wi-Fi. 0:33:29 You had workers working from the road, people using mobile devices. 0:33:34 So installing like Norton Antivirus or McAfee Antivirus on your desktop was no longer sufficient 0:33:35 security. 0:33:39 And so our service, Open DNS, was cybersecurity delivered as a service. 0:33:42 And it happened just intrinsically as a part of your internet connection. 0:33:44 So you didn’t have to have special software. 0:33:47 You didn’t have to install an appliance or a piece of hardware. 0:33:50 And so as people were working differently and the networks were becoming more ephemeral, 0:33:54 Cisco, which is a major cybersecurity company, such as the largest cybersecurity company, 0:33:57 wants to evolve to match that shifting IT landscape. 0:33:59 You mentioned the pivot a few times. 0:34:02 Tell me about that, because that’s such an overuse, one of those platitude words like 0:34:04 big P, little P, whatever. 0:34:07 And I know you mean it and actually what happened, but give me a little bit more texture around 0:34:08 the pivot. 0:34:09 What was that like? 0:34:10 The best time I never want to have again. 0:34:15 I mean, look, this might be its podcast onto its own, because there was an 11 month period 0:34:17 where I wasn’t even CEO of the company. 0:34:19 My original investor had fired me. 0:34:20 Oh my God. 0:34:21 I was CTO. 0:34:22 I didn’t know that. 0:34:23 I’ve been demoted. 0:34:24 CTO is awesome though. 0:34:25 I think CTO is the most powerful person in the company. 0:34:26 Not when you want to be CEO. 0:34:27 I guess that’s true. 0:34:30 We pivoted the business 2009. 0:34:33 What we thought was a consumer business actually turned out to just be a free business. 0:34:37 One day we actually got a call from a major oil and gas company that had been using us. 0:34:41 And we knew they were using us globally, like on oil rigs or their headquarters or other 0:34:42 distributed offices. 0:34:46 And so then they finally we got an email like, look, we need to have a support contract 0:34:49 like as a matter of our, just like corporate hygiene. 0:34:51 So like figure it out and like give us a quote. 0:34:54 We need to like have a way to call you if there’s a problem. 0:34:58 And so we went and got one of these like virtual phone numbers on the internet that would like 0:34:59 route to like an engineer’s phone number. 0:35:02 And if that person didn’t pick up about route to like the next engineer’s phone number, 0:35:04 if that person didn’t pick up about route to my phone. 0:35:05 Oh my God. 0:35:06 You were like the support desk. 0:35:07 Yeah. 0:35:11 It was like a tiered call system and went to like three people and we sent them a quote 0:35:13 for a hundred grand and they signed it immediately and returned it. 0:35:17 And they now went from like us making $2 a year and advertising, which we hated to paying 0:35:20 us a hundred grand for something we’re already doing and we get to turn off the ads. 0:35:23 You don’t need to be a rocket science to figure out like, wait a minute, maybe there’s something 0:35:24 here. 0:35:26 And we had two or three other companies that had asked previously for something like that. 0:35:29 So we went and sent them quotes and they all signed them and returned them. 0:35:32 Why do you think you didn’t know that this would be the business model up front? 0:35:33 Like why did you have to pivot? 0:35:35 Honestly, not to sound judgmental at all. 0:35:38 It seems obvious to me when you say it in hindsight. 0:35:39 Totally. 0:35:40 So I’m confused at why you didn’t see that coming up. 0:35:44 I think we were sort of enamored with this idea of keeping the whole internet safer. 0:35:46 And that meant going after individuals. 0:35:47 Idealistic. 0:35:51 We had partnerships with Nectar and D-Link and these people that sold consumer routers. 0:35:55 And so we sort of ignored the opportunity that’s right in front of our face. 0:35:58 But as soon as you realize like you’re not going to be able to raise money and like you 0:36:01 actually have to build a business, you start to like open your eyes a little bit. 0:36:02 And so we did that. 0:36:07 And then I hired Michelle Law, who actually spent seven years at Greylock to run BD for 0:36:08 us. 0:36:13 And ultimately she became my COO, a wonderful person and good friend. 0:36:18 And she basically had seen enterprise companies many times and so she realized as we wanted 0:36:20 to go enterprise that a bunch of the team had to change. 0:36:23 First of all, half the team just like didn’t care about building an enterprise software 0:36:24 company so they just quit. 0:36:28 Then like the other half of the team just like could not internalize that we can’t just 0:36:32 like change the UI overnight because it turns out some of our big customers had their own 0:36:34 manuals that they had built with screenshots of our product. 0:36:38 If we got a nasty email once from this major oil and gas company, they said like we have 0:36:42 all this training material and screenshots and videos we made and you just totally changed 0:36:43 your whole dashboard. 0:36:44 Yeah. 0:36:45 Like you can’t do that. 0:36:47 And you just have to learn how to manage those things. 0:36:49 And like then you do feature flags, which are things that are like common today. 0:36:54 But in 2009, like feature flagging things and feature flagging means that like some subset 0:36:58 of cohort of customers gets the access to a new feature or a new look and feel. 0:37:01 A lot of people use it for A/B testing to see if something works, but you can also use 0:37:05 it just to like keep certain customers on certain packages or on older features or older 0:37:06 looks and feel. 0:37:11 So it’s not like you still have one code base, but people have slightly different experiences. 0:37:13 And so we were starting to do those things. 0:37:16 Like we started implementing feature flags and things of that nature, but it meant that 0:37:21 over the course of about 12 to 18 months of the 30 people before the pivot, I think only 0:37:22 three were left at the end. 0:37:25 When did you go from CEO to CTO? 0:37:28 So right before all that happened, from most to 2008. 0:37:32 And then the only good thing that ever came out of the total global recession and economic 0:37:35 collapse was that my early investor needed cash. 0:37:39 And so we found two investors, and that’s actually when I first met Mark and Ben. 0:37:42 We found two investors to come in and buy out my early investor. 0:37:44 Those investors came in, started to rebuild the company. 0:37:49 But the biggest thing that’s fascinating to me is you came back as a CEO. 0:37:53 So what changed that you didn’t make this, I mean, cause you’re the same person, you 0:37:54 didn’t change overnight. 0:37:55 Right. 0:37:57 Like how did you pull that off? 0:37:58 Yeah. 0:38:02 Coming back as CEO the second time, after spending almost a year as CTO, one of the things I 0:38:06 saw when I wasn’t CEO was all these things that weren’t happening in the company. 0:38:07 Yeah. 0:38:08 That sort of been happening. 0:38:12 And of course I blamed the current CEO, but the reality was I actually was not doing them 0:38:13 either when I was CEO. 0:38:16 Sometimes you just have to have this like outside the glass box kind of view. 0:38:17 Yeah. 0:38:18 Wait a minute. 0:38:19 People don’t know what’s important. 0:38:20 Wait a minute. 0:38:22 We’re not making it clear what the priorities are. 0:38:23 Wait a minute. 0:38:26 We’re not firing these low performing people, but I wasn’t doing any of those things either. 0:38:28 And so that to me was very eye opening. 0:38:32 So when I came back as CEO, I think I was a much better listener. 0:38:35 I think I had this like belief maybe the first time I was CEO that I’m expected to have all 0:38:36 the answers. 0:38:37 Uh huh. 0:38:38 And it’s just not possible. 0:38:41 What is important as CEOs have to make decisions, and I think they have to be able to articulate 0:38:44 their decisions, but they don’t have to have all the answers. 0:38:46 That’s a really important point. 0:38:49 There’s actually a big difference between an answer and a decision. 0:38:50 Totally. 0:38:52 That’s actually something really to reflect on because I think most people conflate those 0:38:53 two things. 0:38:54 Totally. 0:38:56 And in fact, it turns out actually the opposite is true about having the answers. 0:39:00 In fact, I often tell CEOs because I like even before I joined Andrews Norwood’s people 0:39:01 call me for advice. 0:39:02 And that’s one of the things I really enjoy. 0:39:03 That’s why you’re VC now. 0:39:04 Yeah. 0:39:05 That’s why I’m a VC. 0:39:07 That’s one of the best parts about the job is like, I like being the first phone call 0:39:10 for a CEO when they’ve had a tough moment or they need help. 0:39:14 One of the things I often tell CEOs is like, you know, actually, like when you think about 0:39:17 the table of leaders around you, like there’s actually room around the table for one person 0:39:20 who has no idea what they’re doing, and that’s you, a CEO. 0:39:24 If you have the right leadership team, they’re adding intelligence for you. 0:39:28 You know, I had sort of gone from technical CEO to product CEO to sales CEO. 0:39:31 But my fault as a sales CEO is that I loved the dog and pony show. 0:39:32 I loved the pitch. 0:39:33 I hated the clothes. 0:39:34 Why is that? 0:39:35 That’s fascinating. 0:39:39 You know, I thought, you know, you could say that it was ego or ignorance or naivete. 0:39:42 Like, I didn’t like asking for the purchase order because first of all, I always thought 0:39:43 our pricing was low. 0:39:46 So if the customer and customers often like to negotiate. 0:39:49 Oh, you’re like ready to fight, like, fuck you, I want you to pay more. 0:39:50 Yeah. 0:39:51 So the customer goes, oh, $100,000. 0:39:52 I think it’s to be 70. 0:39:53 I’m like, fuck you. 0:39:54 It should be $140,000. 0:39:55 Like, I’m raising the price. 0:39:57 You’re the wrong guy to bring it the clothes. 0:39:58 Yeah. 0:40:00 My sales would be like, yeah, so you can’t negotiate with this customer because like, 0:40:02 you’re going to blow up this deal. 0:40:06 But also I didn’t like the uncomfortable, and I’m in a much different place now, obviously. 0:40:10 But like at that time and where I was as a CEO, I hated the negotiation. 0:40:11 I got uncomfortable. 0:40:16 Everyone, they taught me so much because there was only room around the table for me to not 0:40:17 really know all the answers. 0:40:23 I will often say that my CMO at OpenDNS, Jeff Samuels, I think of him not just as my CMO, 0:40:24 but as a mentor to me. 0:40:27 I mean, he taught me so much and actually I would say that about my VP of engineering, 0:40:29 my head of sales, my VP of sales. 0:40:32 I could take the inputs and use all that to make a decision. 0:40:35 And I felt very good about those decisions I made. 0:40:38 I think CEOs find it a huge relief when you tell them, you’re allowed to not know. 0:40:42 In fact, you kind of, if you have the best people, you’re going to know the least. 0:40:47 It is not uncommon for a CEO or a leader, a manager, this is just a good general life 0:40:48 advice. 0:40:51 It’s like, you know, you don’t want to be like the whiny person constantly like harping 0:40:52 on something. 0:40:56 But what I would say is like, you do sometimes need to present an idea more than once. 0:41:01 My old head of finance who ultimately became my best friend, used to always joke with me 0:41:04 that like he would just tell me everything he said twice because he knew the first time 0:41:05 I’d ignore him. 0:41:07 I think I have the same problem. 0:41:08 Yeah. 0:41:11 He would tell me some statistic about what’s happening with marketing spend or with hiring 0:41:12 or sales plans. 0:41:14 And I’d be like, oh, that’s not really a problem. 0:41:15 Like whatever. 0:41:16 Like, I don’t care. 0:41:17 You’re just like a crazy finance, like bean counter. 0:41:18 I don’t care. 0:41:22 But then like you’d come back like a week later and be like, hey, I have more data. 0:41:24 Like I did further analysis. 0:41:25 Like you ignored me. 0:41:26 But like, I know I’m right here. 0:41:27 And then I’d be like, oh, you’re right. 0:41:29 Why didn’t you tell me this last week? 0:41:30 Yeah. 0:41:34 So in that case, the CEO can get answers from all their management team and then make a 0:41:36 decision based on all the answers you’re hearing. 0:41:37 That’s right. 0:41:40 And I do think sometimes you do have to tell people more than once and that’s just a function 0:41:42 of how human beings operate. 0:41:45 So speaking of this telling people more than once and learning to listen, that was your 0:41:49 big shift between when you came back to be CEO and you kind of learned your lesson, so 0:41:50 to speak. 0:41:54 I honestly feel like that’s kind of a trite thing people say all the time, listen better. 0:42:01 I hate the design thinking mindset around empathy for the, and this scenario and this persona 0:42:03 and it’s just so, I can’t diagnose what’s off. 0:42:07 I think when you’re building a company, being empathetic, really it means understanding. 0:42:09 It doesn’t mean accommodating. 0:42:12 There were situations all the time, this happens all the time as a leader, like you may not 0:42:14 resolve that thing. 0:42:15 You can still understand it and be empathetic. 0:42:17 Like I can be like, yeah, that is terrible. 0:42:18 Like I understand what you’re saying. 0:42:19 I’m hearing you. 0:42:21 Honestly, that’s half the battle in relationships. 0:42:22 That’s right. 0:42:23 You don’t need an answer, 99% of it. 0:42:24 You just need to understand. 0:42:25 You should have someone to say, fuck, I feel for you. 0:42:26 That sucks. 0:42:27 And you’re already feeling like 80% better. 0:42:28 That’s right. 0:42:29 That’s right. 0:42:32 When I think about empathy, you really want to be a great listener. 0:42:36 And so actually a friend of mine, Wendy McNaughton, she does this all like New York Times thing 0:42:39 every other week where she really goes deep onto a topic. 0:42:40 She’s written these books. 0:42:41 I think she thinks of herself as an artist. 0:42:43 I think of her as an artist and entrepreneur. 0:42:47 One of the things that she taught me about a year or a year or two ago was like when 0:42:52 she’s trying to teach people like how to sort of be a really, really solid listener, is 0:42:56 that when someone’s talking to you, you’re like, tell me more about that. 0:42:57 That’s just a phrase. 0:42:58 Tell me more about that. 0:42:59 Five words. 0:43:00 So just make that your first question. 0:43:02 When you talk to a customer, oh, what’s going on? 0:43:05 Oh, we’re doing like annual planning, budget planning, tell me more about that. 0:43:07 How are you thinking about that? 0:43:08 What is happening? 0:43:10 What’s the frustrating part about annual planning? 0:43:11 Tell me more about that. 0:43:15 So what’s interesting to me about that is, to me, this is the difference between a focus 0:43:18 group and an ethnographer. 0:43:21 Focus groups and surveys are asking questions for things you already know to ask. 0:43:22 That’s right. 0:43:26 And an ethnographer is embedded in an organization or is sitting and is essentially just listening 0:43:29 to learn and observe and letting those patterns reveal things. 0:43:33 So deeper insights come out when you go down there, like tell me more about that path. 0:43:34 Exactly. 0:43:37 That’s when you get these flashes in your brain of like, wait, now I really understand 0:43:38 what’s happening. 0:43:40 It’s not that annual planning sucks. 0:43:43 It’s that you’re having budget issues that aren’t being resolved in a way that you need 0:43:46 or that maybe your tools you’re using to do annual planning or your way you communicate 0:43:50 and collaborate with your team or the way you work cross-functionally is not working. 0:43:51 Totally. 0:43:52 Totally. 0:43:55 I consider myself an ethnographer-esque editor because I want the context to know what I’m 0:43:57 not hearing, to really understand. 0:44:01 So it’s interesting because on the ethnographer side, I don’t think people know this about 0:44:05 you, but you started off your career or academic career because you actually started working 0:44:06 when you were like what? 0:44:07 Eighth grade? 0:44:08 What is that? 0:44:09 Like 14 or 15? 0:44:10 And that’s when you got your first W too, right? 0:44:11 Yeah. 0:44:13 I’ve had a 1099 or a W2 every year since eighth grade. 0:44:17 I worked at a mom and pop ISP in San Diego and I learned all about routing and networking. 0:44:20 I went to Washington University in St. Louis. 0:44:22 I applied to the School of Arts and Sciences. 0:44:26 When I went there to interview, they actually then had me interview with somebody in the 0:44:28 School of Engineering in the computer science department. 0:44:31 By the end of first semester of freshman year, I switched back to the School of Arts and 0:44:32 Sciences. 0:44:35 And the reason I switched is I took a class of Introduction to Human Evolution and I 0:44:36 just found it so fascinating. 0:44:39 Like I’ve always learned in my life, I do best of the things I really enjoyed working 0:44:40 on. 0:44:42 Like I have trouble doing things I don’t want to do. 0:44:43 Me too. 0:44:44 I’m the exact same way. 0:44:46 Yeah, sounds obvious, but like some people can actually just like will their way through 0:44:47 the hard stuff. 0:44:48 No, I can’t. 0:44:49 I have no energy. 0:44:50 I have zero. 0:44:51 Talk about returning energy. 0:44:52 I have like no energy to do the things. 0:44:53 Yeah. 0:44:54 I’m just like also like I’ll be okay if I just don’t do this. 0:44:55 Yeah. 0:44:56 But I really didn’t enjoy it. 0:44:58 So I learned how to optimize for the things that I like doing. 0:45:02 Anthropology, every book I read I thought was so interesting. 0:45:06 I learned about like how women enforce power hierarchy in South America in a way that we 0:45:07 don’t have elsewhere in the world. 0:45:10 I learned about like what happens in Southeast Asia around farming. 0:45:12 I learned about the Green Revolution in Africa. 0:45:16 But then I find that like in my life, I actually think about these things all the time. 0:45:19 That was back to me in my next question is, do you think it actually is useful in your 0:45:21 career as a technologist? 0:45:22 Absolutely. 0:45:24 I think about demographic transitions. 0:45:26 I think about when I read about like what’s happening in Japan. 0:45:29 It makes me think about how is that going to change my investing thesis? 0:45:31 And I think it comes up constantly. 0:45:34 It comes up both both tactically as you think about yourself in like leadership and organizational 0:45:35 dynamics. 0:45:37 It gives you an appreciation that there’s many perspectives in the world. 0:45:40 In fact, it gives you an appreciation that more perspectives are more better and you 0:45:42 want more. 0:45:46 So that is then a perfect way to close this episode. 0:45:52 So David Yulovic, he’s made a journey from anthropologist to technical CEO to product 0:45:55 CEO to sales CEO to go-to-market CEO. 0:45:56 And now investor. 0:45:58 Welcome to the A6NC podcast. 0:45:59 Thanks.
with David Ulevitch (@davidu) and Sonal Chokshi (@smc90)
Since the startup (and founder) journey doesn’t go neatly linear from technical to product to sales, tightening one knob (whether engineering or marketing or pricing & packaging) creates slack in one of the other knobs, which demands turning to yet another knob. So how do you know what knob to focus on and when? How do you build the right team for the right play and at the right time?
It all depends on ”What time is it”: where are you on the journey, and where do you want to go… In this episode of the a16z Podcast, general partner David Ulevitch (in conversation with Sonal Chokshi) shares hard-earned lessons on these top-of-mind questions for founders; as well as advice on other tricky topics, such as pricing and packaging, balancing between product visionary vs. product manager, how to manage your own time (and psychology!) as your company grows, and more. Much of this is based on his own up-and-down, inside-outside, big-small-big-small, long journey as CEO (and CTO) for the company he co-founded, OpenDNS.
The company was later acquired by Cisco after it pivoted from consumer to enterprise. Speaking of, what are the latest shifts and nuances in selling and buying enterprise products, beyond the phrase ”consumerization of enterprise”? Or beyond the cliché of ”design thinking” — how does one go beyond user experience and beyond things like fun gifs (which are pronounced, ahem, ”jifs”) to focusing on the whole customer experience, and earning the right to be complicated? All this and more in this episode… plus the magic 5 words that will help any CEO (and anyone, really).
The views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation.
This content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only, and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investors or prospective investors, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund and should be read in their entirety.) Any investments or portfolio companies mentioned, referred to, or described are not representative of all investments in vehicles managed by a16z, and there can be no assurance that the investments will be profitable or that other investments made in the future will have similar characteristics or results. A list of investments made by funds managed by Andreessen Horowitz (excluding investments and certain publicly traded cryptocurrencies/ digital assets for which the issuer has not provided permission for a16z to disclose publicly) is available at https://a16z.com/investments/.
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0:00:05 The content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business 0:00:10 tax or investment advice, or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed 0:00:15 at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. For more details, please see 0:00:21 a16z.com/disclosures. Hi, welcome to the A16Z podcast. This is 0:00:27 Frank Chen. Today’s episode is called “Five Open Problems for the Blockchain Computer.” 0:00:32 It originally aired as a YouTube video. And you can watch all of our YouTube videos at 0:00:39 youtube.com/a16zvideos. Well, welcome to the A16Z YouTube channel. Today, 0:00:45 I’m here with Ali Yahya, our deal partner in the A16Z crypto team. And we’re going to 0:00:49 have a fun conversation. So here’s what we’re going to do. I’m going to pretend Ali to 0:00:54 be a Google software engineer or an Apple software engineer, right? So I’m somebody 0:00:59 who knows how to write software, has been doing it for a while. And then all of a sudden, 0:01:03 I saw my friends start to peel off and go to crypto startups. And I’m looking around 0:01:08 going, “What’s happening? Google’s a great place or Apple’s a great place. Why are people 0:01:13 leaving to go to crypto startups?” And maybe you can help me understand what’s causing 0:01:16 all these smart, talented people to head into crypto land. 0:01:17 I love it. 0:01:22 Fantastic. So maybe let’s just start with the world in which we live today, which is, 0:01:28 you know, I use my iPhone or my Android phone. I happen to use a Google phone, the Pixel. 0:01:35 I use Google Photos. I use Gmail. My carrier is T-Mobile. It’s sort of a centralized world. 0:01:39 And it works pretty well, right? Like, it’s pretty reliable. And Google gets all my photos 0:01:44 and my mail arrives when I want it. And so that’s not a bad world. Is crypto really 0:01:48 trying to overturn that world? 0:01:53 That world does work fine, but it’s not the frontier. So what I would say is the reason 0:02:00 that crypto is so exciting is because it offers a fundamentally new paradigm for computation 0:02:03 that has features that are completely novel and different from the features that enable 0:02:09 applications like social media, as it exists today, like sharing photos, like all of sort 0:02:14 of the centralized services that we know and love today. And so I think with every successive 0:02:22 wave of computation that we’ve seen throughout the history of computing, normally, the new 0:02:28 paradigm tends to suck at first and tends to be pretty bad at most things that the old 0:02:34 paradigm is very good at. But it happens to shine in one or two particular ways that enable 0:02:38 new applications that previously were just not possible to build. And so with, I mean, 0:02:43 I think one of the clearest examples is just the example of mobile phones enabling applications 0:02:49 like Uber, where applications like Instagram, by virtue of having a camera and a GPS bolted 0:02:54 onto the phone, that enable those kinds of behaviors that with a personal computer, you 0:02:57 couldn’t have possibly, couldn’t have possibly built. 0:03:00 Your PC didn’t know where you were necessarily, so it couldn’t enable Lyft. 0:03:04 Exactly. And it would have been also just deeply impractical for one to pull out one’s 0:03:05 laptop. 0:03:08 Hold on, let me get my PC. 0:03:16 And so with crypto, I think the key dimension along which these decentralized computers 0:03:22 that people are building in the world of crypto shine is that of trust. They provide this 0:03:32 new angle that previous computers didn’t have because previous computers are owned and operated 0:03:39 by individuals or by single entities like companies. And so you have to trust that individual, 0:03:43 you have to trust that company to actually run the software that they’re claiming that 0:03:47 they’re running and to actually do what they claim they will do with your data. And with, 0:03:51 we’re basically with the entire interaction between you and them. And so we trust Google 0:03:56 with our photos, we trust Google with our email, we trust Google with just about everything 0:04:01 that entails the kinds of interactions that we have with Google. 0:04:06 This new paradigm of computation is such that you now have a computational fabric that is 0:04:11 not owned and operated by any one person. This is the whole point of decentralization. 0:04:15 When people talk about decentralization in the world of crypto, they mean decentralization 0:04:23 of human control. Not decentralization of computing in a geographic sense. It’s not 0:04:28 decentralization in any other way that you may think. Like the key thing about crypto 0:04:34 is decentralization of human power and human control over systems and figuring out clever 0:04:41 ways to build a system such that it is self policing and such that it’s security and its 0:04:47 trust emerges bottom up from its participants and from individuals as opposed to top down 0:04:54 from like some trusted organization at the top that kind of enforces the rules. 0:05:00 Got it. So instead of trusting Google or Facebook or Apple, I can then trust the collective 0:05:05 of people who have contributed their computing, their storage, power, etc., etc., to deliver 0:05:12 the service that I’m consuming. And that’s the big innovation. And so why don’t we go 0:05:18 through the implications of that by sort of talking through, well, what will we need to 0:05:26 rebuild in crypto land, starting with compute, so that all of the applications that run on 0:05:31 top of this distributed computer sort of will have the power that you’re describing. So 0:05:35 let’s start with distributed compute. What do we need? So I guess maybe to set the stage, 0:05:40 if we think of compute today, we have computers that can perform certain monotransactions 0:05:46 per second. We have visa, which can clear so many financial transactions per second. 0:05:49 And then we compare those things with things like, well, how many Bitcoin transactions 0:05:54 can clear, how many Ethereum smart contracts can clear. So why don’t we talk about how 0:05:57 do we get distributed compute to really sing in crypto land? 0:06:04 Absolutely. So I think so much of the attention in crypto tends to be on this metric of transactions 0:06:08 per second. And I think we would argue that that’s the wrong, I mean, it’s not even the 0:06:13 right framing because we’re not talking about just a ledger that processes payments. We’re 0:06:19 talking about a computer, we’re talking about a decentralized fabric for general computation. 0:06:23 So the right metric is not really transactions per second, it’s really instructions per second. 0:06:28 How many, how many instructions of some computation can you process in any given period of time? 0:06:33 And that’s kind of what people know as, know as as throughput. And so that’s one of the 0:06:38 metrics for scalability that that matter when it comes to compute. The other one is the 0:06:42 latency to finality. It’s like, how do we know that the computation was done and that 0:06:49 it can no longer be reverted, that it can no longer, that its output was final and that 0:06:54 nothing can happen that could reverse it and have it be something different. You can trust 0:06:59 that that outcome is settled. So that’s latency to finality is how much time do you have to 0:07:05 wait before that happens. And people talk all the time about how Bitcoin has terrible latency 0:07:10 to finality, you have to wait 60 minutes before you can be reasonably sure that your 0:07:14 payment is final. So that’s another another access. And then the final one when we talk 0:07:22 about scalability of computation is what is the cost per instruction? How much do I have 0:07:26 to pay for that transaction? How much do I have to pay for just an arbitrary computation 0:07:31 on Ethereum or on some of the more general platforms for for computation? And the reason 0:07:35 obviously that all of this matters is because the kinds of applications that we want to 0:07:44 build will just require far greater scalability and also will require far lower cost to really 0:07:49 to really work. And I think it may be helpful to just exemplify what those applications 0:07:53 are. I think some of the some of the things that we we are seeing already in the world 0:07:59 of of Ethereum kind of the Ethereum ecosystem is maybe the richest so far in terms of actual 0:08:04 developer activity on top. So we’ve seen kind of the emergence of this parallel financial 0:08:12 world where you have things like like stable coins, which are price stable cryptocurrencies 0:08:18 that have some logic that modulate the supply of the of the token to keep it stable to some 0:08:23 external reference like the US dollar. And then on top of that, people build things like 0:08:27 lending platforms and they build they build things like derivatives platforms, they build 0:08:33 things like decentralized exchanges where you can exchange tokens or exchange crypto assets 0:08:38 without depending on some central exchange. So all of these things that’s like one one 0:08:43 example one trend that is already happening among among many other trends that we can 0:08:48 talk about other examples later review if you think it’s helpful. But all of that depends 0:08:59 on far greater throughput, far lower latency to finality and far lower cost per per instruction. 0:09:04 It’s already just with this initial activity, we’re already seeing the limits of the current 0:09:09 of the current technology. So it’s an open problem. How do we increase throughput? And 0:09:13 for that particular question, people people like what one of the things that matters the 0:09:19 most is the delay in propagation of messages in a distributed system. That’s what ends 0:09:28 up dominating the cost of that particular problem. So people talk about the block time 0:09:34 in crypto was like how much time do you have to wait before you can append a new block 0:09:39 to the blockchain and blocks usually contain computations they contain transactions. So 0:09:44 you can lower the amount of time that you have to wait for new blocks to come along, 0:09:50 then you will process more transactions and more computations per per unit time than you 0:09:55 would otherwise. And so propagating messages in the network is is a is the dominant factor 0:10:00 is that’s what makes it slow to sort of finalize a transaction. Exactly. And the reason for 0:10:04 this is that we are building a distributed system. And so if you think about it, what 0:10:09 is the difference between a distributed system and one that’s just centralized? And that 0:10:14 is that there’s distance between the different nodes that are participating in the system. 0:10:18 So the key difference is that now there’s this additional communication cost between 0:10:24 the different nodes in the system. And that cost is also is significant because it’s bounded 0:10:29 is it like the lower bound on it is the speed of light. You cannot get faster than the speed 0:10:35 of light. So so it provides it causes this this kind of lower bound as to how perform 0:10:40 it can possibly be. And you can only get so clever before you reach that that that kind 0:10:46 of lower bound. But it is the case that today we’re still far far from from that lower bound. 0:10:49 There’s still a lot of room for improvement. Yeah, I mean, people in general pretty impatient. 0:10:53 I remember when the chip and pin system started getting deployed here in the United States, 0:10:57 it was just a couple of years ago, right? And then the you didn’t start your credit 0:11:02 card, it would take like five seconds, right? And that was a lot slower than the swipe. And 0:11:06 people were like, this is never going to work. I’m not waiting five seconds for my credit 0:11:12 card to clear. And so maybe talk a little bit about, you know, sort of what is the propagation 0:11:17 delay today? And then what’s practical to get to given sort of speed of light limitations? 0:11:20 And then what’s the target? And how do we get there? 0:11:28 Yeah, for sure. So today, I mean, there’s this there’s enormous tension between, well, 0:11:33 to back up a little bit. So there are two things that matter here. One of them is how 0:11:38 much time does it take to send a message between two two points in space? But then there’s 0:11:46 also the problem of what what influence does the size of the message have on on that amount 0:11:51 of time? And so there’s basically the two angles here are latency and bandwidth, latency 0:11:55 being the amount of time that it takes to send a message bandwidth, being how much how 0:12:00 much data can you actually fit through the pipe per unit of per unit of time. So there’s 0:12:05 a tension in this space, you can see this reflected in in say the Bitcoin like block 0:12:14 size debate. Yeah, between sort of the throughput that you can get out of a network and the 0:12:19 propagation delay that that is caused by say increasing the block size. So in the case 0:12:24 of Bitcoin, people people were talking about doubling the block size from one megabyte to 0:12:29 two megabytes. So that would increase the throughput of the Bitcoin blockchain, because 0:12:35 now you can fit twice as many transactions, and the blocks will still come at a 10 minute 0:12:42 cadence. But that would increase the propagation delay for those blocks, which would cause 0:12:46 certain miners to no longer really be able to participate because they won’t get the 0:12:49 block in time. So they would have to they would eventually end up falling out, you’d 0:12:55 end up with a more centralized system. So we see here there’s a trade off between performance 0:12:59 and decentralization, assuming that you want to keep security constant, you don’t want 0:13:04 to suffer. You still need the trust, right, you can give up on the trust, you can’t allow 0:13:10 double spending, right. So I always thought that the reason say Bitcoin was slow was the 0:13:15 proof of work was so computationally demanding. Is that still the case, or is that is that 0:13:16 a solved problem? 0:13:21 So it’s a very, very good point. So we’ve been talking so far we’ve been talking about 0:13:29 the throughput of of instructions for a blockchain, which is one of the three different dimensions 0:13:35 for scalability of compute. The third one was the cost of instruction of an instruction 0:13:41 how much does it cost to have a transaction be processed. So the cost of proof of work 0:13:49 is what ends up driving the cost of an instruction so far, so so high. Rather than I mean, like 0:13:56 so there are, there are like various different lines of work. There’s the line of work that’s 0:14:01 trying to improve the propagation of messages and to make that more efficient. So there 0:14:07 are companies like blocks route, which are building like a kind of a content delivery 0:14:13 network which has advanced computer networking technology that allows miners to propagate 0:14:18 their blocks to other miners very efficiently. And so that’ll help with the propagation delay, 0:14:19 which will help with the throughput problem. 0:14:23 So the new generation CDN that is optimized for crypto. 0:14:27 And in fact, they call it a blockchain distribution network, a BDN. 0:14:28 Oh, got it. 0:14:31 And so that’s an interesting angle and that operates at layer zero is like the networking 0:14:36 layer below the blockchain layer. And it can help any blockchain project, any blockchain 0:14:42 project that builds on top of it will benefit from faster propagation of messages. 0:14:45 And the classic internet definitely needed this. Like it’s impossible to imagine the 0:14:50 internet without a CDN, right? You’d be waiting a lot longer for almost anything without that 0:14:54 layer of infrastructure. So that makes sense. So there’s sort of a CDN layer. 0:14:57 Yeah. And then, and then there are people who are working on this latency to finality 0:15:01 dimension, which we also talked about, which is how much time do you have to wait before 0:15:10 your message or your update, your computation is final. And so that is a consensus problem. 0:15:16 How do we agree that the update is final? How do we agree that something can no longer 0:15:23 be reversed? So proof of work is a probabilistic consensus algorithm in that there is always 0:15:28 some probability that whatever update to the ledger was performed could be reverted at 0:15:35 some point in time later. And the key aspect there is that the more time passes, the less 0:15:40 likely it becomes that that update gets reverted. But it’s always probabilistic. And this is 0:15:43 why you kind of have to wait 60 minutes before you know that it’s final, because that’s 0:15:48 the point at which that probability becomes so minimal that you can effectively trust 0:15:49 that it won’t be reverted. 0:15:54 But there is innovation in consensus algorithms that are better than that, that are not probabilistic 0:16:01 and that are actually deterministic and are final on a far shorter time span. 0:16:05 Yeah. And you need both, right? You need non probabilistic and you need fast, right? 0:16:10 So I, you know, everybody talks about the, the Ethereum contract things underlying things 0:16:16 like, hey, when you go rent an Airbnb, that lock will open because I know it’s you. There’s 0:16:20 a smart contract that governs the, oh, you’re allowed to stay here tonight. No one’s going 0:16:26 to wait there 60 minutes for that. And so is it feasible? Are we on a path to basically 0:16:31 enable use cases like that where like, I’ve got my smart key and I’m in front of the Airbnb 0:16:35 and like in seconds that thing is going to open because the contract clear, is that possible 0:16:38 or is that not quite possible yet? We don’t know the path. 0:16:43 I think, I mean, we do see, we do see a path. I think that, so given the improvements on 0:16:49 the networking layer with companies like BoxRoute, improvements on the consensus layer with companies 0:16:53 like DFINITY and Ethereum 2.0 and Cosmos and Polkadot, there’s like a large number of people 0:17:00 working at that level. And then finally, improvements on the cost per instruction. Similarly, proof 0:17:05 of stake and other consensus algorithms don’t use the expensive proof of work that the original 0:17:09 blockchain’s used. And so that can also come down as you can see a world where, where this 0:17:15 does come down to a degree that it becomes fairly practical for everyday use for things 0:17:23 like kind of like a quick lighthearted interactions between people or between people and machines. 0:17:29 And so I think that that is certainly possible and I think we’re on our way. But I think 0:17:35 it’s worth noting, decentralized systems will always be more expensive and less performant 0:17:41 than centralized ones. There’s just an inherent tradeoff there and there’s an inherent cost 0:17:47 to decentralizing a computer system. And so it won’t replace everything. There will 0:17:53 be applications that will always make sense for a centralized world, for a centralized 0:17:57 world. And there will be some applications for which decentralization very much does 0:18:03 make sense. And those are the ones where trust is the key differentiator, where trust is 0:18:08 the bottleneck to scale. That’s where decentralized systems will shine. 0:18:12 I want you to give me a couple of examples of sort of applications where trust is the 0:18:18 key as opposed to performance or cost or whatever. But before we do that, I want to talk about 0:18:23 this notion of proof of work, transitioning to proof of stake, because this is super important. 0:18:30 I read all the time that Bitcoin mining is consuming some known fraction of the world’s 0:18:35 electricity because the math is so hard to actually do one of these proof of works, right? 0:18:41 It has to go similar to public key cryptography. And so what’s happening here? Like, how do 0:18:45 we get on a path where we’re not consuming all the world’s electricity doing these proofs? 0:18:51 Yeah. So the key goal for crypto networks is to build trust in a way that is bottom-up 0:18:55 and that does not depend on some central authority. And so as a result, you have to figure out 0:19:01 a way to make the network be self-policing and to kind of have an incentive structure 0:19:07 that makes its members police one another in a way that the entire network kind of works 0:19:12 and sort of proceeds according to people’s expectations. So in a sense, you have to make 0:19:20 it the rational equilibrium to play by the rules of the game rather than to defect and 0:19:26 profit in some way that is against the rules and that kind of figures out a way to game 0:19:31 the system. And so in Bitcoin, one of the key ways this worked was through this proof 0:19:35 of work. So maybe talk a little bit about how did it work? Why did it consume so much 0:19:40 electricity? And then where are we going? So the key problem that crypto networks have 0:19:46 to solve is figuring out who gets to participate because there’s no one central party who is 0:19:50 able to decide who gets to participate and who doesn’t. That’s the entire point we want 0:19:56 to do away with that. And so proof of work does this by requiring every participant to 0:20:01 compute an expensive proof of work. It’s a computation that’s done on top of every block 0:20:05 that they want to add to the blockchain. So that’s an extrinsic resource that they have 0:20:11 to come across, they have to procure to be able to participate and it prevents any one 0:20:18 person from completely monopolizing the system and from having unilateral ability to modify 0:20:22 the underlying blockchain. That of course is very expensive because you have to come 0:20:27 across all of this computational power in order to participate. So proof of stake says 0:20:31 something different is instead of making the resource that you have to come across and 0:20:37 you have to procure be extrinsic to the system, why not make it something that’s intrinsic 0:20:44 to it, namely why not make it a crypto asset, why not make it a token that you have to own 0:20:50 in order to buy your participation in the system. So what proof of stake does is it 0:20:57 says if you own 2% of the tokens in the network, then by and large on average you’ll have 2% 0:21:01 of the say in what blocks get to make it onto the blockchain and which ones don’t. But now 0:21:09 because of the asset itself, the resource that you need to be in procession of in order 0:21:14 to participate, because it’s no longer extrinsic to the system, it’s no longer a resource that 0:21:19 is sort of a physical resource like electricity and rather it’s entirely virtual, now the 0:21:25 cost of actually participating in consensus and making the entire network work in real 0:21:31 terms comes down dramatically. And it’s just secure or at least theoretically can be made 0:21:37 just to secure and that’s a controversial statement but I will sort of stand by it. 0:21:42 But it’s less expensive and so from a cost per instruction, on a cost per instruction 0:21:47 basis it’ll be much more performant than a proof of work system. 0:21:51 So if I could restate that it sounds like in Bitcoin with its proof of work I had to 0:21:56 bring electricity, consume the electricity, do this hard math and that was how I sort 0:22:00 of entered the system and participated and my reward is a minor for burning all this 0:22:06 electricity as I get paid in Bitcoin. In proof of work I’m bringing basically tokens, sorry, 0:22:10 in proof of stake I’m bringing the tokens themselves, I’m not consuming electricity I’m just bringing 0:22:17 the tokens themselves and I’m by virtue of my ownership of the tokens I can participate 0:22:23 in a proof of stake that delivers the same trust properties as proof of work without 0:22:25 burning all the electricity. 0:22:26 Exactly. 0:22:31 Got it. Got it. So it sounds like all of these things need to come together for us to build 0:22:36 sort of distributed compute in this new world, right? We need the new CDNs, we need this transition 0:22:40 to things that look like proof of stake so we’re not consuming all this electricity. 0:22:46 Any other big innovations that need to happen in this space to bring the transaction cost 0:22:48 down and the transaction speed up? 0:22:54 I think those are the big ones. So we’re talking about the three pillars of computation, well 0:23:00 the three pillars of scalability of computation, there’s throughput, there’s latency and then 0:23:03 there’s a cost per instruction and so we kind of addressed all three, there’s companies 0:23:06 that are working in all three and I think these are very much still open problems and 0:23:12 there’s just a lot of green field for exploration and so I will tell you Google engineer, this 0:23:17 is where it’s exciting, this is where your skills as a sort of distributed systems engineer 0:23:23 or machine learning expert can kind of leverage those skills to figure out some of these open 0:23:24 problems. 0:23:29 Got it, so if I’m motivated by doing things like I want to create a better TCP/IP, I want 0:23:34 to create a better HTTPS and oh man I’m just too late to the party, like I arrived when 0:23:38 all those protocols were already settled, like you’re saying this space is for me because 0:23:42 a lot of the problems haven’t been settled yet, right? A thorny problem, unsettled, big 0:23:43 world impact. 0:23:48 Yeah, even if it’s been 10 years since the publishing of the Bitcoin white paper, this 0:23:55 is still very early days, because I think that it’s only recently that people have begun 0:24:00 to conceive of blockchains as computers as opposed to just payment systems, so the emergence 0:24:09 of Ethereum was in 2014 and it’s only really been five years or four years really of people 0:24:14 thinking of blockchains in this way and so it’s very early days, the space is very nascent 0:24:17 and there’s just a lot of work to do, great. 0:24:21 So perfect time, why don’t we sort of move on to part two, so we’ve talked about distributed 0:24:28 compute, let’s talk about distributed storage and so we started with the Google photos example, 0:24:34 I kind of trust Google to have all my storage, all my photos, but to do that they have huge 0:24:38 servers with lots of hard drives in them scattered around the world, it’s pretty expensive and 0:24:44 so if I was a startup trying to mount a frontal assault against that, I kind of only have 0:24:50 two choices, one is raise like a trillion dollars and try to duplicate their infrastructure, 0:24:58 put data centers everywhere, points of presence, or I could do what the distributed crypto community 0:25:02 is trying to do which is convince you to lend me a bit of your hard drive space. 0:25:09 The key reason that we need a decentralized layer of storage is because it itself will 0:25:14 be a foundational building block for this decentralized world computer that we’re talking 0:25:19 about and so in order for some of these applications that we’ve talked about that are not really 0:25:26 possible to build on top of a centralized architecture to really work, we need the full extent of 0:25:31 a computer that works in this way and so if we had a centralized storage layer instead 0:25:38 of a decentralized one then that would be the weakest link, it would dilute the promise 0:25:44 of the decentralized layer of computation if you don’t have all of the pieces themselves 0:25:49 being decentralized and so that’s why it’s important because we want to enable these 0:25:56 applications that kind of depend on decentralization for trust and it’s not so much to compete 0:26:02 head on with Amazon because the economics are different, as we said like decentralizing 0:26:08 a system always comes with the cost and so it won’t make sense for just storing your 0:26:14 photos if storing your photos is something that Amazon/Google can do and if there’s 0:26:19 no trust dimension to doing that, maybe if you care deeply about your photos not ever 0:26:24 being seen by anyone but yourself or by anyone but your close friends then maybe you can 0:26:28 imagine using a different kind of architecture, one that’s maybe more decentralized, but for 0:26:32 that kind of use case I imagine sort of the centralized data center model, it works very 0:26:38 well and they’re not paying the decentralization tax and so it’s always going to be cheaper 0:26:45 for them to store your photos but there are interesting opportunities, so for example 0:26:48 there’s a project called Filecoin, there are a number of others too that are working in 0:26:52 the same space, one of them is called SIA, another one is called StoreJ and they are 0:26:59 trying to build decentralized marketplaces for storage, so the idea is yes I can rent 0:27:05 some of your idle storage space on your laptop and pay you for that storage in Filecoin and 0:27:11 the reason that that’s now possible is because I can now trust that you will actually store 0:27:15 my files and you can trust that I will pay you for that storage even if we’re complete 0:27:20 strangers and reside across the world from one another because of the cryptographic guarantees 0:27:23 of the underlying protocol. 0:27:29 And so that’s important because previously without crypto and without blockchains that 0:27:34 would have been a very difficult interaction to coordinate and it would have been very hard 0:27:39 for us to establish trust from halfway across the world and make that exchange happen. 0:27:44 So it’s a marketplace that now emerges where previously it couldn’t have and it gives us 0:27:54 this property that no one controls this sort of layer of storage and we can use it in conjunction 0:27:58 with a computation layer to build applications that are fully decentralized and that are 0:28:07 unstoppable and kind of run in their own right and therefore command greater trust than 0:28:09 applications that are centralized. 0:28:13 So I remember before the crypto craze there were definitely startups that were trying 0:28:17 to do that do this exact thing which is sort of let’s share hard drive space. 0:28:22 I remember there were backup companies that basically say your price would be I’ll make 0:28:26 up a price $20 per gig per month but if you contribute your own hard drive space your 0:28:31 price is $10 per gig a month or whatever and making up those numbers but they never really 0:28:32 got to scale. 0:28:39 So what are the advantages of doing this with sort of a cryptographic protocol as their 0:28:43 intermediary as opposed to just hey there’s a company and there’s a service and there’s 0:28:48 a price chart and please participate right and we’re going to sort of transact value 0:28:50 and fiat currency. 0:28:55 Yeah, well I think that the key difference is that those companies were operating on 0:29:03 the assumption that the value at here is an economic that you actually that is kind of 0:29:12 like Uber you’ll tap into all of this unused storage space that previously was inaccessible 0:29:17 that you’ll offer that at a cheaper rate but I think that in the end because storage is 0:29:24 the most commoditized of computational resources and because there’s just so strong economies 0:29:31 of scale that benefit companies like Amazon as they build data centers the economic argument 0:29:32 just doesn’t doesn’t work. 0:29:37 So the reason that we need decentralized storage networks is not because they’re going to reduce 0:29:43 the price of storage by orders of magnitude at least for most kinds of files and for most 0:29:47 use cases I don’t believe that that’ll be the case. 0:29:53 The value proposition is that again we now no longer have this central entity that’s 0:29:57 controlling the storage on this network and so for the kinds of applications that depend 0:30:02 on that the kinds of applications that really cannot be built unless you have that you just 0:30:04 have no other option. 0:30:05 Yeah. 0:30:09 So you would pay the additional cost you pay a higher price for storing your files and 0:30:12 file coin because that matters. 0:30:17 Is there a privacy argument here which is the because it’s decentralized for instance 0:30:23 there’s nobody to give a government subpoena to to say I want to see your files. 0:30:29 I think privacy comes into it to some extent but I think it’s a little bit orthogonal because 0:30:33 you can imagine encrypting your files before storing them in a centralized service. 0:30:34 Yeah. 0:30:35 Fair. 0:30:40 So you there are ways of building privacy into into sort of existing centralized storage 0:30:41 networks. 0:30:42 Okay. 0:30:46 And then what are some of the challenging computer science things about building these 0:30:51 and so if there was proof of work for computation what are the proof of in the space. 0:30:52 Yeah. 0:30:55 Well the biggest one is trusting that the people who are claiming to be storing your 0:30:58 files actually are storing your files. 0:31:04 So there’s this line of work that’s been spearheaded by the people at Filecoin and by 0:31:11 Stanford’s cryptography lab, Dan Bonet’s lab and sort of people like Confisch and Benedict 0:31:18 Boone’s underneath him have done a lot of work on figuring out how to create cryptographic 0:31:20 proofs of retrievability. 0:31:26 How can I prove to you that I actually am storing the files that I’m claiming that I 0:31:27 am storing. 0:31:28 Right. 0:31:29 And it’s super interesting. 0:31:33 It’s extremely cutting edge and it’s basically at the heart of how you make a system like 0:31:34 this work. 0:31:35 Yeah. 0:31:39 So you basically have to catch the pretenders which is you don’t want somebody to be able 0:31:44 to say yes I’ll store your files and then not actually store them right because it would 0:31:49 be cheaper for them not to store them right and so these sort of proofs of retrievability 0:31:51 are basically ways to catch the pretenders. 0:31:52 Exactly. 0:31:53 Right. 0:31:54 And it’s sort of a mathematical fashion. 0:31:56 So yeah, you actually had a conversation with Ben Fisch on this. 0:32:01 So for people who are interested in exploring this topic further, there’s a couple YouTube 0:32:02 videos. 0:32:03 Awesome. 0:32:04 So, okay. 0:32:05 So we’ve talked about distributed compute. 0:32:07 We’ve talked about distributed storage. 0:32:10 I guess the third leg is now networking like what’s happening here. 0:32:14 Actually this kind of reminds me, do you remember the company Phone? 0:32:20 This is sort of back in 2006 and the idea was I could buy a Wi-Fi router from this company 0:32:23 called Phone and then I could sort of do one of two things with it. 0:32:29 One, I could sort of offer it in Linus mode which is I gave it away free Wi-Fi access 0:32:30 right. 0:32:34 Anybody that came to my house with my Wi-Fi router, you could access my Wi-Fi for free 0:32:40 and then in exchange I could access anybody else’s Wi-Fi access point for free. 0:32:44 So that’s mode one or I could be in bill mode and in bill mode basically I would say look 0:32:52 my Wi-Fi is available to you but you’re going to rent it for two bucks and in exchange for 0:32:56 that I would have to pay to access other people’s Wi-Fi. 0:33:01 So I could be in open source mode or I could be in rent seeking mode and it was this attempt 0:33:08 to basically create a distributed ISP out of millions and millions of wireless. 0:33:09 So it’s something wireless access points. 0:33:12 Is something similar going on in crypto today? 0:33:13 Absolutely. 0:33:19 So the difficulty with those efforts has often been just the problem of density and the problem 0:33:20 of incentives. 0:33:26 So how do you get enough people to offer up hardware that forwards packets and provides 0:33:32 bandwidth within a particular geographic region to make it make sense and to make it work 0:33:39 and to be at all competitive with sort of the more kind of centralized top-down internet 0:33:41 backbone infrastructure that we rely on. 0:33:46 And so there are a number of projects that are, it’s very early because this is actually 0:33:48 probably one of the hardest problems in this space to tackle. 0:33:52 How do you decentralize even the networking layer, the communication between different 0:33:58 nodes and to not have it depend on centralized internet infrastructure. 0:34:05 So people are talking about incentivized mesh networking protocols where you can earn cryptocurrency, 0:34:13 you can earn the asset that’s native to a particular protocol by setting up a router. 0:34:17 This router can be a normal router that just forwards packets but it could also be wireless 0:34:24 and provide a different layer of connectivity that otherwise, that essentially makes the 0:34:31 networking layer more robust and more resistant to censorship and perhaps even more performant 0:34:35 if you have just greater connectivity to the people you want to interact with. 0:34:40 So yeah, I think this is one of these problem areas that’s fairly far out because it kind 0:34:46 of depends on the other two building blocks and it has its unique challenges because now 0:34:49 we’re talking about bringing hardware into the picture. 0:34:51 That’s always a whole other kind of worms. 0:34:56 But it is very interesting and I think in the end, it’ll also be a piece of the puzzle. 0:35:03 So that’s one angle to it, it’s decentralizing networking and then the other angle is making 0:35:08 networking itself just more performant for the use cases of decentralization. 0:35:12 So we talked a little bit about the CDNs for blocks. 0:35:16 So that kind of falls into that category, into this category as well. 0:35:17 Got it. 0:35:20 So those are the key ingredients that you need to build a computer, right? 0:35:24 You need compute, you need network, you need storage and it looks like there’s sort of 0:35:27 efforts underway in all of these things. 0:35:32 Let’s assume for a second that time has gone by and protocols and sort of Darwinian fashion 0:35:38 have competed and a couple winners have emerged and these things look more like solved problems. 0:35:43 So now the exciting opportunity is, okay, now we can build killer apps on top of the 0:35:47 blockchain computer and so maybe talk to me about what is the community most excited about? 0:35:50 What kinds of apps are you going to build? 0:35:53 Because as you’ve been pointing out, it’s not going to be the straightforward replacements 0:35:55 for the things that we know and love today. 0:36:01 It’s not like instantly the replacement for Airbnb or Google Photos or Lyft because those 0:36:04 systems don’t have to pay the decentralization tax. 0:36:08 It’s probably going to be another class of apps at least to begin with. 0:36:12 That is the killer question and I think as with any new technology it is very difficult 0:36:16 to predict what applications will be the most impactful. 0:36:22 I think one reason to believe that the kind of innovation that we’ll see will be enormous 0:36:28 is that everything happens, all of the code that’s written in the space ends up being 0:36:29 open source. 0:36:31 And so as a result the ideas are out there. 0:36:36 People share their ideas with other teams, other teams sort of build on top of one another’s 0:36:37 ideas. 0:36:43 And so the kind of innovation that we’re likely to see is just combinatorial in nature and 0:36:49 likely more explosive and will accelerate more quickly than it has for previous waves 0:36:52 of computing and previous waves of technology. 0:36:59 We do have this kind of decentralized world computer that is a kind of computational fabric 0:37:04 on top of which applications can run and it is unified in that one application can easily 0:37:06 talk to another. 0:37:10 Then we have the possibility of composability of applications. 0:37:16 So not only do we have the sharing of ideas that are just available to people because 0:37:22 by virtue of being open source, but we also have the actual composability of running code. 0:37:25 Code that runs on top of this computational fabric that builds on top of the code that 0:37:27 other people have built. 0:37:32 And this kind of composability will just fuel the flame of combinatorial innovation even 0:37:33 further. 0:37:38 So I feel like the kinds of applications that we’ll see as a result are fundamentally 0:37:40 impossible to predict. 0:37:44 But I will say, I think the kinds of things that we’ve started to see, the kinds of applications 0:37:48 that seem to be working so far, and it’s still very early and they’re working only in kind 0:37:56 of niche, within niche communities, are ones where trust is the bottleneck to scale. 0:37:59 So I think the most obvious one began with Bitcoin. 0:38:08 It’s attempting to be money and the only way that you would trust a program that maintains 0:38:15 a ledger of tokens that claims that those tokens should be money is if that ledger isn’t 0:38:20 in the control of any one entity or any one individual. 0:38:27 I guess you would trust the central government, maybe, but you would not trust a company to 0:38:28 do that. 0:38:31 So you wouldn’t have been able to build Bitcoin on top of Amazon. 0:38:35 Bitcoin is like one example of an application that you can build and a bunch of the applications 0:38:41 that have worked so far in the Ethereum ecosystem primarily have been financial in nature, have 0:38:47 been things that build on top of that initial idea, so things like lending platforms, derivatives, 0:38:54 exchanges, things that depend on trust for them to really take off. 0:38:59 But we’ve also started to see other applications that benefit from this feature. 0:39:05 I think gaming is an interesting one where you can imagine taking the existing world 0:39:09 of gaming, you can imagine, for example, a world of Warcraft where people have significant 0:39:14 investment in their character and in the gear that they have and in the lives that they 0:39:22 live within these games, taken to a whole other level where you actually own your character 0:39:27 and you own the gear for your character and you can take your character and gear out of 0:39:33 the game and maybe into another game because you now have this interoperable trustworthy 0:39:36 fabric of computation that other developers can build on top of. 0:39:43 So that kind of investment in your personality and in your character in the game is unlike 0:39:44 what we’ve seen in gaming before. 0:39:48 So this could take gaming just to a whole other level and that could be a very interesting 0:39:49 set of applications. 0:39:53 But it very much depends on these three building blocks, we need scalability before gaming 0:39:55 can really take off. 0:40:00 And we’ve seen examples of this, I think CryptoKitties is one where people became very invested 0:40:08 in owning this digital collectible, which is something that is fundamentally new. 0:40:13 Never before would you be able to directly own something that’s digital is the first 0:40:14 time that that’s possible. 0:40:18 I love this idea of being able to take sort of a high level character that I’ve developed 0:40:23 in one game and moving it to another because, you know, look, essentially a high level character 0:40:27 in say, World of Warcraft is the ultimate proof of work, right, which is I had to do 0:40:31 a lot in order to get this character to be super high level. 0:40:34 And now I’m kind of stuck in World of Warcraft, which is great if I want to play more World 0:40:38 of Warcraft, but like it’d be awesome if I could take my proof of work and move it to 0:40:39 another system. 0:40:40 Absolutely. 0:40:41 Yeah. 0:40:46 Yeah, I mean, I think there’s a story about how Vitalik, part of Vitalik’s inspiration 0:40:51 for starting Ethereum is having, I’m not sure which game it was, but it was like some 0:40:58 gaming platform that revoked his ownership over, over like a key, a key item in the game. 0:40:59 There it is. 0:41:02 That made him like, made him like so, so mad, right. 0:41:06 This is the problem with centralization, right, which is you have a company operating 0:41:08 a game and they can do whatever they want with the game, right. 0:41:13 One change to the terms of service and all of a sudden your proof of work is basically, 0:41:14 it’s invalid. 0:41:15 Exactly. 0:41:16 Yeah. 0:41:17 That would make you mad. 0:41:20 Well, if you think about sort of trust being the key feature, I mean, there’s so many 0:41:26 sort of, you know, properties that we think about on the internet that are essentially 0:41:27 sort of brokers of trust, right. 0:41:33 So LinkedIn is sort of the trusted entity to manage your resume and present your resume. 0:41:37 And eBay is sort of the trusted marketplace where the sellers or Etsy is sort of the trusted 0:41:42 place where you sort of send money and expect stuff, right. 0:41:49 There’s Airbnb and Lyft, and so like trust seems like a super powerful primitive for 0:41:50 creating killer apps. 0:41:51 Yeah, definitely. 0:41:58 And I think the web 2.0 world has figured out how to bootstrap trust in a way that 0:42:05 depends on things like identity and reputation, where there’s social capital associated with 0:42:08 your track record on the internet. 0:42:16 So things like reviews on Yelp or things like reviews on or stars on Uber or number of likes 0:42:21 on Twitter and number of followers on just generally social media. 0:42:28 These things are, this is like the mechanism for trust that’s used in web 2.0. 0:42:30 And I think crypto is orthogonal to that. 0:42:36 Crypto today has no sense of identity, that people are pseudonymous, people can create 0:42:38 multiple addresses and pretend to be different people. 0:42:43 People can abandon identities that maybe have a bad reputation and move over to new identities 0:42:45 that don’t. 0:42:53 And the entire fabric of trust, therefore, depends not on social capital but rather on 0:42:54 financial incentives. 0:43:00 So it’s this orthogonal layer where you’re incentivized to behave honestly because there 0:43:03 is real money at stake. 0:43:08 And if you lie or if you behave in a way that’s not in accordance to the rules of the protocol, 0:43:10 then there’s something that you will lose as a result. 0:43:17 So there’s sort of financial capital and financial incentives as a way of bootstrapping trust 0:43:20 and then there’s social capital as a way of bootstrapping trust and I think that’s one 0:43:29 of the key differences between the web 2.0 world and the now web 3.0 crypto-enabled world. 0:43:34 And what will be very interesting to see is the two models coming together. 0:43:36 So that’s something to kind of look out for. 0:43:41 And it seems like Keybase is sort of an early attempt at that, which is on the one hand 0:43:46 you had all of these private keys that represented you in these cryptographic networks and on 0:43:50 the other hand you had sort of your Twitter profile and your LinkedIn profile and your 0:43:56 Facebook profile and Keybase sort of bridged them. 0:44:00 What other things do you think we will see in this space of sort of making identity more 0:44:01 seamless? 0:44:02 Yeah. 0:44:04 I think Keybase is a key one. 0:44:13 A key problem is how do you map a real human individual to a public key in a way that is 0:44:15 trustworthy and in a way that you can rely on. 0:44:21 So Keybase is this and I think it’s a very apropos example where you can use your existing 0:44:26 web 2.0 world identity to bootstrap your web 3.0 identity. 0:44:31 You can use your Twitter account and your Facebook account and your GitHub account and 0:44:39 your website and point them all to this cryptographic identity that you can then use to interact 0:44:43 with other people in the sort of crypto anonymous world. 0:44:47 And they can verify that that really is you because of the cryptographic assurances of 0:44:54 those connections between Twitter and so on and your public key. 0:44:55 You can take that further though. 0:45:00 I think once you do have identity in the crypto world and I think it is an unsolved problem, 0:45:05 Keybase is the first kind of attempt, but there’s still a lot to do there. 0:45:10 Once you have a solid layer of identity within crypto, that also doesn’t sacrifice privacy. 0:45:15 So it’s worth noting there’s a big trade-off there, like if you have strong identities 0:45:19 and you have less privacy and it’s kind of difficult to come to the right balance between 0:45:22 the two and it will vary per application. 0:45:26 But once you have a good system for that, then you can start building reputation systems. 0:45:30 You can even imagine like a page rank style algorithm for reputation. 0:45:41 If I trust Frank and Frank trusts Joe, then I kind of indirectly trust Joe. 0:45:46 And you can imagine kind of taking this to the whole other level to really enhance the 0:45:53 kind of trust that emerges from financial incentives with social capital and with reputation. 0:45:54 That’s very powerful. 0:45:58 There’s some of this even in things like the Facebook marketplace today, which is you see 0:46:02 somebody listing cheese or a bike or whatever and you’ll see, “Oh, this is a friend of Ali.” 0:46:06 And then that brings a level of trust to that transaction that wouldn’t otherwise exist. 0:46:07 Exactly. 0:46:12 And one of the reasons this is so important for crypto is that today, every interaction 0:46:16 in the world of crypto tends to be very transactional. 0:46:20 You don’t even know who you’re dealing with and so it really is about that one transaction. 0:46:27 It’s one-off and whenever there’s conflict, it’s a one-off prisoner/dilemma style game. 0:46:30 Whereas if you had identity and if you had reputation, you could turn all of those one-off 0:46:35 prisoner/dilemma style games into iterated prisoner/dilemma style games, which are far 0:46:36 easier to solve. 0:46:38 You have like the long view of relationships. 0:46:45 You can have a track record and rapport with the people that you interact with if you only 0:46:47 had that other layer. 0:46:50 So so many of the problems, the game theoretical problems that need to be solved for crypto 0:46:54 to work that are so hard to solve will become easier once you have this additional lever 0:46:55 to play with. 0:46:56 Yeah, that’s super interesting. 0:46:57 Right. 0:47:01 So every prisoner/dilemma type game is sort of assume perfect strangers go in and now 0:47:05 we have to sort of mathematically model what will happen, not knowing anything about them. 0:47:06 Exactly. 0:47:09 But if you threw me and you into a prisoner’s dilemma, right, like we’ll have much higher 0:47:14 fidelity predictions about what each other like, “I’m not going to squelch on you, Ali. 0:47:15 He’s a friend of mine.” 0:47:18 Especially if we know that we’re going to be in a similar kind of game in the future. 0:47:21 And it’s like if we cooperate now, then we’ll build rapport and then it’ll be easier for 0:47:24 us to cooperate in the future. 0:47:29 And if we cheat each other now, then we will kind of ruin that opportunity later on and 0:47:32 make it harder for us to cooperate down the line. 0:47:33 Super interesting. 0:47:38 So one thing before we go, I want to talk a little bit about governance, because today 0:47:43 it seems like there’s a lot of conversation in the tech community about, “Gee, maybe the 0:47:47 tech giants have gotten too big,” right, because with the stroke of a pen and one change in 0:47:52 terms of service, like all of a sudden, the rules of engagement or the winners and losers 0:47:55 in that environment are dramatically different. 0:48:00 In crypto land, the idea would be let’s not have one company which completely owns their 0:48:05 terms of service control that, there’s going to be sort of a decentralized community. 0:48:10 But we end up with some of the same questions, right, like who gets to change the terms of 0:48:11 service? 0:48:14 How do those changes come about, who proposes them? 0:48:19 So maybe talk to me a little bit about what’s happening in the community as we iterate on 0:48:20 systems of governance. 0:48:25 Yeah, you’re hitting at one of the most fundamental questions in this space, which is that if 0:48:32 you do build a system that is decentralized and that control over it does not rest with 0:48:36 any one individual, then there’s a question, well, how do you go about updating it? 0:48:39 How do you go about changing it in any meaningful way? 0:48:43 If it is going to be a complex system that adapts and evolves over time, this question 0:48:46 most certainly has to be answered in order for any of this to work. 0:48:53 So this is a question of sort of governance of protocols, and there are enormous number 0:48:57 of experiments that people are running, like different kind of approaches. 0:49:04 The canonical and sort of initial approach was out of Bitcoin, which is that essentially 0:49:07 you do just have to coordinate with all of the stakeholders, all of the people who are 0:49:14 running the Bitcoin node software in order to change the protocol. 0:49:18 And in this case, that would be that all miners, all of the people who are running the code 0:49:23 to mine Bitcoin, have to modify their software, and this is a human level process. 0:49:28 You have to call them up or you have to sort of issue an announcement saying that the protocol 0:49:31 is being upgraded and get that to work. 0:49:35 There are other approaches that people are exploring with that are more sort of they’re 0:49:38 formalized and are built into the protocol. 0:49:41 So there’s the idea of being able to vote with tokens. 0:49:50 So if I own a certain stake, a certain amount of the network, then I can use the tokens 0:49:55 that constitute that stake to vote in favor or against proposals that may be made by the 0:49:56 community. 0:50:01 It’s just another approach to decentralize governance that tries to lower the barrier 0:50:03 and tries to make it a little bit more seamless. 0:50:07 There’s an enormous set of challenges associated with that because there are possible attacks 0:50:10 where you can bribe people. 0:50:12 There is the issue of voter participation. 0:50:17 And all of the issues that you see in governance systems outside of the world of crypto, just 0:50:18 an offline government. 0:50:19 Offline? 0:50:20 Who’s going to the election? 0:50:21 How do they vote? 0:50:22 Exactly. 0:50:24 How do we prevent dead people from voting? 0:50:25 Exactly. 0:50:30 These problems have become replicated in crypto as well and they are therefore like fundamentally 0:50:33 difficult problems that have been unsolved for millennia. 0:50:39 So it’s not as if crypto will solve any of that, it’ll just have to figure out the right 0:50:44 mechanisms and the right structures to be good enough and to enable systems that are 0:50:51 decentralized to adapt and to change and evolve while striking a balance between sort of 0:50:53 evolvability and decentralization. 0:50:59 And actually, we did two podcasts specifically on this question, the question of governance 0:51:03 and crypto, that will go much, much deeper and talk about all of the challenges. 0:51:07 So if you’re interested in that topic, I recommend checking those out. 0:51:08 Perfect. 0:51:12 We’ll throw the links into the YouTube video so you can follow them easily. 0:51:15 Well, Ali, this has been super interesting. 0:51:20 There’s so many problems to be solved, there’s so many meeting computer science things to 0:51:25 be had, like how do you prove that I’m actually storing your photos instead of just pretending 0:51:28 to store your photos and collecting the money. 0:51:33 And so I guess the way I think about it is like if you have ever wished that you could 0:51:41 have been like a semiconductor engineer at Bell Labs in the 1950s or a PC enthusiast in 0:51:47 the 1970s and you were like, “I missed the 50s and then I missed the 70s.” 0:51:53 And then like if you wished you were at UIUC with Mark at the dawn of the internet in the 0:51:55 90s, like, “Look, here it is. 0:51:57 This is the new computing platform. 0:51:59 Here is your opportunity. 0:52:00 It’s not too late.” 0:52:05 And these are the times to exactly insert yourself into that conversation if sort of that’s 0:52:09 what you wish you had the opportunity to do is influence some of these protocols, these 0:52:12 incentive systems at the ground level. 0:52:13 Absolutely. 0:52:14 Awesome. 0:52:15 Fantastic. 0:52:18 So that’s it for this episode. 0:52:22 And if you liked what you saw, go ahead and subscribe to the list. 0:52:25 If you have comments, go ahead and leave them down below. 0:52:28 Maybe you could pick one thing that you were super excited about, like what problem do 0:52:32 you wish you could solve as an engineer. 0:52:33 And we will see you next episode. 0:52:42 [BLANK_AUDIO]
Do you sometimes wish you had been born in a different decade so you could have worked on the fundamental building blocks of modern computing? How fun, challenging, and fulfilling would it have been to work on semiconductors in the 1950s or Unix in the 1960s (both at Bell Labs) or personal computers at the Homebrew Computer Club in the 1970s or on the Internet browser at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (and later Mountain View, CA) in the 1990s?
Good news: it’s not too late. There’s a new computing platform being built today by a vibrant and rapidly growing cryptocurrency community. You might have noticed some of your coworkers and friends leaving big stable tech companies to join crypto startups.
In this episode, which originally appeared on YouTube, a16z crypto partner Ali Yahya (@ali01) talks with Frank Chen (@withfries2) about five challenging problems the community is trying to solve right now to enable a new computing platform and a new set of killer apps:
If you’re a software engineer, product manager, UX designer, investor, or tech enthusiast who thrives on the particular challenges of building a new computing platform, this is the perfect time to join the crypto community.
The views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates. Certain information contained in here has been obtained from third-party sources, including from portfolio companies of funds managed by a16z. While taken from sources believed to be reliable, a16z has not independently verified such information and makes no representations about the enduring accuracy of the information or its appropriateness for a given situation.
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0:00:03 – Hi, and welcome to the A16Z podcast. 0:00:04 I’m Hannah. 0:00:06 Good data, bad data, there’s maybe no other area 0:00:09 where understanding what the evidence actually tells us 0:00:11 is harder than in health and parenting. 0:00:14 In this episode, economics professor Emily Oster, 0:00:16 author of “Expecting Better” 0:00:18 and the recently released “Cribsheet,” 0:00:21 a data-driven guide to better, more relaxed parenting, 0:00:23 does just that, looking at the science and the data 0:00:25 behind the studies we hear about 0:00:27 and make decisions based on in those worlds. 0:00:30 From whether to breastfeed your child to screen time 0:00:32 to sleep training, we talk about what it means 0:00:35 to make database decisions in these settings, 0:00:37 in diet and in health and in life, 0:00:39 like whether chia seeds are actually good for you 0:00:42 and how we can tell what’s real and what’s not. 0:00:44 We also talk about how guidelines and advice like this 0:00:47 gets formalized and accepted for better or for worse 0:00:49 and how they can or can’t be changed. 0:00:52 And finally, how the course of science itself 0:00:55 can be changed by how these studies are done. 0:00:57 – You describe yourself as teasing out causality 0:00:58 in health economics. 0:01:01 Can you give us a little primer on what exactly that means 0:01:02 and how you start going about doing that? 0:01:04 – So there are a lot of settings in health 0:01:06 and in all of those settings, 0:01:09 we have to figure out what does the evidence say. 0:01:11 And I think about some of them in this context of parenting, 0:01:14 but you can think about even questions like, 0:01:15 is it a good idea to eat eggs 0:01:17 or is it a good idea to take vitamins, 0:01:19 other kinds of health decisions. 0:01:20 And you can sort of think about there being 0:01:23 kind of two types of data you could bring to that. 0:01:25 One would be randomized data. 0:01:26 So you could run a randomized trial 0:01:29 in which half of the people got eggs 0:01:30 and half of the people didn’t. 0:01:31 And you followed them for 50 years 0:01:33 and you saw which of them died. 0:01:36 And that would be very compelling and convincing. 0:01:38 And when we have data like that, it’s really great. 0:01:40 – I mean, I kind of think of that as being the default. 0:01:42 No, is that not at all the standard? 0:01:45 – That is the gold standard, but it is not the default. 0:01:47 So many of the kinds of recommendations 0:01:48 that I look at in parenting, 0:01:50 but that you look at in general in health 0:01:52 are based on observational data, 0:01:54 which is the other kind where we compare people 0:01:56 who do one thing to people who do another thing 0:01:58 and we look at their outcomes. 0:02:00 And one of the ways in which the people differ 0:02:02 is on the thing that you’re studying, 0:02:06 but of course there are other ways that they may differ also. 0:02:06 – A million other ways. 0:02:08 – A million other ways, yes. 0:02:10 And data like that is really subject 0:02:12 to these kind of biases that the kind of people 0:02:13 who make one choice are different 0:02:16 from the kind of people who make another choice. 0:02:17 One of the things that’s very frustrating 0:02:19 in a lot of the health literature 0:02:21 is that there isn’t always that much effort 0:02:24 to improve the conclusions that we draw 0:02:25 from those kind of data. 0:02:27 – And we’re using that kind of approach 0:02:31 because of the inability to have long longitudinal studies, 0:02:33 or it does tend to be a shortcut. 0:02:35 – So I think it is both things. 0:02:38 So it is much easier, faster to write papers, 0:02:40 to produce research about that, 0:02:42 and it can be really useful for developing hypotheses. 0:02:43 – So it’s like a scratch pad almost. 0:02:46 – In the best case scenario, it’d be like a scratch pad. 0:02:48 Like let’s just look in the data 0:02:50 and see what kinds of things are associated 0:02:52 with good health or associated with good outcomes for kids. 0:02:54 And then we could imagine a next step 0:02:58 where you would analyze more rigorous gold standard. 0:02:59 And sometimes that happens. 0:03:01 So there’s one really nice example of the book 0:03:03 where this happens exactly like you would hope, 0:03:06 which is in studying the impact of peanut exposure 0:03:07 on peanut allergies. 0:03:10 So the first paper on that is written by a guy, 0:03:12 and what he did was he just compared Jewish kids 0:03:16 in the U.K. to Jewish kids in Israel, 0:03:18 and he saw that the kids in Israel 0:03:19 were less likely to be allergic to peanuts, 0:03:22 and he said that’s because they eat this peanut snack 0:03:24 when they’re being as a bomba. 0:03:28 And so then that’s like the hypothesis generation, 0:03:30 and then he went and did the thing you would really like, 0:03:32 would just say, okay, let’s run a randomized trial, 0:03:34 and let’s randomly give some kids early peanuts, 0:03:35 and some kids not. 0:03:37 And indeed, like he found that he was right. 0:03:39 So that’s like a great example 0:03:42 of like how you would hope that literature would evolve. 0:03:44 But in many of the kinds of health settings 0:03:47 we’re interested in, that you can’t do that, 0:03:49 or it is much harder to do that, 0:03:52 because the outcomes would take a long time to realize, 0:03:54 or it’s expensive, or it’s hard to manipulate 0:03:55 what people are doing. 0:03:57 And then we often end up relying 0:04:00 on these more bias sources of data 0:04:02 to draw our conclusions, not just as a scratch pad. 0:04:06 And I think that’s where we encounter problems. 0:04:08 – That’s where it gets murky, 0:04:10 and we never know whether we should eat eggs or not. 0:04:13 Yeah, and that’s exactly the area that you tend to focus on. 0:04:14 – Yeah, exactly. 0:04:16 I try to first see are there good pieces of data 0:04:19 that we can use, and then if we’re stuck with the data 0:04:20 that isn’t good, trying to figure out 0:04:25 which of the murky studies are better than others. 0:04:27 And what would you mean by better? 0:04:30 Well, it’s roughly like how good is this study 0:04:34 at controlling or adjusting for the differences across people? 0:04:38 – So you talk about kind of breaking it down 0:04:42 into both into the relationship between data and preference. 0:04:44 How do you factor in that in the healthcare system 0:04:46 where it’s so diverse, where preference 0:04:48 has such an incredible effect 0:04:51 and puts you into so many different possibilities? 0:04:53 – I think this is why in these spaces, 0:04:55 decision-making should be so personal. 0:04:59 We often run up in health and also in parenting 0:05:01 and all of these spaces into a place 0:05:04 where we’re telling people like there’s a right thing 0:05:06 there’s a right thing to do. 0:05:10 And I think that that can be problematic 0:05:12 because it doesn’t recognize this difference 0:05:14 in preferences across people. 0:05:16 – You have to basically accept the variety 0:05:17 in the system and then give a space 0:05:18 for preference in the decision-making. 0:05:20 – Yeah, but I think it’s exactly these preferences 0:05:22 that of course make it hard to learn 0:05:24 about these relationships in the data. 0:05:26 ‘Cause once you recognize that a lot of the reason 0:05:28 that some people choose to eat eggs 0:05:29 and some people choose to eat cocoa crispies 0:05:31 is that some people really like cocoa crispies 0:05:32 and some people really like eggs. 0:05:34 How can you ever learn about the impact of eggs 0:05:37 because we know there must be differences across people. 0:05:39 And I think that that becomes even more extreme 0:05:41 when we think about really important decisions 0:05:42 that people are making, 0:05:44 like the kinds of choices they make in parenting 0:05:45 or also in their diets. 0:05:48 – So can you walk us through one example like that 0:05:51 of where it was a really kind of murky gray area 0:05:53 and how you pull out the causality? 0:05:54 – The best example of this in the data 0:05:57 in the parenting space is probably in breastfeeding. 0:05:59 Let’s say you wanna know the impact of breastfeeding 0:06:00 on obesity in kids. 0:06:02 That’s a thing which you hear a lot. 0:06:06 Breastfeeding is a way to make your kid skinny and so on. 0:06:09 And so the basic way you might analyze that 0:06:12 is to compare kids who are breastfed to kids 0:06:13 who are not and look at their obesity 0:06:14 when they’re say seven or eight. 0:06:16 And indeed, if you do that, 0:06:17 you will find that the kids who are breastfed 0:06:20 are less likely to be obese than the kids who are not. 0:06:24 But you will also find that there’s all kinds of relationships 0:06:27 between obesity and income and obesity, 0:06:28 mother’s income and mother’s education 0:06:30 and other things about the family. 0:06:32 And those things correlate with breastfeeding 0:06:34 and they also correlate with obesity. 0:06:36 – So you can’t really pull apart this web. 0:06:38 – So it’s hard to pull apart the web. 0:06:39 So I would say this is an example 0:06:42 where the data is suggestive. 0:06:43 It would certainly be consistent 0:06:45 with an effect of breastfeeding on obesity, 0:06:48 but I think it doesn’t prove an effect. 0:06:50 And then you can sort of take the next step 0:06:52 and say, okay, well, do we have any data that’s better? 0:06:53 And in that example, 0:06:55 we do have one kind of randomized data. 0:06:57 But again, we run up against the limits 0:06:59 of all kinds of evidence. 0:07:02 So the randomized data on this question 0:07:05 is from a randomized trial that was run in Belarus 0:07:07 in the 1990s. 0:07:09 They randomly encourage some moms to breastfeed 0:07:09 and some moms not. 0:07:11 And so there’s a lot of good things 0:07:12 that we can learn from that. 0:07:14 – But such a specific place in time. 0:07:15 – Exactly, it’s so specific. 0:07:16 And you said like, well, you know, 0:07:21 how do I take that result to the Bay Area in 2019? 0:07:23 It’s a challenge. 0:07:24 Okay, well, is there any other within this space 0:07:28 of not randomized datas or anything that’s better? 0:07:29 And in that case, there is, 0:07:32 there are some studies that like compare siblings, 0:07:35 where you look at two kids born to the same siblings, 0:07:36 born to the same mom. 0:07:39 One of whom was breastfed and one of whom was not. 0:07:40 And then look at their obesity rates. 0:07:41 And when you do that, 0:07:43 you find there’s basically no impact. 0:07:46 So then you’re kind of holding constant like who’s the mom. 0:07:49 So if you’re a worry was that there are differences 0:07:51 across parents in their choices to breastfeed, 0:07:53 well now you’re looking at the same parent. 0:07:54 – Right, you’re normalizing. 0:07:55 – You’re normalizing. 0:07:57 And so you may think, oh, that’s great, perfect. 0:07:57 I’m totally done. 0:07:59 But of course you’re not, 0:08:02 this isn’t perfect because why did the mom choose 0:08:03 to breastfeed one kid and not the other? 0:08:04 – People are not choosing random. 0:08:05 – You had to see section one time, 0:08:07 you didn’t another time. 0:08:08 – If that were the reason that would be great, right? 0:08:11 If the reason were just like kind of worked one time, 0:08:12 didn’t work the other time. 0:08:14 If there was something that was effectively 0:08:16 a little bit random, 0:08:19 then that would be exactly the kind of variation 0:08:21 you’d wanna use. 0:08:23 But the thing you worry about is like one kid 0:08:25 is not doing well, is unhealthy. 0:08:26 So the mom chooses not to breastfeed 0:08:30 or chooses to breastfeed to try to make them healthier. 0:08:32 Those are the kind of things where there’s some other reason 0:08:34 that they’re choosing differences in breastfeeding 0:08:36 which has its own effect on the kid’s outcomes. 0:08:41 So you kind of like some of what I try to do in the book 0:08:43 is sort of like put all of these pieces together 0:08:46 and kind of like look at them 0:08:50 and think about them all as a sort of totality of evidence 0:08:52 and just think like how compelling is this altogether? 0:08:55 – It sounds almost like sifting, like using a sifter. 0:08:58 You take all this very murky data, 0:09:00 very variable from all sorts of different contexts 0:09:02 and like put it through the sifter of like 0:09:03 this kind of data, this kind of data 0:09:06 and then match it all up and say, okay, what do we have left? 0:09:08 And then therefore, and then hand that over and say, 0:09:11 and now you make the decision based on this. 0:09:12 – Based on this. 0:09:14 – Right, here’s kind of what we can be more or less 0:09:15 or less sure about. 0:09:17 – You talk a little bit about the idea 0:09:20 of constrained optimization as being very important. 0:09:23 Can you explain what that means and how that plays out? 0:09:25 – In economics, we think about people 0:09:27 optimizing their utility function. 0:09:28 The idea is that you have a bunch of things 0:09:30 that make you happy, that’s your utility. 0:09:33 They produce your utility and you want to make the choices 0:09:35 that are going to optimize your utility. 0:09:39 They’re going to give you the most amount of happiness points, 0:09:40 eudals, eudals. 0:09:44 It’s really, it’s a very warm and fuzzy. 0:09:46 – Yeah, I feel like I’m gonna go home and use that. 0:09:47 – Absolutely. 0:09:49 – Like you gave me some eudals today. 0:09:53 – But we also recognize that people have constraints. 0:09:54 In the absence of constraints, 0:09:58 like having money to buy things or time to do them, 0:10:00 people would just have an infinite amount of stuff. 0:10:02 That’s the thing that would make them the most happy. 0:10:04 And so, but when you’re actually making choices, 0:10:07 you’re constrained by either money or time. 0:10:09 And in the book, I talk a lot about this 0:10:12 in the context of time, that you’re as a parent, 0:10:15 you’re making choices, and you have some preferences 0:10:16 and things you would like to do, 0:10:19 but you are also facing some constraints. 0:10:22 – But is there, is information flow kind of what, 0:10:25 and the data itself a constraint in that regard? 0:10:27 Is that a, because it’s so piecemeal, 0:10:29 the information you get. 0:10:30 That feels almost totally random. 0:10:32 Like some media story picks up on something, 0:10:34 you tend, you know, some tidbit, you hear some, 0:10:36 unless you’re like systemically 0:10:38 studying a graduate seminar on parenting, 0:10:41 which none of us do, you know, then it is random. 0:10:44 – Yeah, and I think we wouldn’t necessarily think of that 0:10:46 as in constraints, because of course in our models, 0:10:49 people are fully informed about everything all the time. 0:10:52 That’s one of the great things about the models. 0:10:52 – But in real life? 0:10:55 – But in real life, yeah, I think people face constraints 0:10:58 associated with just not having all the information. 0:11:01 And, you know, also the fact that this, 0:11:04 these kind of information, like whipsaws over time, 0:11:07 that you know, you get one piece and then you kind of, 0:11:10 the next day there’s a different piece of information 0:11:12 and we have a tendency to kind of 0:11:15 a glom onto whatever is the most recent thing 0:11:16 that we have seen about this, 0:11:19 as opposed to what is the whole literature 0:11:21 over this whole period of time say. 0:11:24 – Right, you say, you have a great quote where you say, 0:11:26 in confronting the questions here, 0:11:28 we also have to confront the limits of the data 0:11:29 and the limits of all data. 0:11:30 There’s no perfect studies, 0:11:33 so there will always be some uncertainty about conclusions. 0:11:35 The only data we have will be problematic. 0:11:37 There will be a single not very good study 0:11:39 and all we can say is that this study 0:11:41 doesn’t support a relationship. 0:11:44 So it feels kind of hopeless. 0:11:46 I loved when you talked about the first three days 0:11:47 of when you brought Penelope home 0:11:50 and it really brought that back for me 0:11:52 as I was just this dark room 0:11:54 that you’re kind of alone making these decisions. 0:11:57 How do you even begin to see this data, 0:12:00 you know, as a decision making practice? 0:12:02 Like how does that translate? 0:12:04 – There are pieces where it’s easier, 0:12:08 where the data is better and makes it is clearer 0:12:10 about what you need to do or what the choices are. 0:12:12 You will be making many choices 0:12:17 without the benefit of evidence or data or very good data. 0:12:19 I think part of what makes some of this parenting so hard 0:12:21 is that for those of us who like, you know, 0:12:24 evidence and facts and it’s hard to accept, 0:12:26 I’m just going to have to make this decision 0:12:29 basically based on what I think is a good idea. 0:12:30 – Based on my gut. 0:12:31 – Based on my gut. 0:12:36 – And, you know, maybe based on my mom and, you know. 0:12:37 – Which is a sample size of one. 0:12:39 – A sample size of one. 0:12:41 And, you know, maybe if you have like a mother-in-law 0:12:43 and father-in-law, it’s like a sample size of two, 0:12:46 but that’s kind of, that’s kind of it. 0:12:48 And I think that that’s really scary, 0:12:50 especially when the choices seem so important. 0:12:52 – Yeah, I mean, but it feels like, you know, 0:12:54 that’s kind of at heart what you’re trying to do, right? 0:12:56 Is like to translate and to give tools 0:12:58 in this decision making place. 0:13:02 So how would you begin to systematize that? 0:13:06 I mean, is there a way to bridge that gap better 0:13:07 in the system? 0:13:09 – I think that it would be helpful 0:13:12 if more information was shared. 0:13:14 So I think a lot of these things, 0:13:17 there is a lot of information that is contained 0:13:21 in people’s experiences that we are not using 0:13:23 in our evidence production. 0:13:27 So in the book I talk about like the sleep schedule, right? 0:13:30 So you’re sort of told as a parent, like, oh, you know, 0:13:32 this is kind of roughly like around six weeks, 0:13:35 your kid will start sleeping like longer at night, 0:13:38 but there’s no, the information that’s sort of 0:13:42 typically conveyed to people is not a range. 0:13:44 It’s just like around six weeks-ish, 0:13:46 you know, that’ll start to happen. 0:13:48 But the truth is like, yeah, that’s kind of right, 0:13:51 but it’s, if you look at data on when that actually happens, 0:13:54 it’s pretty, it’s a pretty wide range. 0:13:57 And I think part of what is so stressful 0:14:00 about this early, these like early parts of parenting 0:14:03 are that it’s very hard to understand 0:14:06 whether what you’re experiencing is like normal. 0:14:08 And I think if you could understand, like, yeah, 0:14:11 most kids don’t do this thing at this time 0:14:13 or most parents have this experience or- 0:14:15 – The way the graph plots kind of. 0:14:16 – Yeah. – A little more broadly. 0:14:17 – Exactly. 0:14:19 What is, I think that would be, that would be super helpful. 0:14:21 And that’s a place where I can imagine, 0:14:23 you know, data collection helping, right? 0:14:27 You know, we have a much more of an ability at this point 0:14:30 to like get information about what is happening 0:14:33 with our kids, what’s happening with, you know, with our health. 0:14:35 There is a sense in which that could be helpful 0:14:39 in just setting some norms for the normal, 0:14:42 the standard variation across people. 0:14:45 – So looking at the variation and providing that 0:14:46 as like a piece of the information. 0:14:47 – As a piece of the information. 0:14:48 – Here’s also the variation on that. 0:14:49 – Yeah. – Yeah. 0:14:51 – Yeah, and I think that is kind of part of like 0:14:53 generating the uncertainty and sort of showing people 0:14:55 like what are the limits of the data, right? 0:14:58 That how sure are you that this should happen at this time? 0:15:00 – Not just how sure, but like what are some of the 0:15:02 like other ends of the curve? 0:15:04 I mean, that’s just information you just don’t get. 0:15:05 – Yeah, you just don’t get, right. 0:15:07 – So let’s zoom out a little bit 0:15:09 as somebody who lives in the world deeply of data 0:15:11 in the health system. 0:15:14 We’re in a time of enormous shift, right, for data. 0:15:17 Does the improvement, does our kind of the sea of data 0:15:20 and like better data, cleaner data, more granular data, 0:15:23 all that help this at all, this question? 0:15:28 – Yeah, and I think we are collecting so much data 0:15:32 on people, both sort of individual people 0:15:34 are collecting a lot of data about themselves. 0:15:37 Health systems are collecting a lot of data about people. 0:15:40 This data is like underutilized, I think. 0:15:41 We’re amassing pools of it, 0:15:43 but not in ways that are especially helpful. 0:15:45 So, you know, when I go to conferences 0:15:47 and people who work on healthcare, 0:15:48 like there’s a tremendous amount of data 0:15:50 that’s being used on health claims, right? 0:15:51 So if you sort of think about like, 0:15:53 what are some kinds of data that we have? 0:15:55 We have like health claims data, like payments, 0:15:56 everything that we’re, 0:15:58 where there’s an individual payment for it, 0:16:00 we’ll like see, we’ll see it. 0:16:02 There’s almost no work with medical records. 0:16:05 Even though every hospital, everybody’s using Epic, 0:16:08 you would think that that would make it straightforward 0:16:11 to have that data in a usable form, but it’s not. 0:16:12 And, but you know, at the same time, 0:16:16 the potential for sort of going beyond like, 0:16:18 here is all the tests that you ordered 0:16:21 into actually like, what happened with those tests? 0:16:23 And then what happened to this person later? 0:16:27 Like that data is not being mined in the way 0:16:30 that we could to try to look at some, you know, 0:16:33 at some of the kinds of outcomes that are a result. 0:16:36 – The causality that you would pull out afterwards. 0:16:37 – Yeah, absolutely. 0:16:39 You know, how can we improve our causality? 0:16:40 More data is helpful. 0:16:42 More information about people is helpful. 0:16:43 Being able to look at, you know, 0:16:45 the timing relationship between some treatment 0:16:47 and some outcome, those are all the kinds of things 0:16:50 that, you know, having better data would help us, 0:16:51 would help us do. 0:16:53 – Are there other areas where you start, 0:16:56 you are starting to see the data coalesce in a way 0:16:59 where you’re able to pull meaningful insights from it? 0:17:01 – So I think, yes, you know, when we have better data, 0:17:06 we can use better tools, even if we don’t have randomization. 0:17:09 A classic example in health is looking at the impacts 0:17:11 of like a really advanced neonatal care. 0:17:14 Like how cost effective is it to have like, 0:17:16 you know, kids in sort of getting like, 0:17:17 really extensive NICU care? 0:17:21 Like how effective is that in terms of improving survival 0:17:22 and how much does it cost? 0:17:23 – No, such a basic question. 0:17:27 – Such a basic question, and super hard to imagine analyzing 0:17:29 because of course, you know, babies that are very small 0:17:32 and are sick cost more but also have worse outcomes. 0:17:34 And so if you sort of looked at that, 0:17:36 you would be like, well, actually like spending more, 0:17:38 we’re not getting anything because those babies 0:17:41 are more likely to die than babies that are spending less. 0:17:46 We define very low-birthway babies as less than 1500 grams, 0:17:48 which means that the treatment that you get 0:17:51 if you’re a baby at 1500 and three grams 0:17:53 is very different than the treatment that you get 0:17:56 as a baby at 1497 grams, which is completely arbitrary. 0:17:59 I mean, the choice of 1500 grams has nothing to do with science. 0:18:00 – It’s like this line in the sand. 0:18:02 – That’s not a good way to set policy. 0:18:04 However, having set the policy like that, 0:18:07 you can then say, okay, well now we have some babies 0:18:08 that are almost exactly the same, 0:18:11 but the babies that are a little bit lighter 0:18:12 that are like 1497 grams 0:18:14 get all kinds of additional interventions 0:18:17 relative to the babies that are 1500 and three grams. 0:18:18 And when people have done that, 0:18:21 they see actually the babies at 1497 grams do better. 0:18:24 – So the line actually is beneficial in that way 0:18:26 because you’re defining these two groups very closely. 0:18:28 – Oh, interesting. 0:18:29 – Setting this line in this arbitrary way 0:18:31 lets you get at some causality. 0:18:32 – Even though not good for the babies. 0:18:34 – Sort of having done it good for research. 0:18:35 – Good for information. 0:18:36 Interesting. 0:18:38 What are some of the other tools? 0:18:39 Are there others in that list? 0:18:44 – So that’s an example called regression discontinuity, 0:18:47 that there’s some discontinuous change in policy 0:18:49 on either side of a cutoff. 0:18:52 And that has become a sort of part of a big toolkit 0:18:55 of things people are using more of. 0:18:57 The other is to look at sort of sharp changes 0:19:01 in policies at a time, at like a moment in time. 0:19:03 – Oh, so the same thing at the same time. 0:19:05 – Then there’s that and then there’s looking across 0:19:07 when different policies change differently 0:19:08 for different groups. 0:19:13 So, all of these things have become easier with more data 0:19:15 and become more possible with more data. 0:19:16 And I think that that has improved our inference 0:19:19 in some of these settings. 0:19:21 – I love that you talked a little bit about the experience 0:19:24 of doing your own data collection kind of in the wild 0:19:27 with this spreadsheet after Penelope was born, 0:19:27 which made me laugh so much 0:19:30 ’cause it was so much like my spreadsheet. 0:19:33 It was just so sad to think of like all these moms alone 0:19:35 in their bedrooms at night. 0:19:35 – I know, I know. 0:19:40 I mean, I think there’s been a lot more apps 0:19:44 since like we had that help, yeah. 0:19:48 But still, I love that you said 0:19:52 it gives the illusion of control, not control. 0:19:55 And in that particular, in these kinds of like data vacuums, 0:19:58 like if we’re not good at statistical analysis 0:20:01 or like pulling out causality from these murky areas, 0:20:03 like if we’re not Emily Oster basically, 0:20:05 how do you like, or even if you are, 0:20:08 how do you kind of stay on that line 0:20:10 of like the illusion of control 0:20:11 versus like actual knowledge 0:20:14 that like impacts real decision-making? 0:20:15 – No, I think it’s super hard 0:20:17 because the thing is the illusion of control 0:20:19 is a very powerful illusion. 0:20:20 – Very, yeah. 0:20:24 – And both empowering and dangerous in health context. 0:20:25 – Exactly. 0:20:26 Like we would, you know, you would sort of, 0:20:29 we like people to feel like they’re in control. 0:20:30 Some of the message of this book, 0:20:31 I think people have taken, not quite right, 0:20:33 but to say like, well, it doesn’t really matter 0:20:36 what choices you make, like all choices are good choices. 0:20:38 I think there’s, that’s not quite the right, 0:20:39 it’s not quite the message. 0:20:41 – That’s, I’m surprised that’s the message 0:20:42 that people take from this. 0:20:43 – Occasionally. 0:20:45 – There are a lot of different good choices 0:20:47 that you could make about parenting. 0:20:50 And so I think that there is a piece that like, 0:20:54 we maybe don’t need to be so like obsessive 0:20:55 about all of these. 0:20:55 – About one of those. 0:20:57 – About one of those, any one of those, 0:20:58 of those choices. 0:20:59 – What’s your point about range? 0:21:02 It’s like, well, let’s educate a little bit more 0:21:03 about like the spectrum of possibilities. 0:21:05 – Spectrum of good, of good choices. 0:21:06 – Yeah. 0:21:09 Another area I feel like where every other day 0:21:11 there’s a new study that says something different. 0:21:14 And it feels like there’s a plethora of studies 0:21:15 is screen time. 0:21:17 I’m just, I’m gonna put that out there right now. 0:21:18 I’m sorry. 0:21:21 Everybody, we’re gonna touch that third row. 0:21:22 – Three times. 0:21:24 – So can you walk us through, 0:21:28 like can you help guide us through some of that maze? 0:21:29 – So when I looked into screen time, 0:21:31 I had always thought about like screen time 0:21:32 is like bad. 0:21:35 Like it’s like, the question is, is it bad or not? 0:21:37 But actually there’s like a whole other side of this, 0:21:38 which is some people like screen time 0:21:40 is the way to make your kid smart. 0:21:42 Like you can, like your baby can learn from that. 0:21:42 – Okay. 0:21:44 So point number one is what does screen time 0:21:45 actually mean? 0:21:45 – Right. 0:21:46 – Which is a bunch of different stuff. 0:21:47 – Yeah. 0:21:48 And I think that’s part of the, 0:21:49 like that’s part of the problem with this is like, 0:21:51 when you say screen time, like what do you mean? 0:21:52 – Yeah. 0:21:54 – Do you mean like, you know, educational apps? 0:21:55 – Yeah. 0:21:56 – Do you mean… 0:21:57 – Do you mean Sesame Street? 0:21:57 – Sesame Street? 0:21:58 – Where you like jump in the shower? 0:21:59 – Yeah. 0:22:01 – Or yeah, and that point like while you jump in the shower, 0:22:03 like what is the other thing you’re going to be doing 0:22:04 with your time? 0:22:07 I think this is where all of these recommendations 0:22:11 seem to assume that the alternative use of your, 0:22:13 like if your kid wasn’t watching Sesame Street, 0:22:15 you would be like on the floor, 0:22:16 like playing puzzles with them 0:22:18 and like super engaged with them. 0:22:19 Which like, maybe is true. 0:22:21 – Taking them to the zoo and like having them touch 0:22:22 different textures of animal skins 0:22:25 or whatever like sensory development, yeah. 0:22:26 – Yeah, which like is great stuff 0:22:28 that you should definitely do with your kid. 0:22:30 But some of the time when, you know, 0:22:32 when our kids are watching TV, 0:22:34 it’s cause like we, it’s, 0:22:35 that maybe isn’t the thing 0:22:36 that you would otherwise be doing. 0:22:37 – Yeah. 0:22:39 – You could be like purring healthy vegetables 0:22:40 to like feed them well. 0:22:42 – Yeah, exactly. 0:22:43 I’m sure that’s what we’re all doing. 0:22:47 – Or maybe watching a little reality TV 0:22:49 for five minutes while you fold laundry. 0:22:51 – You look a little bit of called a midwife, 0:22:53 you know, got a little bit of, yeah. 0:22:54 – The problem with screen time is that the evidence 0:22:56 is very, is very poor. 0:22:58 – Can you just break up like why the evidence 0:22:59 is so poor? 0:23:00 Because this does seem like an area 0:23:02 where there should have been time 0:23:04 for that kind of gold standard randomized study 0:23:05 that to develop. 0:23:07 No, what is the evidence problem? 0:23:09 – So the, I think the evidence problem is twofold. 0:23:11 One, it’s actually not a super easy thing 0:23:14 to run a randomized trial on 0:23:15 because these are choices 0:23:17 that people are thinking a lot about. 0:23:19 And, you know, think about something like an iPad. 0:23:20 Like, do you want to be involved 0:23:23 in a randomized trial of whether you’re a kid? 0:23:24 – Oh, there’s too much intention, 0:23:25 too much at stake. 0:23:26 – Too much attention, exactly. 0:23:28 – Too much like lifestyle stuff. 0:23:30 Some people have been able to use like the introduction 0:23:33 of TV, which was sort of had some random features 0:23:34 to like look at the impacts of TV. 0:23:36 And that evidence is sort of reassuring 0:23:37 and suggested TV is okay. 0:23:38 But of course it’s very old. 0:23:40 It’s like from the fifties. 0:23:42 – A whole different way of consuming everything. 0:23:43 – Yeah. 0:23:44 – And I think the other thing is, 0:23:46 the other problem with the sort of current, 0:23:48 answering the current questions people want, 0:23:50 like what about iPads, what about apps, you know, 0:23:52 is that they just haven’t been around long enough. 0:23:54 So a lot of the kinds of outcomes you would want to know 0:23:58 that even things like short run, like test scores, 0:24:02 you know, I got the first iPad when my daughter was born. 0:24:03 Like that was like one, 0:24:04 and I remember getting in being like, 0:24:06 this is never going to catch on. 0:24:09 This is why I’m not in tech. 0:24:10 I was like, who would use this? 0:24:12 – I mean, while your daughter’s like swiping. 0:24:14 – I mean, while you’re just like, okay. 0:24:17 But you know, now she’s in second grade. 0:24:20 Like that’s kind of the earliest that you could kind of 0:24:22 imagine getting some kind of, 0:24:24 what we’d measured test scores or something like that. 0:24:26 But even, you know, she didn’t use the iPad anywhere 0:24:30 near as like facile away as my four year old, right? 0:24:32 This is evolving so quickly 0:24:35 that any kind of even slightly longer term outcomes 0:24:37 are really hard to imagine measuring, 0:24:40 let alone, you know, absent a randomized trial, 0:24:42 the, like if you weren’t able to randomize this, 0:24:44 which I think you won’t be able to, 0:24:48 the amount of time kids spend on these screens 0:24:52 is really wrapped up with other features of their household. 0:24:54 – Yeah, okay, so you have the definitions. 0:24:59 You have the time and the speed at which things are changing. 0:25:01 And then you have the willingness for people 0:25:03 to actually like engage and change 0:25:05 or doing things differently. 0:25:07 And then so all of that leads to what kind of, 0:25:10 so what do the studies actually tend to look like 0:25:12 in this space that we draw conclusions from? 0:25:14 – So actually there’s almost nothing 0:25:16 about iPads or phones. 0:25:18 – That seems so contrary to like 0:25:20 what the media is saying every five minutes. 0:25:22 – Yeah, so there’s tons of studies on TV, 0:25:24 which compare kids who watch more and less TV. 0:25:26 And, you know, you can, but most of that, again, 0:25:28 is sort of studies that are like based on data 0:25:31 where before people were watching TV on these screens, 0:25:35 maybe TV is TV, and you know, you can imagine 0:25:36 that that would be kind of similar. 0:25:39 But things like these apps, these just like no studies, 0:25:41 you know, or there’ll be, there’s like, 0:25:45 I think there’s one like abstract from a conference. 0:25:47 This is not a paper, there’s like answering comments 0:25:49 where it was just like we have some kids 0:25:51 and we like compare the kids who like spend, 0:25:52 like the babies who spend more time 0:25:54 watching their parents’ phones. 0:25:57 And then they like do worse, they’re like, look worse. 0:25:59 – But it’s like, it’s pathetic, it’s sad. 0:26:01 – It’s a terrible piece of evidence. 0:26:04 – So is this an area in which you just go with your gut? 0:26:07 – I mean, I try to generate a fancy version of go 0:26:10 with your gut, which is called Bayesian updating. 0:26:13 And so I basically try to say, look, you know, 0:26:16 I mean, we want to step back and think about 0:26:18 what are the places of uncertainty? 0:26:21 Logic would tell you, you know, your kid is awake 0:26:24 for what it is like 13 hours a day, 12 hours a day. 0:26:27 If your two year old is spending seven of those 12 hours 0:26:30 playing on the iPad, then there’s a lot of things 0:26:31 that they are not doing. 0:26:32 That’s probably not good. 0:26:36 On the other hand, you know, if your kid is spending 0:26:40 20 minutes every three days, it’s very hard to imagine 0:26:41 how that could be bad. 0:26:44 – So just thinking about it purely in times of like, 0:26:46 time allotted to any one activity, basically. 0:26:48 And then I think once you do that, then you’re sort of like, 0:26:50 okay, but you know, there are things that we’re uncertain 0:26:52 about, you know, what if my kid watches an hour of TV 0:26:54 every day or spends an hour on a screen every day? 0:26:56 Like is that too much, is the limit? 0:26:59 If we sort of accept like five minutes a day is fine. 0:27:00 Seven hours a day is too much. 0:27:03 Like is the limit at an hour, is the limit at two hours? 0:27:06 You know, and I think the truth is what we will find 0:27:08 if we end up in for doing any studies like this, 0:27:10 is that it depends a lot what other things 0:27:13 they would be doing with their time. 0:27:15 – Wouldn’t it also depend so much on the child? 0:27:19 – Some children need, you know, learn in a kind of way 0:27:21 that lends itself to this technology. 0:27:24 Some children need other kinds of learning, you know. 0:27:25 It’s highly individual. 0:27:27 – Yeah, I mean, I think this gets into the problem 0:27:29 with studying older kids in general, 0:27:30 that just like there’s so much, 0:27:31 there’s so many differences across kids. 0:27:33 It’s hard to even think about how you would structure 0:27:34 a study to learn about them. 0:27:37 Nevermind actually, like using evidence that exists. 0:27:40 – It’s really interesting because the last time we went 0:27:43 to take my daughter for her annual checkup, 0:27:44 or maybe it was my son, I can’t even remember it. 0:27:46 It’s so different from the first days 0:27:47 of those early spreadsheet where now I’m like, 0:27:49 did I even get it on which one is that? 0:27:51 – Yeah, exactly. 0:27:54 Anyways, the doctor said very concretely, 0:27:57 two hours, two hours max, within any date. 0:27:58 But it was really interesting to me 0:28:01 that it was such a specific line in the sand. 0:28:04 And now I’m thinking about how that information 0:28:06 would even get into that, 0:28:08 to percolate down to that level of like the system 0:28:10 and get kind of fossilized into the system, 0:28:12 so that that recommendation is being passed on to parents. 0:28:14 Like how does that happen with these studies? 0:28:18 How do they translate to that level of advice? 0:28:22 – Yeah, I think what happens is like organizations 0:28:23 like the American Academy of Pediatrics, 0:28:26 they bring people together to basically talk 0:28:28 about the conversation we just had, 0:28:30 which was like, okay, let’s agree, 0:28:31 sort of like we don’t know that much about this, 0:28:34 like five minutes seems fine, seven hours is too much. 0:28:36 These are like smart people who see kids a lot, 0:28:38 who presumably are using some knowledge 0:28:41 that they have about kids to pick some number. 0:28:43 But the answer is like, you could pick 0:28:44 a lot of different numbers. 0:28:47 We sort of say this and then it becomes like this rule. 0:28:49 And people have some impression that it comes 0:28:52 from some piece of evidence as opposed to sort of like, 0:28:58 you know, a synthesis of expert opinion or something, 0:29:01 which is really what it’s from. 0:29:04 – You also work specifically on certain health recommendations. 0:29:08 So how they change over time and how we stick to them. 0:29:10 You wrote a paper on behavioral feedback. 0:29:13 And then you talk about how those individual choices 0:29:15 might in fact be changing the science itself. 0:29:17 Can you talk about what that means 0:29:18 and how that might be happening? 0:29:20 – I was thinking about exactly this issue of like, 0:29:21 okay, we just make some recommendation 0:29:24 and sometimes those recommendations are kind of arbitrary, 0:29:25 but then they go out in the world 0:29:27 and people respond to them. – Take on lives of their own. 0:29:28 – Exactly. 0:29:30 And so like a sort of a good example, 0:29:32 vitamin E is supplements. 0:29:35 Like in the early 90s, there were a couple of studies 0:29:37 which suggested that like they are good for your health, 0:29:38 that like prevent cancer. 0:29:40 And so then there was like a recommendation, 0:29:42 like people should take vitamin E. 0:29:45 And then we had to ask a question like what, 0:29:47 like who takes vitamin E after that? 0:29:51 And one of the concerns is the kind of people 0:29:53 who would adopt these new recommendations, 0:29:55 like who listens to their doctor. 0:29:59 It is people who are probably, 0:30:01 maybe they’re more educated, maybe they’re richer, 0:30:05 but like above all, they are interested in their health. 0:30:07 So they are taking vitamin E, so they avoid cancer, 0:30:09 but they’re also exercising, so they avoid cancer. 0:30:11 And they’re eating vegetables, so they avoid cancer. 0:30:12 We use, call them selected. 0:30:14 These people are like positively selected 0:30:16 on other health things. 0:30:18 And so indeed you can see in the data 0:30:21 that the people who start taking vitamin E 0:30:22 after this recommendation changes 0:30:25 are kind of also exercising and not smoking 0:30:27 and doing all kinds of other stuff. 0:30:30 Well, why is that like interesting or problematic? 0:30:34 Well, later we’re gonna go back to the data 0:30:36 ’cause that’s like the way science works. 0:30:38 But now the people who take vitamin E 0:30:42 are even more different than they were before, right? 0:30:43 So now these people are like. 0:30:44 So you’ve added another layer. 0:30:45 You’ve added another layer. 0:30:47 So in fact, you can see that in the data. 0:30:49 You can see that basically before these recommendations 0:30:52 changed, there was sort of a small relationship 0:30:56 between taking vitamin E and like subsequent mortality rates. 0:30:58 But after the recommendations change, 0:31:01 you see like a very large relationship 0:31:03 between vitamin E and mortality rates. 0:31:06 And so it looks like basically ends up looking like vitamin E 0:31:08 like is really great for you. 0:31:09 – Has this big impact. 0:31:11 – But of course that’s because at least, 0:31:13 it seems like it must be at least in part 0:31:16 because the people who adopt vitamin E 0:31:21 are the people who are also doing these other things. 0:31:23 – So what does that mean then? 0:31:24 It feels like such a loss. 0:31:26 Like how does one ever- – It’s so depressing. 0:31:28 – Yes. (laughs) 0:31:31 How would one ever develop like a recommendation 0:31:33 based on what we think we know. 0:31:34 – I know. 0:31:36 – And untangle it from like- 0:31:39 – So this paper is very destructive in some sense. 0:31:42 – Other than saying like it probably doesn’t matter 0:31:44 if you take vitamin E, so that’s like news you can use. 0:31:46 You can take that home with you. 0:31:50 But I mean, I think it does more or less just highlight 0:31:54 some of the inherent and very deep limitations 0:31:58 with our ability to learn about some of these effects, 0:31:59 particularly when they’re small. 0:32:01 – Is this basically part of the sort of crisis 0:32:02 of reproducibility? 0:32:04 – I think it’s not unrelated. 0:32:06 So I often think about this idea of p-hacking, 0:32:10 which refers to the idea that you keep running your studies 0:32:12 until you get a significant result. 0:32:16 There’s a bunch of people interested in this process 0:32:19 of like how science evolves 0:32:24 and the ways in which the evolution of science 0:32:27 influences the science itself or the incentives 0:32:31 for research influence how science works. 0:32:35 And I think it’s particularly hard to draw conclusions 0:32:39 in these spaces like diet or these health behaviors 0:32:41 where the honest truth is probably a lot 0:32:43 of these effects are very small. 0:32:45 So if you ask the question like, 0:32:47 what is the effect of chia seeds on your health? 0:32:49 My dad is like really into chia seeds. 0:32:50 – That was a thing. 0:32:51 There was a moment. 0:32:53 – Well, he’s still in that moment. 0:32:53 He’s still in there. 0:32:56 And what is the effect of those on your health? 0:32:58 The actual effect is probably about zero. 0:33:00 Maybe it’s not exactly zero, 0:33:01 but it’s almost certainly about zero. 0:33:03 – But are there sometimes secret sleeper? 0:33:05 Like, whoa, they’re actually might, 0:33:08 the only way to find out is to do these things. 0:33:09 – Yeah, yeah. 0:33:10 And so maybe there are some secrets. 0:33:12 – Like maybe kale really is magic. 0:33:14 – Maybe it is, but it’s probably not. 0:33:18 I spent a lot of time with these diet data 0:33:21 and there’s these sort of like dietary patterns 0:33:23 like the Mediterranean diet, 0:33:26 which do seem to have some sort of vague support 0:33:30 in the evidence, but I would be extremely surprised 0:33:33 if we ever turn up like the one single thing. 0:33:35 – One magical food. 0:33:36 – So the point is it’s the pattern. 0:33:38 – It’s the pattern and it’s all the other things 0:33:39 that you’re doing, right? 0:33:42 If you smoke three packs a day and you never exercise, 0:33:45 but you eat some kale, that’s not gonna help you. 0:33:46 – Yeah, yeah. 0:33:47 – The kale’s not gonna help. 0:33:50 – What about when you really do need to affect change? 0:33:54 What are the ways in which these guidelines 0:33:57 can shift over time with kind of new sources of information 0:33:58 or data and statistics? 0:33:59 Like what’s the positive? 0:34:02 How does that actually play out in the right manner? 0:34:05 – Yeah, so I think there are times in which we, 0:34:08 the change in evidence is so big 0:34:12 and so like compelling that we can get changes, 0:34:15 best practices in obstetrics, 0:34:19 like how do you deliver, reach baby, as an example, 0:34:21 they change, like those changed over time 0:34:25 because there was like one very big well-recognized study 0:34:28 that everybody agreed like this is now the state of the art. 0:34:30 – And it happens fast at that point? 0:34:31 – And then it happens pretty fast. 0:34:32 It doesn’t happen immediately. 0:34:33 Like you might have thought that those kind of changes 0:34:35 could be like immediately affected 0:34:36 and I think that they’re not, 0:34:39 but they do happen over time. 0:34:44 Those examples really rely on there being like a cohort 0:34:49 of sort of like experts who are all reading the guidelines 0:34:51 and sort of seeing that they changed 0:34:56 and then themselves are sort of doing this all the time. 0:34:59 I think part of what’s hard in the broader health behavior 0:35:01 space where it’s people who need to make the choices, 0:35:03 not physicians. 0:35:06 – Yes, when it’s in the home and those dark bedrooms. 0:35:08 – It’s like that’s much harder to get people 0:35:10 to change their behavior in those spaces. 0:35:12 – It’s not these pediatric guidelines. 0:35:13 Those are not effective. 0:35:14 – Yeah, I do not think those are effective. 0:35:16 Or I think we don’t see any evidence in the data 0:35:18 that those are effective at moving these, 0:35:20 at least in these kind of spaces. 0:35:21 – So what’s the answer? 0:35:23 How do we positively affect change 0:35:25 and gather these insights and have smart people 0:35:26 making good recommendations? 0:35:29 – So I mean, I think one answer is media attention. 0:35:32 The kind of few times when we see very large spikes 0:35:35 and changes, they actually seem to correspond 0:35:36 with some media coverage. 0:35:39 On the flip side, like media can often be very bad. 0:35:41 Some of these big changes in these expert things 0:35:44 were kind of resulted from media coverage, 0:35:46 which was really like sensationalist 0:35:48 and like totally inappropriate. 0:35:50 And, you know, it wasn’t like a very nice, 0:35:53 like New York, New York time story about some study. 0:35:56 It was like a sensationalist 2020. 0:35:57 – About what? 0:36:00 – About, this is about vacuum extraction, 0:36:02 which is a way of pulling the baby out 0:36:04 and has gone down a lot over time. 0:36:05 And it was like the sort of sensationalist 0:36:08 like John Stossel 2020 episode 0:36:09 about how it could hurt your baby, 0:36:11 which caused like big productions. 0:36:12 – Interesting. 0:36:14 – Yeah, you know that like. 0:36:15 – But the science was there. 0:36:17 – The science, yeah, was there. 0:36:19 I mean, he overstated the science, 0:36:21 but it was, it was probably there. 0:36:23 – So it’s almost like a random confluence 0:36:24 of like when the science is there 0:36:26 and the media hits it the right way, 0:36:27 and then we see change? 0:36:28 – Yeah. 0:36:29 (laughing) 0:36:30 – It’s okay. – That’s something 0:36:31 to hope for. 0:36:34 – Yeah, that doesn’t feel like we can plan so much for that. 0:36:38 – You also study when we are resistant to change. 0:36:40 You looked specifically at diabetes, 0:36:42 people I think who had been diagnosed with diabetes 0:36:44 and then whether or not their behavior changed, 0:36:46 even given a certain amount of information. 0:36:49 So what do you see there about our resistance to change 0:36:52 even with the right kinds of information? 0:36:54 – I mean, I think one of the big challenges 0:36:56 in the health space at the moment 0:36:57 is that like so much of the, 0:37:00 so many of the health problems that we have in the US 0:37:03 are like problems associated with behavior, 0:37:06 just the fundamental fact that like people do not eat great 0:37:09 and we have a lot of morbidity 0:37:11 and expense associated with that. 0:37:14 And I think there is often a lot of emphasis 0:37:16 on the idea like if we just get the information out, 0:37:19 if people just understood vegetables were good for them, 0:37:20 hey, what are you vegetables? 0:37:21 – Doesn’t happen. – That’s not true. 0:37:24 I think, and so this paper is about sort of looking 0:37:26 at something where kind of a pretty extreme thing 0:37:28 happens to people, like they are diagnosed with diabetes 0:37:31 and we can see what happens to their diet. 0:37:33 And the answer is, it improves a tiny amount. 0:37:36 – Even with a real come to Jesus moment. 0:37:38 – Exactly, and a lot of new information. 0:37:41 – Right, and monitoring, follow-up, right? 0:37:42 I mean, you’re diagnosed with diabetes, 0:37:44 like you have to take medicine every day, 0:37:46 you got to go to the doctor like get a tester, 0:37:47 you know, test your insulin, 0:37:48 at least for some period of time. 0:37:51 So this isn’t like something where you can just forget 0:37:54 that it happened and even then the changes in diet, 0:37:56 you know, they’re there, but they’re really small. 0:38:00 They’re like, you know, like one less soda week or something. 0:38:01 – Oh gosh. – Like really, 0:38:02 like really small. 0:38:03 – And how are you noticing these? 0:38:06 – We’re inferring information on diagnosis 0:38:09 from people’s purchases of testing products 0:38:11 and then following their grocery purchases. 0:38:13 So this is like an example of using, 0:38:15 you know, a different kind of data. 0:38:16 So not health data in this case. 0:38:19 It’s actually like Nielsen data. 0:38:21 So Nielsen data on what people buy, 0:38:24 but then, you know, using some like machine learning techniques 0:38:27 to try to figure out from the kinds of things people buy, 0:38:29 when were they diagnosed with diabetes, 0:38:31 and then looking at their diets over time. 0:38:33 – So is the answer that there has to be 0:38:36 some sensational story that talks about like– 0:38:38 – I mean, I think there, I’m not even sure that would help. 0:38:40 I think part of the problem is people really like 0:38:42 the diets that they’re comfortable with. 0:38:45 Like diet is like such a habit formation thing, 0:38:48 and you know, people are willing to make 0:38:52 important health sacrifices to maintain the diet 0:38:53 that they like. 0:38:55 We get into some of these questions of preferences, 0:38:57 like, and you know, if people, 0:38:59 if that is the choice that people wanna make, 0:39:03 like should we be trying to intervene with policy? 0:39:05 Like let’s say everybody had all the information, 0:39:07 they knew that they shouldn’t drink so much soda 0:39:08 and that they should lose weight, 0:39:10 but they still chose not to. 0:39:13 Like do we wanna develop policies that affect that? 0:39:13 I’m not sure. 0:39:15 – Yeah, maybe that’s just free will. 0:39:16 – Yeah, maybe that’s just free will. 0:39:18 And it comes up in the parenting stuff too. 0:39:20 Like, you know, how much do we wanna be externally 0:39:23 controlling the choices people make with their kids, 0:39:25 even if we don’t think that they’re the right choices. 0:39:28 – But I do think there’s a segment of people 0:39:30 who want to make the change, but the gravity, 0:39:32 you know, because of the information, 0:39:33 but the gravity of the habit is so much 0:39:36 that it’s hard to know where to go about it. 0:39:39 – I guess I would say, where do you see this data going? 0:39:42 Like if you had your fantasy for where you want 0:39:44 the kind of data and the way that we see this data evolving 0:39:47 and the way that you see that kind of percolating out 0:39:50 to the public, I mean, in terms of being sort of a translator 0:39:51 and providing people the tools, 0:39:54 like what do you wanna see in terms of the way the system 0:39:57 responds to or integrates this data in the future? 0:40:00 – Yeah, I mean, I think the big message of the book 0:40:03 is in some sense that you should use the data 0:40:07 to make yourself confident and happy in your choices. 0:40:10 I think so much of what is hard about parenting 0:40:14 is that in the moment you are not often confident 0:40:17 in your choices, and then when somebody asks you, 0:40:20 like, why did you do that, then you feel bad, right? 0:40:23 And I think that there’s a sense in which sort of 0:40:24 looking at the data, but then confronting like, 0:40:27 well, we don’t know, but you’d be like, okay, I made this choice. 0:40:28 You know, I decided to let my kids watch an hour 0:40:31 of TV every day, because like I thought about it 0:40:33 and I thought there wasn’t any data, 0:40:35 and like that’s the choice that I made, 0:40:37 that sort of that confidence is like important 0:40:40 for being happy, and if we could sort of like 0:40:44 move in that direction, I think that would be good. 0:40:46 – It reminds me a lot of what one of my good friends, 0:40:47 Brandy said to me when I was in the trenches 0:40:49 of like babyhood and having a lot of anxieties 0:40:52 around all these hot button issues, breastfeeding, 0:40:53 sleep time, like all of it. 0:40:55 She had been through it, her kids were in college, 0:40:57 and she was like, let me give you a piece of advice. 0:40:59 Be wrong, but be wrong with confidence. 0:41:00 – Yes. 0:41:01 – Just be wrong with confidence. 0:41:02 That’s all that matters. 0:41:03 – Yeah. – Yeah. 0:41:04 – No, exactly. 0:41:05 – I love confidence, I love that. 0:41:07 Yes, I am wrong with confidence so frequently. 0:41:08 – Yes, and actually it turns out to be right. 0:41:09 – Like it turns out that it’s fine. 0:41:10 – The truth is there’s a lot of good options. 0:41:11 – A lot of good options. 0:41:12 – Yeah. – Thank you so much 0:41:14 for joining us on the A16Z podcast. 0:41:15 – Thank you for having me.
with Emily Oster (@ProfEmilyOster) and Hanne Tidnam (@omnivorousread)
Are chia seeds actually that good for you? Will Vitamin E keep you healthy? Will breastfeeding babies make them smarter? There’s maybe no other arena where understanding what the evidence truly tells us is harder than in health… and parenting. And yet we make decisions based on what we hear about in studies like the ones listed above every day. In this episode, Brown University economics professor Emily Oster, author of Expecting Better and the recently released book Cribsheet: A Data-driven Guide to Better, More Relaxed Parenting, from Birth to Preschool, in conversation with Hanne Tidnam, dives into what lies beneath those studies… and how to make smarter decisions based on them (or not). Oster walks us through the science and the data behind the studies we hear about — especially those hot-button parenting issues that are murkiest of all, from screen time to sleep training.
How we can tell what’s real and what’s not? Oster shows us the research about how these guidelines and advice that we are ”supposed” to follow get formalized and accepted inside and outside of healthcare settings — from obstetrics practices to pediatrics to diet and lifestyle; how they can (or can’t) be changed; and finally, how the course of science itself can be influenced by how these studies are done.
0:00:06 Hi, everyone. Welcome to the A6NC podcast. I’m Sonal, and today Mark and I are doing another one 0:00:10 of our book author episodes. We’re interviewing Annie Duke, who’s a professional poker player and 0:00:17 World Series champ and is the author of Thinking in Bets, which is just out in paperback today. 0:00:21 The subtitle of the book is Making Smarter Decisions When You Don’t Have All the Facts, 0:00:25 which actually applies to startups and companies of all sizes and ages, quite frankly. I mean, 0:00:30 basically any business or new product line operating under conditions of great uncertainty, 0:00:34 which I’d argue is my definition of a startup and innovation. So that will be the frame for 0:00:39 this episode. Annie is also working on her next book right now and founded HowIDecide.org, 0:00:43 which brings together various stakeholders to create a national education movement around 0:00:48 decision education, empowering students to also be better decision makers. So anyway, 0:00:51 Mark and I interview her about all sorts of things in and beyond her book, 0:00:55 going from investing to business to life. But Annie begins with a thought experiment, 0:00:58 even though neither of us really know that much about football. 0:01:02 So what I’d love to do is kind of throw a thought experiment at you guys so that we can 0:01:06 have a discussion about this. So I know you guys don’t know a lot about football, 0:01:09 but this one’s pretty easy. You’re going to be able to feel this one, which is do this thought 0:01:16 experiment. Pete Carroll calls for Marshawn Lynch to actually run the ball. 0:01:18 So we’re betting on someone who we know is really good. 0:01:21 Well, they’re all really good, but we’re betting on the play that everybody’s expected. 0:01:25 This is the default. This is the assumed irrational thing to do. 0:01:30 Right. So he has Russell Wilson handed off to Marshawn Lynch. Marshawn Lynch goes to barrel 0:01:35 through the line. He fails. Now they call the time out. So now they stop the clock, 0:01:39 they get another play now, and they hand the ball off to Marshawn Lynch, 0:01:45 what everybody expects. Marshawn Lynch again, attempts to get through that line and he fails. 0:01:52 End of game, Patriots win. My question to you is, are the headlines the next day 0:01:58 that worst call in Super Bowl history? Is Chris Collins we’re saying, I can’t believe the call, 0:02:04 I can’t believe the call, or is he saying something more like, that’s why the Patriots are so good, 0:02:09 their line is so great. That’s the Patriots line that we’ve come to see this whole season. 0:02:15 This will seal Belichick’s place in history. It would have all been about the Patriots. 0:02:21 So let’s sort of divide things into, we can either say the outcomes are due to skill or luck, 0:02:27 and luck in this particular case is going to be anything that has nothing to do with Pete Carroll. 0:02:31 And we can agree that the Patriots line doesn’t have anything to do with Pete Carroll. Belichick 0:02:34 doesn’t have anything to do with Pete Carroll. Tom Brady doesn’t have anything to do with Pete 0:02:38 Carroll as they’re sealing their fifth Super Bowl victory. So what we can see is there’s two 0:02:44 different routes to failure here. One route to failure, you get resulting. And basically what 0:02:50 resulting is, is that retrospectively, once you have the outcome of a decision, once there’s a 0:02:55 result, it’s really, really hard to work backwards from that single outcome to try to figure out 0:02:59 what the decision quality is. This is just very hard for us to do. They say, oh my gosh, the outcome 0:03:05 was so bad. This is clearly, I’m going to put that right into the skill bucket. This is because of 0:03:10 Pete Carroll’s own doing. But in the other case, they’re like, oh, you know, there’s uncertainty. 0:03:15 What could you do? Weird, right? Yeah. Okay. So you can kind of take that and you can say, aha, 0:03:21 now we can sort of understand some things. Like, for example, people have complained for a very 0:03:28 long time that in the NFL, they have been very, very slow to adopt what the analytics say that 0:03:32 you should be adopting, right? And even though now we’ve got some movement on like fourth down 0:03:36 calls and when are you going for two point conversions and things like that, there’s still 0:03:40 nowhere close to where they’re supposed to be. So they don’t make the plays corresponding to 0:03:45 the statistical probabilities? No. In fact, the analytics show that if you’re on your own one 0:03:51 yard line and it’s fourth down, you should go for it, no matter what. The reason for that is if you 0:03:54 kick it, you’re only going to be able to kick to midfield. So the other team is basically almost 0:03:59 guaranteed three points anyway. So you’re supposed to just try to get the, try to get the yards. 0:04:03 Like, when have you ever seen a team on their own one yard line on fourth down be like, yeah, 0:04:08 let’s go for it. That does not happen. Okay. So we know that they’ve been like super slow 0:04:12 to do what the analytics say is, is correct. And so you sit here and you go, well, why is that? 0:04:18 And that thought experiment really tells you why, because we’re all human beings. We all 0:04:23 understand that there are certain times when we don’t allow uncertainty to bubble up to the surface 0:04:29 as the explanation. And there are certain times then we do. And it seems to be that we do when we 0:04:35 have this kind of consensus around the decision, there’s other ways we get there. And so, okay, 0:04:39 if I’m a human decision maker, I’m going to choose the path where I don’t get yelled at. 0:04:45 Yeah, exactly. So basically we can kind of walk back and we can say, are we allowing the uncertainty 0:04:49 to bubble to the surface? And this is going to be the first step to kind of understanding what 0:04:55 really slows innovation down, what really slows adoption of, of what we might know is good decision 0:04:58 making, because we have conflicting interests, right, making the best decision for the long run, 0:05:03 or making the best decision to keep us out of a room where we’re getting judged or 0:05:07 yelled at or possibly fired. So can I, let me propose the framework that I used to think about 0:05:12 this and see if you agree with it. So it’d be a two by two, a two by two grid and it’s consensus 0:05:17 versus non-consensus and it’s right versus wrong. And the way we think about it, at least in our 0:05:24 business is basically consensus, right is fine. Consensus, non-consensus right is fine. In fact, 0:05:29 generally you get called a genius. Consensus wrong is fine because you just, you know, 0:05:32 it’s just the same mistake everybody else made. You all agree, right, it was wrong. 0:05:36 Non-consensus wrong is really bad. It’s horrible. It’s radioactively bad. 0:05:40 Right. And so, and then, and then as a consequence of that, and maybe this gets to the innovation 0:05:44 stuff that you’ll be talking about, but as a consequence of that, there are only two scripts 0:05:49 for talking about people operating in, in the non-consensus directions. One script is they’re 0:05:54 a genius because it went right and the other is they’re a complete moron because it went wrong. Is 0:05:58 that, does that map? That’s, that’s exactly, that’s exactly right. And I think that the problem 0:06:04 here is that what is right and wrong mean in your two by two, wrong and right is really this, 0:06:08 just to turn out well or not. Yeah, okay. And this is where we really get into this problem 0:06:13 because now what people are doing is they’re trying to swat the outcomes away and they understand, 0:06:19 just as you said, that on that consensus wrong, you will have like a cloak of invisibility over 0:06:24 you. Like, you don’t have to deal with it. Right. So, let’s think about other things besides 0:06:30 consensus. So, consensus is one way to do that, especially when you have like complicated cost 0:06:34 benefit analyses going into it. I don’t think that people, when they’re getting in a car, 0:06:41 are actually doing any kind of calculation about what the cost benefit analysis is to their own 0:06:47 productivity versus the danger of something very bad happening to them. Like, well, as a society, 0:06:50 someone’s done this calculation, we’ve all kind of done this together. And so therefore, 0:06:54 like getting in a car is totally fine. I’m going to do that. And nobody second guesses anybody. 0:06:57 Somebody dies in a car crash. You don’t say, wow, what a moron for getting in a car. 0:07:03 No. Another way that we can get there is through transparency. So, if the decision is pretty 0:07:09 transparent, another way to get there is status quo. So, like a good status quo example that I 0:07:14 like to give because everybody can understand it is, you have to get to a plane and you’re with 0:07:21 your significant other in the car and you go the usual route. So, you go your usual route. 0:07:26 Like, you go literally, this is the route that you’ve always gone and there’s some sort of accident, 0:07:30 there’s bad traffic, you missed the plane and you’re mostly probably comforting each other 0:07:35 in the car. It’s like, what could we do? But then you get in the car and you announce to 0:07:41 your significant other, I’ve got a great shortcut. So, let’s take the shortcut to the airport. And 0:07:46 there’s same accident, whatever, horrible traffic, you missed the flight. And that’s like that status 0:07:50 quo versus non-status quo decision. Right. You’re going against what’s familiar and comfortable. 0:07:56 Exactly. If we go back to the car example, when you look at what the reaction is to a pedestrian 0:08:02 dying because of an autonomous vehicle versus because of a human, we’re very, very harsh with 0:08:07 algorithms. For example, if you get in a car accident and you happen to hit a pedestrian, 0:08:12 I can say something like, well, Mark didn’t intend to do that. Because I think that I understand 0:08:17 your mind is not such a black box to me. So, I feel like I have some insight into what your 0:08:23 decision might be and so more allowing some of the uncertainty to bubble up there. But if this 0:08:29 black box algorithm makes the decision, now all of a sudden, I’m like, get these cars off the road. 0:08:33 Never mind that the human mind is a black box itself. Of course. But we have some sort of 0:08:37 illusion that I understand sort of what’s going on in there, just like I have an illusion that I 0:08:40 understand what’s going on in my own brain. And you can actually see this in some of the 0:08:46 language around crashes on Wall Street, too, when you have a crash that comes from human 0:08:50 beings selling. People say things like, the market went down today. When it’s algorithms, 0:08:56 they say it’s a flash crash. So now they’re sort of pointing out, this is clearly in the 0:08:59 skilled category. It’s the algorithm’s fault. We should really have a discussion about algorithmic 0:09:04 trading and whether there should be allowed. When obviously the mechanism for the market 0:09:08 going down is the same either way. So now if we understand that, so exactly your matrix, 0:09:12 now we can say, well, okay, human beings understand what’s going to get them in the room. 0:09:19 And pretty much anybody who’s living and breathing in the top levels of business at this point is 0:09:22 going to tell you, process, process, process. I don’t care about your outcomes, process, process, 0:09:27 process. But then the only time they ever have like an all hands on deck meeting is when something 0:09:31 goes wrong. Like let’s say that you’re in a real estate investing group. And so you invest in a 0:09:37 particular property based on your model. And the appraisal comes in 10% lower than what you 0:09:42 expected. Like everybody’s in a room, right? You’re all having a discussion. You’re all examining 0:09:46 the model. You’re trying to figure out, but what happens when the appraisal comes in 10% higher 0:09:50 than expected? Is everyone in the room going, what happened here? Now there is the obvious 0:09:54 reality, which is like, we don’t get paid in process. We get paid in outcomes. Booker players, 0:09:58 you don’t get paid in process, you get paid in outcome. And so there is an incentive alignment. 0:10:02 It’s not completely emotional. There’s also an actual, there’s a real component to it. 0:10:08 Yeah. So two things. One is you have to make it very clear to the people who work for you that 0:10:13 you understand that outcomes will come from good process. That’s number one. And then number two, 0:10:19 what you have to do is try to align the fact that as human beings, we tend to be outcome driven 0:10:28 to what you want in terms of getting an individual’s risk to align with the enterprise risk. 0:10:31 Because otherwise you’re going to get the CYA behavior. And the other thing is that we want 0:10:35 to understand if we have the right assessment of risk. So one of the big problems with the 0:10:39 appraisal coming in 10% too high there could be that your model’s correct. It could be that you 0:10:44 could have just a tail result, but it certainly is a trigger for you to go look and say, was there 0:10:48 risk in this decision that we didn’t know was there? And it’s really important for deploying 0:10:54 resources. I have a question about translating this to say non-investing context. So if in the 0:11:01 example of Mark’s Matrix, even if it’s a non-consensus wrong, you are staking money 0:11:06 that you are responsible for. In most companies, people do not have that kind of skin in the game. 0:11:12 So how do you drive accountability in a process-driven environment that the results actually 0:11:17 do matter? You want people to be accountable yet not overly focused on the outcome? How do you 0:11:23 calibrate that? So let’s think about how can we create balance across three dimensions 0:11:26 that makes it so that the outcome you care about is the quality of the forecast. 0:11:33 So first of all, obviously this demands that you have people making forecasts. You have to stay 0:11:38 in advance. Here’s what I think. This is my model of the world here where all the places are going 0:11:45 to fall. So this is what I think. So now you stated that and the weather the outcome is “good” 0:11:50 or “bad” is how close are you to whatever that forecast is. So now it’s not just like, 0:11:55 oh, you won to it or you lost to it, it was your forecast good. So that’s piece number one is make 0:12:00 sure that you’re trying to be as equal across quality as you can and focus more on forecast 0:12:04 quality as opposed to like traditionally what we would think of as outcome quality. 0:12:12 So now the second piece is directional. So when we have a bad outcome and everybody gets in the room, 0:12:16 when was the last time that someone suggested, “Well, you know, we really should have lost more 0:12:24 here.” Like nobody’s saying that. But sometimes that’s true. Sometimes if you examine it, you’ll 0:12:29 find out that you didn’t have a big enough position. It turned out, okay, well maybe we should have 0:12:36 actually lost more. So you want to ask both up, down, and orthogonal. So could we have lost less? 0:12:42 Should we have lost more? And then the question of should we have been in this position at all? 0:12:46 So Inventure Capital, after a company works and exits, they say it sells for a lot of money, 0:12:51 you do often say, “God, I wish we had invested more money.” You never, ever, ever, ever, 0:12:55 I have never heard anybody say on a loss we should have invested more money. 0:12:59 See, I wouldn’t be great if someone said that. Like wouldn’t you love for someone to come up and 0:13:03 say that to you? That would make you so happy. And what would be the logic of why they should say 0:13:06 that? I still don’t get the point. Exactly. Why does that matter? I don’t really understand that. 0:13:11 So let’s, can I just, like simple in a poker example. So let’s say that I get involved in a 0:13:20 hand with you and I have some idea about how you play. And I have decided that you are somebody 0:13:26 that if I, if I bet X, you will continue to play with me. Let’s say this is a spot where I know 0:13:32 that I have the best hand. But if I bet X plus C that you will fold. So if I go above X that I’m 0:13:36 not going to be able to keep you coming along with me, but if I bet X or below that you will. So I 0:13:43 bet X you call, but you call really fast in a way that makes me realize, oh, I could have actually 0:13:48 bet X plus C. You hit a very lucky card on the end and I happened to lose the pot. I should have 0:13:52 maximized at the point that I was a mathematical favorite. Your model of me was wrong, which is 0:13:56 a learning independent of the winner, the loss. Exactly. So you need to be exploring those questions 0:14:01 in a real honest way. Because it has to do with how you size future bets. This is exactly like a 0:14:05 company betting on a product line. Correct. And then like ticking, like, you know, what the next 0:14:09 product line is going to be, and then not having had the information that would then drive a better 0:14:12 decision-making process around that. Right. So think about the learning loss that’s happening, 0:14:16 because we’re not exploring that. The negative direction is, and now you should do this on 0:14:22 wins as well. So if you do ever discuss a win, you always think like, how could I press? How 0:14:25 could I have won more? How could I have made this even better? How could I do this again in the 0:14:29 future? Should we have won less? We oversized the bet and then got bailed out by a fluke. 0:14:33 We should have actually had less in it. And sometimes not at all, because sometimes 0:14:37 the reasons that we invested turned out to be orthogonal to the reasons that it 0:14:41 actually ended up playing out in the way that it was. And so had we had that information, 0:14:45 we actually wouldn’t have bet on this at all, because it was completely orthogonal. Like, 0:14:50 we totally had this wrong. It just turned out that we ended up winning. And that can happen. 0:14:54 Obviously, that happens in poker all the time. But what does that communicate to the people on 0:14:59 your team? Good, bad, I don’t care. I care about our model. I want to know that we’re 0:15:03 modeling the world well and that we’re thinking about how do we incorporate the things that we 0:15:09 learn? Because we can generally think about stuff we know and stuff we don’t know. There’s 0:15:13 stuff we don’t know we know, obviously. So we don’t worry about that, because we don’t know 0:15:18 we don’t know it. But then there’s stuff we could know and stuff we can’t know. It’s things like 0:15:22 the size of the universe or the thoughts of others. Or what the outcome will actually be. 0:15:28 We don’t know that. I have a question about this, though. What is a time frame for that forecast? 0:15:32 So let’s say you have a model of the world, a model of a technology, how it’s going to adopt, 0:15:38 how it’s going to play out. In some cases, there are companies that can take years to get traction. 0:15:42 You want to get your customers very early to figure that out, right? So you can get that data. 0:15:48 But how much time do you give? How do you size that time frame for the forecast? So you’re not 0:15:52 constantly updating with every customer data point. And so you’re also giving it enough time for your 0:15:57 model, your plan, your forecast to play out. You have to think about very clearly in advance, 0:16:03 what’s my time horizon? How long do I need for this to play out? But also, don’t just do this 0:16:06 for the big decisions, because there’s things that you can forecast for tomorrow as well, 0:16:11 so that you end up bringing it into just the way that people think. And then once you’ve decided, 0:16:15 okay, this is the time horizon of my forecast. And you would want to be thinking about what 0:16:22 are forecasts we make for a year, two years, five years for the specific decision to play out. 0:16:27 And then just make sure that you talk in advance at what point you’ll revisit the forecast. 0:16:31 So you want to think in advance, what are the things that would have to be true 0:16:36 for me to be willing to come in and actually revisit this forecast? Because otherwise, you can 0:16:39 start, as you just said, you can turn into super bad. You like to leave in the wind. 0:16:44 Exactly, because then you’re one bad customer and you suddenly over-rotate on that when, 0:16:49 in fact, it could have been not leaving the thing. So if you include that in your forecast, 0:16:52 here are the circumstances under which we would come in and check on our model. 0:16:57 Then you’ve already got that in advance. So that’s actually creating constraints 0:17:01 around the reactivity, which is helpful. Two questions on practical implementation of the 0:17:05 theory. So what I’m finding is more and more people understand the logic of what you’re describing, 0:17:09 because people are getting exposed to these ideas and kind of expanding in importance. 0:17:12 And so more and more people intellectually understand this stuff. But there’s two kind of, 0:17:16 I don’t know, so-called emotion-driven warps or something that people just really have a hard 0:17:21 time with. So one is, you understand this could be true of investors, CEO, product line manager, 0:17:24 in a company, kind of anybody, in one of these domains, which is you can’t get the 0:17:27 non-consensus right results unless you’re willing to take the damage, 0:17:32 the risk on the non-consensus wrong results. But people cannot cope with the non-consensus 0:17:37 wrong outcome. They just emotionally cannot handle it. And they would like to think that 0:17:39 they can. And they intellectually understand that they should be able to. But as you say, 0:17:44 when they’re in the room, it’s such a traumatizing experience that it’s touching the hot stove, 0:17:48 they will do anything in the future to avoid that. Is that just a… And so one interpretation would 0:17:52 be, that’s just simply flat out human nature. And so to some extent, the intellectual understanding 0:17:56 of here doesn’t actually matter that much because there’s an emotional override. And so that would 0:18:00 be a pessimistic view on our ability as a species to learn these lessons. Or do you have a more 0:18:04 optimistic view of that? I’m going to be both pessimistic and optimistic at the same time. 0:18:09 So let me explain why. Because I think that if you move this a little bit, it’s a huge difference. 0:18:13 You sort of have two tasks that you want to take. One is, how much can you move the individual to 0:18:19 sort of train this kind of thinking for them? And that means naturally, they’re thinking in 0:18:24 forecasts a little bit more, that when they do have those kinds of reactions, which naturally 0:18:30 everybody will, they write the ship more quickly so that they can learn the lessons more quickly. 0:18:35 Right? I mean, I actually just had this happen. I turned in a draft of my next book, the first 0:18:38 part of my next book to my editor, and I just got the worst comments I’ve ever gotten back. 0:18:42 And I had a really bad 24 hours. But after 24 hours, I was like, you know what, she’s right. 0:18:48 Now, I still had a really bad 24 hours. And I’m the like, give me negative feedback, like Queen, 0:18:52 because I’m a human being. But I got to it fast. Like, I sort of got through it pretty quickly 0:18:57 after this. I mean, I, you know, the, you know, on the phone with my agent saying, I’m standing 0:19:01 my ground. This is ridiculous. And then he got a text the next day being like, no, she’s right. 0:19:05 And then I rewrote it. And you know what? It’s so much better for having been rewritten. And now 0:19:10 I can get to a place of gratitude for having the negative feedback. But I still had the really 0:19:15 bad day. So it’s okay. It doesn’t go away. Right. Yeah. And it’s okay. Like, we’re all human. 0:19:22 Like, we’re not robots. So number one is like, how much are you getting the individuals to say, 0:19:27 okay, I improved 2%. That’s so amazing for my decision making and my learning going forward. 0:19:32 And then the second through line is, what are you doing to not make it worse? 0:19:37 Because obviously, for a long time, people like to talk about I’m results oriented. 0:19:39 I mean, it’s like the worst sentence that could come out of somebody’s mouth. 0:19:43 Why is that the worst? I’ve heard that a lot. Because you’re letting people know that all you 0:19:47 care about is like, did you win or lose? That’s fantastic. Be results oriented to all you want. 0:19:52 You should pay by the piece. You will get much faster work. But the minute that you’re asking 0:19:56 people to do intellectual work, results oriented is like the worst thing that you could say to 0:20:01 somebody. So I think that we need to take responsibility. And the people in our orbit, 0:20:06 we can make sure at minimum that we aren’t making it worse. And I think that that’s, 0:20:10 so that’s pessimistic and optimistic. I don’t think anyone’s making a full reversal here. 0:20:13 So the second question then goes to the societal aspect of this. 0:20:18 And so we’ll talk about the role of the storytellers or as they’re sometimes known, 0:20:22 the journalists and the editors and the editors and the publishers. And so the very 0:20:26 first reporter I ever met when I was a kid, this is Jared Sandberg at the Wall Street Journal. 0:20:30 The internet was first emerging. Like there were no stories in the press about the internet. 0:20:33 And I used to say, like, there’s all this interesting stuff happening. Why am I not 0:20:36 reading about any of it in these newspapers? And he’s like, well, because 0:20:39 the story of something is happening is not an interesting story. He said, 0:20:42 there are only two stories that sell newspapers. He said, one is, oh, the glory of it. 0:20:45 And the other is, oh, the shame of it. And basically he said, it’s conflict. So it’s 0:20:48 either something wonderful has happened or something horrible has happened. Like those 0:20:51 are the two stories. And then you think about business journalism as kind of our domain. 0:20:54 You got to think about it. You’re like, those are the only two profiles of a CEO 0:20:57 or a founder you’ll ever read. It’s just like, what a super genius for doing something, 0:21:01 presumably not consensus and right, or what a moron. Like what a hopeless idiot for doing 0:21:05 something, not consensus and wrong. And so, and so since I’ve become more aware of this, 0:21:09 like it’s actually gotten, it’s gotten very hard for me to actually read any of the coverage 0:21:12 of the people I know, because it’s like the people who got not consensus, right, 0:21:15 they’re being lavished with too much praise. And the people who got not consensus wrong, 0:21:19 they’re being damaged for all kinds of reasons. The traits are actually the same in a lot of 0:21:25 cases. And so I guess as a consequence, like if you read the coverage, it really reinforces this 0:21:30 bias of being results oriented. And it’s like, it’s not our fault that people don’t want to 0:21:34 read a story that says, well, he tried something and it didn’t work this time, right? 0:21:34 Yes, exactly. 0:21:35 And so is there a… 0:21:38 But it was mathematically pretty good. If we go back to Pete Carroll, 0:21:43 this is a pretty great case. If we think about options theory, that just quickly the past preserved 0:21:47 the option for two run plays. So if you want to get three tries at the end zone instead of two, 0:21:51 for strictly for clock management reasons, you pass first. 0:21:54 Right. And that’s not going to kick off ESPN Sports Center that night. And so optimistic or 0:22:00 pessimistic that the narrative, the public narrative on these topics will ever move. 0:22:08 I’m super, super pessimistic on the societal level, but I’m optimistic on if we’re educating 0:22:13 people better, that we can equip them better for this. So I’m really focused on how do we 0:22:19 make sure that we’re equipping people to be able to parse those narratives in a way that’s more 0:22:27 rational. And particularly, now there’s so much information. And it’s all about the framing 0:22:33 and the storytelling. And it’s particularly driven by what’s the interaction of your own 0:22:36 point of view. We could think about it as partisan point of view, for example, versus 0:22:40 the point of view of the communicator of the information and how is that interacting with 0:22:44 each other, in terms of how critically are you viewing the information, for example. 0:22:50 I think this is another really big piece of the pie and somewhat actually related to the question 0:22:53 about journalism, which is that third dimension of the space. So we talked about two dimension, 0:22:57 which is sort of outcome quality, and how are you allowing that you’re exploring both 0:23:02 downside and upside outcomes in a way that’s really looking at forecast. How are you thinking 0:23:07 directionally, so that you’re more directionally neutral. But then the other piece of the puzzle 0:23:13 is how are you treating omissions versus commissions? So one of the things that we know 0:23:19 with this issue of resulting is, here’s a really great way to make sure that nobody ever 0:23:26 results on you. Don’t do anything. If I just don’t ever make a decision, I’m never going to 0:23:31 be in that room with everybody yelling at me for the stupid decision I made, because I had a bad 0:23:36 outcome. But we know that not making a decision is making a decision. We just don’t think about it 0:23:40 that way. And it doesn’t have to just be about investing. You can have a shadow of your own 0:23:44 personal decision. So, you know, it’s really interesting. I remember I was giving somebody 0:23:51 advice who was like 23. And so obviously, you know, newly out of college had been in this position 0:23:56 for a year and was really, really unhappy in the position. And he was asking me like, I don’t know 0:24:01 what to do. I don’t know if I should change jobs. And I said, well, you know, so I did all the tricks, 0:24:04 you know, time traveling. And so I was like, well, okay, imagine it’s a year from now. Do you 0:24:09 think you’re going to be happy in this job? No. Okay, well, maybe you should go and choose this 0:24:14 other, maybe you should go and try to find another position. And this is what he said to me. And this, 0:24:18 I think, shows you how much people don’t realize that the thing you’re already doing, the status 0:24:23 quo thing, choosing to stay in that really is a decision. So he said to me, but if I go and find 0:24:28 another position, and then I have to spend another year, which I just spent trying to learn the ins and 0:24:33 outs of the company. And it turns out that I’m not happy there. I’ll have wasted my time. And I said 0:24:38 to him, okay, well, let’s think about this, though, the job you’re in, which is a choice to stay in, 0:24:44 you’ve now told me it’s 100% in a year that you will be sad. Then if you go to the new job, 0:24:49 yes, of course, it’s more volatile. But at least you’ve opened your, you’ve opened the range of 0:24:54 outcomes up, but he didn’t want to do it because it doesn’t feel like staying where he was, didn’t 0:24:59 feel like somehow he was choosing it. So that he felt like if he went to the other place, he 0:25:04 ended up sad that somehow that would be his fault in a bad decision. So profound. In my case, 0:25:08 this is my beginning a little too personal, but in my case, it was a decision that I didn’t know 0:25:13 I had made to not have kids. And it’s still an option, but it’s probably not going to happen. 0:25:18 And my therapist kind of told me that my not deciding was a choice. And I was like so blown 0:25:23 away by that, that it had then allowed me to then examine what was going on there in that 0:25:28 framework in order to not do that for other arenas in my life, where I might actually 0:25:32 want something, or maybe I don’t, but at least it’s a choice that there’s intentionality behind 0:25:36 it. Well, I appreciate you sharing. I mean, I really want to thank you for that because I think 0:25:41 that people, first of all, should be sharing this kind of stuff so that people feel like they can 0:25:45 talk about these kinds of things. Number one, and number two, in my book, I’ve got all these 0:25:49 examples in there of like, how are you making choices about raising your kids when it feels so 0:25:52 consequential? You do decisions for other people. Right. And you’re trying to decide like, 0:25:56 should I have kids or shouldn’t I have kids? Or this school or that school or where am I supposed 0:26:03 to live? And the thing that I try to get across is, we can talk about investing like I’m putting 0:26:09 money into some kind of financial instrument, but we all have resources that we’re investing. 0:26:14 That’s right. It’s our time, your energy, your heart. It could be whatever, your friendships, 0:26:19 your relationships. So you’re deploying resources and like for the kind of decision that you’re 0:26:24 talking about, it’s like, if you choose to have children, you’re choosing to deploy 0:26:29 certain resources with some expected return, some of it good, some of it bad. And if you’re 0:26:34 choosing not to have children, that’s a different deployment of your resources toward other things. 0:26:38 And you need to know that there are limits. Everything isn’t a zero-sum game. 0:26:43 No. But approaching the world and the fact that evolution has approached the world as a zero-sum 0:26:48 game and our toolkit makes it a zero-sum game, means that we need to still view everything 0:26:52 as a zero-sum game when it comes to those trade-offs and resources. Because you are losing 0:26:56 something every time, even in a non-zero game. Right. So I don’t feel like the world is a zero-sum 0:27:01 game in terms of like, most of the activities that you and I would engage on, we can both win too. 0:27:06 But it’s a zero-sum game to go back to your therapist. It’s a zero-sum game between you 0:27:10 and the other versions of yourself that you don’t choose. Exactly. Or an organization and 0:27:14 the other versions of itself it doesn’t choose. Exactly. So there’s a set of possible futures 0:27:20 that result from not making a decision as well. So on an individual decision, let’s put things 0:27:26 into three categories. Clear misses, near misses, and hits. There’s some that would just be a clear 0:27:30 miss, throw them out. And there’s some that I’m going to sort of really agonize over and I’m going 0:27:36 to think about it and I’m going to do a lot of analysis on it. And so the ones which become a 0:27:42 yes go into the hit category. And the other one is a near miss. I came close. What happens with 0:27:48 those near misses is they just go away. So what I realized is that on any given decision, let’s 0:27:52 take an investment decision. If I went to you or you came to me and said, well, tell me what’s 0:27:57 happening with the companies that you have under consideration. On a single decision, 0:28:02 when I explain to you why I didn’t invest in a company, it’s going to sound incredibly reasonable 0:28:07 to you. So you’ll only be able to see in the aggregate, if you look across many of those 0:28:13 decisions, that I tend to be having this bias toward missing. Towards saying, you know what, 0:28:18 we’re not going to do it so that I don’t want to stick my neck out. Now this for you is incredibly 0:28:21 hard to spot because you do have to see it in the aggregate because I’m going to be able to 0:28:27 tell you a very good story on any individual decision. So the way to combat that and again, 0:28:31 get people to think about what we really care around here as forecast, not really outcomes, 0:28:36 is actually to keep a shadow book. The anti portfolio should contain basically all of your 0:28:41 near misses, but then you have to take a sample of the clear misses as well, which nobody ever looks 0:28:46 at because the near misses tend to be a little in your periphery. If they happen to be big hits. 0:28:50 So here’s the problem. So the good news is bad news. So the good news is we have actually done 0:28:54 this. And so we call it the shadow portfolio. Awesome. And the way that we do it is we make 0:28:59 the investment. We take the other equivalent deal of that vintage of that size that we almost did, 0:29:02 but didn’t do. We put that in the shadow portfolio and we’re trying to do kind of 0:29:07 apples to apples comparison. In finance theory terms, the shadow portfolio may well outperform 0:29:11 the real portfolio. And in finance terms, that’s because the shadow portfolio may be higher variance, 0:29:16 higher volatility, higher risk, and therefore higher return. Because the fear is the ones that 0:29:20 are hitting are the ones that are less, they’re less spiky, they’re less volatile, they’re less 0:29:25 risky. Right. So what’s wonderful about that, when you decide not to invest in a company, 0:29:29 you actually model out why that’s in there. It’s often, by the way, it’s often a single flaw that 0:29:34 we’ve identified. Yeah. Like it’s just like, oh, we would do it except for X. Right. Where X looks 0:29:37 like something that’s like potentially existentially bad. Right. And then that’s just 0:29:41 written in there. And so you know that. So, and then just make sure people, like those ones that 0:29:45 people are just rejecting out of hand. That’s my question. So we never do that. But let me ask 0:29:48 you how to do that though. So that’s what we don’t do. And as you’re describing, 0:29:51 I’m like, of course we should do that. I’m trying to think of how we would do that. Because the 0:29:57 problem is we reject 99 for everyone we do. Yeah. So you just literally, it’s a sample. You just 0:30:00 take a random sample. A random sample. Okay. I mean, as long as it’s just sort of being kept 0:30:06 in view a little bit, because what that does is it basically just asks as pushing against your model. 0:30:10 You’re just sort of getting people to have the right kind of discussion. 0:30:15 So all of that communicates to the people around you, like, I care about your model. 0:30:19 So let me ask you a different question on, because you talk about sort of groups of decisions. 0:30:22 So the other question, portfolios of decisions. So the other question is, early on in the firm, 0:30:25 I happen to have this discussion with a friend of mine. And he basically looked at me and he’s like, 0:30:29 you’re thinking about this all wrong. You were thinking about this as a decision. You’re thinking 0:30:32 about investor not. He said, that’s totally the wrong way to think about this. You should be thinking 0:30:38 about this is, is this one of the 20 investments of this kind, of this class size that you’re 0:30:42 going to put in your portfolio. When you’re evaluating an opportunity, 0:30:47 you are kind of definitionally talking about that opportunity. But it’s very hard to 0:30:51 abstract that question from the broader concept of a portfolio or a basket. 0:30:54 Yeah. What I would suggest there is actually just doing some time traveling that as people 0:30:58 are really down in the weeds to say, let’s imagine it’s a year from now, and what does the portfolio 0:31:04 look like of these investments of this kind. So I’m a big promoter of time traveling, of just 0:31:08 making sure that you’re always asking that question, what does this look like in a year? 0:31:11 What does this look like in five years? Are we happy? Are we sad? 0:31:15 If we imagine that we have this, what percentage of this do we think will have failed? 0:31:19 We understand that any one of these individual ones could have failed. So let’s remember that. 0:31:24 And I think that that really allows you to sort of get out of what feels like the biggest decision 0:31:29 on earth because that’s the decision you have to be making and be able to see it in the context of 0:31:35 kind of all of what’s going on. It’s fantastic. One of the most powerful things my therapist 0:31:39 gave me, and it was such a simple construct. It was sort of like doing certain things today is 0:31:45 like stealing from my future self. Oh, it blew me. It blew my mind. So beautiful. 0:31:49 It’s so beautiful. And it seems so like, you know, hokey, like personal self help you. But 0:31:55 actually I had never thought of because we were on a continuum by making discreet individuals 0:31:59 like Sonal in the past, Sonal today, Sonal this woman in the future I haven’t met yet. 0:32:06 Wow. Like the idea of stealing from her was like I… That’s really a lovely way to put it. 0:32:10 Yeah, she is. I have an amazing therapy. I like talking publicly about therapy because 0:32:15 I like to stick on it. No, I’m very, very open about like, let’s not hide it. It’s totally fine. 0:32:19 There’s no fucking reason to hide it. I totally agree. Some of the ways that we deal with this 0:32:23 is actually prospectively employing really good decision hygiene, which involves a couple of 0:32:28 things. One is some of this good time traveling that we talked about where you’re really imagining 0:32:32 what is this going to look like in the future so that that’s metabolized into the decision. 0:32:39 Two is making sure that you have pushback once there’s consensus reached. Great. Now let’s go 0:32:44 disagree with each other. Then the next thing is in terms of the consensus problem is to make 0:32:51 sure that you’re eliciting as much input not in a room with other people. So, you know, 0:32:55 when somebody has a deal they want to bring to everybody that goes to the people individually, 0:32:58 they have to sort of write their thoughts about it individually. And then it comes into the 0:33:01 room after that. As opposed to the pile on effect that just happened. As opposed to the pile on 0:33:06 effect. And that reduces the sort of effects of consensus anyway. So now this is how you then come 0:33:11 up with basically what your forecast of the future is that then is absolutely memorialized because 0:33:15 that memorializing of it acts as the prophylactic. First of all, it gives you your forecast, which 0:33:19 is what you’re trying to push against anyway. You’re trying to change the attitude to be that 0:33:24 the forecast is the outcome that we care about. And it acts as a prophylactic for those emotional 0:33:28 issues, right? Which is now you, it’s like, okay, well, we all talked about this and we had our 0:33:33 red team over here and we had a good steel man going on. And we kind of really thought about 0:33:39 why we were wrong. We questioned if somebody, you know, let’s, if somebody has the outside view, 0:33:45 what would this really look like to them by eliciting the information individually. We were 0:33:51 less likely to be in the inside view anyway. We’ve done all of that good hygiene. And then that acts 0:33:56 as a way to, to protect yourself against these kinds of issues in the first place. Again, 0:34:02 you’re going to have a bad 24 hours. I’m just like, for sure. But you can get out of it more 0:34:07 quickly, more often and get to a place where you can say, okay, moving on to the next decision, 0:34:11 how do I, how do I improve this going forward? Yeah. So building on that, but returning real 0:34:16 quick to my optimism pessimism question, if society is not going to move on these issues, 0:34:19 but we can move as individuals. So one form of optimism would be more of us can move as 0:34:23 individuals. The other form of optimism could be there will just always be room in these 0:34:26 probabilistic domains for the rare individual who’s actually able to think about this stuff 0:34:30 correctly. Like there will always be an edge. There will always be certain people who are 0:34:34 like much better at poker than everybody else. There will. Oh, I think that’s for sure. Okay. 0:34:38 Because most people simply, most people just simply can’t or won’t get there. Like a few 0:34:42 people in every domain might be able to take the time and have the discipline of willpower to kind 0:34:46 of get all the way there. But most people can’t or won’t. I think that in some, in some ways, maybe 0:34:51 that, that’s okay. Like, I mean, I sort of think about from an evolutionary standpoint, that kind 0:34:55 of thinking was selected for, for a reason, right? Like it’s better for survival, likely better for 0:34:59 happiness. You mean the conventional, conventional wisdom? Yeah. Don’t touch the burn stove twice. 0:35:03 Yeah. Or run away when you hear rustling in the leaves. Don’t sit around and say, well, it’s a 0:35:06 probabilistic world. I have to figure out how often is that a lion that’s going to come eat me? 0:35:09 Most people shouldn’t be playing in the World Series of Poker. I have people come up to me all 0:35:14 the time and be like, Oh, you know, I play poker, but it’s just a home game. You know, and I’m like, 0:35:17 what are you saying? Just a home game. Like there are different purposes to poker. Like 0:35:21 you probably have a great time doing that. And it brings you a tremendous amount of enjoyment. 0:35:24 And you don’t have an interest in becoming a professional poker player and why just be 0:35:30 proud of that. I think that that’s amazing. Like I play tennis. I’m not saying, Oh, but you know, 0:35:36 I’m just playing week, you know, I’m just playing in like USTA, like 3.5. Like I’m really happy with 0:35:42 my tennis. I think it’s great. So I think we need to remember that like people have different things 0:35:48 that they love. And this kind of thinking, I think that I would love it if we could spread it more. 0:35:52 But of course, there are going to be some people who are going to be ending up in this 0:35:56 category more than others. And that’s okay. Like not everybody has to think like this. I think 0:36:00 it’s all right. So one of the things I get asked all the time is like, well, we can’t really do 0:36:06 this because people expect us to be confident in our choices. Don’t confuse confidence and certainty. 0:36:12 So I can express a lot of uncertainty and still convey confidence. Ready? I’m weighing these 0:36:16 three options, A, B and C. I’ve really done the analysis. Here’s the analysis. And this is what 0:36:22 I think. I think that option A is going to work out 60% of the time. Option B is going to work 0:36:27 out 25% of the time. And option C is going to work out 15% of the time. So option A is the clear 0:36:33 winner. Now, I just expressed so much uncertainty in that sentence. But also a lot of confidence. 0:36:37 But also a lot of confidence. I’ve done my analysis. This is my forecast. And all that I 0:36:42 ever ask people to do when they do that is make sure that they ask a question before they bank 0:36:46 the decision, which is, is there some piece of information that I could find out that would 0:36:51 reverse my decision that would actually cause, not that would make it go from 60 to 57. I don’t 0:36:55 care modulating so much. I care that you’re going to actually change. And your point is that organizations 0:36:59 can then bake that into their process. And not just in the forecasting, but in arriving to that 0:37:04 decision. So that then the next time they get to it right or wrong, they make a better decision. 0:37:10 And if the answer is yes, go find it. Or sometimes the answer is yes, but the cost is too high. It 0:37:15 could be time. It could be opportunity costs, whatever. Exactly. So then you just don’t. And 0:37:18 then you would say, well, then you all recognize as a group, we knew that if we found this out, 0:37:22 it would change our decision. But we’ve agreed that it would, the cost was too high. And so we 0:37:25 didn’t. So then if it reveals itself afterwards, you’re not sad. Well, you’ve talked a lot about 0:37:29 how people should use confidence intervals and communicating, which I love because we’re both 0:37:37 ex-PhD psychology people, neither are finished. So I love that idea. One thing that I struggle with, 0:37:40 though, is again, in the organizational context, like if you’re trying to translate this to a 0:37:46 big group of people, not just one-on-one or small group decisions, how do you communicate a confidence 0:37:52 interval and all the variables in it in an efficient kind of compressed way? Like honestly, 0:37:57 part of communication and organizations is emails and quick decisions. And yes, you can have all 0:38:03 the process behind the outcome. But how do you then convey that even though the people were not 0:38:08 part of that room of that discussion? I think that there’s a simpler way to express uncertainty, 0:38:12 which is using percentages. Now, obviously, sometimes you can only come up with a range. 0:38:19 But for example, if I’m talking to my editor, and this is very quick in an email, I’ll say, 0:38:24 you’ll have the draft by Friday, 83% of the time. By Monday, you’ll have it 97% of the time. 0:38:27 Those are inclusive, right? That’s another way of doing a confidence interval, but without 0:38:32 making it so wonky. Without making it so wonky. So I’m just letting her know, most of the time, 0:38:37 you’re going to get it on Friday, but I’m building, like my kid gets sick or I have trouble with a 0:38:42 particular section of the draft or whatever it is, and I set the expectations for that way. 0:38:45 That’s fantastic. I mean, we’ve been trying to do forecasting even for like timelines for 0:38:49 podcasts, editing and episodes. And I feel frustrated because I have like a set of frameworks, 0:38:55 like if there’s accents, if there’s more than two voices, if there’s, you know, a complexing, 0:38:59 room tone, like interaction, feedback, sound effects. I know all the factors that can go into 0:39:05 my model, but I don’t know how to put a confidence interval in our pipeline spreadsheet for, you 0:39:09 know, all the content that’s coming out. Yeah. So one way to do it is think about what’s the range, 0:39:13 what’s the earliest that I could get it, and you put a percentage on that. And then you think about 0:39:17 the latest day, they’re going to get it. And you put a percentage on that. And so now, 0:39:23 what’s wonderful about that is that it’s a few things. One is I’ve set the expectations properly 0:39:28 now so that I’m not getting, you know, yell that on Friday, like where the hell’s the draft. 0:39:32 Exactly. And I think that, and a lot of what happens is that because we’re sort of, we think 0:39:37 that we have to give a certain answer. It ends up, boy, who cried wolf, right? So that if I’m 0:39:44 telling her, I’m going to get it on Friday and, you know, 25% of the time, 25% of the time I’m 0:39:50 late, she just starts to not put much stock in what I’ve said anyway. So that’s number one. 0:39:54 Number two is what happens is that you really kind of infect other people with this in a good 0:39:59 way, where you get them, it just moves them off of that black and white thinking. So like, 0:40:02 I love that. One of the things that I love thinking about, and this is the difference 0:40:09 between a deadline or kind of giving this range, is that I think that we ask ourselves, 0:40:16 am I sure? And other people, are you sure way too often that it’s a terrible question to ask 0:40:20 somebody because the only answer is yes or no. So what should we be asking? How sure are you? 0:40:25 How sure are you? I have a quick question for you on this because earlier you mentioned uncertainty. 0:40:30 How do you as an organization build that uncertainty in by default? So first of all, 0:40:34 we obviously talked a little bit about time traveling and the usefulness of time traveling. 0:40:39 So one thing that I like to think about is not overvalue the decision that’s right at hand, 0:40:45 the things that are right sitting in front of us. So you can kind of think about it like, 0:40:50 how are you going to figure out the best path? As you think about what your goals are and obviously 0:40:54 the goal that you want to reach is going to sort of define for you what the best path is. 0:40:58 If you’re standing at the bottom of a mountain that you want to summit, let’s call the summit your 0:41:02 goal, all you can really see is the base of the mountain. So as you’re doing your planning, 0:41:06 you’re really worried about how do I get the next little bit, right? How do I start? 0:41:10 But if you’re at the top of the mountain having a tanger goal, now you can look at the whole 0:41:14 landscape. You get this beautiful view of the whole landscape and now you can really see what 0:41:18 the best path looks like. And so we want to do this not just physically like standing up on a 0:41:23 mountain, but we want to figure out a cognitive way to get there. And that’s to do this really good 0:41:28 time traveling. And you do this through back casting and premortem. And now let’s look backwards 0:41:33 instead of forwards to try to figure out, this is now the headline. Let me think about why that 0:41:37 happened. So you could think about this like as a simple like weight loss goal. I want to lose a 0:41:41 certain amount of weight within the next six months. It’s the end of the six months. I’ve lost 0:41:47 that weight. What happened? You know, I went to the gym. I avoided bread. I didn’t eat any sweets. 0:41:53 I made sure that, you know, whatever. So you now have this list. Then in pairing with that, 0:41:59 you want to do a premortem, which is I didn’t get to the top of the mountain. I failed to lose 0:42:03 the weight. I failed to do whatever it is. And then all the things you can do to counter program 0:42:07 against that. Exactly. Because that’s going to reveal really different things. It’s going to reveal 0:42:13 some things that are just sort of luck, right? Let me think, can I do something to reduce the 0:42:17 influence of luck there? Then there’s going to be some things that have to do with your 0:42:22 decisions. Like I went into the break room every day and there were donuts there. And so I couldn’t 0:42:26 resist them. So now you can think about how do I counter that, right? How can I bring other people 0:42:30 into the process and that kind of thing? And then there’s stuff that’s just, you can figure out, 0:42:33 it’s just out of your control. It turned out out of slow metabolism. And now what happens is that 0:42:36 you’re just much less reactive and you’re much more nimble because you’ve gotten a whole view of 0:42:40 the landscape and you’ve gotten a view of the good part of the landscape and the bad part of the 0:42:46 landscape. But I’m sure as he told you, people are very low to do these premortems because I think 0:42:52 that the imagining of failure feels so much like failure that people are like, no, and you should 0:42:56 posit, you know, positive visualization. I mean, even in brainstorming meetings, everyone’s like, 0:43:00 don’t dump on an idea. But the exact point is you have to dump on an idea and kill the winnowing 0:43:06 of options. No. As part of the process, you should be then premorteming it. Exactly. There’s 0:43:11 wonderful research by Gabrielle Adinchin that I really recommend that people see that the references 0:43:18 are in my book. In across domains, what she’s found is that when people do this sort of positive 0:43:22 fantasizing, the chances that they actually complete the goal are just lower than if people 0:43:27 do this negative fantasizing. And then there’s research that shows that when people do this 0:43:32 time travel and this backwards thinking that increases identifying reasons for success or 0:43:39 failure by about 30%, you’re just more likely to see what’s in your way. So like, for example, 0:43:44 she did like one of the simple studies was she asked people who were in college, 0:43:49 you know, who do you have a crush on that you haven’t talked to yet? She had one group who, 0:43:53 you know, it was all positive fantasies. So like, oh, I’m going to meet them and I’m going to ask 0:43:56 them out on a date and it’s going to be great and then we’re going to live happily ever after and 0:44:01 whatever. And then she had another group that engaged in negative fantasizing. What if I asked 0:44:06 them out and they say no? Like they said no and I was really embarrassed and so on and so forth. 0:44:12 And then she revisited them like four months later to see which group had actually gone out on a date 0:44:16 with the person that they had a crush on and the ones that did the negative fantasizing were much 0:44:20 more likely to have gone out on the date. It’s fantastic. Yeah. So one of the things that I 0:44:25 say is like, look, when we’re in teams to your point, we tend to sort of view people as naysayers, 0:44:32 right? But we don’t want to think of them as downers. So I suggest divide those up into two 0:44:37 processes. Have the group individually do a back cast, have the group individually write a narrative 0:44:42 about a pre-mortem. And what that does is when you’re now doing a pre-mortem, it changes the 0:44:47 rules of the game where being a good team player is now actually identifying the ways that you fail. 0:44:51 I love what you said because it’s like having two modes as a way of getting into these two 0:44:55 mindsets. Right. Where you’re not stopping people from feeling like they’re a team player. And I 0:44:59 think that that’s the issue. As you said, it’s like, don’t sit there and like, you know, crap on 0:45:04 my goal. Well, because what are they really saying? You’re not being a team player. So change the 0:45:09 rules of the game. You had this line in your book about how regret is an unproductive. The issue is 0:45:14 that it comes after the fact, not before. So the one thing that I don’t want people to do is think 0:45:18 about how they feel right after the outcome. Because I think that then you’re going to overweight 0:45:25 regret. So you want to think about regret before you make the decision. You have to get it within 0:45:29 the right timeframe. What we want to do instead is write in the moment of the outcome when you’re 0:45:34 feeling really sad. You can stop and say, am I going to care about this in a year? Think about 0:45:39 yourself as a happiness stock. And so if we can sort of get that more 10,000 foot view on our own 0:45:45 happiness and we think about ourselves as we’re investing in our own stock, our own happiness 0:45:50 stock, we can get to that regret question a lot better. You don’t need to improve that much 0:45:57 to get really big dividends. You make thousands of decisions a day. If you can get a little better 0:46:04 at this stuff, if you can just, you know, de-bias a little bit, think more probabilistically, 0:46:10 really sort of wrap your arms around uncertainty to free yourself up from sort of the emotional 0:46:15 impact of outcomes. A little bit is going to have such a huge effect on your future decision making. 0:46:19 Well, that’s amazing, Annie. Thank you so much for joining the A6NZ podcast. 0:46:21 -Thank you very much. -Yes, thank you.
with @annieduke, @pmarca, and @smc90
Every organization, whether small or big, early or late stage — and every individual, whether for themselves or others — makes countless decisions every day, under conditions of uncertainty. The question is, are we allowing that uncertainty to bubble to the surface, and if so, how much and when? Where does consensus, transparency, forecasting, backcasting, pre-mortems, and heck, even regret, usefully come in?Going beyond the typical discussion of focusing on process vs. outcomes and probabilistic thinking, this episode of the a16z Podcast features Thinking in Bets author Annie Duke — one of the top poker players in the world (and World Series of Poker champ), former psychology PhD, and founder of national decision education movement How I Decide — in conversation with Marc Andreessen and Sonal Chokshi. The episode covers everything from the role of narrative — hagiography or takedown? — to fighting (or embracing) evolution. How do we go from the bottom of the summit to the top of the summit to the entire landscape… and up, down, and opposite?The first step to understanding what really slows innovation down is understanding good decision-making — because we have conflicting interests, and are sometimes even competing against future versions of ourselves (or of our organizations). And there’s a set of possible futures that result from not making a decision as well. So why feel both pessimistic AND optimistic about all this??
0:00:05 The content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business 0:00:10 tax or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed 0:00:14 at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. 0:00:19 For more details, please see A16Z.com/disclosures. 0:00:22 Welcome to the A16Z YouTube channel. 0:00:25 Today I’m here with Olaf from PolyGener, good friend of Olaf. 0:00:31 You’re both longtime cryptocurrency enthusiasts, maybe if you don’t mind, we’ll just go back 0:00:32 a little bit. 0:00:36 You were employee one at Coinbase back in what year was that? 0:00:37 2013. 0:00:38 Okay. 0:00:39 And I guess you got interested in crypto before that? 0:00:40 Yeah. 0:00:44 So I was in college when I got into Bitcoin and I wrote my undergraduate thesis on Bitcoin 0:00:45 in 2011. 0:00:48 And what first got you excited about it? 0:00:53 So when I first read about it, I thought there’s no way this is possible to have a native 0:00:56 internet money that isn’t controlled by any sort of central party. 0:00:58 So I found it fascinating on its face. 0:00:59 It’s just sort of technically– 0:01:00 Yeah. 0:01:06 But then once I dug into it, I kind of thought about the nth order implications and you realize 0:01:08 this is a huge deal. 0:01:12 It means that for the first time, you can have digital scarcity on the internet. 0:01:17 And of course, you could move to a global unified financial and monetary system that’s 0:01:23 outside the scope of any sort of sovereign state, political control, and is really opt 0:01:24 in by all the users. 0:01:28 So the general idea was just really fascinating to me. 0:01:32 And I really did right away sort of buy as much Bitcoin as I could. 0:01:36 But that was back when Bitcoin was kind of the dominant idea and everyone thought the 0:01:40 kind of main thing you could do with this kind of new architecture was digital money. 0:01:45 Since then, the kind of possibility space, at least to me, feels like it’s expanded dramatically. 0:01:46 Yes, it has. 0:01:52 And so to me, the big moment was when Ethereum launched. 0:01:58 For me, I started seeing– a big breakthrough in my head was when I realized that Ethereum 0:02:03 wallets were actually more like browsers than bank accounts. 0:02:07 And I started seeing some stuff get built on Ethereum that people in Bitcoin had tried 0:02:08 to do for a long time. 0:02:12 In Bitcoin, you only have one asset, which is Bitcoins. 0:02:15 People had tried to build other sorts of tokens or assets that would settle to the Bitcoin 0:02:16 blockchain. 0:02:19 And there were projects like Mastercoin, Counterparty– 0:02:20 We funded this project Lighthouse. 0:02:21 We helped– 0:02:22 Oh, yeah. 0:02:24 And that was basically decentralized crowdfunding. 0:02:25 Yeah. 0:02:26 There was crowdfunding on Bitcoin. 0:02:27 It was just very, very difficult. 0:02:37 I mean, Bitcoin has decided, perhaps correctly, to trade off the expressiveness of the programming 0:02:39 language for increased security. 0:02:43 So they have a very weak programming language– very deliberate, though– which provides, 0:02:48 I think, perhaps better security and kind of– it’s more conservative kind of development 0:02:49 plot path. 0:02:51 So as a result, it’s very hard to build crowdfunding. 0:02:56 And I remember when Ethereum came out, it was literally one of the 20 line pieces of 0:02:57 code on the home page with that. 0:03:02 And this is one of the things I think people really underestimate how much the developer 0:03:04 abstraction matters. 0:03:09 So it took Mike Hearn, something like eight months to build Lighthouse using Bitcoin scripting, 0:03:15 the Ethereum ERC20 system– you and I could practically do this on our cell phones now. 0:03:21 And that layer of abstraction opens up use cases that I think people underestimate how 0:03:22 big a deal it is. 0:03:24 Well, it’s the same with all computing. 0:03:30 You could have done– there were mobile phones that had GPS and cell phone connectivity 0:03:32 pre-iPhone. 0:03:35 But the iPhone made it so the app developer didn’t have to understand any of that stuff 0:03:36 worked. 0:03:41 You could focus on recruiting drivers and building a beautiful UI. 0:03:44 And to me, obviously, the iPhone– there’s a bunch of great things about the iPhone and 0:03:45 the Android and what made smart phones take off. 0:03:50 But a lot of it was that they figured out the right abstraction layer for the developers 0:03:56 so that you could get a million apps and a whole bunch of creativity that happened as 0:03:57 a result of that. 0:04:02 And I actually think we’re going to see the next wave of that now with WebAssembly or 0:04:08 Wasm because there have been problems with the Ethereum solidity language, huge security 0:04:09 problems. 0:04:13 And there’s not actually as much expressivity as people think there is. 0:04:16 It’s still limited to solidity. 0:04:20 Even one other language was basically found to be totally insecure. 0:04:29 So I think that these VM systems moving towards a Wasm compiler– and this is like Polkadot, 0:04:34 DFINITY, eWasm, so like Ethereum 2– I think it’s a really big deal. 0:04:37 So just to explain to people– so Bitcoin comes up with this new kind of architecture 0:04:42 that I think of as– I think it’s, frankly, mischaracterized today as ledger. 0:04:43 I think of it as a computing platform. 0:04:45 So what seems to be a computer and a ledger? 0:04:46 Ledger is more like a hard drive. 0:04:48 A computer is a hard drive plus a processor. 0:04:50 And Bitcoin has a processor. 0:04:54 It’s just a processor that has a limited– but deliberately limited in the applications 0:04:55 it can run. 0:05:00 And the main application it runs is the thing that moves Bitcoins around, right? 0:05:02 Ethereum says, hey, let’s take that processor and let’s expand it a lot. 0:05:06 But as you’re saying it does, they developed their own programming language solidity, which 0:05:10 is kind of JavaScript-like, but it’s kind of eccentric. 0:05:16 And just so people know, eWasm, so that’s WebAssembly, which is now baked into every browser. 0:05:23 And so it’s sort of– there are now billions of computers that run eWasm natively. 0:05:27 And it will soon become– there already is, and it’s going to continue to become the most 0:05:31 dominant kind of runtime environment for software in the world. 0:05:34 And what that means is now that all the blockchains are supporting eWasm, that means that all 0:05:40 of these compilers that are built from other programming languages, Python, Rust, whatever, 0:05:44 if you’re a favorite language, you already have– you get the piggyback off of all of 0:05:47 the tooling that’s been built over the last 20 years to the other programming languages. 0:05:52 So you make it a much more kind of familiar experience to developers. 0:05:56 And so instead of needing to learn solidity, which is, again, this custom language, it’s 0:06:02 a pretty new language, the scheme of things, you can use your off-the-shelf favorite programming 0:06:03 language. 0:06:06 To me, this is a similar step function that we saw from Bitcoin scripting. 0:06:08 Well, see, it’s not just the programming language then. 0:06:11 It’s also like– it’s like the great thing about Python is not just like there’s 10,000 0:06:13 GitHub projects, or I mean, there’s formal verification. 0:06:17 So just as an example, why does it take a long time to release an Ethereum project today? 0:06:21 I think at least half the development time probably is security audits, right? 0:06:25 And that’s because you’ve got this really kind of this new programming language, people 0:06:29 don’t fully understand it, there aren’t these kind of tools around it, and suddenly you 0:06:34 switch to something like Python, and you’ve got just like 20 years of whatever, 15 years 0:06:39 of incredible tools that are built around that environment. 0:06:40 Yeah, that’s exactly right. 0:06:48 And so to me, this is one way that we’re building useful abstractions to make this even easier 0:06:51 to ship like end user applications. 0:06:52 Yeah. 0:06:55 Yeah, I mean, the big thing’s happening now, so I guess kind of jumping forward. 0:06:58 So I think you and I probably see it similarly, there was kind of the first era, which was 0:07:01 Bitcoin, but it was sort of the main– the only thing really in that first era, one of 0:07:02 the only things. 0:07:06 Then there’s sort of the Ethereum era, which sort of takes this idea of digital money and 0:07:09 expands it to blockchain computers, right? 0:07:16 And now I think what we’re seeing over the next 12 months or so, maybe 12 to 24 months, 0:07:18 is the kind of the wave three happening, right? 0:07:24 Which is taking the ideas of Ethereum, upgrading the developer experience like you just discussed, 0:07:29 very importantly upgrading the scalability, which means multiple things, it means more. 0:07:34 It basically means what we call in traditional venture capital, scale out, not scale up. 0:07:38 So instead of getting scaled by adding more, a beefier computer, you can get scaled by 0:07:40 adding more computers to the network, right? 0:07:43 Which lets you kind of expand linearly with the demand. 0:07:47 And that requires what’s known as sharding or some sort of parallelism that lets you 0:07:48 run. 0:07:51 And that’s what a lot of these new projects, or they’re doing better developer experience 0:07:56 and things like WASM and just all the other tooling around it, they’re building parallelism 0:08:01 in from the start, right, as opposed to having to upgrade later. 0:08:04 And what else? 0:08:08 I think a third one for me is they’re often building the ability to upgrade the protocol 0:08:09 into the protocol. 0:08:10 Yep. 0:08:11 Yep. 0:08:13 So the kind of governance of the protocol itself and also the governance of the smart contracts 0:08:14 themselves. 0:08:15 Yes, exactly. 0:08:22 So to me, Bitcoin and Ethereum, and maybe very much intentionally, have not had formal 0:08:25 systems to upgrade themselves. 0:08:29 And that’s because it does open up a potential security threat to the system. 0:08:32 If it can upgrade, then who controls that upgrade process? 0:08:37 But if you can adequately design an upgrade process that is controlled by the same people 0:08:43 that already control the consensus layer, you know, it’s an equivalent threat as baking 0:08:46 a bad block or something like that. 0:08:51 So to me, you know, the ability to say, actually, there’s a better system, let’s upgrade and 0:08:55 move to that system in a coordinated manner. 0:08:56 You know, I think that’s really exciting. 0:09:02 That’s the way I think of that, is there’s always a trade-off between the security of 0:09:08 the system and the very promise of a blockchain computer to me is that it’s making a commitment 0:09:12 that the code will continue to run as designed, there’s sort of game theoretic guarantees. 0:09:15 And you want to, of course, maintaining that commitment is very, very important. 0:09:16 Yep. 0:09:22 But there’s a trade-off because software also, as we know from, you know, decades of experience, 0:09:29 A, has bugs that needs to be fixed, and B, benefits from, you know, from sort of iterative 0:09:30 upgrade cycles, right? 0:09:31 Yeah. 0:09:32 And so how do you balance those two things? 0:09:37 And so Bitcoin Ethereum kind of took the extreme kind of conservative route, which said the 0:09:40 only way to upgrade is to kind of get a whole bunch of people to just literally upgrade their 0:09:44 software simultaneously, which led to all these kind of offline things, including sort of 0:09:49 famously the Bitcoin Civil War and then the Ethereum fork, which was very contentious. 0:09:52 And so they were kind of built in a way to be very conservative with their governance 0:09:53 methods. 0:09:54 Exactly. 0:09:55 Yep. 0:09:56 And so how do you find the right balance? 0:10:03 And the people are experimenting and trying new systems to get a better balance. 0:10:09 So I think a big part of this is there are actors in the Bitcoin and Ethereum and other 0:10:16 crypto systems that are part of what defines like the reality of those systems. 0:10:21 And so you could call these node operators in Bitcoin, miners obviously have a role to 0:10:22 play in it. 0:10:26 In proof of stake protocols, it’s very much the token holders who are staking. 0:10:29 And we’ve seen really, really strong participation. 0:10:33 So in a lot of these delegated proof of stake protocols, you see, you know, 70, 80 percent 0:10:36 of token holders participating in consensus. 0:10:39 So they’re already defining what is the latest block in the blockchain. 0:10:43 They’re already defining the rules of that computer. 0:10:49 So in my mind, you know, how can we say we’re going to use a decentralized mechanism to 0:10:55 come to consensus about the computer state, but we’re going to also say it’s impossible 0:10:58 to come to a decision about how to change the rules of the computer. 0:11:02 So I’m very skeptical that we can’t achieve very secure on-chain governance. 0:11:04 I think we can. 0:11:09 And to me, it’s a very big deal because if you get governance right, in theory, everything 0:11:11 else should be a sort of waterfall down from that. 0:11:16 And you can do very exciting things that I think we haven’t done. 0:11:21 You know, I think a big problem for both Bitcoin and Ethereum has been funding of core protocol 0:11:22 development. 0:11:24 So application developers have found all sorts of ways to monetize. 0:11:28 You can go raise a VC round, you can do a token sale, you know, there’s lots of money 0:11:32 sloshing around in general if you’re building on top of these protocols. 0:11:36 But Ethereum has this weird problem where there’s probably 100x the number of developers 0:11:40 building apps on top as there are building core protocol stuff for Ethereum. 0:11:41 And so to me… 0:11:43 Well, that has to do with the history of Ethereum, right? 0:11:48 So there was a foundation which has a certain amount of money, but there was never kind 0:11:50 of a structure set up. 0:11:51 Yeah, there’s no structure. 0:11:52 And in reality… 0:11:54 Set up to continuously fund the development. 0:11:59 And in reality, there needs to be some sort of, basically like a tax system, where if 0:12:02 I contribute to the core protocol and create all of this value… 0:12:05 Well, it’s like what Zcash does, what they have inflation baked into the protocol and 0:12:07 some portion of that goes through… 0:12:13 Which is kind of crude, because their system is, you know, it’s designed around one team. 0:12:17 I don’t think it’s designed to last 100 years and its current implementation. 0:12:19 In their defense, I don’t think they do either. 0:12:20 Yeah, yeah. 0:12:23 I mean, I think that they think of it as a MVP to a better system. 0:12:24 Yeah, to a better system, yeah. 0:12:30 And so in my mind, the ability for developers to contribute new protocol suggestions and 0:12:33 basically add a build to them. 0:12:37 So then I could say, if this gets merged in and this actually becomes the new version 0:12:41 of the protocol, me and my development team are actually going to inflate a certain number 0:12:42 of coins. 0:12:43 They’re just going to be created. 0:12:46 It’s like dilution, basically, for the existing holders, and they’re going to be rewarded 0:12:47 to us. 0:12:51 And because this is a long-term iterative game between all the token holders and the developers 0:12:54 who are going to contribute code to the protocol, it’s actually in the token holder’s best 0:13:01 interest to pay them and say, “Okay, we’re going to pay you guys what I accept as an 0:13:02 Ethereum holder.” 0:13:04 Like a 1% dilution to ship Ethereum 2? 0:13:06 Absolutely, right? 0:13:07 It’s a no-brainer too. 0:13:13 And so if you could create 1% of the Ethereum tokens and grant those to the development 0:13:17 team, today that’s like, what, $200 million? 0:13:18 It’s a large amount. 0:13:23 What do you say to the skeptics who think that proof-of-stake governance will devolve 0:13:29 into either like a blue talkercy on one hand or the big investors or whatever, whatever 0:13:35 type of talkercy, kind of control for their own interests, or alternatively are vulnerable 0:13:38 to bribery attacks and other kinds of… 0:13:44 Yeah, so I just think that we have relatively at scale proof-of-stake systems today. 0:13:47 This argument seemed better 12 months ago before Tezos and Cosmos. 0:13:48 Yeah, that’s my thing. 0:13:51 It’s like, you see Tezos and Cosmos, it’s like, if you can get away with these attacks, 0:13:54 there are $100 million bounties to go through them. 0:13:55 The biggest bug bounties? 0:13:58 Yeah, I’m a big believer in economic incentives for these bug bounties. 0:14:03 I mean, if you can attack Tezos and break consensus and get bad blocks through it… 0:14:06 I haven’t followed the Tezos stuff, I’m sure there are people trying to attack it. 0:14:08 Oh, I’m sure there are. 0:14:11 And I’m just like there’s people trying to attack Bitcoin all the time, right? 0:14:13 And these are highly adversarial environments. 0:14:18 But in my view, proof-of-stake to me has a few features that I really like about it. 0:14:25 So one, you have node operator and miner type participants and token holders. 0:14:30 And in the Bitcoin system, we’ve actually seen cases where these parties don’t have 0:14:37 the best interests in mind, like there’s not a perfect overlap for their interests. 0:14:40 And so in a way, you could argue there’s like a check and balance or something like that. 0:14:43 But in a system like Tezos or Cosmos, those are the same people, right? 0:14:45 So the token holders are the validators. 0:14:49 And I think that just means in general, there’s going to be a better alignment of interests 0:14:53 between the block producers and the token holders. 0:14:59 The second thing is that if you attack a proof-of-stake network, mitigation of the attack after it 0:15:01 happens is significantly easier. 0:15:07 So if you come in with 51% of the coins, and in most proof-of-stake, it’s actually 34% 0:15:11 of the coins is enough to attack, and you start doing bad things, right? 0:15:14 Bad blocks and stuff like that. 0:15:18 The minority people here can really just hard fork the chain and delete your coins and keep 0:15:19 going. 0:15:26 However, the reason they can do that is because that attacker’s validation was intra-protocols, 0:15:30 like within the protocol, so you can delete their stuff and move forward. 0:15:36 If you do that with hardware and proof-of-work systems, you actually have to change the hashing 0:15:40 algorithm for the entire proof-of-work chain and burn everything to the ground, like for 0:15:42 the good guys and the bad guys. 0:15:46 Because you have to fork so that the hardware is now bad for everyone. 0:15:50 And so you have to basically punish the good guys and the bad guys to mitigate a proof-of-work 0:15:51 system. 0:15:54 So in a proof-of-work system, summarize that, in a proof-of-work system, the worst-case 0:15:57 scenario is your attack doesn’t work. 0:16:01 And a proof-of-stake system, the worst-case scenario is you lose all of your– not only 0:16:04 your attack doesn’t work, but you also lose your entire life savings in that protocol. 0:16:05 Yes, exactly. 0:16:08 So it’s a much more punitive measure. 0:16:13 Well, it’s disproportionately punitive to the bad guy in proof-of-stake. 0:16:17 By the way, and so I would add also the other thing about proof– I mean, there’s also the 0:16:18 energy use. 0:16:19 Oh, well, yeah. 0:16:20 Yeah. 0:16:21 It doesn’t– Bitcoin mining destroys all this– waste all this energy. 0:16:22 It deliberately does. 0:16:23 But it’s still bad. 0:16:27 Also, very– for me, it’s a critical thing is– you’re talking about developer experience 0:16:29 and user experience. 0:16:34 You just simply can’t have sub-second transaction finality in a proof-of-work system. 0:16:38 So Bitcoin, you really need to wait– each block is 10 minutes, and it has to do with 0:16:43 the coordination among the network and the network propagation latency and things. 0:16:44 But also, it’s a probabilistic method. 0:16:47 So you really have to wait probably 60 minutes, if not longer. 0:16:50 And from a user experience point of view, if I send you– and it’s the same with the 0:16:51 theorem today, it’s proof-of-work. 0:16:55 And you go, if you download Quid, Miss Wallet, and you try to use some of these apps, there’s 0:17:00 a lot of really cool apps as early, but you’ve got to wait 30 seconds after you click a button. 0:17:02 That’s not a modern user experience. 0:17:05 And the only way we’re going to get to modern user experience is through these proof-of-stake 0:17:06 systems. 0:17:09 They have all these different methods that get much faster transactions. 0:17:11 So just, I think, a whole bunch of reasons why. 0:17:15 For example, with sharding, no one that I’ve ever heard of knows how to do sharding in 0:17:16 proof-of-work. 0:17:20 So a pairless of scaling, all these other things we’re talking about require a mistake. 0:17:24 There’s a reason that every– I think 2017 was a major year of fundraising, and 2019 0:17:25 is a major year of launches. 0:17:30 And there’s a reason that every blockchain that’s launching today is mostly using proof-of-stake. 0:17:32 I mean, with the exception of Grin and things like this, right? 0:17:33 Yeah. 0:17:38 But those are all just simple transactional– they don’t have smart contracts, they don’t 0:17:41 have really scaling solutions. 0:17:47 Evolution is not– is very much focused on private payments and scalable payments. 0:17:52 It’s not trying to open up a suite of new applications that were not possible with bolder protocols. 0:17:54 Which to me is the really exciting thing. 0:17:59 What is possible that we haven’t seen happening today? 0:18:03 Because even the Ethereum developers, when they shipped the protocol in 2015, I don’t 0:18:07 think any of them could have conceived of the whole ICO wave. 0:18:14 And that was like 18 months away, and it was still hard to see that that was coming. 0:18:17 To me, this is what makes computing interesting, right? 0:18:18 Is there’s this interplay. 0:18:23 If you go look at the PC, the internet, smartphones, I think we’re going to see– it’s a crypto, 0:18:27 I think we’re going to see it with VR in a couple– this year, in a couple years. 0:18:30 There’s this interplay where you get– the platforms get better. 0:18:32 In this case, we’re talking about Layer 1 smart contract platforms, right? 0:18:36 Which are the ones we’re talking about that are coming out over the next 12 to 18 months. 0:18:40 And those are kind of the equivalent of the Apple II or the iPhone or whatever in this 0:18:41 world. 0:18:42 To me, that’s cool. 0:18:43 That’s great. 0:18:44 And we’re into that, right? 0:18:47 But the really cool part is all of the crazy stuff that people– no one imagined– it’s 0:18:50 really funny if you go back and look at the early Apple II ads. 0:18:53 So Apple II came out in ’77, PCs didn’t really take off for six years. 0:18:56 And for those six-year peer people, we’re trying to figure out what do you do with these 0:18:57 things. 0:18:58 And all the old ads are really funny. 0:19:01 They always have people at the kitchen table doing their recipes, and computer companies 0:19:02 didn’t really know. 0:19:05 But then the developers came along and invented word processing spreadsheets. 0:19:06 All this other cool stuff. 0:19:09 And so that to me is what’s really– like, right now, we’re seeing a little bit on the 0:19:10 application side. 0:19:14 But it’s limited because the platforms, the Layer 1 smart contract platforms, just aren’t 0:19:15 there. 0:19:16 Right? 0:19:17 So we can’t– I mean, we’re seeing cool stuff. 0:19:21 We’ll talk about it today, like in DeFi, for example, in terms of finance, where maybe 0:19:24 the performance parameters are looser and things. 0:19:26 They don’t need the kind of performance you need for other things. 0:19:30 But what’s really going to get exciting to me is that period of, like, hopefully a year 0:19:34 or two from now when we’ve got a great platform, and then we just see this explosion of creativity. 0:19:38 Yeah, well, and the big thing is people need to untether themselves from thinking only 0:19:42 in terms of efficiency improvements of existing processes. 0:19:46 So like early use cases for Bitcoin that people talked about a lot is basically cost savings 0:19:52 of remittance or cost savings of micropayments or something like that. 0:19:57 But that’s really looking at existing use cases and applications that– like a recipe 0:19:59 book and saying, oh, let’s put this on the computer. 0:20:01 That’s how it always happens, by the way. 0:20:04 Like, you look at early web, and they took magazines, or they put brochures, and they 0:20:05 put them on the web. 0:20:06 But that’s just how people think. 0:20:09 And then it took people 10 years to realize, wait, this is a two-way medium. 0:20:10 Yeah, there’s all these– 0:20:12 You could generate a content in YouTube and Facebook. 0:20:16 So what I really care about are what are going to be the native apps that are only possible 0:20:17 with blockchains. 0:20:23 And also, the other thing is people are very caught on the Web2 model. 0:20:27 People are talking about daily active users, but of financial products. 0:20:28 It’s just an odd thing. 0:20:31 They’re like, are you a daily active user of your mortgage? 0:20:32 Yeah. 0:20:33 Right? 0:20:34 It’s like the wrong framework. 0:20:35 It’s just the wrong question. 0:20:36 Right? 0:20:37 But to me, I think we need to– 0:20:42 Well, the reason everyone was so focused on DAUs for Web2 was because the main business 0:20:46 model was advertising, and that was proven– so it was a proxy for what the business model 0:20:47 was. 0:20:50 But ultimately, if you have a business model that is not dependent on DAUs, that’s not 0:20:51 your main metric. 0:20:52 Yeah, exactly. 0:20:59 To me, I just think we’re going to see this iteration and explosion of basically financial 0:21:03 services and finance, but at the speed of open source software development, which is 0:21:04 really, really fast. 0:21:10 And it’s highly iterative, and it’s like a big shared open code repository that people 0:21:11 are building on. 0:21:15 So to me, the innovation here is going to be very, very fast. 0:21:18 I mean, it already has been, but it will continue to be. 0:21:25 And the thing I look forward to is what’s going to happen that is sort of unimaginable 0:21:30 today, and sort of by definition wasn’t possible with the old architecture. 0:21:34 I think, to me, one of the– there are many kind of cool sci-fi things in crypto. 0:21:41 I think one of the coolest things is the idea of a kind of code software that has agency 0:21:43 or sort of autonomous software. 0:21:49 So you think about maker today or compound, and this idea that the code itself actually 0:21:54 controls money and has business processes and logic, and it’s not the code that’s run 0:21:59 by– it’s not like code– Google code controls stuff, too, or PayPal does, but it’s not really 0:22:00 the code that does it. 0:22:04 They’re just the instruments through which the management of that company executes their 0:22:05 will. 0:22:09 Here, the code itself actually is autonomous and is no longer controlled. 0:22:14 This is the sort of idea, to me, the key idea of a blockchain is that the code continues 0:22:19 to run as designed, and it has sort of game theoretic guarantees that it will. 0:22:24 And that gives code this autonomous– I use autonomous not in the sense of AI autonomous, 0:22:28 but in the sense of having agency and self-control and runs forever. 0:22:33 As we speak right now, these contracts on Ethereum are running and doing things and distributing 0:22:36 money or collecting money or running other business logic. 0:22:42 A rough but potentially useful analogy is thinking about the corporate structure. 0:22:46 So the idea of a corporation, in theory, is that it kind of runs forever. 0:22:50 And management can turn over, and there’s different types of capital formation to keep 0:22:52 it funding and everything. 0:22:57 And it’s all through legal contracts in certain regions, right? 0:23:01 So the corporation, as a legal entity, is always sort of registered with the state in 0:23:06 a specific geographic region, and it’s all papered through legal contracts. 0:23:11 But could a system like that that coordinates capital from many, many different people and 0:23:16 outlives any of the individual people, could that move to a pure software system, using, 0:23:19 as you said, sort of autonomous software? 0:23:23 Instead of these legal contracts that are based in specific geographic regions, can 0:23:26 it be sort of sovereign to the internet? 0:23:32 These are the types of ideas that– it sounds crazy today, but when you think about this 0:23:38 sort of history of the corporation and the liquid stock markets that we have, all these 0:23:42 concepts that we think of as– they’ve been around forever, they’re really only about 0:23:44 100 years old or something like that. 0:23:47 To me, then, an obvious question is, why would you want that? 0:23:51 And to me, the answers are– one is very important you mentioned before is open source, the fact 0:23:56 that all of these things we’re discussing, they’re all available by definition. 0:23:58 They have to be, if they’re on Ethereum, they have to be open. 0:24:01 You can go read the GitHub code, if you can’t do it yourself, you can have somebody else 0:24:03 do it, so it’s completely open. 0:24:09 But then another very important feature is this, what we call compositionality or composability, 0:24:14 is the idea that you can have one organization here and I can take that and I can build another 0:24:17 one on top of it that references it. 0:24:20 And I know I can do– and that’s– the only reason I can do that is a couple of things. 0:24:23 One is it software that you can actually call the functions and things like that, and it’s 0:24:25 open source and so I can audit it and trust it. 0:24:30 But the third thing is because the code itself sort of exists on its own, I know I can build 0:24:33 on top of it and the code will continue to operate that way, and there won’t be some 0:24:38 whimsical change in business strategy by the owners of the code, right? 0:24:39 Exactly. 0:24:45 Which to me, I guess, and this is informed partly through my experience in non-crypto-tech, 0:24:50 is just so much– there’s so many issues created around platforms and around trusting platforms. 0:24:54 And so you think about Zynga building on Facebook and the hundreds of entrepreneurs who tried 0:25:00 to build on top of Twitter and just like, it would have been so cool if, to me, if Twitter 0:25:04 were this sort of open protocol the way SMTP email is, and you could have– someone could 0:25:11 build the superhuman of Twitter as opposed to– and the anti– people are complaining 0:25:12 about spam on Twitter. 0:25:15 Why isn’t there a third party marketplace with spam filters the way there is with email 0:25:16 clients? 0:25:17 It used to be. 0:25:21 And just all the kind of cool stuff that you get– and you see in the open source world 0:25:23 now where it’s like Lego bricks and you’re building these buildings out of the different 0:25:27 bricks, and every piece of code is a new Lego brick, and then you get this kind of combinatorial 0:25:28 explosion of innovation. 0:25:29 Yeah. 0:25:33 Well, and this is– I think a lot of people get caught up or confused on this. 0:25:35 Decentralization is not an ideological thing. 0:25:39 It’s an architecture to support that permission-less building. 0:25:42 This is why the internet was so big. 0:25:46 If there was like an intranet and Microsoft owned it, like Microsoft MSN and Microsoft 0:25:51 Net back in the day, we would never have seen Amazon, Google, and all these companies grow 0:25:53 like they have. 0:25:58 So to me, that decentralized architecture of all these systems, it’s not like an ideological 0:25:59 thing. 0:26:02 It’s really just an architecture that allows developers to build anything they want. 0:26:07 And as you said, it’s all sort of permanent, and it’s like if every data structure on the 0:26:10 entire internet was open and had an open API. 0:26:15 We’ve seen the power of the kind of composability in the open source world now in the traditional 0:26:19 open source world, meaning like Linux, and Apache, and all this other stuff. 0:26:21 That has been a phenomenal success. 0:26:23 90 plus percent of the software in the world today is open source. 0:26:27 Every, you know, the bulk of the software on your iOS phone, the bulk of your software 0:26:29 on your Android phone, every data center. 0:26:30 Why is open source done so well? 0:26:32 Because you can remix it, right? 0:26:34 You can take the piece of code and you can do stuff with it. 0:26:37 And it just gets this, you know, it starts off, and you go back to like when Linux came 0:26:41 out in like whatever early 90s, it was definitely worse than Windows, but then it just followed 0:26:47 this much faster like innovation curve because of this fact that you can compose these Lego 0:26:48 bricks together. 0:26:51 And you had just anyone in the world who can come contribute, some smart person in some 0:26:55 random place can see some bug and fix it, just like all those effects. 0:27:01 And now, but the problem was open source still depended on the goodwill or this financial 0:27:04 interest of somebody to actually run the code. 0:27:07 And that’s of course where AWS and Google Cloud stepped in, like we’re going to actually 0:27:10 run it because open source was just code, right? 0:27:16 And whereas blockchains are code instantiated, right, it’s code that’s running, and it doesn’t 0:27:20 depend on the kindness of strangers or capitalists to run it. 0:27:23 And therefore can’t be usurped in the same way, and it’s just much more powerful because 0:27:27 it keeps state and has data and has computing ability and just all these other things that 0:27:28 open source didn’t have. 0:27:32 So to me, it’s like the best of those two worlds is like all the power of a modern computer 0:27:36 and then the, and then the composability that made open source successful. 0:27:37 Yep. 0:27:38 Yep. 0:27:44 And I do think that people underestimate just the scope of types of applications that will 0:27:46 come out of this. 0:27:52 I think that this idea of a global unified internet money is one of the basics and it’s 0:27:54 a very, very big deal. 0:28:01 And if we do have these sort of decentralized autonomous corporations or something, they’re 0:28:05 going to be using the internet money in order to communicate among each other and create 0:28:08 financial contracts and things like that. 0:28:14 But this is why this is such an exciting area because it just feels like the possibilities 0:28:15 are sort of limitless. 0:28:19 So let’s talk about the kind of the state of the world right now too. 0:28:24 So I think the New York Times just talked about how they think the crypto is over and 0:28:27 there’s all these sort of negative articles about it. 0:28:28 As you fuel. 0:28:29 Yeah. 0:28:30 I’ve been reading these since. 0:28:31 I’ve been reading these for almost 10 years. 0:28:36 I’ve been reading these about the internet too for even longer and technology for longer. 0:28:44 But there has been a price downturn, I don’t know, maybe some of the excitement is down 0:28:45 or something. 0:28:46 I don’t know. 0:28:49 But so kind of like it’s what I’m getting at is where are we in the in the life cycle 0:28:50 of this kind of. 0:28:51 Yeah. 0:28:58 So I do think that 2017 was a year of new financial instruments and it was actually I think a 0:29:03 lot of people underestimate how small of an amount of money was available 2016 and before 0:29:04 that. 0:29:05 Yeah. 0:29:06 For cryptocurrency and blockchains. 0:29:09 The whole universe was just pretty small. 0:29:13 You know, there was no billion dollar company anywhere. 0:29:16 It was really just a sort of nichey thing. 0:29:19 And for that reason, there just wasn’t a lot of capital available. 0:29:22 Now the people that were very excited though about cryptocurrency were the people using 0:29:23 cryptocurrency. 0:29:27 But I do think that we saw a huge amount of funding and projects that had been in the 0:29:29 works for many, many years. 0:29:33 How to funding this file coin taso stuff like that. 0:29:39 And so then, you know, I think 2019 is turning out to be the year of launches. 0:29:44 You’ve just seen these hugely ambitious projects actually get to across the finish line. 0:29:47 And Cosmos is a great example launched just about a month ago. 0:29:53 And it’s sort of the first system we’ve ever seen that will allow cross blockchain interaction. 0:29:58 So we’ve always had these kind of siloed logic and state in say Ethereum. 0:30:03 And now you could have smart contracts or tokens on Ethereum transfer like to other 0:30:04 blockchains potentially. 0:30:08 It also gives you a scaling story because you can have multiple blockchains. 0:30:10 So it’s almost kind of like sharding, right? 0:30:11 You have different blockchains that contract to it. 0:30:12 Sort of. 0:30:14 I think we think of it as heterogeneous shards as opposed to homogeneous shards. 0:30:17 So each shard can have run its own language and its own environment. 0:30:18 That’s exactly right. 0:30:22 And so the development momentum feels very strong to me and we’re going to see a lot 0:30:24 of very, very exciting launches in 2019. 0:30:27 However, I think that will be to very little fanfare. 0:30:31 It’s kind of like Ethereum launched in, you know, the middle of crypto winter in 2015 0:30:32 and nobody cared. 0:30:36 You know, it’s not like Ethereum launching was a year of time. 0:30:39 And it’s not like you’re going to launch it and it’s going to be an overnight success. 0:30:41 You need to then, I think of this as a two-step go to market. 0:30:44 So the first step is getting developers, right? 0:30:47 And so, and you got to build that community and they got to build tools and you got to 0:30:50 build like, you just think about all the stuff that we take for granted probably in the Ethereum 0:30:55 world of like, you know, wallets and, you know, IDEs and debuggers and just like, you 0:31:00 know, ether scan and just like the whole, like cashing, you know, alchemy stuff, cashing 0:31:01 tools or whatever. 0:31:02 There’s a whole set of infrastructure. 0:31:03 Right. 0:31:04 So that’s got to get built. 0:31:05 You’ve got to get people fired up. 0:31:06 You’ve got to have like hackathons. 0:31:11 You’ve got to, people got to learn the, you know, due tutorial, just a whole set of things 0:31:12 that have to happen. 0:31:16 And so even when you launch these, these new layer ones, I think it’s probably, I don’t 0:31:20 know, at least 12 months, probably before you see like higher quality applications coming 0:31:21 out. 0:31:25 The other thing about, about, as you know, with these, with these, because the code is 0:31:27 autonomous, because once you write it, it’s out there. 0:31:31 You really have to get the security right and some of that, those improvements will come 0:31:34 through better programming languages and tools, but it also just takes longer. 0:31:37 I think here people compare it to kind of hardware development versus software development. 0:31:41 Like you can’t, if you build faulty hardware, you have to recall it physically. 0:31:42 Yeah. 0:31:43 Yeah. 0:31:44 You know, faulty SaaS software. 0:31:47 You can fix a few things and deploy. 0:31:48 And so it just takes a while. 0:31:53 So, so I think, yeah, I do, I share your feeling that this will be your launches. 0:31:57 However, it will be more of a developer kind of phenomenon than a user phenomenon. 0:32:03 I do think it’ll take, yeah, 12 months, as you said, before we see a lot of the ways 0:32:06 that these will be used in surprising manners, right? 0:32:11 I do think that Ethereum was very exciting when it came out, but I really do think even 0:32:17 the people that built Ethereum didn’t, couldn’t properly predict exactly how it would be used. 0:32:20 And these, these use cases are like 18 months down the line. 0:32:22 It’s not that far around the corner. 0:32:27 This is one thing I love about cryptocurrency is if you miss like three months, you’re already 0:32:32 behind on, on the scope of, of kind of what is possible and, and what is happening. 0:32:36 So when you talk about applications, so what are you, so like, I think the thing that’s 0:32:40 working the most probably on Ethereum today is, is DeFi, decentralized finance, right? 0:32:44 And I know, let’s, maybe let’s talk a little bit about that and what you’re excited about 0:32:46 and then like other, other types of applications. 0:32:52 So I do think that one of the very big things being built on Ethereum that’s exciting are 0:32:54 stablecoins. 0:32:59 And particularly for me, it’s crypto collateralized stablecoins where the, the stablecoin that’s 0:33:03 pegged to say the dollar or, but it really couldn’t be anything, any asset that’s not 0:33:04 endogenous to the blockchain. 0:33:10 So it could be Google stock or it could be S&P 500, it could be a bond, whatever, whatever 0:33:11 it might be. 0:33:17 The backing for that value is a smart contract that’s holding, you know, Ethereum compatible 0:33:19 assets. 0:33:21 And this is like the MakerDAO system. 0:33:25 I think it’s a really, really big deal because a lot of the use cases that people originally 0:33:30 envisioned for cryptocurrencies related to financial services or payments had this significant 0:33:32 problem, which is just the volatility. 0:33:37 So even e-commerce with something as volatile as Bitcoin, you said like the one hour you 0:33:41 wait until you have to actually close and receive those bitcoins. 0:33:44 I mean, margin on e-commerce often is pretty low, right? 0:33:49 You might be getting four or 5%, but the volatility in an hour in Bitcoin can be more than that. 0:33:55 So I do think that these stablecoins are critical for other types of applications. 0:34:01 And so the auger prediction market, you know, other, even just like token trading, you know, 0:34:05 what is the base pair you’re trading against in a decentralized exchange? 0:34:08 Is it Ether against some other coin? 0:34:11 I think also like you just think about lending, for example, like people don’t, you know, 0:34:17 if you’re buying a house in dollars, you want your stablecoin pegged to dollars. 0:34:21 And the stablecoin can actually then act as collateral in other types of use cases. 0:34:25 So I do think that stablecoins are like a critical building. 0:34:30 The other thing about MakerDAO that’s interesting is just how it’s a very interesting kind of 0:34:35 economic structure for how they enforce the peg and how they kind of incentivize the ecosystem. 0:34:38 And the fact that that runs in a smart contract which holds a significant amount of money is 0:34:47 just a real, I think to me, a testament to the power of the Ethereum design and the 0:34:49 sort of what smart contract platforms can do. 0:34:58 It’s one of many examples, but it’s got more traction, I think people realize, as in it’s 0:35:03 about 2% of all Ether is held in the MakerDAO contract. 0:35:06 And now that’s hard capped by the protocol. 0:35:08 So they could take off that cap. 0:35:13 And when I say they, I mean actually the MKR holders who vote on these changes. 0:35:19 And so if they wanted to potentially massively increase the amount of Ether locked in that 0:35:21 contract, they really could. 0:35:27 Now I do think it almost starts to create systemic risk at around, say, 5% of all Ether. 0:35:31 I mean for the Ethereum protocol, for the MakerDAO protocol, so you don’t want half 0:35:35 of all Ether held in this thing, but in just sheer dollar terms, you know, there’s hundreds 0:35:42 of millions of dollars locked in this protocol that people are basically using to get a loan. 0:35:47 And so it’s, while these DeFi things are very, very hard to use, it’s kind of a disaster 0:35:48 from a UX perspective. 0:35:52 You have to download all the software, you have to have Ether, you know, and you have 0:35:56 to click through a million different things and have a mental model for what you’re doing. 0:36:02 You have to be, I mean, it’s just a testament to how hardcore the enthusiasts are that… 0:36:03 Yeah, exactly. 0:36:07 And you know, I think a lot of them are arbitrageers and folks like that that are just doing kind 0:36:09 of profit seeking behavior. 0:36:14 But it’s, yeah, I mean, to me, we are seeing kind of the early success of some of these 0:36:17 low level stablecoin systems. 0:36:22 And I think that stablecoins are going to be a critical part of the recipe for a lot of 0:36:25 more abstracted, higher level use cases. 0:36:30 I think of it as, our friend Boloji has a kind of framework I like, which is, you know, 0:36:36 he would say, I think, is that the idea that you’d buy a cup of coffee using a cryptocurrency 0:36:39 is sort of one of the least interesting use cases. 0:36:43 And he has this kind of model where it’s kind of U-shaped where it’s, on the one hand, there’s 0:36:47 about a billion and a half people that have smartphones but are unbanked, are not part 0:36:49 of the internet economy. 0:36:54 And for those people, it’s very interesting to have a digitally native currency, right? 0:36:58 And architecturally, it makes a lot of sense because one of the key features of cryptocurrencies, 0:37:03 it’s a bearer instrument, meaning the recipient can verify that they got paid using just sort 0:37:07 of math on the internet and not having to rely on a bank or some third party and therefore 0:37:10 doesn’t need an ID and doesn’t have fraud risk and everything else. 0:37:13 So that’s sort of the one end where the stuff is so powerful. 0:37:17 And then the other end is kind of the high end of the software developers and you now 0:37:21 have programmable money, programmable loans, all these kind of cool new things you can 0:37:24 do on the innovation side. 0:37:30 I think of it as like what if, here’s a sort of metaphor, but the fact that photos are 0:37:35 just a file format that you can send to people, allowed people to invent Facebook and Instagram, 0:37:39 and if instead, this is again a metaphor, but if instead you had to kind of get permission 0:37:44 every time you sent a photo, if it was a service and not a file format, like there would have 0:37:48 been way less innovation around kind of media over the last 20 years and now what if money 0:37:52 is a file format, it’s just a string of bits, it’s just a string of bits, it’s no longer 0:37:55 a web service that’s connected to PayPal or Visa or something and they can’t take their 0:37:58 money and screw it up or do whatever they want and it make you get permission and make 0:38:03 you get, you know, and disenfranchise a billion and a half people and everything else, like 0:38:07 now it’s just bits and like what can you do, it’s a very powerful concept. 0:38:15 It is and I do think that, you know, an interesting feature of cryptocurrencies for me is that 0:38:19 the people that become knowledgeable about cryptocurrencies, I would say about 95% of 0:38:25 them or more, think it’s a good idea once you become knowledgeable about it. 0:38:31 And so to me, a lot of this is just an education process of like how do we get more and more 0:38:37 people to recognize why cryptocurrencies have this extremely unique value? 0:38:41 It’s the most misunderstood, I feel like tech is often misunderstood, but this is by far 0:38:45 the most, at least that I’ve worked in by far the most, the delta between the reality and 0:38:50 the perception and partly it’s self inflicted wound because of the kind of early crypto 0:38:53 movement and it was, you know, a lot of kind of political anarchist types got into it 0:38:58 and things, but it’s that’s lingered and it’s just really misunderstood and it’s very 0:38:59 where I agree with you. 0:39:02 I have this, I have this a go over and over again, especially people that are technical, 0:39:06 you give them like the Ethereum white paper, the Filecoin white paper, whatever, you know, 0:39:10 just a bunch of the Bitcoin white paper and they come back and they’re like, oh my God, 0:39:12 this is totally different than what people described to me and what I read about. 0:39:13 Exactly. 0:39:21 It’s because it’s easy to pay attention to the bad actors and prices and stuff when 0:39:28 in reality, the kind of fundamental development, yeah, like you said, from Bitcoin to this 0:39:32 more general computer to the more advanced applications that, again, like Filecoin being 0:39:39 this low level building block that’s going to enable all sorts of new behaviors because 0:39:44 just thinking about Filecoin, like, how am I supposed to build any sort of decentralized 0:39:47 application if I can’t do file storage, right? 0:39:51 It’s kind of this basic building block, but I can’t build Twitter the protocol or Uber 0:39:55 the protocol to compete with the centralized web platform unless I have a decentralized 0:39:59 file architecture underneath it, which today is not really possible. 0:40:05 And so these low level systems, it’s really remarkable the rippling implications of what 0:40:10 will become possible. And I do think that the number one barrier is just very simply 0:40:11 education. 0:40:17 This is an esoteric and complex area and there’s also a huge amount of smoke and mirrors, right? 0:40:22 I do think that there are, have always been in the crypto space, it’s international and 0:40:28 it’s permissionless. So there’s just a lot of crazy behaviors and crazy characters and 0:40:30 it’s easy to focus on that stuff. 0:40:35 That’s actually one of the good things about the price downturn is I think it’s cleaned 0:40:41 up a lot of that and sort of put the focus back on innovation and technology. 0:40:49 Yeah, I agree. I think that the sort of builders of all this stuff never really stop, but they’re 0:40:56 also not who the media necessarily pays attention to. I think that the media tends to be a reflection 0:41:00 of the investors and the investors tend to be really short sighted and focus very much 0:41:04 on month to month or even day to day type volatility. 0:41:11 So one interesting trend is what we call vertically integrated applications and something we’ve 0:41:16 been talking about. And I think the way I think about it is sometimes when you don’t 0:41:26 have the full kind of tech stack built out, sometimes for a project to kind of get adoption, 0:41:31 they need to build more themselves. So like a good historical example is Blackberry, they 0:41:37 come up with an email smartphone in 2003 and at the time you just didn’t have sort of a 0:41:40 great smartphone platform like the iPhone, you didn’t have great connectivity, you didn’t 0:41:43 have great backend. So they built the whole thing. They built this hardware, they built 0:41:47 the software, they built the network, they built the backend and they were able to kind 0:41:51 of get kind of, I think it was like pull the future forward. Eventually you could do this 0:41:54 by building an app on the iPhone, but like at the time you couldn’t, so they had to build 0:41:58 it all. And I think we’re seeing some of that pattern now because we don’t have all the 0:42:05 layers kind of at the ideal state now, particularly like the layer one smart contract platform 0:42:08 we were talking about earlier, just we don’t have kind of a great scalable everything else. 0:42:16 But the, I mean the old wisdom was sort of build a low level, you know, extensible protocol 0:42:21 and developers will come and build all the useful apps. And I think a great example of 0:42:26 that was the Zero X protocol system, which is like token trading on Ethereum using a 0:42:31 smart contract. So they said, we’re not going to own sort of the end user interface, we’re 0:42:36 going to build a low level system and then different people are going to come build web 0:42:40 interfaces. I think the newer generation of the smart contract developers, we’ve seen 0:42:44 say we’re going to build that low level protocol, but we’re also going to own the user interface 0:42:49 and kind of build that full stack experience. And that vertical integration as you put it, 0:42:54 I think is potentially going to be a catalyst for a lot of the stuff to move a little bit 0:43:02 faster than it has historically. And so there’s the project Sello that’s working on first 0:43:09 a kind of low level stablecoin designed for payments and remittances, as well as an Android 0:43:14 kind of mobile first application designed for folks that don’t have access to traditional 0:43:18 banking or financial services. And so by owning kind of both pieces, they can kind of iterate 0:43:24 a bit faster and potentially understand the full scope of how the customers is using this 0:43:29 platform. And provide kind of a modern user user experience 0:43:33 that you would hope for from a non kind of blockchain app and they’ll provide kind of 0:43:37 a similar user experience. But then also I think have the kind of the what I think is 0:43:43 the modern crypto business model of, you know, they own some of the coins and they ultimately 0:43:49 want to see the tokens appreciate and don’t need to and therefore okay with other people, 0:43:52 for example, starting to build their own apps and like and supplanting their app, they don’t 0:43:57 need to control the end to end thing all the way in the future because they have this business 0:44:01 model that’s aligned with the community, it’s this fighting the community of the model 0:44:06 where like the more you give away, the better you do for yourself, which is obviously in 0:44:09 web two, it was kind of own everything and fight. 0:44:12 So it’s interesting because it’s start at the model is sort of start web to like just 0:44:16 to get the user experience right, but then but then have the business model that’s sort 0:44:21 of web three and therefore let you have this great property of grow the pie not fight over 0:44:27 the pie. Yeah, exactly. Okay, so that’s that’s and then and then I guess one of the thing 0:44:34 we haven’t covered is we talked about payments, we talked about centralized finance. We talked 0:44:38 a little bit about like file coin and kind of what I would call incentivized infrastructure 0:44:43 like kind of new infrastructure that has incentives built in. What are some of the areas that that 0:44:49 you know kind of application areas. I mean, one thing with with these crypto protocols 0:44:55 is you can build markets for anything. And so anything today that’s sort of a one to 0:45:00 one service with for example, in the case of file coin, Amazon Web Services, Microsoft 0:45:05 Azure, whatever, Google Cloud, you can turn that into a competitive marketplace that sort 0:45:10 of unifies all of these. And so while file coin builds this competitive spot market for 0:45:14 file storage, you could have a similar thing for many of these kind of low level computer 0:45:20 resources. So you could do that for compute. You could do that. I think AI data would be 0:45:26 very interesting one. Yeah, a genetic data. Right. So then you could even where is the 0:45:29 AI like it seems to me a critical question of the next 10 years is where is AI data live? 0:45:34 Does it live in Google and Amazon servers? Or is it an open protocol where you know anyone 0:45:38 can access it and there’s some incentive model for providing it and forgetting it. One interesting 0:45:44 intersection is homomorphic encryption, which allows you to train a machine learning system 0:45:47 based on data that you actually don’t know the plain text. So you only see the encrypted 0:45:54 version. It allows people to say, okay, I’m going to share the data from my Tesla or my 0:45:59 smartphone with a major corporation and get paid for that data. And that corporation will 0:46:03 actually never learn the data but can still train the machine learning algorithm. It’s 0:46:10 a bit abstract and I think it’s early on that type of use case, but it’s potentially very 0:46:14 transformative. I think also, you know, you could architect social networks, marketplaces 0:46:17 like ride sharing, all of this stuff could be architected using these methods and I think 0:46:21 there would be benefits to all sorts of community members, kind of stakeholders, including the 0:46:26 drivers and riders. And so that’s a separate, maybe a longer conversation. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 0:46:32 Yeah. I do think the value accrual when these things succeed go to the entire large and 0:46:37 they’re governed by the larger bases, by, you know, by instead of basically an extractive 0:46:42 corporation that owns the platform and at the end of the day has some level of an adversarial 0:46:48 relationship with its users. Yeah. I mean, it’s today, yes, Facebook loves its users, 0:46:54 but also it wants to put as many ads in front of the users as it possibly can, which actually 0:47:00 disrupt the user experience. So it’s, yeah, it’s an odd relationship, I think that these 0:47:04 Web2 platforms have with their user bases. I think another interesting area is, it’s 0:47:09 kind of out of fashion at the moment, but I think it will come back as NFTs or, you 0:47:15 know, digital goods. It’s always been, you know, there was a whole, I don’t know if you 0:47:19 were around for this, but the, during when World of Warcraft was a big deal, there was 0:47:24 this whole kind of underground market called farming. So people wanted to, instead of having 0:47:28 to, you know, earn your way up to level 70, people wanted to buy their way and there was 0:47:32 this whole thing where like people would, there’s this, these off, off-game X protocol 0:47:37 websites where you could go do this and it was a big deal. And so a similar idea is to 0:47:41 sort of take that and legitimate it and say, hey, you can earn, you know, in a game or 0:47:45 in a virtual world or in some other kind of experience, you know, what if there are goods 0:47:49 that the user can actually own and take from one game to another and buy and sell them 0:47:53 and you add economic incentives and you can make a living doing this and you can actually 0:47:56 own these things in a way that you can’t today. Today you’re really just kind of borrowing 0:48:00 them and these games will come and go and they’ll, you’ll spend all this time earning 0:48:04 stuff and it’ll all then disappear or you’ll forget about it. And this is just a much kind 0:48:08 of more, it’s much more like the offline world, like when you get stuff, you keep it and people, 0:48:11 and people that’s really popular in the offline world and I think it will be popular in the 0:48:12 online world too. 0:48:17 Oh, I mean, the rippling implications of it are, are, are big too. So if you can own your 0:48:22 avatar and you can own the avatar sword and shield and everything, other, like we said 0:48:25 earlier, everything here is interoperable. It’s like an open API. So any developer can 0:48:31 then build an expansion pack or a mod on the game. It turns like the modding community 0:48:37 around various games into like a real economic system. And so then you could actually imagine 0:48:43 like in the longer term, it’s almost like, think about every like rupee you’ve ever 0:48:48 earned in a game or every bit of gold. Imagine if that was actually all unified among like 0:48:52 almost every game, right? And there were like secondary markets between one game and another 0:48:58 game and you could actually maybe bring your avatar from one game to another game. There’s 0:49:05 just, you know, it’s almost like turning the universe of video games into Minecraft, right? 0:49:12 Obviously, that’s a sort of far future, but I do think this, this open and interoperable 0:49:14 low level systems do enable that type of thing. 0:49:17 Also, the other cool thing is with, with the economic incentives, you suddenly, for example, 0:49:22 you could imagine funding your game instead of going to Activision and asking them for 0:49:27 money, you can fund your game by pre-selling some of the goods. You could have third party 0:49:32 creators who earn living, some person, you know, whatever with the smartphone is designing 0:49:35 virtual goods and selling them and earning a living that way. 0:49:40 Well, and one of the most successful categories on Kickstarter is kickstarting video games, 0:49:44 because, you know, gamers are hardcore and they want to support independent developers. 0:49:48 Now imagine if you could take that from, I’m just going to buy your game, I’m actually 0:49:54 going to invest in your game, right? It’s way more powerful, and it aligns the interest 0:49:59 between the gamers and the indie developers. So to me, yeah, that could be a very big trend. 0:50:04 And we have seen some level of that, and I think one of the problems was, you know, when 0:50:08 you can pre-sell these game items, you get this investor community rather than the gaming 0:50:14 community interested. And so I do think it’s important to, you know, make sure that it’s 0:50:19 not, it’s like, it’s people who actually want to play the game, right, that are sort 0:50:24 of buying those game items. But I do think that that interoperability of avatars and 0:50:27 items and levels and stuff like that is, is a big deal. 0:50:30 Yeah. Right, awesome. Thanks, thanks a lot for being here. 0:50:31 Yeah, thanks for having me, Chris. 0:50:40 [BLANK_AUDIO]
In a followup to one of our most popular podcast episodes which originally aired in April 2017 (https://a16z.com/2017/04/03/cryptocurrencies-protocols-appcoins/), a16z Crypto Fund General Partner Chris Dixon returns to talk with Olaf Carlson-Wee of Polychain Capital in a free-wheeling conversation about the seven major trends they see happening in blockchain computing now as we shift from basic protocol design to pragmatic product launches:
Improving developer productivity
Scaling out versus scaling up
On-chain governance
Proof of Stake Networks, and especially their resilience to attacks
2017: year of of fund raising, 2019: year of launches
Autonomous and re-mixable code
Killer apps: distributed finance and beyond
This conversation was originally recorded for our YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/c/a16zvideos
The views expressed here are those of the individual AH Capital Management, L.L.C. (“a16z”) personnel quoted and are not the views of a16z or its affiliates.This content is provided for informational purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal, business, investment, or tax advice. You should consult your own advisers as to those matters. References to any securities or digital assets are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute an investment recommendation or offer to provide investment advisory services. Furthermore, this content is not directed at nor intended for use by any investor or prospective investor, and may not under any circumstances be relied upon when making a decision to invest in any fund managed by a16z. (An offering to invest in an a16z fund will be made only by the private placement memorandum, subscription agreement, and other relevant documentation of any such fund which should be read in their entirety.)Past performance is not indicative of future results. Charts and graphs provided within are for informational purposes solely and should not be relied upon when making any investment decision. Please see a16z.com/disclosures for additional important information.
0:00:05 The content here is for informational purposes only, should not be taken as legal business 0:00:10 tax or investment advice or be used to evaluate any investment or security and is not directed 0:00:15 at any investors or potential investors in any A16Z fund. For more details, please see 0:00:22 a16z.com/disclosures. Hi, welcome to the A16Z podcast. This is 0:00:27 Frank Chen. Today’s episode is called “The Future of Decision-Making, Three Startup Ideas.” 0:00:33 It’s a conversation I had with Chad Nouse, originally as a YouTube video. You can watch 0:00:39 all of our YouTube videos at youtube.com/a16zvideos. Now on to the episode. 0:00:45 Hi, welcome to the A16Z YouTube channel. I am Frank Chen, and today I am here with 0:00:51 Chad Nouse. Chad is part of the enterprise investing team, and he’s noticed something, 0:00:55 and so let’s just get right into it. So you’ve noticed something around the way that big 0:01:00 companies are trying to do digital transformation. So why don’t we start there. What are the 0:01:04 big companies doing? What is digital transformation? 0:01:10 Yeah, digital transformation is something that gets thrown around quite a bit. I think 0:01:16 there’s a big shift now. We’re starting to see a lot of industries actually starting 0:01:20 to go through digital transformation, and I would bucket the things that people do in 0:01:27 digital transformation into two areas. The first one is around moving from these manual 0:01:34 paper processes to more digital ones that are easy to change, faster to modify, more 0:01:38 agile. The second thing that people tend to do when they’re doing digital transformation 0:01:46 is move from these manual processes to more automated processes, and so automation. And 0:01:53 I think that this shift is now starting to happen in earnest, and we’re going to start 0:01:59 seeing three things pop out. The first one is people’s roles and functions to a certain 0:02:06 degree are going to start shifting around. The second one is we’re going to start seeing 0:02:12 new demand for new technology and new tools as these new functions and roles actually emerge 0:02:18 and start to change. And third, that’s going to also lead eventually to a change in market 0:02:24 dynamics and how companies run, who will become successful, who wins in certain spaces. 0:02:30 Interesting. So anywhere there is a fax machine or a clipboard or sort of a big bundle of 0:02:34 papers, there’s opportunity. We’re going to go from analog to digital, and then we’re 0:02:38 going to automate whatever business process was behind that piece of paper that you had 0:02:43 fill out in triplicate. So why don’t we talk about a couple of examples of these? What 0:02:45 are good examples? 0:02:52 So I’ll talk a little bit about product management. So earlier on, people, the way they used to 0:03:00 decide what products to build, how to prioritize features or bugs to fix, is they’d go and 0:03:06 they’d run these surveys that are manually, and they send them out to people, or the product 0:03:10 managers go and talk to people. They spend a ton of time doing these, collecting all 0:03:14 the data and figuring out, okay, these are, this is the segment of people I care about 0:03:17 the most. Here’s the issues that they care about. Let me figure out what the problem 0:03:19 is and so on. 0:03:22 As an old product manager, I went on those calls. 0:03:26 You flew to a customer and you dutifully listened to what they wanted, and you’d sort of come 0:03:28 back and try to sort them all. 0:03:33 And that, I mean, it’s a huge time sink. A lot of the product manager’s time used to 0:03:39 be that. What’s happening now is we have a new generation of tools that actually allow 0:03:44 the automation of data collection from the product. What’s actually happening? What 0:03:51 features are people using? Where are they getting stuck? And so where the product manager 0:03:57 now, instead of having to go and do all these surveys, would look at a dashboard that describes 0:04:02 what people are doing in their product. And then they would be able to analyze it and figure 0:04:08 out from that what features, what areas of the product are they getting stuck in, and 0:04:12 be able to communicate with engineers. Here’s the things that we need to do. 0:04:17 And then once they fix some of these, they can actually roll them out gradually and do 0:04:22 A/B tests to figure out did this actually fix the problem or did it not fix the problem. 0:04:25 And decide that if something actually did fix the problem, then continue to roll out 0:04:27 to the rest of the population. 0:04:30 So that’s on the product management side. 0:04:37 You see another example actually happening on the marketing side. I’m sure you’ve heard 0:04:45 of growth hacking. So for a long time, marketers used to be this madman kind of thing where 0:04:49 you spend a lot of time figuring out the creative aspect of what you do, you spend a lot of 0:04:54 time on a lot of money on advertising campaigns and you kind of spray and pray for the most 0:05:03 part. What has happened over the past few years is the rise of this marketing engineering 0:05:11 role to a certain degree. This is one where a marketer who understands numbers, who understands 0:05:18 engineering systems, who understands pipelines would work with these data systems and actually 0:05:25 try to figure out ways that are low cost that would actually increase growth in a certain 0:05:32 segment of the population. And that requires a lot of data instrumentation, a lot of understanding 0:05:38 people and a lot of creativity in figuring out how to spur growth or how to get traction 0:05:40 in a certain area. 0:05:47 So Don Draper’s tools were typewriters and stories, right? And so the tool set around 0:05:52 this is going to change dramatically if we make this transition from sort of the old 0:05:56 world analog un-automated to the new world. And by the way, I think you have a name for 0:05:57 the new world. 0:06:04 Yeah. So let me first say like what’s actually going to happen. So as people’s jobs become 0:06:10 more and more automated, a lot of the things that they get, a lot of the things that they 0:06:16 used to do that are work will go away. And what’s actually left in their jobs is mainly 0:06:22 decision making, figuring out like what am I going to do? What am I going to focus on? 0:06:27 How should I do it? And communication or other things that are actually related to their 0:06:35 job like creative work, human aspects that can be automated, buy in, alignment, et cetera. 0:06:40 But the road work goes away. And so that means that there’s a ton of decisions, a lot more 0:06:46 decisions that they’re doing more frequently on a daily basis that they have to go through. 0:06:51 So what that means is that to a certain extent, everybody is going to end up becoming more 0:06:56 of an analyst in that sense in the enterprise. When I say everybody, I kind of mean like 0:07:05 the middle of the enterprise. And what that really means is they’re going to have these 0:07:10 questions that they’re going to need to ask on a daily basis, but with no tools to actually 0:07:16 help them do these. So you might say, well, you know, people used to do this for a very 0:07:19 long time. They used to use BI tools to actually answer questions. 0:07:24 Yeah, business intelligence, right? So you build the data warehouse, you build the tables 0:07:27 on top of it, right? Then you build your reports. So. 0:07:33 Exactly. And so I think that BI tools are not going to be enough in this world. And I’ve 0:07:36 come up with a term for like the type of tools that we need that I’m calling operational 0:07:42 intelligence, because it’s actually targeting the operational people. It’s the type, it’s 0:07:47 questions that people need to answer on a daily basis and they have to answer them immediately. 0:07:54 Questions like, where is the bottleneck in my funnel right now? And how do I eliminate 0:08:03 it? Or I have my competitor is having a flash sale. How do I figure out how much of my revenue 0:08:09 is impacted? Which customer segment should I target? And what should I, what should I 0:08:13 put on sale? And those are things that you’re going to have to answer in the moment. You 0:08:19 can’t have, so for BI, you would need this army of analysts, where you would just ask 0:08:23 a question and then they would go off into your enterprise and rummage through all the 0:08:29 data sources, try to understand kind of like what the question that you’re asking is kind 0:08:33 of try to understand what the business context is and then show you, build you a dashboard 0:08:37 and hope that that’s the one that you want. Yeah. Well, there’s the old joke about BI, 0:08:42 right? Which is it’s $10 million to your first report. And then you realize, oh, I didn’t 0:08:47 want this question answered anyway. Wrong question. Exactly. And so the solution there 0:08:52 is kind of what I’m calling operational intelligence. And there’s three pieces to it. The first 0:09:01 one is that it has to be, it has to be immediate. It can’t be eventual like BI. You can’t just 0:09:06 say, oh, I need to answer this question and then get an answer like three months later. 0:09:10 It has to be answered in the moment. And that involves a few things. Like first, that you 0:09:15 have to actually be able to do it yourself. Like you have to actually get the data in 0:09:21 real time as opposed to it being late. The second piece is that it has to be kind of 0:09:28 continuous. It has to be real time. You can’t have your data being sent into these systems 0:09:35 on a batch basis every day or every week or whatever. The data that you actually see to 0:09:41 make your decisions has to be what’s happening at this point. Right now. So the classic example 0:09:44 of this would be sort of social listening on Twitter, right? Which is that’s got to 0:09:49 be an ongoing process because things can blow up with your brand either in a good way or 0:09:53 a bad way at any time. So you can’t say, hey, I’m done analyzing Twitter for the quarter. 0:09:57 I’m done. Exactly. Exactly. Another example, I mean, I said 0:10:03 this earlier about the A/B testing. I mean, if you’re looking at, if you’re trying to 0:10:09 do A/B tests, you can’t just let it go and come back next week and see whether the thing 0:10:14 worked or not. You actually have to be continuously monitoring what’s actually happening in the 0:10:21 A/B test space and figure out did the B test work or did the A test work better? And am 0:10:25 I going to flip the switch now? Because if, I mean, you’re doing an A/B test on a segment 0:10:29 of the population, you don’t want them to completely fail in the end. 0:10:33 In fact, we’re seeing with some of the more sophisticated machine learning systems that 0:10:38 you actually have multiple models, machine learning models that are live at any given 0:10:43 time. And you’re actually doing nightly bake-offs against these models, right? Which is model 0:10:47 A will get 40% of the traffic, and then model B will get 20% of the traffic. And then we’ll 0:10:52 just sort of let them run and the best models get promoted to receive more of the traffic 0:10:57 over time. So that’s an example of what you’re talking about is this sort of continuous process. 0:11:04 It’s really interesting that like what we’ve seen is this kind of monitoring, this kind 0:11:08 of continuous monitoring, like what I’m calling operational intelligence, has actually been 0:11:12 kind of standard on the engineering side for a very long time. People have been monitoring 0:11:21 systems and engineering for a very long time. And they would kind of run A/B tests continuously 0:11:25 to try to improve performance. And now we’re actually seeing these kinds of engineering 0:11:29 disciplines kind of migrate into other functions of the org, right? Like marketing seems to 0:11:33 have been the first one to go after that and then product management. And we’re actually 0:11:39 seeing now people trying to do this for salespeople, trying to like look, okay, here are the things 0:11:45 that salespeople have done. And in order to close a deal, let’s actually learn from that 0:11:48 as a pattern and like figure out how to get everybody, every salesperson on the team to 0:11:51 get to the level of the top performer. 0:11:55 Yeah. Cresta.ai is a great example of this, right? So you’re chatting and you’re getting 0:11:59 real time advice about, hey, maybe this is the time to mention we have a product in this 0:12:01 space. Yeah, that’s a real time recommendation. 0:12:02 Exactly. 0:12:08 Yeah. So in the old days, engineering typically was first because like websites were coming 0:12:12 online and you needed to watch those things, right? Because everybody knows the statistics 0:12:16 that if like, you know, your webpage loads this much slower, you’re going to lose that 0:12:20 much more people through the conversion funnel. And so like you had to watch all these things 0:12:25 in real time. And now that’s getting outside of IT, right? 0:12:31 Yeah. It’s interesting also that, so I used to work at AppDynamics. I was there for a 0:12:38 few years and AppDynamics sells APM tools, application performance monitoring tools. 0:12:43 It’s probably one of the easiest things to sell because you go up to your customer and 0:12:48 you’re like, well, how much does it cost for your engineering systems to be down for, you 0:12:58 know, five minutes, 10 minutes, an hour? And then you say, hey, we prevent that from happening. 0:13:02 That same kind of sale hasn’t yet happened in these other works. It’s a little harder 0:13:06 to prove the ROI. But I think it’ll get there. 0:13:11 Right. So now this is about sales performance, marketing performance of those people. 0:13:12 Exactly. 0:13:17 And we’re going to sort of treat them as if they were websites, right? What’s the downtime? 0:13:22 What’s the dollars lost if you have a salesperson being non-optimal at this point in time? 0:13:23 Exactly. 0:13:30 Yeah. And so to recap sort of the tool change from business intelligence to operational intelligence, 0:13:36 sort of, I need it now. I don’t need it in three months. Three months is too late. That’s 0:13:41 one. Two is I need it ongoing. I don’t need a one time, hey, I’m done. 0:13:42 Right. 0:13:46 I need to, and then I think there was another aspect of the tools that you expect to change 0:13:47 and what is that? 0:13:49 It has to be self-service, not full service. 0:13:50 Oh, I see. 0:13:56 You can’t have somebody else going and doing all the work for you. Those tools have to 0:14:01 actually give you insights that are catered to you and you have to actually be able to 0:14:03 ask the questions yourself out of these tools. 0:14:04 Right. 0:14:06 They have to enable you to do all these things by yourself. 0:14:12 Yeah. So basically the tools need to be easy enough to use such that the average business 0:14:17 analyst can basically just poke at the data and then any answer comes out as opposed to 0:14:22 you think of a question some team later, six weeks later, turns that into a very complicated 0:14:24 SQL query and then the report comes back. 0:14:30 Yeah. I wouldn’t even say it’s an analyst that actually is doing this. These are tools 0:14:36 for the actual operational people as opposed to the, as opposed to, I call them meta-operational 0:14:40 because they’re like analysts. They’re about the business. They’re not the business. 0:14:41 I see. 0:14:45 So what a good example of somebody who now needs to consume these tools directly, which 0:14:47 is different, Brent, a marketer. 0:14:54 The growth hacker, the product manager, the customer support manager, the sales person, 0:15:00 these are all the actual functional operational people that need to consume this data. 0:15:04 Got it. So that would be a big change, right? Because in the past it was sort of a very 0:15:09 sophisticated technical consumer, right, who would be the interface between the business 0:15:12 person and the system and now you’re saying the business person needs direct access to 0:15:13 the system. 0:15:14 Exactly. 0:15:20 So it can be easy, right? So if we think about the entire stack of how it came to be that 0:15:26 you’ve got a BI answer, right, there was ETL, there was storage, there were data cubes, 0:15:35 there were analytics, right? So do you think each layer of the stack is going to need to 0:15:40 change or do you think these are just features that the incumbents can add? 0:15:41 Yeah. Good question. 0:15:49 So I think that the breakdown of the stages of data pipeline is a functional breakdown, 0:15:54 not really so much legacy. Like you’ve got ETL at the top, you’ve got, well, maybe at 0:15:59 the bottom depending on how you like to draw your pancake from the left to the right. 0:16:05 You’ve got ETL at the, right after your data sources, you’ve got storage where all the 0:16:10 data that you’ve processed goes in, like these are your data warehouses, your databases, 0:16:15 data lakes, et cetera. You’ve got processing that happens to extract the data from the 0:16:21 storage layer and turn it into insights or whatever. You’ve got analytics that’s actually 0:16:32 used to turn a question into actual execution. You’ve got the access layer which controls 0:16:37 and governs who is allowed to access what. And then you’ve got processing at the end, 0:16:40 I’m sorry, a presentation at the end that actually. 0:16:41 That’s where your answer comes out. 0:16:43 This is the dashboard. 0:16:49 I think every layer, functionally each layer is going to remain the same, like at the core 0:16:54 it’s going to be doing the same things. But each layer is going to have new non-functional 0:17:00 requirements. Each layer is going to have to be usable by a non-technical person who 0:17:08 is trying to ask their own questions. And we see that happen in large companies. These 0:17:14 large companies have already built these stacks. So Airbnb, for example, built SuperSet and 0:17:22 they luckily open sourced it to the world. And now it’s used by hundreds of companies. 0:17:28 It’s a presentation layer product that’s focused toward more technical engineers or data scientists 0:17:34 to be able to get ad hoc access to their data and answer questions immediately. 0:17:42 One of our investments imply is doing this for the analytics and the processing layer. 0:17:49 So they’re able to store streaming data directly into their database and allow you to do OLAP 0:17:54 types of queries and analytics on top. And they provide a presentation layer that allows 0:18:00 you to slice some dice on problems. Databricks is another one. They’re focused on the processing 0:18:09 layer. So we’re seeing a bunch of things happening in each of these layers. And I think probably 0:18:15 the layer that hasn’t yet seen the most changes is the ETL layer. 0:18:20 And what do you think that is? Is that the hardest layer? Is it just, well, that’s going 0:18:24 to be the hardest to turn a business user into a direct customer of? Because traditionally 0:18:26 that’s been very wonky. 0:18:34 Yeah. I think two reasons why ETL has been so hard. The first one is it actually requires 0:18:43 domain specificity. ETL for healthcare is not going to look the same as ETL for financials. 0:18:44 Ridesharing. 0:18:49 For ridesharing, for whatever. The ontologies, the things that they care about are different. 0:18:56 And so any company that does these has to really get deep into that domain. The second 0:19:04 one is it’s a lot of integration and a lot of kind of heavy manual work. And engineers 0:19:08 don’t really like to build these kinds of things. So they’re going for the lower hanging 0:19:09 fruit at this point. 0:19:14 Got it. But it seems like overall you’re arguing there are a lot of startup opportunities 0:19:19 here that the incumbents are going to have a hard time retrofitting their products, right? 0:19:24 So it’s pretty hard to change a product that was designed originally for a technical user 0:19:29 to turn that into a non-technical. Is that sort of a fair summary of where you’re going? 0:19:34 Yeah. So if you think about the opportunities in operational intelligence, I’d probably 0:19:41 break them into maybe three categories. The first one, actually the first two are maybe 0:19:46 like related to each other. It’s basically you want to become an operational intelligence 0:19:55 vendor. So you sell software and tools that enable existing incumbents to become operationally 0:20:02 more capable. You enable them to do operational intelligence. And within that category there’s 0:20:07 a breakdown. So you can either target a specific role. So I’m going to enable the salesperson 0:20:11 to become successful or I’m going to enable the product manager or I’m going to enable 0:20:20 the customer success manager. And so we see products in each of these categories today. 0:20:26 There hasn’t yet been complete breakout success in any of these, but it’s super crowded and 0:20:35 I think it’s probably the hardest one to win in at this point. The second category is within 0:20:49 that vendor superset is segment focused vendors. So companies that sell operational intelligence 0:20:59 tools to existing incumbents, for example, companies that sell sensors and analytics 0:21:07 for oil and gas companies. So these are people who will collect data from your wells, optimize 0:21:13 it and then collect that data from your wells, put it into dashboards, tell you how your 0:21:18 wells are doing and tell you how to optimize it in order to improve efficiency. So like 0:21:23 a vertical solution for oil and gas. For oil and gas. So those are those are still vendors 0:21:28 selling software, maybe some hardware into an existing industry. And then finally you 0:21:38 have the vertically integrated, you know, operationally intelligent company that competes 0:21:43 against the existing incumbents. And so we’ve got plenty of examples of that at this point. 0:21:48 So we’ve got Airbnb that’s in the hospitality business. We’ve got some Sara in the logistics 0:21:59 industry. We have Lyft and Uber in transportation. And I think that’s where the biggest value 0:22:06 is, but also one of the hardest to go into. Yeah, the classic full stack startup, right? 0:22:10 Which is I’m going to build these operational intelligence tools, but nobody else gets to 0:22:14 use them. I’m using it to serve my own business. And I’m going to win the market by winning 0:22:20 the customers directly. Yeah. And I think that the industries that are going to win 0:22:25 the most out of operational intelligence are going to be these kind of like traditionally 0:22:35 non-IT buyers. So oil and gas, groceries, construction, these are businesses that are 0:22:43 really, you know, trillion dollar industries, or trillions. But they have very low margins. 0:22:47 Like they’ve existed for such a long time that they’ve they’ve operationally become 0:22:58 really efficient. And at the same time, commoditized. So I’ll give you an example. The largest 0:23:05 construction group in the world is called the ACS group. The revenues are about like 0:23:12 34 billion per year, but their margins are about six and a half percent. And so a small 0:23:18 change in the gross margins for these businesses, a small change in how operationally efficient 0:23:26 they are translates into huge increases in their profit margins. Another example is Costco. 0:23:32 So in 2017, their revenues were about 12 and a half billion. And they were operating on 0:23:40 about 11% gross margin. Again, another another place where a change in operational efficiency 0:23:46 can lead to huge changes in revenues. The final example is a little different. This 0:23:50 one is less about gross margins, but more about capital deployed. And so the example 0:23:58 here is ExxonMobil, the mobile. If you were to guess what their like the value of the 0:24:01 capital that they have deployed around the world, what would you what would you guess? 0:24:07 Oh, ExxonMobil. Yeah. Hundreds of billions. Is it the order magnitude? 0:24:16 So ExxonMobil is about 230 billion capital. And they’re the way they measure their performance 0:24:26 is on return on capital invested ROIC. It’s it’s it’s a it’s very different. It’s different 0:24:30 than how you know the grocery example I gave earlier, which was based mainly on the gross 0:24:37 margins. And their return is about nine and a half percent or so. So again, a small change 0:24:43 in the operational efficiency of the of the capital that they have deployed can translate 0:24:49 into huge additional gains. I mean, they’re deploying about like 23 billion dollars additional 0:24:55 capital this year. That’s a lot of spending. Yes. And that’s that’s that’s the I mean, 0:25:00 it’s really interesting, like helping these companies on the that that are capital heavy. 0:25:06 So it sounds like you’re excited about a whole sort of gamut of startups. One would be, hey, 0:25:12 look, I’m going to sell a particular technology to enable you to be more operationally intelligent. 0:25:17 Right. You’re also interested in the full stack startups, which is I can sell an entire 0:25:23 solution to a customer directly and nobody else gets my oh, I goodness, so to speak. 0:25:28 What are some examples of sort of startups that you are? What are some examples of things 0:25:36 that you’re personally excited about? I can give you some some examples on the on the 0:25:40 infrastructure side. So I’m excited about the SuperSep project. I’m excited about what 0:25:51 implies doing. I think I think there’s a lot of I think a lot of what’s actually happening 0:25:59 is people are now starting to see analytics and observability as as urgent, as necessary 0:26:05 to running their business. And so I think that there’s a really great opportunity in 0:26:15 that space. I’m also really interested in companies or vendors, software vendors, into 0:26:19 incumbents, into large existing industries, like into construction, companies that sell 0:26:26 into construction or companies that sell into groceries. We’ve seen a few startups in that 0:26:34 domain. The hardest, some of the hardest problems here is that these are startups that are going 0:26:41 to have very different economic profiles than the traditional, you know, Silicon Valley 0:26:43 startup that that we know. 0:26:54 So first off, these are you’re selling into markets that are stagnant, that are very low 0:26:58 margin. They don’t have a lot of margin to go around, right? They can’t afford to pay 0:27:04 a lot. Exactly. And they’re not used to buying new technology. They kind of understand one, 0:27:09 two, and three, and like they don’t really know about four, or they don’t know how to 0:27:15 digest it. And so a lot of the effort there is going to be around educating and the sales 0:27:22 cycles are going to be very long. The pie at the end of that, like the other, the flip 0:27:26 side of this is that these are huge businesses, right? 0:27:30 Yeah. Construction, oil gas, retail chains, right? 0:27:36 Once you’re in, you’re in. And so when you’re actually starting a company in this area, 0:27:42 there’s a few things that you want to keep in mind. One, you need to educate your investors. 0:27:45 Like these are usually investors are not going to understand these businesses really well. 0:27:51 And they might not know the difficulty of actually selling into them, like what it takes. 0:27:59 And so you need to prep your investors for this like long haul thing for the long term. 0:28:05 And they need to understand that this is at the end of this, there’s a really bright light. 0:28:11 The second piece is you need to get domain expertise. Like you need to become the expert 0:28:19 in that business. And you need to become a kind of trusted advisor to these companies. 0:28:24 And so when they say things like, oh, you know, we want to go through digital transformation, 0:28:27 you need to help them understand like, here’s what that means. We’re going to be here for 0:28:33 you. We’re going to guide you through it and actually help them with both a significant 0:28:37 amount of services as well as software on the back end. 0:28:42 So don’t shy away from the services. Don’t shy away from the services, especially in these industries. 0:28:49 Well, Jan, thank you so much for coming and sharing this idea. The good thing about this is that 0:28:55 the world really is changing fast. If you are a retailer, Amazon has scared the bejesus out of 0:29:02 you, right? And so what used to be a very long tedious sales cycle has gotten a little quicker 0:29:06 because Amazon’s in the rearview mirror. And so everybody sort of knows that they need to go 0:29:10 faster. They need to make decisions sort of lower in the organization. They need to make them in 0:29:16 real time. And so it’s exciting to see startups helping that transition to real time decision 0:29:22 making pushed lower in the organization. So thanks for joining the YouTube channel. 0:29:27 If you liked what you saw, go ahead and subscribe. Feel free to leave comments. Maybe the question 0:29:32 that I’ll use to prime the comments is, what are your favorite examples of decisions that now need 0:29:39 to be made in more real time? And look forward to joining the conversation there. See you next episode.
As companies digitize, they change the way they make decisions: decisions are made lower in the organization, based on data, and increasingly automated. This creates opportunities for startups creating new ways to collect and analyze data to support this new style of decision making. In this episode (which originally aired as a YouTube video), Jad Naous (@jadtnaous) and Frank Chen (@withfries2) discuss this change and the startup opportunities these changes create.
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0:00:02 Hi, and welcome to the A16Z podcast. 0:00:06 I’m Hannah, and this episode is all about building a software company in healthcare. 0:00:11 In this conversation, Jorge Conde, A16Z general partner in bio and healthcare, previous founder 0:00:16 of the genomics company Nome, and Julie Yu, partner on the deal team for the Bio Fund, 0:00:21 and previous founder of the patient provider matching system Kyrus, explained what it is 0:00:25 that makes building a company in the healthcare space so fundamentally different from in other 0:00:26 sectors. 0:00:28 And why exactly it’s so damn hard. 0:00:32 So let’s start with basically just the very fundamental difference between building a 0:00:36 software company full stop and building a software company in the healthcare space. 0:00:39 What are the most foundational, crucial differences? 0:00:45 Well, historically at least, software had two very important sort of qualities in healthcare. 0:00:48 The first one, the actual quality of software deployed in healthcare system historically 0:00:49 has not been great. 0:00:51 User interface wise and experience wise. 0:00:52 Bad track record. 0:00:53 Bad track record there. 0:00:56 And the second one is that it was usually not highly valued. 0:01:01 So at least a lot of times it was considered either free or cheap. 0:01:02 And why was that? 0:01:05 That in it from the very beginning, there was not a lot of value attached to this. 0:01:09 On the healthcare system, a lot of things still have a very human component to them, 0:01:14 automating things and sort of creating frictionless experiences or delightful experiences. 0:01:17 The things that software is really good at doing, it’s just really hard to do in the 0:01:18 healthcare system. 0:01:21 The second one is, I’m going to generalize for a second, but I think a lot of times in 0:01:26 the healthcare system, software has sold us a component of a broader service or of a 0:01:27 broader offering. 0:01:31 And so therefore it’s the piece that tends to get sort of devalued first because it obviously 0:01:32 has the lowest marginal cost. 0:01:36 It’s going to create this weird dynamic for software companies that are trying to build 0:01:37 in healthcare. 0:01:41 There’s a higher degree of sensitivity in this particular market for things that get 0:01:44 in the way of the patient provider experience. 0:01:47 One of the challenges/opportunities within healthcare is that it tends to be much more 0:01:50 risk averse when it comes to adoption of new technologies. 0:01:55 One meaningful difference in introducing a software product to this market versus other 0:02:02 markets is the level of scrutiny and the bar that you need to hit from a not even usability 0:02:07 perspective but just utility and actually having validation of if you are going to introduce 0:02:13 something new into the care delivery flow, it better work because the stakes are so high. 0:02:16 If you get it wrong, you could either send a patient in the wrong direction or they might 0:02:20 not get the care that they need or it could actually harm the individuals involved. 0:02:23 So not just higher barrier to entry but higher stakes, correct? 0:02:24 Immediately. 0:02:26 They’re a reticent buyer, generally speaking. 0:02:30 They’re running on very thin margins if we’re selling into the healthcare system, into provider 0:02:37 space and it needs to work because if it doesn’t, obviously there can be patient harm so the 0:02:42 probability that a newcomer, an upstart can come in and make that case in a convincing 0:02:44 way is a very, very difficult challenge. 0:02:48 So does that mean you have to have certain prerequisites that you may not need to have 0:02:49 in other spaces? 0:02:52 If you know you have these challenges and you know that you’re entering this space with 0:02:55 a lot more barrier to entry and a lot higher stakes, are there certain things you need 0:03:01 in place, a certain kind of proof of concept that you might not have to have otherwise? 0:03:04 Well, first of all, I think you’re touching on a very important thing which is in the space 0:03:07 and I’m going to specifically focus on sort of the healthcare system. 0:03:11 So let’s call it provider systems, payers and the like. 0:03:17 You have to really understand what the workflows are, what the problem space is and how to 0:03:19 actually address any of those things. 0:03:24 And so one of the biggest challenges I think that companies have when they want to build 0:03:28 software products here is to really understand what problem they’re going to solve because 0:03:33 I think you have this weird sort of intersection between it’s very non-intuitive, it’s still 0:03:39 very human driven and centric, there are regulatory barriers, you don’t want to get in between 0:03:42 say a provider and a patient, you know, most people aren’t born with the ability to say 0:03:48 like I know I can insert a piece of software into this part of the workflow and I will 0:03:50 solve an acute pain point for the system. 0:03:51 That’s not obvious. 0:03:53 And some of that is actually lack of standardization. 0:03:57 You would think that medicine is an industry that has a tremendous amount of standardization 0:04:01 and protocols around how people make decisions and do things. 0:04:04 But it actually turns out that healthcare is an industry that actually is characterized 0:04:06 by a tremendous amount of variation. 0:04:07 And variation in what kinds of ways? 0:04:11 It could be variation in terms of actually literally the decision that if you have ten 0:04:16 doctors who are all presented with the same patient, you might see ten different decisions 0:04:18 about how to treat that patient. 0:04:22 Some physicians might be more aggressive about using invasive surgical techniques versus 0:04:27 others who are more holistic, even just how I was brought up religiously or culturally 0:04:29 might impact the way I think about that problem. 0:04:33 From a product perspective, you could have multiple drugs that all treat the same condition, 0:04:35 that all have different implications and whatnot. 0:04:39 So even there, even though you have a patient population that is characterized by the same 0:04:43 diagnosis, you could have dozens of different ways that those patients play out. 0:04:47 And so it makes it very hard for a technology company to come in and sort of generalize 0:04:53 and say, you know, there is one single method for, you know, manufacturing this thing or 0:04:57 for making this decision and managing this patient population, ultimately that reflects 0:05:01 as differences in the financial profile of different patients. 0:05:04 Healthcare, it’s like politics, it’s very local. 0:05:09 Thinking that you’re going to have an out-of-the-box, one and done solution, even in systems that 0:05:14 look similar from either a size standpoint or reach standpoint or even a geographic standpoint, 0:05:16 these are all kind of end-of-ones. 0:05:18 So what does that mean? 0:05:24 So we have kind of knowledge of workflow, the knowledge of variety and spectrum and that 0:05:27 you are ultimately working in weirdly an N=1 scenario. 0:05:31 I want to bring it back to like actual practicalities of this sort of company building. 0:05:38 In your experiences, you both founded companies, what do you wish you had known or done differently 0:05:42 from the very beginning, given the complexity of that space and the unique challenges that 0:05:44 building a company in healthcare presents? 0:05:48 With Kairis, one of the products that we had was a product that was used by call center 0:05:50 agents in hospitals. 0:05:53 And our thesis when we first launched the product was, oh, well, we’re just going to 0:05:58 go after every hospital that has a call center and they probably all operate similarly. 0:06:02 And what constitutes the job of a call center agent is probably relatively homogenous. 0:06:06 And so we can make all sorts of assumptions about how it’s built, how it’s deployed and 0:06:07 how it’s managed over time. 0:06:11 The thing that strikes me already is that feels like a reasonable assessment of the 0:06:12 lay of the land. 0:06:13 Yeah. 0:06:15 And especially, I think it’s very easy to get fooled in healthcare by looking at other 0:06:20 industries and seeing how it works in the rest of the world because certainly… 0:06:21 And then you pull up the… 0:06:22 Yeah. 0:06:24 And then you pull up the wool and it’s like, oh, it’s completely the opposite. 0:06:25 Call centers. 0:06:28 I mean, that’s definitely an industry that if you look at retail or even all the airline 0:06:33 companies and how they operate their customer service operations tend to be pretty standardized 0:06:36 and pretty sophisticated in a lot of cases. 0:06:39 When did you start to realize this wasn’t maybe your average call center? 0:06:45 Like on day one, first of all, there’s heterogeneity in the actual scope of services of pretty 0:06:47 much every call center that we encountered. 0:06:51 Some call centers might be fully centralized and they’re like a central 800 number that 0:06:56 receives every call that comes into the hospital versus others that are decentralized that 0:07:01 only serve the primary care line versus the cardiology line versus the dermatology line. 0:07:05 And because of that, they will have just fundamentally different starting points of where they have 0:07:07 to be in the workflow for the thing to work. 0:07:12 The other aspect is the scope of functions that the call center plays. 0:07:15 It could be everything from just a general marketing service where a customer might call 0:07:18 in and say, do you provide these kinds of services? 0:07:20 Can you give me directions to the clinic? 0:07:23 All the way to I need a prescription refill. 0:07:24 I’ve been diagnosed with this thing. 0:07:27 I need to figure out what kind of surgery I need. 0:07:29 So again, much bigger range of possibilities. 0:07:30 Correct. 0:07:31 Yeah. 0:07:36 Like I’m a call center agent and how do you define in my job so that when I give you another 0:07:41 piece of software to use to do that job, it’s going to be seamless. 0:07:44 And when you have that kind of heterogeneity around even the sheer definition of what the 0:07:48 job is, it makes it very hard to design a scalable solution that can kind of fit into 0:07:50 all those different environments. 0:07:55 So day one, we actually were fortunate to get a customer that did have a pretty robust 0:08:00 centralized call center group that was hundreds of people who literally were answering every 0:08:02 call that was coming into the health system. 0:08:06 And so the immediate sort of leap that we made was, oh, they must all look like this. 0:08:11 Even if 80% of it was the same and there was 20% sort of buffer that needed to be modified, 0:08:12 we can deal with that. 0:08:16 Yes, they all had central call centers, but the fundamental scope of jobs that they were 0:08:19 doing were completely different across the board. 0:08:22 And some were more clinical in nature, some were more marketing in nature, some were more 0:08:24 financial in nature, et cetera. 0:08:26 So what were the knock on effects of that? 0:08:27 Yeah. 0:08:32 The impact on like, go to market, product design and spend product strategy. 0:08:36 Most importantly, the service model of you could either say, we’re going to design our 0:08:40 software to be so flexible that it could work in any environment. 0:08:46 Or you could say, we’re going to provide services to come train your people to behave in a more 0:08:49 standardized way relative to the rest of our book of business. 0:08:52 And so we ultimately ended up taking a hybrid approach to both. 0:08:55 But the latter, you know, that services approach is something that we hadn’t thought about 0:09:00 that allowed us to sort of abstract out the variation to some degree, but also provide 0:09:04 value back to the customers in a pretty unique way because then we had the best practices 0:09:07 for, you know, how it should work. 0:09:10 So ultimately it was a good thing, but it was a major fork in the road. 0:09:11 Absolutely. 0:09:15 Because there is so much variability, because there’s so much localization, the notion of 0:09:20 the pure SaaS model where you’re just throwing technology over the fence and assuming that 0:09:25 it will fit into whatever environment you’re deploying it into, that is a moot point in 0:09:30 healthcare, you actually do need to think about the services component of things. 0:09:34 There was a whole generation of companies that got started like a decade ago that took 0:09:39 these sort of tech-only approaches and failed to get scale or had to fundamentally pivot 0:09:43 their models to actually take into account more of the human element of the service delivery 0:09:44 model. 0:09:45 I mean, even there’s a term for it now, right? 0:09:50 Tech-enabled services is a way of doing things now in digital health that I think is well 0:09:56 recognized that it’s necessary to wrap the technology with a human component to essentially 0:10:00 address and be able to accommodate all the variation that you see across different customer 0:10:01 bases. 0:10:04 And it changes your cost structure fundamentally, the nature of how we talked about the business 0:10:05 and how it scales. 0:10:08 And even our fundraising strategy fundamentally changed because of that. 0:10:13 And so we did have to, you know, raise more and give ourselves more runway and think about 0:10:15 different ways to manage our margin. 0:10:19 It sounds like everything that could have been changed by that. 0:10:23 Let’s go back to a specific example where you really put your foot in it. 0:10:26 Well, so in our experience at Noam, it was interesting because here, this is a company 0:10:32 with, the sole purpose of the company was to provide software capability to analyze 0:10:33 genomic information. 0:10:36 And so, you know, when you launch that, your assumption is, well, this could be used to 0:10:39 power all kinds of applications. 0:10:43 It could be used for research, either an academia and industry, it can be used for, you know, 0:10:44 clinical diagnostics. 0:10:45 Flexible. 0:10:46 We thought it was very flexible. 0:10:50 But challenge one is, you know, a solution looking for a problem is always a very, very 0:10:51 dangerous thing. 0:10:52 I think that’s universally true. 0:10:54 I think it’s especially true in the healthcare space. 0:11:00 And challenge two was understanding exactly where, in the case of the clinical setting, 0:11:03 where this technology would be used in the workflow. 0:11:07 So here we wanted to go after the clinical labs. 0:11:08 That was your initial hypothesis? 0:11:12 Our initial hypothesis for an application in a clinical setting. 0:11:17 You have technicians and docs that are inside of the laboratory setting, receiving samples, 0:11:23 running a test, analyzing the results of that test, generating a report that gets signed 0:11:25 off by a lab director that goes back to a physician. 0:11:27 Usually it’s in the form of a diagnosis, right? 0:11:29 And it gets signed off and it goes to the physician. 0:11:36 The physician now takes that report and basically decides what to do based on that information. 0:11:42 So our assumption was, well, if you have the ability to sequence DNA now in a way that 0:11:46 you couldn’t before, before you’d have to do all of these specific tests, you have to 0:11:49 know what to test and then you’d test it and then you’d get a report. 0:11:53 You had to know what street lamp the keys were under, right, like there in that case. 0:11:57 Whereas once you had the full genome, you could just sequence everything and just run 0:11:59 a bunch of software queries. 0:12:04 So our thought going into this was, well, that’s an incredibly powerful tool for clinical labs 0:12:08 because first of all, you can sequence just once and analyze over time. 0:12:09 Right. 0:12:12 It seems like a totally legitimate assumption to make. 0:12:15 And it turns out that there was a lot of challenges with that assumption. 0:12:17 The first one is every lab is different. 0:12:21 A lot of them didn’t have the budget or the willingness to basically pay the upfront 0:12:28 piece to buy the capability to use this technology or they didn’t have the ability to sequence 0:12:29 everything upfront. 0:12:33 Even if all of the subsequent queries would be technically free later. 0:12:34 Why not? 0:12:35 The way they’re reimbursed. 0:12:36 Oh, how fascinating. 0:12:37 Too expensive, basically. 0:12:38 It’s too expensive. 0:12:43 So even the theoretically there’s an ROI, a return on the investment of sequencing upfront, 0:12:48 just the way the industry structure, the way reimbursement flows, the way payments flow. 0:12:50 It just didn’t make sense for a lot of labs to do this. 0:12:53 So how was that not just a complete roadblock at that point? 0:12:54 It was a big roadblock. 0:12:58 So what that required us to do was to then focus on clinical labs that had the ability 0:13:00 to make certain investments in upfront costs. 0:13:04 And those tended to be very sophisticated labs that do a lot of research work in addition 0:13:08 to patient care and they tended to be on the sort of on the bleeding edge and they wanted 0:13:11 to incorporate new technology and they were great partners and all of that. 0:13:13 But then it goes back to your end of one problem. 0:13:18 So you sell something into that lab and you go next door and next door has a totally different 0:13:21 set of capabilities, a totally different set of constraints, a totally different set 0:13:22 of expectations. 0:13:27 And so therefore, all of a sudden the solution you created for lab A is not relevant or unattainable 0:13:29 for lab B. 0:13:33 Now, to just add to the stepping in it, you know, when you’re analyzing genomic data, 0:13:36 there’s a massive amount of computation required. 0:13:40 And so we went in there assuming, well, this is easy, we’re just going to shoot all of 0:13:44 this up to the cloud, we’ll run the analysis, we’ll send the data back to the lab, the lab 0:13:48 could verify it, generate a report and off we go. 0:13:51 It turns out labs weren’t comfortable sending data up into the cloud, full stop. 0:13:55 At that time, it was just completely– At that time, arguably even today, arguably 0:13:59 even today in 2019, but definitely at that time, we probably should have known that earlier 0:14:03 that would have changed how we thought about going into the clinical lab space. 0:14:04 How would you have done your homework? 0:14:06 I mean, what would that have actually looked like? 0:14:11 It was frankly, I think just defining the specs of what would be required to bring in 0:14:17 our technology, because I think people intuitively know that genomic data is massive, but I don’t 0:14:22 think they know sort of the level of computation required to run the interpretation. 0:14:23 Right. 0:14:24 So like really running the numbers. 0:14:26 Running the numbers for them and by the way, we tried everything. 0:14:30 I mean, we brought representatives from AWS that could show them that they had a HIPAA 0:14:35 compliant cloud that they had received all the certifications and it came back to risk 0:14:36 aversion. 0:14:39 So someone, the lab director, saying like, “Look, I’m sure all of that’s true, but I’m 0:14:41 not going to risk sending all of this data up into the cloud.” 0:14:46 So that was a big, big challenge for us and it ended up being a major limitation for our 0:14:50 ability to expand into the clinical setting because of all of those barriers. 0:14:51 So what did you do? 0:14:56 We had to do a plan A and a plan B. And so the plan A was we assumed that there would 0:15:01 be a couple of forward looking labs or forward thinking labs that would be willing to work 0:15:05 in the cloud environment, much easier to deploy there. 0:15:10 The plan B was we had to create a box and we had to create a box and the box had to have 0:15:11 essentially the competition. 0:15:12 A normal appliance. 0:15:13 Yeah. 0:15:14 We had a normal appliance. 0:15:15 Remember that. 0:15:16 Oh my gosh. 0:15:17 Because they didn’t want the data to go outside. 0:15:21 And it’s for the reasons that we’d expect, you know, there’s regulatory, there’s risk 0:15:24 associated with that today in 2019. 0:15:28 In fact, the companies that have managed to use this technology have taken the sort of 0:15:30 full stack service approach. 0:15:35 So that sort of high low strategy became the approach is get folks to deploy into the cloud 0:15:37 when they were willing to. 0:15:43 And in the case where folks needed an appliance, we basically had to go to labs that had enough 0:15:47 a sample volume that an appliance made sense for them and make basically the case there 0:15:48 from an investment standpoint. 0:15:53 So again, multiple choice, variety and like addressing in different ways. 0:15:58 A pure software company in healthcare is a really hard thing to do. 0:16:01 Because on the one side, you have this challenge that it’s hard to create a sort of a solution 0:16:03 that’s going to fit everyone. 0:16:08 And therefore you need to have some level of services around that software. 0:16:09 That’s on one extreme. 0:16:12 So when you need to have humans in the process or in the loop. 0:16:16 And then the other extreme, if it is pure software, then it’s considered that it should 0:16:17 be free. 0:16:18 So it’s very hard to abstract value. 0:16:19 That’s so interesting. 0:16:23 Do you think that’s shifting at all with the kind of understanding of the importance of 0:16:24 data and some other things? 0:16:25 Yeah. 0:16:27 Look, I would argue it’s shifting on a couple of axes. 0:16:30 The first one is data is becoming more and more valuable. 0:16:36 Historically data was viewed as being either too small in terms of its impact, too narrow, 0:16:38 too dirty, et cetera, et cetera. 0:16:39 Too difficult. 0:16:40 Yeah. 0:16:41 Too unstructured. 0:16:42 So that historically has been the case. 0:16:47 So if you have ways to ingest data and clean it and make it meaningful, then I think that 0:16:48 is valued. 0:16:52 Probably the most public one is what Flatiron was able to do and ultimately getting acquired 0:16:55 by Roche for $2 million. 0:17:00 That’s viewed as using an electronic medical record to capture patient experiences, take 0:17:05 that information, and give researchers the ability to drive valuable insights from that. 0:17:06 That’s a relatively new thing. 0:17:08 So I think there is the ability to create value there. 0:17:10 So I think that’s one axis. 0:17:14 I think there’s a general shift in the model that having a tech-enabled service can be 0:17:18 a valuable thing and if done well can be a scalable business. 0:17:23 In other words, if you know what you’re trying to build and if the software layer reduces 0:17:29 sufficient friction in the system and allows you to add people, not linearly as you scale, 0:17:33 but in a leverageable way, then all of a sudden you could have tech-enabled services that 0:17:35 can grow and become large businesses. 0:17:40 So leaning into what it is that makes it difficult almost and then scaling that, leveraging that. 0:17:41 Exactly. 0:17:42 Finding ways to make that scalable. 0:17:43 Yeah. 0:17:45 That’s not easy to do, but I think it is now doable in a way that probably it wasn’t. 0:17:46 Yeah. 0:17:50 So we see that same trend actually happening in the consumer world where you used to have 0:17:55 a bunch of services like the marketplaces that were purely tech and were just matching 0:17:59 supply and demand and then getting out of the way, whereas now you see a lot more services 0:18:03 like in the real estate market where they’re actually managing properties. 0:18:06 We’re actually going to clean the place and make sure it has good furniture and all that 0:18:07 kind of stuff. 0:18:11 I think the same premise holds true in healthcare where you realize that in order to truly make 0:18:15 an impact, you kind of have to own certain parts of the full stack and that’s what you 0:18:17 see playing out in the rest of the world as well. 0:18:18 Okay. 0:18:22 So we’ve talked about kind of knowing the workflow and the complexity of the system, 0:18:26 running the numbers and specking it out as concretely as possible. 0:18:28 How about in terms of team building? 0:18:33 Are there ways that you, knowing what you knew down the road that you would have changed 0:18:36 how you thought about building the team from the very beginning? 0:18:38 My prior experience was not in healthcare. 0:18:42 And so a lot of my views on how to do these kinds of things were informed by a company 0:18:45 that was just a pure enterprise software company. 0:18:48 And one of the mantras was you want to, in the early stages of a company, hire for all 0:18:52 around athletes and just people who are utility players who can like roll with the punches 0:18:53 and figure it out. 0:18:57 It doesn’t matter what kind of experience they had as long as they’re scrappy, intellectually 0:19:00 motivated people, they’re going to figure it out. 0:19:04 So it certainly took that approach when we started Kyrus and hired folks not necessarily 0:19:09 from healthcare who maybe had some engineering experience or sales experience from elsewhere 0:19:12 in the world and said, “We’re just going to go in there and figure it out.” 0:19:15 But you surely had some deep experts in the space as well. 0:19:17 So my co-founder is a physician by training. 0:19:23 So we had sort of the deep clinical knowledge, but I would say actually we didn’t have that 0:19:28 many people who knew the specific market that we were going after. 0:19:32 And that’s another characteristic of healthcare startups is healthcare is so massive that 0:19:36 when you talk about market segment, you have to be very specific about what you’re talking 0:19:37 about. 0:19:41 So when people come and say, “Oh, I have a company that sells to providers,” I’m like, 0:19:42 that’s great. 0:19:43 That’s like, you know… 0:19:44 What does that actually mean? 0:19:45 Yeah. 0:19:47 Like there’s 20 billion ways that you could describe providers like, “Are you selling 0:19:48 to hospitals? 0:19:49 Are you selling to health systems? 0:19:50 Are you selling to individual practices?” 0:19:53 And each of those can be multi-billion dollar markets in and of themselves. 0:19:56 I used to work in publishing and it reminds me of people who would pitch their books to 0:19:58 us and be like, “It’s for the general reader.” 0:19:59 And you’re like, “Who? 0:20:00 Who? 0:20:01 There is no general reader.” 0:20:02 Exactly. 0:20:03 There’s like somebody who likes to read Amy Tan. 0:20:07 There’s somebody who likes to read like, you know, Dan Brown or whatever. 0:20:08 These are different people. 0:20:09 Yeah. 0:20:10 There you go. 0:20:11 So yeah. 0:20:14 So basically we had folks in our company who had “health care experience,” but maybe 0:20:18 it was from the pharma industry or from payer or even like a different segment of the health 0:20:22 of the provider market, but not the specific market that we were going after, which was 0:20:24 like a very esoteric… 0:20:28 We were going after the biggest health systems, like the top down approach in the enterprise 0:20:29 space. 0:20:32 And there’s very specific characteristics to those organizations that are very different 0:20:34 than even smaller hospital networks. 0:20:38 The areas of the team building exercise that I wish we had been more thoughtful about were, 0:20:43 you know, in terms of customer facing roles, where it was a team responsible for managing 0:20:47 the customer relationship longer term, you know, just how important it is for those people 0:20:54 to have some kind of understanding and empathy and ideally experience with the kind of people 0:20:55 that we were servicing. 0:20:59 There is total merit to saying, “Actually, we need some insiders who might not have any 0:21:05 technical skills whatsoever, but can help us understand the culture and the politics 0:21:08 and what it means to even like talk to a physician.” 0:21:11 You know, we had a bunch of folks who had never been in health care who walked into meetings 0:21:15 and called doctors by their first names, and that was a complete taboo in certain cultures 0:21:17 where you have to call them Dr. Jones or Dr. Smith. 0:21:21 Like “Stranger in a strange land” kind of like, “Here’s the language here.” 0:21:22 Yeah. 0:21:24 So I think from a team building experience, one of the biggest lessons that we certainly 0:21:31 learned was a valuing health care domain expertise earlier in the evolution of a company relative 0:21:36 to other sectors, and then also thinking about where that makes sense, like what functions 0:21:39 that makes sense, because it’s not a 100% universal statement across the board. 0:21:43 I would say our engineering team, it was actually better that they came from outside 0:21:44 of health care. 0:21:48 Oh, so in specific areas of where you need the knowledge and where you don’t. 0:21:51 Why was it a bad thing for engineers to have that? 0:21:53 Not a bad thing per se, but you wanted people who could like really think out of the box 0:21:58 and not be sort of married to the way it’s done today, because actually that’s exactly 0:22:02 the point of building companies in this space is to not do it the way it’s been done. 0:22:07 And so most of the technology systems that are in place are written on super legacy technologies 0:22:10 and don’t have things like APIs and whatnot. 0:22:13 You need to be like super creative about like how to get into these systems and get data 0:22:18 out because they were like fundamentally not designed to have liquidity around the data 0:22:19 that’s stored in them. 0:22:23 And so it was helpful to have people from the financial services industry, for instance, 0:22:27 who had figured those things out with similar banking systems and whatnot and could kind 0:22:30 of bring some of that creativity to the health care space. 0:22:33 So engineering is definitely a space where I felt there was a positive to not having 0:22:37 that health care domain knowledge, but certainly on the commercial side of the business. 0:22:39 I think it’s critically important. 0:22:42 Making sure that the engineering team is as modern as possible is the most valuable thing 0:22:43 you can do for your company. 0:22:48 Because I think what’s generally true and probably definitely true across the board 0:22:52 is that health care, the data sets are so complex, right? 0:22:56 They’re complex in terms of their variety, they’re complex in terms of their volume, 0:22:57 they’re unstructured. 0:22:58 There’s regulatory requirements. 0:23:02 There’s so many things that are challenging from a data handling standpoint. 0:23:06 So building the pipes in the most modern way possible, absolutely critical. 0:23:11 Whoever’s customer facing, I think has to be from that game, has to understand the space, 0:23:15 has to understand who the customer is, has to understand the cultural norms and all of 0:23:16 those things. 0:23:17 Those things are both true. 0:23:22 You need both in the get-go, industry specific on the customer spacing side and domain expert 0:23:24 from the engineering side, right? 0:23:27 And then let’s talk a little bit about the middle, the product, right? 0:23:28 That’s where the sausage gets made. 0:23:29 Totally. 0:23:32 I’m going to be biased because I was the chief product officer of my company. 0:23:35 And that’s where I would say it was split, where I do think it’s important for the leader 0:23:40 of that organization to have a pretty deep understanding of the market. 0:23:44 And so I happen to have had health care experience, not specifically in this particular segment 0:23:48 per se, but I understood some of those cultural nuances and just dynamics of how the market 0:23:51 worked to be able to set strategy. 0:23:55 Below me, however, some of my best product managers were not health care people at all. 0:23:59 And in fact, we had three products, one that was the call center product that I mentioned 0:24:04 earlier, where the end users themselves were not health care people, right? 0:24:09 And so some of them were like high school graduates who go home and they use their iPhone and 0:24:11 they’re used to all these modern technologies and the rest of their lives. 0:24:15 And then they come to work and they’re faced with these totally esoteric, crappy, hard 0:24:17 to use systems. 0:24:20 And so I wanted someone who actually had kind of a consumer mindset. 0:24:24 Did you find yourself doing a lot of sort of explaining and educating though to bridge 0:24:25 that gap? 0:24:26 Yeah. 0:24:28 My philosophy was just throw them in the deep end. 0:24:32 As part of the onboarding experience at Kyrus, you had to visit a hospital call center and 0:24:34 they actually let you listen in on calls. 0:24:37 It was like a religious transformation for these team members who went. 0:24:42 Some came back and said, I cannot believe that this is how these organizations operate, 0:24:43 right? 0:24:45 Cause like everyone thinks of health care as this very pristine, like I’m going to trust 0:24:49 you with my life and they’ll come back and be horrified because, you know, they see that 0:24:54 things are being run on paper and just how much burden they put on the customer, right? 0:24:57 Because part of what you hear when you’re listening in on these calls is like asking 0:24:59 the patient, what do you want to do? 0:25:01 And the patient’s like, well, why would I have understood? 0:25:04 I’m calling you guys a hospital and you’re supposed to tell me what to do. 0:25:05 So that was one reaction. 0:25:07 The other reaction was completely emotional, right? 0:25:11 Because a lot of these patients who were calling in had just been diagnosed with cancer and 0:25:16 they have no idea what they’re doing and they’re calling because they need help. 0:25:20 And then the call center agent sometimes felt helpless because they didn’t have the tools 0:25:21 or the workflows or the information. 0:25:25 Oh, it reminds me of like a 911 operator with like no training, somebody thrown into 0:25:28 the middle of like, I’m having a massive life crisis. 0:25:29 Yeah. 0:25:30 It was inspiring and motivational. 0:25:33 And so that became part of like our training process was to just go out there and see it 0:25:35 versus me explaining it. 0:25:36 That’s really interesting. 0:25:37 Okay. 0:25:38 So what about timing? 0:25:42 Do you think it’s different in the healthcare space, how you think about what’s the right 0:25:43 moment for your product? 0:25:48 One of the big challenges in healthcare is this idea that you can be too early. 0:25:50 You can be too early for a couple of reasons. 0:25:59 One is you need a lot of changes to workflows for the entire system to become much more modern. 0:26:04 But you think this is different from being too early with like pets.com. 0:26:05 That’s a good question. 0:26:09 So the way I would think about it, I described what was for us at the company, a very obvious 0:26:11 evolution of where genetic testing would go. 0:26:15 You would sequence everything first and you would test multiple times in silicone. 0:26:16 You could see the light at the end of the tunnel. 0:26:17 I mean, that’s a clear future. 0:26:22 And so the question is when is the system ready for your particular solution to a problem 0:26:24 that everyone agrees exists, right? 0:26:28 Everyone agrees that we have to do a better job at being able to diagnose folks with genetic 0:26:29 disease. 0:26:33 And I think everyone would agree that using genomics, the ability to do this at large 0:26:38 scale to query multiple times, to use software, to make intelligent queries would be a very 0:26:41 powerful tool, a very powerful solution for that. 0:26:47 But the reality was, continues to be, that just the structures of the industry are such, 0:26:50 even though that’s where I think we will end up, it’s just not ready for it now. 0:26:54 And I think this is true for any entrepreneur, timing is a big part of anything you do. 0:26:58 I think timelines are especially warped in healthcare because it just takes a long time 0:27:00 to adopt new technologies. 0:27:04 There actually is a peer-reviewed study of the average number of years it takes for 0:27:08 new technologies that are introduced into the medical setting to become mass-market 0:27:09 adopted. 0:27:10 Oh, how fascinating. 0:27:11 Wait, wait, let’s guess. 0:27:12 Two years. 0:27:13 17 years. 0:27:14 No! 0:27:15 I mean, we still have fax machines. 0:27:16 That’s true. 0:27:17 We still have fax machines. 0:27:18 We still use the same… 0:27:21 But we’re not talking about when technology leaves, but you’re right. 0:27:22 It’s the same thing, really. 0:27:23 Yeah, so it gets replaced. 0:27:26 Yeah, you can think about it as all the things that have tried to replace the fax machine 0:27:28 or not yet mass-market adopted. 0:27:29 And it’s the same. 0:27:30 You could see it in… 0:27:35 I think the study actually focused primarily on stethoscopes and thermometers and things 0:27:38 that literally have not been redesigned for hundreds of years because it’s been so hard 0:27:39 to disrupt them. 0:27:42 Over the last 17 years, there’s been a bajillion better versions of the stethoscope that we 0:27:43 are just not seeing. 0:27:45 The wheel could have been reinvented, but better. 0:27:46 Absolutely. 0:27:50 Those are the tangible examples, but the same applies to software and technology. 0:27:54 And that’s a lot of the reason why you see the market-leading companies that own the EHR 0:27:57 space today are literally 45 years old. 0:28:01 And by the way, those companies also didn’t hit their stride until like 20 years into 0:28:02 their journeys. 0:28:06 So time functions completely differently, basically, in this system. 0:28:07 It’s almost like… 0:28:08 It’s like a wormhole. 0:28:12 And second of all, it’s an incredible testament to the strength of these systems that… 0:28:13 Totally. 0:28:14 Yeah. 0:28:16 It’s like, once you do make it, it’s totally sticky. 0:28:21 The LTV, essentially, of tech companies that actually make it and get to a certain level 0:28:23 of scale is through the roof. 0:28:25 There’s no incentive to rip them out because if they work, they work. 0:28:29 The switching costs because of all the human and cultural elements that we described is 0:28:30 huge. 0:28:31 Yeah. 0:28:34 So the longevity of your company, if you’re looking at success, is also incredibly promising. 0:28:35 Yeah. 0:28:38 I mean, certainly at Kairis, the way we mitigated it was we thought about what our fundraising 0:28:42 strategy would be to give ourselves enough runway to have that model play out. 0:28:47 We needed to fund the sales cycles and the adoption cycles to create a new category of 0:28:48 solution that didn’t exist. 0:28:51 Did it hang out in the wormhole for a while? 0:28:52 It’s a big oxygen tank. 0:28:53 Yes. 0:28:57 Global happens in healthcare in under three years, and so you kind of have to give it 0:28:58 some runways. 0:29:01 This is one of the things that we’ve spent time talking about is what does a minimal viable 0:29:03 product in healthcare look like? 0:29:04 Doesn’t exist. 0:29:05 Big bang. 0:29:09 You’ve got to go in and you’ve got to create a category and you’ve got to get that adopted. 0:29:14 I think in other industries, you can sort of quote-unquote get away with having a product 0:29:18 that does one thing really, really well and then start there and yes, expand over time, 0:29:23 but at least you can get by and to prove your value with that initial use case. 0:29:26 I think going back to a lot of the points you made earlier in healthcare, when you’re 0:29:32 in the flow of impacting a patient encounter and saying you’re going to rip something out 0:29:36 or change the way that you’re doing something or what have you, you have to make sure that 0:29:39 it’s going to give you the right answer, so to speak. 0:29:43 Even if it’s just one feature, it might mean, okay, yes, it could be one feature, but you 0:29:46 have to be integrated into seven different systems to make sure that the data flowing 0:29:50 into that one feature is enough to inform the right outcome or decision. 0:29:52 So really fully baked. 0:29:55 If a transaction falls through the cracks, while you’re doing some kind of revenue cycle 0:29:59 type encounter, you might not get paid for a procedure that could have a severe impact 0:30:01 on your bottom line. 0:30:02 You need more funding. 0:30:04 You need to think differently about your strategy for product and what that footprint 0:30:05 looks like. 0:30:08 You have to have the full solution. 0:30:12 And the related point I would make to that is it’s really hard to have a point solution. 0:30:14 Even if that point solution is very, very good. 0:30:18 I think people in general in the healthcare system are looking to buy a complete solution. 0:30:23 So if you take the problem from A to B to C to D, that’s great, but they need A to Z. 0:30:25 They can’t get A to Z from you. 0:30:27 It’s very hard to get them to buy A to C from you. 0:30:29 I’ll go even further than Julie. 0:30:32 I will say, not only does MVP not exist in healthcare, I would argue that product-market 0:30:34 fit doesn’t exist in healthcare. 0:30:35 What do you mean by that? 0:30:40 The definition of product-market fit is when the right product meets a good market. 0:30:44 All of the things we talked about creates such distortions in the marketplace that by the 0:30:49 time you actually get through all the hoops, you have such a skewed product. 0:30:51 It’s not really product-market fit. 0:30:53 It’s almost like accepted product capture. 0:30:56 Here you have regulatory issues. 0:30:57 You have pricing concerns. 0:30:58 You have incumbents. 0:31:03 You have so many aspects that distort the market that I would argue that you don’t have a normally 0:31:06 functioning market for software in healthcare. 0:31:12 How would you both embrace that distortion early on and not get completely knocked off 0:31:14 your path by it? 0:31:19 It strikes me that a lot of what you’re describing is know-thyself, know-yourself very deeply. 0:31:22 That was the tagline I know, by the way. 0:31:25 Oh, was it really? 0:31:26 That’s really funny. 0:31:29 I did not work that in for you. 0:31:34 But also know where you’re going and do that deep, I want to say, soul-searching on a company 0:31:37 level and build out accordingly. 0:31:40 How do you get that big center of gravity of really knowing yourself, knowing where 0:31:44 you’re going, but be able to be flexible with that distortion along the way? 0:31:48 The only North Star you can have, and this is going to sound cliche, but really understanding 0:31:54 your value proposition truly from the customer standpoint, it becomes a critical guide for 0:31:55 what you do. 0:31:58 This is a debate that healthcare companies have all the time, which is should your value 0:32:02 proposition be I’m going to save the system money because the healthcare system is very 0:32:05 inefficient and it runs on very low margins generally. 0:32:08 Should it be that I am going to result in better outcomes for patients? 0:32:13 Is it going to be I’m going to create some sort of a lift in terms of return on investment? 0:32:16 There’s a bunch of different ways you can think about value proposition. 0:32:20 If you don’t have that crystal clear from the outset, the amount of obstacles that you 0:32:24 are going to hit along the way are going to make it such that it’s going to be very difficult 0:32:25 to get to the other side. 0:32:29 If you don’t really understand the workflow and the culture and the regulation and the 0:32:33 governance and the politics and all of the other things, you can have a theory on what 0:32:37 the value proposition is, but you need your customer to confirm that early on and sadly 0:32:40 the best way to confirm that is to have them buy something, obviously. 0:32:44 Julie and I have had this debate before, which is a lot of the software platforms that go 0:32:49 into healthcare have been sort of predicated on we’re going to cut costs. 0:32:54 I don’t know of any sort of solution out there that has meaningfully been able to make a 0:32:56 very, very strong case that they can cut costs. 0:32:59 And by the way, part of it is, I think, is because it’s really hard to measure costs. 0:33:03 It’s almost like a necessary evil where you have to say in some way, shape, or form you 0:33:06 are going to reduce costs, but that can’t be your primary value proposition. 0:33:09 Because at the end of the day, it’s aligned in the cost structure that can get wiped out 0:33:13 over time and potentially get commoditized. 0:33:17 So is the takeaway, know your value proposition as early as possible and test it? 0:33:20 That and then have the conversation of like, okay, if we are able to accomplish what we 0:33:23 just described, is it worth it? 0:33:24 Is the juice worth the squeeze? 0:33:29 Because it’s so expensive to distribute product in this market because of the sales cycles 0:33:34 and the nature of the enterprise sales motion and whatnot, that if you’re not able to envision 0:33:39 a path towards being like at least a half a million dollar kind of a year type solution 0:33:42 in this space, it’s actually not financially worth it to build a business in that area. 0:33:43 Right. 0:33:45 Which goes back to your point of like run the numbers, basically. 0:33:48 At least like back at the envelope, like, you know, whiteboard kind of thing. 0:33:52 I mean, is there anything that you can figure out as you go? 0:33:57 It sounds like you need to know so much before you begin and be so self aware and so kind 0:33:59 of like have the end game in sight. 0:34:03 Are there things that you can leave sort of more organic and like feel out as you go? 0:34:04 Yeah. 0:34:05 No, I mean, absolutely. 0:34:08 There’s tons of things you can be doing on a daily basis with end users and just like 0:34:12 feedback mechanisms on like how people are, are they actually able to do their jobs, for 0:34:15 instance, and making minor tweaks to the workflows and whatnot. 0:34:19 So that was always, you know, a component of a more organic and dynamic aspect of how 0:34:20 we did things. 0:34:24 The other thing that you need to kind of think about doing in parallel is, you know, so much 0:34:29 of success of technology and healthcare is predicated on integrating into other ecosystem 0:34:30 players. 0:34:33 And so this is actually probably one industry where you definitely can’t like just build 0:34:34 in a vacuum. 0:34:38 You actually should understand, even if it’s not, you know, for another few years that you’re 0:34:42 really going to have to do this, like who are the players, we just need to get to know 0:34:46 so that we’re on their radar when time comes for us to take the hammer and like try to break 0:34:50 down the wall of integration with that vendor that we are on their good side and that they 0:34:53 know who we are so we can kind of make that happen faster. 0:34:58 So things like that, I think you can be doing in parallel to, you know, the kind of formulation 0:35:00 of what the footprint of the product is. 0:35:04 If you’ve got the right solution, you can get very creative in how you get paid. 0:35:09 So figuring out different pricing structures or value capture mechanisms, I think is something 0:35:13 that you can do pretty organically because if you are making a difference in the system, 0:35:17 the system has so much cost built into it and so much revenue flowing through it that 0:35:19 there are ways to be very imaginative there. 0:35:21 So that’s the first thing I would say. 0:35:26 The second thing I would say is thinking about adjacencies, you know, going from one, you 0:35:32 know, your core function to the next adjacent use case, not all adjacencies are created 0:35:33 equal. 0:35:34 One might be easier than the other. 0:35:38 It’s almost like, you know, jumping on stones across a pond or something, right? 0:35:41 What’s the next stone I can jump on that’s least likely to make me fall into the water, 0:35:42 right? 0:35:43 Yeah. 0:35:44 Even if it doesn’t get me as far as another one. 0:35:45 Right. 0:35:46 Always have that closer spot insight. 0:35:49 You’re almost, you’re creating the next thing and the next thing and the next thing and 0:35:50 you build out from there. 0:35:54 And eventually you cover so much surface area that, you know, you become a very sticky solution 0:35:58 and you hopefully become a complete solution sort of closer to the A to Z type vision. 0:35:59 Okay. 0:36:00 Last question. 0:36:01 Biggest takeaways. 0:36:04 Quick lightning round for your founder struggling right now. 0:36:05 What would you say? 0:36:06 Bullet points. 0:36:07 Know your market segment. 0:36:12 Be very specific about what segment you’re going after because that has major implications 0:36:14 for your go to market and your product. 0:36:15 Good one. 0:36:16 All right. 0:36:17 Let me get that to you. 0:36:20 One is build the multidisciplinary team early. 0:36:24 Two is understanding and if the person that suffers from the pain point can actually pay 0:36:29 for your solution because there’s a lot of misincentives in the healthcare system. 0:36:34 And three, with the right technology, you can have massive impact on patient lives and 0:36:38 the experience that we have with the healthcare system, which we will all touch in our lifetime. 0:36:42 And if there’s anything you can do to make it better as an entrepreneur, I would say 0:36:44 that is extraordinarily satisfying. 0:36:45 That’s fantastic. 0:36:46 And good bullets. 0:36:49 Thank you both so much for joining us on the A16Z podcast. 0:36:50 Thank you.
with Jorge Conde (@JorgeCondeBio), Julie Yoo (@julesyoo), and Hanne Tidnam (@omnivorousread)
Building a software company in healthcare is hard — and comes along with unique challenges no other entrepreneurs face. In this conversation, a16z bio general partner — and previous founder of genomics company Knome — Jorge Conde; and a16z bio partner and former founder Julie Yoo (of patient provider matching system, Kyruus) share their mistakes and hard earned lessons learned with a16z partner Hanne Tidnam.
Why is this so damn hard? How should founders think about this space differently? What are the specific things that healthcare founders can do — when, where, and why? You’ll wish you only knew this when you started your own company!
0:00:03 – Hi, welcome to the A16Z podcast. 0:00:05 This is Frank Chen. 0:00:06 This episode, which is called 0:00:09 “Inside the Apple Software Factory,” 0:00:11 originally aired as a YouTube video. 0:00:13 You can watch all of our YouTube videos 0:00:17 at youtube.com/A16ZVideos. 0:00:18 Hope you enjoy. 0:00:21 – Well, welcome to the A16Z YouTube channel. 0:00:24 I’m Frank Chen, and today I am so excited. 0:00:27 I feel like I have won the golden ticket 0:00:29 to Willy Wonka’s Chocolate Factory, 0:00:32 because look, if you’re in Silicon Valley, 0:00:34 the one chocolate factory you want 0:00:37 your desperate to go visit is Apple. 0:00:40 And the reason for that is Apple has consistently 0:00:44 over its history turned out some of the most intuitive 0:00:47 and delightful and just plain awesome products 0:00:51 that people use, and people are dying to find out 0:00:56 how is it that Apple makes such delightful products? 0:00:59 And so today, I’m here with Ken Cacienda, 0:01:01 and I’m so excited for him to tell us 0:01:06 all about the creative process that he used, 0:01:07 and his team used to create these products. 0:01:09 So Ken, thank you so much for coming. 0:01:10 – Well, thank you so much. 0:01:11 It’s great to be here with you. 0:01:12 – Well, let’s get right into it. 0:01:16 So maybe talk a little bit about how you ended up at Apple, 0:01:19 because like on paper, you don’t look like 0:01:20 the typical software engineer. 0:01:22 So go back and do the laundry. 0:01:24 Like, where were you born in? 0:01:27 – Oh, well, I was born in New York, 0:01:30 stayed there on Long Island, downstate, 0:01:33 grew up close to Beaches, lived there until 0:01:35 I went away to college, I went to Yale, 0:01:37 and got a degree in history. 0:01:40 And then after I graduated from Yale, 0:01:42 I didn’t do the typical thing. 0:01:44 I went to Motorcycle Mechanics School. 0:01:45 – Really? 0:01:47 All right, Ivy League, and what motivated that? 0:01:49 Like, you just learned motorcycles? 0:01:50 – I wanted to learn how to fix motorcycles. 0:01:53 – Well, when I graduated from college, 0:01:56 I wanted to do something that was as different 0:02:00 from Ivy League College as possible. 0:02:02 – I think that qualifies. 0:02:06 – Right, right, this was dismaying to my parents, 0:02:07 my father in particular, I can tell you. 0:02:08 – I’m sure. 0:02:10 – But, yeah, so I– 0:02:11 – At least you didn’t have an Asian parent. 0:02:16 – Well, I think my dad was pretty confused about the choice. 0:02:27 Anyway, but eventually, they got behind and supported that, 0:02:31 and so I fixed motorcycles, and then I wasn’t really 0:02:33 quite sure what I wanted to do. 0:02:38 I had this degree in history, but wanted to keep following 0:02:42 my nose, find new and interesting things to do. 0:02:47 I also did a lot of work in photography when I was at Yale. 0:02:50 I spent a lot of time in the Art and Architecture Library 0:02:52 on the Yale campus, just reading books, 0:02:53 and learning about art. 0:02:55 – Beautiful buildings on campus. 0:02:58 – Oh, for sure, yeah, very interesting architecture, 0:03:01 the Art and Architecture building in particular. 0:03:04 Well, anyway, so I became more interested in photography. 0:03:06 I wound up getting a job at a newspaper 0:03:08 in the New York area, Newsday. 0:03:11 Did two years there, working in their editorial library 0:03:16 with their photo archive, but then I kind of decided 0:03:19 that wasn’t really going anywhere fast enough, 0:03:21 so I moved to Japan. 0:03:21 – Wow. 0:03:24 – I had a three-part plan for going to Japan. 0:03:27 I was gonna photograph myself, make a portfolio 0:03:31 of my own work, and I thought that it might be interesting 0:03:35 to get some teaching experience, so I taught English, 0:03:37 and I was chasing a girl. 0:03:39 (laughing) 0:03:40 – And not an actor, right? 0:03:43 – That was the three-part plan, right? 0:03:45 Photograph, teach, chase a girl. 0:03:48 I wound up catching the girl, and so we’ve been married 0:03:51 for, it’s gonna be 25 years, and congratulations. 0:03:52 – Oh, congratulations. 0:03:53 – A couple months here. 0:03:54 – That’s so awesome. 0:03:59 – And so after that, I took that of the portfolio of work 0:04:01 that I put together two years in Japan 0:04:04 and applied to a fine arts program, 0:04:07 the Rochester Institute of Technology, 0:04:09 for a master of fine arts degree program. 0:04:14 But it was there that I discovered the World Wide Web. 0:04:18 And so I put my plans to be a fine art photographer 0:04:22 or maybe a professor of photography, 0:04:24 or putting together the teaching experience 0:04:25 with photography. 0:04:28 I just set that aside, because I saw the web 0:04:31 for the first time, it was probably 1994, 0:04:34 and I thought it was the most amazing thing. 0:04:39 Somozek, and the professor, oddly enough, 0:04:42 loaded up one of the few websites comparatively 0:04:45 that was available, Yahoo, when it was text only. 0:04:46 – Right, right. 0:04:49 – And so to me, the interest was, 0:04:51 I’m gonna make photos show up on this thing. 0:04:52 I’m gonna take my experience, 0:04:57 my love of fine art and the liberal arts, 0:05:00 and figure out how to make that come alive on the web. 0:05:02 And then just wound up getting more and more 0:05:03 into programming. 0:05:07 I graduated, or I left RIT without graduating 0:05:10 with any degree, but by that time, 0:05:11 I learned enough to go get a job 0:05:12 at a web development company, 0:05:14 and wound up making websites, 0:05:18 and this start-up, that start-up, the next start-up, 0:05:20 I wound up at a company called EZL. 0:05:21 – Oh, right, of course. 0:05:26 – I did Linux software development making, 0:05:27 desktop Linux. 0:05:29 – Right, every year is the year of desktop Linux. 0:05:33 – The desktop Linux, we thought that 1999 or 2000 0:05:35 was gonna be the year of desktop Linux, 0:05:37 it turned out, not to be, but– 0:05:38 – Not to be. 0:05:41 But you worked on the Nautilus file browser? 0:05:43 – I actually worked on the portion of Nautilus 0:05:47 that connected to these sort of proto-cloud services. 0:05:48 – Right. 0:05:49 – And interesting, our cloud– 0:05:50 – Dropbox before it’s time, right? 0:05:52 – Interestingly, for where I am here, 0:05:54 Andres and Harwitz, we hosted our cloud services 0:05:55 at LoudCloud. 0:05:56 – Oh, thank you very much. 0:05:57 – Yes. 0:05:58 – Yes. 0:05:59 – Very good customer. 0:06:04 – So, we went ahead with that project, 0:06:06 but of course that company didn’t succeed. 0:06:09 But of course, EZL had this long-standing connection 0:06:11 through some of its principles, 0:06:13 Andy Hertzfeld, Mike Boydch, Bud Tribble. 0:06:15 – Yeah, the legends, right? 0:06:16 Macromedia– 0:06:19 – And that got me an introduction to Apple. 0:06:19 – Yeah. 0:06:21 – And started Apple in 2001, 0:06:23 and started getting into making, 0:06:26 the web browser for Apple was my first project. 0:06:28 – That’s fantastic. 0:06:30 And why don’t we get into that story, 0:06:31 because as you tell in the book, 0:06:34 you sort of started experimenting 0:06:36 with the old Netscape code base, right? 0:06:36 – Right. 0:06:40 – Called Mozilla, I guess, by then. 0:06:42 But you ultimately didn’t go that way. 0:06:45 – Right, well you see, it’s sort of interesting, 0:06:48 and maybe we’ll get into this more as we talk. 0:06:51 The way that Apple worked in this period, 0:06:52 during the Steep Jobs era, 0:06:55 is that he would set this vision. 0:06:59 And so his vision was, Apple needs its own web browser. 0:07:02 So at the time, when I joined in 2001, 0:07:07 Mac OS X, the new version of the desktop operating system, 0:07:11 replacing the old classic version of Mac OS 0:07:15 that had been chipping on the computer since the 80s. 0:07:16 – Right. 0:07:18 – Right, so it came along with this Unix-based replacement. 0:07:23 But that system didn’t have its own web browser. 0:07:25 It was still part of the agreement 0:07:26 that had been made a couple of years earlier 0:07:30 with Microsoft to provide Apple with web browser. 0:07:32 So, Internet Explorer. 0:07:33 – Right, when Bill invested– 0:07:34 – That’s right. 0:07:35 – Right, he brought Office to the Mac, 0:07:37 and then IE became the default browser. 0:07:38 – Correct. 0:07:39 – People don’t remember this anymore. 0:07:43 – Correct, but that was the situation that Apple was in, 0:07:47 is that this exciting new technology, the web, 0:07:50 was something that wasn’t under its own control. 0:07:53 And so the vision for Apple, back then, 0:07:55 and even still today, 0:07:57 is that Apple wants to be in control 0:08:01 of what it considers to be critical technology 0:08:05 that gets critical to its user experience. 0:08:08 – Yep, and as all the operating system companies decided, 0:08:10 the web browser was critical, 0:08:12 it wasn’t an optional add-on component. 0:08:16 Netscape and Microsoft famously got into a legal battle 0:08:19 over this, so Apple arrived at the same insight. 0:08:21 And then interestingly, the two code bases 0:08:24 that you consider to get Safari off the ground 0:08:28 were Mozilla, the Netscape code base, 0:08:32 and then Conquer, which was a Linux web browser, 0:08:33 and they were both open source. 0:08:36 And so talk to me about what it felt like at the time 0:08:37 to be looking at open source inside Apple, 0:08:39 which is a famous sort of like, 0:08:41 we’ll build it all ourselves. 0:08:45 – It was interesting that the executives, 0:08:47 people like Avi Tavanian, 0:08:51 who was the chief software VP at that time, 0:08:55 and Steve, were willing to consider open source. 0:09:00 But just to give a brief summary of our full investigation, 0:09:05 we considered writing a browser from scratch, 0:09:06 we also considered going out and licensing 0:09:08 from a company like Opera. 0:09:09 That was the company that– 0:09:10 – There were many, yeah. 0:09:11 – Licensure browsers back then. 0:09:12 – Right, right. 0:09:14 And so, but we, Don Melton and I, 0:09:18 which was the two people we joined on the same day in 2001 0:09:22 to begin this browser investigation, 0:09:25 and we looked at open source because it was, 0:09:27 we were a team of two people. 0:09:29 And a web browser is a pretty complicated thing, 0:09:30 if you– – It’s pretty complicated. 0:09:30 – It’s harder than it looks. 0:09:31 – It’s harder than it looks. 0:09:36 So we thought that if we could make a compelling case 0:09:40 to use open source as a way to jump ahead in the effort, 0:09:44 stand on the shoulders of giants, right? 0:09:47 You know, it would get us to a point 0:09:50 where we would have something sooner. 0:09:51 And that was really the goal. 0:09:53 And being open source, 0:09:57 if we took this software from, say, another platform 0:10:01 that neither Mozilla nor Conqueror worked on the Mac. 0:10:03 So we were gonna have this opportunity 0:10:04 to bring this code from elsewhere 0:10:09 and make it Apple zone and really make it look and feel 0:10:12 like it was a native program to the Mac. 0:10:14 So that was, and looking at that, 0:10:16 it really just came down to Conqueror 0:10:18 was one-tenth the size of Mozilla. 0:10:20 And so as a two-person team, 0:10:23 soon thereafter, a three-person team, 0:10:26 this just was the easiest way 0:10:28 to get from where we were to where we wanted to be. 0:10:29 – Yeah, it makes sense. 0:10:31 I mean, people don’t remember this 0:10:32 about the early days of the browser, 0:10:34 but when we shipped Netscape, 0:10:36 we had to do it on 20 platforms. 0:10:38 So every build was a, all right, 0:10:39 here’s the one for ARIX, 0:10:40 here’s the one for Digital Unix, 0:10:41 here’s the one for AIX, 0:10:42 here’s the one for HPUX. 0:10:44 And here’s, by the way, is Windows 95, 0:10:47 Windows 98, Windows NT, right? 0:10:52 Like it was such a cross-platform exercise 0:10:54 that the code base sort of grew and grew. 0:10:56 – Sure, and so we only had to do that once 0:10:59 in that we took this Linux code 0:11:01 and brought it over to the Mac. 0:11:03 And of course, it was a challenge for us, 0:11:04 so I can only imagine what it would be 0:11:07 to kind of keep all of these platforms going. 0:11:09 Concurrently, as you’re trying to make improvements 0:11:11 and add features and make things better. 0:11:15 – Yeah, and so you ultimately decided 0:11:16 on the Conqueror code base, 0:11:17 the sort of your starting point. 0:11:19 And then pretty early in the development process, 0:11:23 you ended up building a stopwatch, the PLT. 0:11:24 – Right. 0:11:26 – And so maybe talk a little bit about 0:11:28 that why did you decide to do that? 0:11:29 And then ultimately flash forward, 0:11:32 like when Steve announced the browser, 0:11:34 he would say this is the fastest, 0:11:36 like it was one of the key features. 0:11:37 And did you know at the time 0:11:39 that you built the stopwatch that he was gonna do that, 0:11:41 or like would you get lucky? 0:11:45 – So no, no, we didn’t, it was not luck at all. 0:11:48 Steve was very, very clear to us 0:11:53 from at a very early stage in our browser development process 0:11:56 was that, well, of course, 0:11:59 he wanted to deliver the best experience out to customers. 0:12:00 That was it. 0:12:03 He wanted to put a smile on the user’s face, right? 0:12:07 And so if you think about the challenge that we had, 0:12:10 there was this existing browser on the platform. 0:12:11 – Right, Microsoft. 0:12:14 – That people were familiar with, right? 0:12:16 And so now we’re gonna come along 0:12:18 and we’ll say, well, no, well, you had that other thing. 0:12:22 Here is this new browser that we want you to use. 0:12:24 It’s Apple’s own browser. 0:12:28 And well, what is gonna convince people 0:12:29 to make the change? 0:12:30 And so Steve thought, well, 0:12:32 we’re gonna need a compelling argument. 0:12:36 And to be compelling, it needs to be simple. 0:12:40 And so his idea, his vision was, 0:12:43 look, we need to make this thing perform fast. 0:12:45 Again, thinking back to the time that, 0:12:47 oh, the network wasn’t so fast. 0:12:49 I mean, some people were getting, 0:12:51 maybe broadband at the office, 0:12:55 but certainly at home, you’re still doing dial-up, right? 0:12:59 And so anything that you could do to sort of speed up 0:13:04 the browsing experience was something 0:13:06 that would be attractive to people. 0:13:07 People would notice. 0:13:10 And so he said, browser team, 0:13:12 you need to figure out how to make this browser fast. 0:13:14 And he told us this. 0:13:18 A year plus ahead of time. 0:13:22 So this PLT, the page load test as a PLT stands for, 0:13:25 was this performance tool that we used 0:13:27 during our daily development. 0:13:29 So that every code check-in that we had, 0:13:33 we would run our page load test to see 0:13:35 that there were no speed regressions. 0:13:40 We had this idea, that was really Don Melton’s idea, 0:13:41 who was the manager of the team. 0:13:44 He had this little bit of sneaky logic 0:13:49 where he said, okay, team, if we check-in code 0:13:55 and it doesn’t make any speed regression, 0:13:57 only two things can happen. 0:14:00 Either the code will remain the same speed 0:14:02 or it’ll get faster, right? 0:14:05 And again, it’s just one of these simple things 0:14:08 that just turns out to be this profound truth. 0:14:13 Because as we would go over the weeks, the months, 0:14:17 hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of check-ins, 0:14:18 that’s what happened. 0:14:21 Either the code either stayed the same or it got faster. 0:14:24 And over time, because there was this speed priority 0:14:25 coming straight from Steve, 0:14:27 we would look for ways to make it faster. 0:14:32 And eventually, the Safari, when it was released, 0:14:37 it was three times faster than MSIE at loading web pages. 0:14:38 – Yeah, that’s fantastic. 0:14:43 – And the point is, again, Steve Jobs going out on stage, 0:14:48 he has this reputation of being this great marketer, 0:14:49 the reality distortion field, 0:14:52 anything that Steve says you’ll believe 0:14:54 just because he has this through the sheer force 0:14:55 of his personality. 0:15:00 But this was more of a matter of him just saying, 0:15:02 well, we executed on this plan, 0:15:04 we got a great result and here it is. 0:15:07 – So I love this idea that Steve set this goal early on, 0:15:09 ship the fastest browser that you can ship 0:15:10 ’cause when I launch it, 0:15:12 that’s what I’m gonna talk about. 0:15:14 And as I was thinking about 0:15:17 basically the software development process, 0:15:21 it’s rare for a CEO, a big company, 0:15:22 and Apple was a big company back then, 0:15:25 to be so intimately involved in the planning process 0:15:27 and how important do you think that was 0:15:30 to your age of design? 0:15:35 – Yeah, I think the way that Steve organized the company 0:15:40 and built the teams, built the culture, 0:15:44 was an essential part of how we did our work. 0:15:46 And the way I like to describe it 0:15:50 is that Apple was this wonderful combination 0:15:55 of top-down leadership and bottom-up contributions. 0:16:00 So Steve, the top-down part, 0:16:01 I think is almost well-known. 0:16:03 Steve was very, very clear. 0:16:06 He could be almost, you know, domineering, right, 0:16:11 in pushing his vision forward, right? 0:16:15 So when you worked at Apple in software development, 0:16:18 you knew what the vision was. 0:16:21 That was always very, very clearly communicated. 0:16:22 But it still was just a vision. 0:16:24 Now, sometimes he would get specific, 0:16:27 but most of the time he just would tell us, 0:16:30 “I want a great browser and it’s gotta be fast.” 0:16:34 And so with that as a brief handed over 0:16:38 to the engineering team, 0:16:40 it was our job to figure out how to do it. 0:16:43 And so then that’s where the bottom-up contribution 0:16:44 comes from. 0:16:46 He didn’t say, “I want you to make a performance test 0:16:48 “and I want you to institute this policy 0:16:52 “where every check-in doesn’t allow any speed regressions.” 0:16:54 I don’t know, we came up with that. 0:16:57 Providing that bottom-up contribution 0:17:00 that helped to realize the vision. 0:17:02 And then one of these other things, 0:17:05 and perhaps we’ll get into it a little more as we go, 0:17:07 because it is such an important part of Apple’s culture, 0:17:09 is that there would be demos. 0:17:14 So we would periodically, I remember quite clearly, 0:17:18 there was a 0.1, there was a 0.2 demo 0:17:23 where we needed to demonstrate the strength 0:17:26 and the potential of this open source idea 0:17:29 of the conqueror source code that we had chosen 0:17:32 and of our porting plan and efforts 0:17:35 before they would commit to going through 0:17:40 to the project, to go from 0.2 to 1.0. 0:17:44 – And with Steve at the demo at that point? 0:17:48 – He would see the code very, very often. 0:17:49 So that’s a little unusual. 0:17:52 I compare that to sort of a typical Silicon Valley company 0:17:55 where you’re doing these demos frequently. 0:17:59 And so in general, you sort of think of the CEO of a company. 0:18:00 This side is not being involved 0:18:02 in every single milestone, right? 0:18:04 ‘Cause you’re Safari on Mac OS. 0:18:06 Mac OS is one of the many products 0:18:09 that Apple was shipping at the time. 0:18:12 And so it seems unusual that the CEO 0:18:14 would be involved in this many demo points. 0:18:16 And how important do you think that is to sort of– 0:18:17 – Well Steve, I’m actually gonna dispute 0:18:19 one of the things that you said, if I may, 0:18:22 is that certainly during the Steve Jobs era, 0:18:27 and I still think to today here in 2019, 0:18:30 Apple didn’t ship a whole lot of products. 0:18:32 Back then, Steve, quite famously, 0:18:36 when he reestablished control over the company, 0:18:41 he came up with that product matrix, right? 0:18:45 Where we’re gonna have consumer product, a pro product, 0:18:47 a desktop product, and a portable product, right? 0:18:49 And so we’ve got four products. 0:18:51 And it’s the same operating system, right? 0:18:55 Mac OS, and so there’s actually very, very few products. 0:19:00 Now interestingly, when I joined Apple in June of 2001, 0:19:02 Mac OS X had come out, 0:19:04 and so we had that two-part product matrix 0:19:05 that we were still working in. 0:19:06 And that was still four months 0:19:09 before the announcement of the iPod, 0:19:14 which was just that beginning of Apple expanding out 0:19:17 from being, well, Apple computer to being Apple Inc, right? 0:19:20 You get into more consumer-focused products 0:19:24 that weren’t really thought of as being computers. 0:19:27 But because, I mean, the point of going through all that 0:19:30 is that since there were so few products, 0:19:35 Steve could keep tabs on what the software teams were doing, 0:19:42 that there was this big initiative to make a web browser 0:19:47 so he could keep tabs on it. 0:19:50 He could find the time on his schedule 0:19:53 to get updates on how the software was doing, and he did. 0:19:55 – Yeah, so it was sort of a focused thing, right? 0:19:57 But Steve’s saying, look, we’re not gonna have 0:19:59 that many SKUs, we’re not gonna have that many products. 0:20:01 Like, then I can put all my eggs in one basket, 0:20:03 get in and watch the basket very carefully. 0:20:07 – You say the word, and it is one of the best words, 0:20:10 perhaps the best word to describe Steve’s approach, 0:20:11 which is focus. 0:20:12 Focus on what? 0:20:14 Great products. 0:20:17 I mean, in those three words, focus, great products. 0:20:22 You get, you can distill down Steve’s approach, 0:20:25 his formula to just a couple concepts. 0:20:30 – Yeah, so you ship Safari, awesome browser, fast native. 0:20:34 You get a lot of people to switch over. 0:20:36 And then, at that point in your career, 0:20:38 after having been this individual contributor 0:20:40 that shipped this awesome product, 0:20:42 you thought, like many people in your shoes, 0:20:45 time to be an engineering manager. 0:20:46 So maybe talk a little bit about that story 0:20:50 of sort of how you thought about it, 0:20:51 and then how you got the job, 0:20:52 and then what the job was like when you got it 0:20:54 as your first engineering manager job. 0:20:59 – Right, well, I always try to think about, 0:21:01 well, what’s next? 0:21:06 And I don’t really have a big career vision. 0:21:10 It’s because, especially the tech world, 0:21:12 it changes so fast, right? 0:21:15 And so it always seems like you come to the end of one thing 0:21:17 and then that’s the moment to really decide 0:21:19 what the next thing should be. 0:21:21 And as you say, I mean, engineering management seemed 0:21:25 to be like this new domain that I didn’t have 0:21:28 a lot of experience in. 0:21:31 So I thought that this would be an interesting opportunity. 0:21:34 And so I pushed for it, I asked for it, 0:21:38 and it was actually Scott Forstahl, the software executive, 0:21:43 really instrumental in coming up with a lot of the 0:21:47 interesting user interface work in the iPhone software, 0:21:49 a project later, which I’m sure we’ll get to. 0:21:52 But he was the one who was in my management chain 0:21:53 who gave me this opportunity. 0:21:58 And so I started working on the Sync Services software 0:22:03 for the Mac, which at that time was really still the software 0:22:08 that would be up in the cloud and would help 0:22:11 two Macs sync with each other. 0:22:13 I mean, we didn’t really have– 0:22:15 – There were no phones, no iPods. 0:22:18 – Right, okay, so it’s like you have a computer, 0:22:19 desktop computer in the office, 0:22:21 you have a desktop computer at home, 0:22:23 or maybe you have a portable and a desktop, 0:22:27 and it was to get those systems exchanging some data, 0:22:30 your contacts, your address book, things like that. 0:22:35 And so I thought this was an interesting challenge, 0:22:37 and people were gonna be getting more devices 0:22:40 and things like that, but I found that very soon 0:22:42 after I got into the job that I was miserable, 0:22:47 that I hadn’t really reckoned, at that point in my career, 0:22:53 with what management really is, it’s about people. 0:22:58 I was still, certainly at that point in my career, 0:23:02 I was still fascinated by the software itself. 0:23:03 That’s what was attracted to me about sync. 0:23:07 It seemed like this distributed computing problem, 0:23:10 and I was enamored of the technology, 0:23:14 and you had client server, and all of this, 0:23:18 and not really, again, thinking about how the right focus 0:23:21 was to build a team, build a team culture, 0:23:24 support the people so that they could do the technology. 0:23:27 And again, at that point in my career, 0:23:29 I wasn’t really ready for that, 0:23:31 and I found myself within just a couple of months 0:23:33 that I was miserable. 0:23:37 – Yep, it’s the lament of a lot of first-time managers, 0:23:39 which is you think, on the other side of it, 0:23:41 of course I want a manager job, it’s the way up, 0:23:43 it’s the natural hierarchy, and then you get there, 0:23:47 and your job is about shipping a team and not a product. 0:23:48 And a lot of people go through that, 0:23:51 oh, I don’t wanna ship a team, I wanna ship a product. 0:23:52 – Right. – All right. 0:23:53 So it sounds like that’s what you did, 0:23:55 you sort of went back to being– 0:24:00 – Yeah, well, I had almost the shape to say, 0:24:02 it was like a mini meltdown, I went to Scott Forstall, 0:24:05 and I said, hey, look, Scott, I don’t wanna do this, 0:24:08 I led you astray, led myself astray, I quit, 0:24:10 I offered a resign, ’cause I know, 0:24:13 and part of the thing was that it was a feeling 0:24:16 of responsibility that I had taken on a responsibility 0:24:18 that now I did not want to fulfill, 0:24:21 and I felt like, well, the only thing for me, 0:24:22 there’s really just two choices, 0:24:25 I could continue on being miserable about it, 0:24:28 or I could just go and say, look, I’m done with this, 0:24:31 I submit my resignation. 0:24:34 So Scott was like, whoa, whoa, whoa. 0:24:36 Just a second, stop right there, 0:24:38 I wanna understand what’s going on there. 0:24:40 So I explained to him what I just explained to you 0:24:43 about really wanting to still be in closer touch 0:24:44 with the technology, and so he said, 0:24:49 okay, well, just go away, he was not pleased with me. 0:24:52 – Yeah, yeah, we got to the management job you asked for. 0:24:53 – You said that you wanted it. 0:24:55 – Right in now, you’re coming back in now, 0:24:57 a couple months later saying that you want something else, 0:24:59 what’s going on. 0:25:02 So yeah, he wasn’t that happy, but he had– 0:25:05 – And at that time, you had sort of started taking calls 0:25:07 from Google recruiters, right? 0:25:09 – Yeah, I mean, because I thought that I was resigning, 0:25:11 so I just need to go get another job. 0:25:14 So I actually did, and I went to– 0:25:16 – Full interview cycle, right? 0:25:18 – I went and did the interview process at Google, 0:25:20 and they offered me a job. 0:25:22 – So you were serious, you were ready to go? 0:25:25 – Well, I was serious, I was serious. 0:25:29 But I turned it down, I turned down that job 0:25:32 because Scott continued to engage with me, 0:25:36 and he said, just kind of sit tight, 0:25:39 maybe we’ve got something for you, 0:25:42 and a couple of days later, 0:25:47 it was actually my direct manager at the time said, 0:25:52 come here, and he took me into his office, 0:25:55 and he said, we want you to work on this new project, 0:26:00 sign this paper, and I kind of thought 0:26:04 there was just the barest little hint on the grapevine, 0:26:07 so I just like, reach out, I signed the paper, 0:26:09 and he said, yeah, we’re making a cell phone. 0:26:10 – Yeah. 0:26:11 – And you’re now on the team. 0:26:12 – So that’s fascinating, right? 0:26:15 So this is a great part of Apple 0:26:16 that’s sort of very different than most Silicon Valley 0:26:18 companies, which is in most Silicon Valley companies, 0:26:20 if you get assigned to another project, 0:26:22 there’s not this level of secrecy, 0:26:24 you’re not signing papers saying, 0:26:25 so tell me a little bit about that, 0:26:28 like what did they read you into at the time? 0:26:30 It was purple at the time, right, what’s the code name? 0:26:34 – You know, the funny thing is that at Apple, 0:26:37 I was already under this blanket non-disclosure. 0:26:38 – You couldn’t say anything about it. 0:26:41 – I mean, for the whole time that I worked there, 0:26:44 I was under these document retention orders, 0:26:47 I would get these periodic emails from the lawyers saying, 0:26:52 do not destroy anything because of the work that I had done 0:26:55 was then submitted in patents and, you know, 0:26:57 perhaps there was gonna be patent litigation. 0:27:01 So this is just the whole mindset, 0:27:03 the whole culture of what Apple was. 0:27:06 There was secret, we were doing patentable 0:27:08 where we were trying to innovate, 0:27:12 and we were interested in treating that work 0:27:15 as a trade secret, something that was valuable 0:27:17 to the company. 0:27:19 – So already super secret culture. 0:27:21 And then you have to sign something, 0:27:22 which is I’m gonna introduce you 0:27:25 to an even more secret culture inside Apple. 0:27:27 It’s kinda like the, you know, when you do the logic classes, 0:27:30 like infinite sets can be larger than other infinite sets. 0:27:31 – That’s right. 0:27:31 – Like now you’re into the larger– 0:27:33 – That’s right, now you’re into a bigger, 0:27:37 bigger, deeper, darker infinity, that’s right. 0:27:40 It is a bottomless well, truly. 0:27:45 And so, yeah, so I had to sign this additional NDA 0:27:47 and yeah, I got introduced to this project, 0:27:51 it was called Purple, the code name for iPhone 0:27:52 and it was in development. 0:27:57 And my job was to join the software effort, 0:28:00 which at that point was maybe six or eight people. 0:28:01 – That’s a tiny team. 0:28:02 – It’s a tiny little team. 0:28:06 To do what I like to term the high level software. 0:28:10 The plan was that we were gonna take 0:28:13 as much of the Mac as possible 0:28:17 and bring it over and squeeze it into one of these, 0:28:20 you know, a tiny little, you know, smartphone form factor. 0:28:24 And so we were gonna take the operating system kernel 0:28:26 and some of the low level libraries, 0:28:29 you know, the networking stack, things like this, 0:28:33 the graphics stack, but above the level of core graphics, 0:28:37 which was the, you know, the low level graphics library. 0:28:40 Above that, it was then, I was invited onto the team 0:28:43 that was gonna invent the touchscreen OS. 0:28:44 So we weren’t gonna take any of the, 0:28:47 naturally the mouse tracking or handling 0:28:50 or anything of app kit, which was the, you know, 0:28:52 the user interface level software for the Mac, 0:28:55 we were gonna make that from scratch for the phone. 0:28:58 So what became UI kit for people who know 0:29:01 about the, you know, the technology for what became, 0:29:04 you know, the iPhone software, iOS, that was our job. 0:29:07 And so we started with it with a clean slate. 0:29:11 And that slate was pretty well clean when I joined again, 0:29:14 just about six or eight people on that effort at the time. 0:29:16 – Yeah, so they tap you on the shoulder, 0:29:18 you’re on the purple team, it’s like six to eight people. 0:29:20 So tell me about the people on the team. 0:29:21 Like what are the roles? 0:29:22 Are there product managers? 0:29:23 Are there UX designers? 0:29:24 – Right, right. 0:29:26 So when I say six or eight people, 0:29:27 that was software engineers. 0:29:28 – Yeah. 0:29:30 – There was also this other team of designers, 0:29:33 which in Apple, we called the human interface team, 0:29:35 the HI team, right, human interface. 0:29:39 And though that was the team of designers, 0:29:42 they would do graphic design, animation design, 0:29:44 but they would also do concepts. 0:29:48 They would provide the thinking behind what is going 0:29:50 to be the experience of the person 0:29:54 that is gonna be using this product that we make. 0:29:56 And so there was this small team, 0:30:01 half dozen software engineers and HI designers, 0:30:04 and then executives, managers. 0:30:06 So there was a fellow named Henri 0:30:09 who was leading the software engineering team. 0:30:10 There was a fellow named Greg Christie, 0:30:13 who was the day-to-day manager of the HI team. 0:30:15 They both reported to Scott Forstahl, 0:30:18 who was the executive, who reported to Steve. 0:30:19 And that was it. 0:30:21 That was the team. 0:30:23 Now, eventually we wound up adding, 0:30:26 over time, the more people, 0:30:29 we probably never had more than 20 software engineers 0:30:32 and maybe 10 designers. 0:30:36 Those two managers and the executive and Steve, 0:30:37 and that was it. 0:30:41 And so there were no product managers. 0:30:43 No product managers, no QA engineers. 0:30:44 No, like until later. 0:30:45 Until later. 0:30:49 So the core of it that got the whole product going 0:30:52 is software engineers, human interface designers, 0:30:52 and executives. 0:30:57 Yeah, we added then a program manager. 0:30:59 So there were maybe like two people 0:31:02 in just managing the schedule, tracking risk, 0:31:05 looking at the bugs. 0:31:07 A couple of QA people joined. 0:31:10 But at Apple, certainly from my standpoint, 0:31:12 I can consider them engineers. 0:31:15 Yeah, they’re the QA engineers. 0:31:18 And so, but still, that still is all encompassed 0:31:21 in the numbers that I gave you. 0:31:25 And in a way, I say there were no product managers, 0:31:30 but I would say that we had one product manager. 0:31:31 There’s two ways that I could say it. 0:31:34 We either had one product manager, Steve. 0:31:34 Right. 0:31:36 Yes, the ultimate decider. 0:31:37 Right? 0:31:39 Or that we all were. 0:31:40 We all were. 0:31:44 It was all our responsibility to make sure 0:31:47 that the product was going to be great for people. 0:31:50 We all shared commonly in that responsibility. 0:31:52 So that’s really interesting. 0:31:54 ‘Cause you sort of distribute the responsibility. 0:31:55 Now it’s everybody’s responsibility, 0:31:58 but a lot of companies would think, 0:32:00 ooh, I’ve got to have a throat to choke. 0:32:02 I’ve got to have like the one person. 0:32:03 But of course, at Apple, that’s one. 0:32:04 So we did, right? 0:32:05 One person with Steve. 0:32:07 Okay, well it’s, but then another way. 0:32:10 When you get down to the level of features, 0:32:11 we had this notion at Apple 0:32:14 of directly responsible individuals. 0:32:15 Oh yeah. 0:32:16 Let’s talk about this. 0:32:18 So we had DRIs, right? 0:32:22 And so when I started working, 0:32:25 when I was invited to join the Purple Effort 0:32:28 because of my experience on the web browser, 0:32:31 I started working on making, crunching down Safari, 0:32:33 optimizing Safari so that it could fit 0:32:37 on a smartphone operating system and form factor. 0:32:41 And, but then after a couple of months, 0:32:46 we had a bit of an impasse with the software keyboard. 0:32:50 And we had what was really quite unusual, 0:32:52 really unique in my experience at Apple, 0:32:56 is that this was judged to be 0:32:58 that the development of the software keyboard 0:33:01 was judged to be a sufficiently high risk. 0:33:04 And that the risk was not being matched 0:33:08 by a commensurate progress, right? 0:33:10 I mean, the whole thing was high risk, right? 0:33:13 We’re gonna make a whole new touch screen operating system, 0:33:13 right? 0:33:15 So the whole thing was high risk. 0:33:17 But the thing is, is that we were making 0:33:20 good incremental progress on most of those areas. 0:33:24 Touch screen and the UI kit and Safari 0:33:26 and messages and calendar and you know, 0:33:28 all of these, you know, the phone app and, 0:33:32 but the touch screen keyboard was lagging behind 0:33:34 all of these other projects. 0:33:37 And so one day, it really, really again, 0:33:39 a unique in my experience, 0:33:42 Henri, who was the software engineering manager, 0:33:46 called all of the engineers out of our offices 0:33:48 into the hallway, we had a group meeting, 0:33:49 again, about two dozen people, 0:33:51 probably even less than that. 0:33:53 And said, okay, you all stop. 0:33:54 Stop what you’re doing. 0:33:57 Stop working on the calendar, the phone app, 0:33:59 you know, the user interface, a level software, 0:34:01 everything, stop. 0:34:04 Starting from now, you’re all keyboard engineers. 0:34:06 – Wow, that is crazy. 0:34:07 Like the entire team. 0:34:09 – Tire team, stop. – Everybody’s a keyboard engineer. 0:34:12 – Because the idea was that if we don’t crack 0:34:16 this problem, we might not have a product. 0:34:18 – Yeah, so I think we need to take people back 0:34:19 to that era, right? 0:34:21 Because this seems super counterintuitive 0:34:24 that you’d put all 20 people on one project. 0:34:27 And so, take us back in time. 0:34:30 So the most popular phone at the time was the CrackBerry, 0:34:31 right? – Yeah. 0:34:33 – The RIM BlackBerry, and it has a physical keyboard. 0:34:34 – Has a physical keyboard. 0:34:39 And so, this was in the fall of 2005. 0:34:42 And again, to just give the time perspective, 0:34:44 Steve stood up on stage and announced the iPhone 0:34:47 in January of 2007. 0:34:50 So again, this is a really, really compressed time scale. 0:34:54 So where, just a little bit more than, 0:34:58 you know, less than a year and a half out from the day 0:35:01 where we were trying to hit that target. 0:35:02 – Yeah, 18 minutes, not a lot of time. 0:35:07 – And we still had really nothing to show 0:35:11 for this effort to give a solution for our phone, 0:35:13 which would compete with the BlackBerry, right? 0:35:16 Of course, the BlackBerry had this wonderful keyboard, 0:35:19 the hardware keyboard, the little plastic keys, 0:35:21 click, click, click, click, the little chick-lip keys. 0:35:23 And again, you said the word CrackBerry. 0:35:28 People loved the products, a great product, right? 0:35:32 But we were gonna provide this different vision 0:35:34 for what a smartphone would be, 0:35:35 is that it was gonna be this, 0:35:38 that there wasn’t going to be enough room 0:35:43 for a plastic keyboard with the keys fixed. 0:35:46 We were gonna give more of the front of the display 0:35:49 over to a screen, to software. 0:35:53 And so the keyboard had to be in software. 0:35:56 – And the idea of all the sort of software-based keyboard 0:35:59 was one of the design things that came from Steve early. 0:36:00 – Yes. 0:36:01 – Like it was just like, look, this is non-negotiable. 0:36:02 I’m not shipping a physical keyboard. 0:36:03 – That’s right. 0:36:08 No, his idea was that we need a keyboard some of the time, 0:36:13 but we certainly don’t need it all of the time. 0:36:16 And so the idea of the keyboard being in software 0:36:18 is that it could get out of the way, 0:36:20 it could go off the screen, 0:36:24 which would then make the rest of that screen real estate 0:36:27 available for a customized user interface that was great, 0:36:30 that was optimized for either the phone app, 0:36:35 or if it’s the calendar, you can see more of your appointments 0:36:37 or see more of a month view for the calendar. 0:36:40 So it was absolutely essential that the keyboard could get 0:36:42 out of the way when you weren’t using it, 0:36:44 so that the device could be opened up 0:36:48 for these other better, richer experiences in the apps 0:36:49 that we were gonna be shipping. 0:36:52 – And what problems were you running into at the time? 0:36:54 Like were people missing keys, 0:36:55 were the keys not big enough? 0:36:56 Like what caused the– 0:36:59 – Yeah, okay, again, I mean, it’s in some ways, 0:37:04 it’s hard to think back given how history has played out, 0:37:07 right, that we have our phones now, 0:37:11 and maybe you’ve got, I’ve got my phone here today, 0:37:14 and I’m two thumb typing, and I’m hardly even looking 0:37:18 at whatever, back when we were working at this early stage, 0:37:23 and we were all new to interacting with touch screens, 0:37:27 we found that we had this real sense of apprehension, 0:37:30 apprehension whenever we were gonna touch a target 0:37:35 on the screen that was smaller than our fingertip, right? 0:37:39 That was actually a really interesting threshold 0:37:42 that, a constraint that we were dealing with 0:37:44 when we were designing the user interface, 0:37:46 is that if the target that you were going for 0:37:49 was larger than your finger, you could target, 0:37:51 because you could maybe move your head 0:37:52 a little bit out of the way, 0:37:55 and you could see what you were going for. 0:37:59 If the target was smaller than your fingertip, 0:38:00 it’s like, did I get it? 0:38:01 I don’t know, right? 0:38:05 And so we started, we didn’t have the tactile feedback 0:38:07 of that blackberry, right? 0:38:10 You could feel the edges of the keys with your fingers, 0:38:11 and of course with the touch screen, 0:38:14 it was just this sheet of glass. 0:38:16 And so that’s the challenge with the keyboard, 0:38:18 is that you needed enough keys 0:38:21 to have a typing experience, right? 0:38:24 But in order to give the number of keys necessary, 0:38:26 the keys needed to be smaller than your fingertip. 0:38:27 So what do you do? 0:38:32 And so it turns out that through investigation, 0:38:36 and lots of demos, and lots of sleeveless nights, 0:38:39 that the way to close that gap 0:38:42 was to give software assistance, yeah. 0:38:44 And so on Rewave the Magic Wand, 0:38:46 everybody now is a keyboard engineer, 0:38:48 everybody needs to figure out 0:38:50 how we’re going to make a reliable keyboard 0:38:51 that’s delightful. 0:38:53 And so what happened from that point? 0:38:56 Was it like a series of demos, 0:38:57 where people just demo, yeah. 0:38:59 – Yeah, we did this series of demos. 0:39:03 We see, again, going back to the way 0:39:05 that it was on that hallway, 0:39:07 and it was just one hallway, 0:39:09 since it was so few people. 0:39:11 It was sort of 20-ish people. 0:39:13 And we all had our individual offices at the time. 0:39:16 This was not open plan office, right? 0:39:17 Everybody had their office. 0:39:19 Mine, when I was working and thinking, 0:39:21 I had my door closed, right? 0:39:23 But then, okay, so I would be in my office 0:39:24 with my door closed, 0:39:27 and I would come up with a demo, an idea, right? 0:39:29 That could be represented in a demo. 0:39:30 Then I opened the door, and I go and see 0:39:34 who else’s door is open, and say, here, try this, right? 0:39:36 And so we would have this culture. 0:39:38 We were all demoing to ourselves, 0:39:40 all the time, and when we were set off 0:39:42 on this thing, you’re all keyboard engineers now, 0:39:44 well, we all just went in our own directions. 0:39:48 Some of us had already well-established, 0:39:51 collegial relationships, 0:39:52 where I would collaborate a lot with you, 0:39:53 and some other people, 0:39:56 they had maybe, they worked by themselves. 0:39:57 Some people had a good relationship 0:39:59 with one of the H.I. designers, or whatever. 0:40:01 So we just cobbled together our own little teams, 0:40:06 our own little efforts, and started making demos. 0:40:08 And again, trying to combat this problem 0:40:10 of the keys being too small. 0:40:12 So one idea that we experimented with 0:40:16 was making larger keys with multiple letters on the keys. 0:40:20 I started experimenting with software assistance. 0:40:22 Maybe there could be a dictionary on the phone 0:40:25 that the software could consult 0:40:31 to provide suggestions that may be much like we have today, 0:40:34 that there’s this bar on top of the keyboard 0:40:36 that is updating as you’re typing keys, 0:40:39 giving you some notion of what the software thinks 0:40:40 you’re trying to do. 0:40:42 – AutoCorrect, the author of AutoCorrect, 0:40:45 which is now not only super useful on the phone, 0:40:47 but probably my favorite comedy genre. 0:40:51 So go watch the Facebook videos 0:40:53 on AutoCorrect comedies, they’re fantastic. 0:40:55 – Yeah, well, sorry about that. 0:41:00 So eventually, the breakthrough, if you will, 0:41:06 that made it possible for software keyboards 0:41:10 to really work in a shipable product 0:41:13 was a software assistance to the extent 0:41:18 that the software may change the letters that you type. 0:41:19 – Right, right. 0:41:21 – That it’ll change it to what it thinks 0:41:22 rather than what you did. 0:41:26 And it’s actually, this phrase is really, really important. 0:41:28 I think really, really, one of the important 0:41:31 organizing concepts for so much that we did 0:41:34 to make the touchscreen operating system work 0:41:37 is because you didn’t get this tactile feedback 0:41:41 because you couldn’t feel the edges of either keyboard keys 0:41:44 or any button or anything in the user interface 0:41:46 is that the software had to be there 0:41:50 working behind the scenes to give you what you meant 0:41:52 maybe differently than what you did. 0:41:53 – Yeah. 0:41:55 And how did you come up with this idea? 0:41:57 ‘Cause this is a classic thinking outside of the box idea, 0:41:59 right, like if you were gonna try to solve this problem, 0:42:03 I bet you saw a lot of variations of sort of key sizes 0:42:06 and that type of thing, but like consulting a dictionary, 0:42:09 putting up suggested words, like where did the idea come from? 0:42:11 – It’s just this iterative process. 0:42:13 It just takes a long, long time. 0:42:16 You start with ideas, maybe somebody else. 0:42:20 It does a demo that does an idea and you had your idea 0:42:23 and you think, oh, maybe if I can combine those two ideas 0:42:28 and make a demo that does the best of everything that I see. 0:42:34 And it was just this collaborative soup 0:42:37 of ideas all swirling around and you just take the, 0:42:42 all of us were, there was a sense of friendly competition. 0:42:45 And it was both of those. 0:42:47 We all wanted to do the best. 0:42:48 We all wanted to be the one. 0:42:53 I mean, I think we all had a sense of maybe a sense of ego 0:42:56 that we wanted to be the one to crack this hard problem 0:43:01 that we were given, but it was all very friendly 0:43:06 in the end that if your idea wound up winning, 0:43:12 proving useful, yeah, you got a little bit of sort of geek, 0:43:15 you know, cred for that on the hallway. 0:43:19 Everybody knew who it was that came up with the idea. 0:43:20 – I wanna talk to you a little bit 0:43:22 about this sort of secrecy, right? 0:43:23 You got read into the Holy of Holies. 0:43:27 It’s more secret than sort of other parts of Apple. 0:43:29 And at one point you decided 0:43:32 as you were refining the auto-correct algorithm 0:43:35 that there were actually experts outside of the purple team 0:43:36 that might be able to help. 0:43:39 But of course they hadn’t been disclosed. 0:43:43 And so like, what was that like to try to go get their help? 0:43:47 – It was tough, it required getting approval. 0:43:50 It’s like, well, I’m gonna go and talk to these people. 0:43:55 But there was no process really at that point 0:43:56 to get them disclosed. 0:44:00 I mean, really, at a certain point, 0:44:04 Steve was still personally approving every person 0:44:07 that was submitted to get disclosed on the project. 0:44:08 But I did get permission to talk to them. 0:44:10 So as long as I told them, 0:44:13 I can’t tell you why I want to know 0:44:18 how, say, the Japanese input method works. 0:44:21 You know, the way the Japanese works 0:44:23 is that there is this input method 0:44:26 that there is a sophisticated way 0:44:29 to take the keys that a user types 0:44:32 and turn it into the Japanese language, 0:44:36 a text that actually reads as Japanese. 0:44:40 And so that just won’t get into the details of that, 0:44:43 but it seemed like it was similar in a way, 0:44:45 I mean, at least in the thought processes, 0:44:49 is that we have this real software 0:44:50 wearing away in the background, 0:44:52 other than, you know, different than, say, 0:44:54 just like a desktop keyboard, 0:44:57 where if you type the A, you get an A, right? 0:45:00 And so I went and talked to them. 0:45:02 But, you know, in the end, 0:45:07 it was just more of a conceptual help 0:45:11 than really anything concrete 0:45:13 that I could put into the software. 0:45:16 It just turns out really that the problem 0:45:17 that I was trying to solve, 0:45:19 which is really input correction, 0:45:22 that you weren’t sure what key you hit, 0:45:26 was a class of problem that was different enough 0:45:28 that it really required different solutions. 0:45:30 – Yeah, looking back at it now, 0:45:31 which is sort of the extreme secrecy, 0:45:34 you couldn’t really describe the problem, right? 0:45:36 And so as a result, you got some conceptual help, 0:45:37 but not sort of concrete design help. 0:45:40 Would you think of this sort of tiers of secrecy 0:45:42 inside Apple as a feature or a bug, 0:45:43 or somewhere in between? 0:45:44 – Yes. 0:45:45 (laughing) 0:45:46 Yes. 0:45:52 You know, the thing is, I think there is a really 0:45:57 underestimated power in keeping your team small. 0:46:03 The cohesion, the small unit cohesion that you have, 0:46:09 where simple things like we’re gonna have a meeting, 0:46:11 who do we invite? 0:46:13 Well, everybody, right? 0:46:16 We’re gonna have a team meeting, right? 0:46:18 Where we’re gonna talk about important milestones, 0:46:20 where we’re gonna call everybody out of their office. 0:46:22 Henry could say, “Hey, everybody, 0:46:25 “come out of your offices, please.” 0:46:30 And within 30 seconds, everybody was standing there, right? 0:46:34 So you get these, there are advantages 0:46:36 to keeping things really, really small. 0:46:40 And of course, then there is the disadvantage 0:46:45 that when you are trying to tackle difficult problems, 0:46:49 you may not have all of the talent that you need. 0:46:54 And you may not have a sufficient amount of diversity. 0:46:55 Right? 0:46:56 Right? 0:46:59 That all the, you know, especially a company like Apple 0:47:01 is trying to make products for everybody. 0:47:04 Well, how do you design for everybody, right? 0:47:09 If the design team is in a microcosm of everybody. 0:47:15 And so there are these really profound challenges, right? 0:47:18 Back in these times, we did the best that we could 0:47:21 within the constraints. 0:47:24 And we tried to then really tap into the benefits 0:47:28 that the smallness and the secrecy gave us as well. 0:47:29 Yeah. 0:47:31 Another funny thing that I learned reading your book 0:47:33 is the secrecy was so extreme 0:47:35 that like you didn’t even know what the product 0:47:36 was gonna be named. 0:47:38 And so like the word iPhone wasn’t even in the dictionary. 0:47:39 That’s right. 0:47:40 It’s like after Steve launched. 0:47:41 That’s absolutely true. 0:47:46 So there was, we were all heading toward this announcement 0:47:51 for the iPhone in January of 2007. 0:47:56 And so if you remember how Steve introduced the product, 0:48:02 he said, give his very dramatic introduction. 0:48:07 As we said, that something to the effect of, 0:48:10 well, we’ve got a groundbreaking product 0:48:14 and you privilege to be involved in a product like this, 0:48:16 maybe once in your career, 0:48:19 but Steve, he had been involved with the Mac 0:48:20 and then the iPod. 0:48:25 And he said, we’re gonna have three new products 0:48:26 of this class today. 0:48:27 And I’m saying like, wait, 0:48:29 there were two other secret projects 0:48:30 that I didn’t know about. 0:48:34 I mean, truly for a moment, I didn’t get. 0:48:35 And it’s like, oh, no, no, no. 0:48:37 It’s just how he’s gonna tell the story. 0:48:38 My product he’s talking about. 0:48:39 That’s right. 0:48:41 That’s gonna be the phone 0:48:44 and it’s gonna be the touch screen music player 0:48:46 and then the internet communicator 0:48:48 and that how, no, this is actually all just one product. 0:48:50 Then we call it iPhone. 0:48:53 And when he said that, that’s when I knew 0:48:56 that I was gonna have to go back the next day 0:48:59 and add iPhone to the auto correction dictionary. 0:49:00 – That’s awesome that he fooled you too. 0:49:02 ‘Cause he fooled me, like, click line. 0:49:04 Now I got, like, you were working on it 0:49:05 so I don’t feel quite as bad. 0:49:06 – Well, you just, I mean, again. 0:49:08 – I fell for it. – The secret is that, 0:49:10 oh, you know, I have to admit that it was just a moment 0:49:12 where it’s just like, wait, wait a second. 0:49:13 Is there something that I don’t know? 0:49:15 I was like, no, it can’t be. 0:49:20 But, yeah, it was, that was just the culture 0:49:23 and the times and the way Steve liked to run things. 0:49:25 – Yeah. 0:49:27 – Now a feature we all take for granted now 0:49:30 actually didn’t appear in iOS until several releases later 0:49:32 and that’s copy and paste. 0:49:34 So I wonder, at the time, did you guys talk about that 0:49:36 and did you make an explicit decision to sort of like, 0:49:38 yep, let’s ship without copy and paste 0:49:39 and was that contentious? 0:49:40 ‘Cause on the surface of the scene, 0:49:42 like, that’s contentious? 0:49:43 – Yes, yes, it was. 0:49:48 But one of the other things that we were really expert at, 0:49:52 to bring back the word that we talked about earlier was focus. 0:49:58 In that we were very, very good, 0:50:03 really very, very early in the development process 0:50:05 to say what was in and what was out. 0:50:06 – Right, physical keyboard. 0:50:08 – Out, that was super early. 0:50:10 – That’s right, very, very early. 0:50:14 And that it was clear that this was, 0:50:19 that getting the text entry system working at all 0:50:21 was going to be one of the real challenges. 0:50:26 I mean, I got used to being in the team meetings 0:50:29 where Anri, team engineering meetings, 0:50:30 again, everybody’s in the room, 0:50:31 so we’ve got 20 people in the room 0:50:35 and Anri is up at the front of the room 0:50:39 and he’s got a keynote slide deck 0:50:42 and he’s saying, okay, big challenges, 0:50:44 well, keyboard, of course, 0:50:46 and then whatever other challenge they may have been 0:50:48 and those challenges came and went, 0:50:49 but keyboard was just a constant 0:50:53 throughout the whole 18 month development cycle. 0:50:57 And so we knew that we wanted cut copy paste, 0:51:00 but we knew that there was simply not gonna be time for it. 0:51:04 So we didn’t spend any real development effort on it. 0:51:07 The one thing that I did implement 0:51:11 for the first iPhone was the loop. 0:51:12 So you press and hold 0:51:14 and it would give that little magnifying glass 0:51:17 above your finger that would show. 0:51:20 And the whole idea of that is that we wanted your finger 0:51:23 to be right where the insertion point, 0:51:25 the little cursor would move. 0:51:28 And so then we needed to show you what, 0:51:31 and so this was an idea that I came up with, 0:51:34 but then there was no time to capitalize that 0:51:36 and expand on that to do cut copy paste. 0:51:41 And it even got delayed an extra year 0:51:43 because in the second year, 0:51:46 after we did the initial release of the iPhone 0:51:47 and then we had that six month delay 0:51:50 before we did the first customer shipments. 0:51:54 And then that whole next year was taken up 0:51:58 by making third party APIs. 0:52:01 – Yep, so two releases before you had copy and paste. 0:52:02 – That’s right, that’s right. 0:52:04 – And so I wanna get right into this 0:52:08 ’cause look, Apple was famous for having exquisite taste 0:52:11 around these design trade-offs. 0:52:13 And a feature like copy and paste kind of feels like, 0:52:15 wait, you’re arguing against copy and paste? 0:52:18 Like, that’s not a great user experience. 0:52:22 And so like, how did the argument evolve? 0:52:25 And sort of the big setup is, look, there’s taste, 0:52:27 taste making, making hard decisions like this. 0:52:29 And then there’s sort of another style of decision making, 0:52:31 which sort of Google made super popular, 0:52:34 which is just relentlessly A/B testing everything, right? 0:52:35 – Right. 0:52:37 – And so like maybe the way Google would have come 0:52:40 at this challenge is, all right, let’s give people tasks. 0:52:41 This one has copy and paste, 0:52:43 this one doesn’t have copy and paste, let’s A/B test it. 0:52:46 – But Apple made sort of like what I would argue 0:52:49 is a pretty courageous call, right, 0:52:54 that seems to fly against the user intuition to exclude it. 0:52:56 – Yeah, well, it was simply a matter 0:52:59 of setting the constraints and keeping them. 0:53:03 And again, maybe if we had doubled the size of the team, 0:53:05 we could have gotten some other things done, 0:53:06 but maybe not to the same level of quality. 0:53:09 And again, once you start adding people, 0:53:11 other things begin to break down, right? 0:53:13 You can’t invite everybody to the team meetings, 0:53:16 so you can’t find a conference room big enough, right? 0:53:18 – And now there’s 40 people who can break the build. 0:53:19 – That’s right, that’s right. 0:53:21 I mean, how you start to have problems like this. 0:53:25 And so we just decided that, well, 0:53:29 it’s like a Steve way of maybe communicating this was, 0:53:32 look, this is the greatest product ever, right? 0:53:35 The touchscreen iPod, 0:53:37 it’s the greatest iPod that we’ve ever shipped. 0:53:39 It’s got all these great features. 0:53:41 It’s a phone, it’s got web browsing 0:53:43 that you can take anywhere with you now. 0:53:45 And there’s no copy-paste, well, who cares? 0:53:46 Well, we’ll get to it, right? 0:53:48 I mean, in the meantime, you’ve got this, 0:53:51 the most amazing product that we’ve ever made. 0:53:56 And so that was, and Steve just was, 0:53:57 in his mind, 0:54:03 he believed that the things that we did do 0:54:05 were good enough to counterbalance 0:54:06 for the things that we couldn’t do. 0:54:09 – So that’s great. 0:54:10 Great segue to sort of the next segment. 0:54:12 I’d love to sort of take us into 0:54:14 what it was like to demo for Steve. 0:54:17 Like, what was the room like, who’s in there? 0:54:19 Like, what’s the emotion of it? 0:54:20 (laughing) 0:54:22 – Everybody wants to know this, right? 0:54:22 – It’s pretty– 0:54:24 – It’s probably the scariest room in Silicon Valley. 0:54:27 – It was pretty, it was pretty scary. 0:54:30 Steve could be intimidating though, 0:54:33 is there is absolutely no doubt about it. 0:54:37 But to get back to this point I mentioned before 0:54:39 of the top down and the bottom up, 0:54:42 as I mentioned, except for this very brief 0:54:44 interlude where I was a manager, 0:54:46 throughout my whole Apple career, 0:54:48 over 15 years, almost 16 years, 0:54:50 I was an individual contributor. 0:54:53 And yet I got the opportunity to demo to Steve 0:54:56 some of the latest work that I did 0:54:59 at various points in my career. 0:55:04 Because he wanted to see from the person who did the work. 0:55:08 And because when he would ask questions, 0:55:11 well, go and ask the expert, right? 0:55:15 And go ask the person who is the DRI, right? 0:55:16 The directly responsible individual, 0:55:19 the person who is, at least according to plan, 0:55:21 the person who when they lose sleep, 0:55:24 they are losing sleep over that thing 0:55:26 that they’re gonna be demoing to me. 0:55:28 So that’s what he wanted to do. 0:55:31 And these demos were very, very small affairs. 0:55:36 Now, interestingly, the demo room for Steve, 0:55:39 the software demo room was this really 0:55:41 just shabby little room. 0:55:42 – That’s not what you would expect 0:55:44 for Steve Jobs’ command performance, right? 0:55:47 – This pristine room that it’s– 0:55:48 – Beautiful lawn mood. 0:55:52 – It’s not like an air filter, the air is clean, 0:55:55 or like the scent of redwoods 0:55:57 or something like that, piped in and no. 0:55:59 No, it was this shabby little room 0:56:01 with this mangy old couch 0:56:04 and just standard issue office furniture. 0:56:07 And that’s what there was. 0:56:10 I don’t know why he didn’t want better, 0:56:14 but the only reason that I can say 0:56:16 is that again, it was a matter of focus. 0:56:18 He was focused on looking at the software 0:56:19 and not worried about the decor. 0:56:21 – Yeah, all right, so take us in the room. 0:56:23 It’s a mangy couch who’s in the room. 0:56:26 Let’s do the version where you’re trading off 0:56:28 sort of the keyboard with the big keys 0:56:28 or the keyboard with the little keys. 0:56:31 – Okay, so now, so skipping ahead a couple of years 0:56:35 after the original iPhone 0:56:37 when we were then doing the original iPad. 0:56:41 So this is now 2009 as I recall. 0:56:43 So a couple of years later. 0:56:48 And so this is actually an original iPad right here. 0:56:50 And it’s actually a really good one, 0:56:53 which is actually autographed by Steve Jobs. 0:56:55 So this was the iPad that I got 0:56:59 at the end of the iPad development process. 0:57:02 But back at the beginning of the iPad process, 0:57:05 I would have a prototype that looked pretty much like this. 0:57:08 And so we were thinking of, well, 0:57:11 what’s the typing experience gonna be like? 0:57:13 And so here’s an original iPhone and original iPad. 0:57:14 Well, we’ve obviously got a bigger screen. 0:57:15 – A lot of pixels now. 0:57:17 – Right, so now what are we gonna do 0:57:20 to make great use of these additional pixels that we have? 0:57:23 And one thing that I also noticed was 0:57:25 if you turn the iPad to landscape, 0:57:30 that screen distance is actually just about the same 0:57:32 as the distance between the Q key 0:57:35 and the P key on a laptop keyboard. 0:57:38 So I was thinking, hey, like, wait a minute, 0:57:41 we could maybe fit a full-size, 0:57:46 something that is a full-size keyboard on a landscape iPad. 0:57:51 Now it turns out that right around at the same time, 0:57:53 one of the H.I. designers, 0:57:55 one of my favorite H.I. designers 0:57:56 that I really loved working with 0:57:58 and who I had also collaborated with 0:58:01 on the iPhone keyboard, Basa Orting, 0:58:04 he was starting to think about iPad keyboards as well. 0:58:06 And so he had come up with this demo 0:58:10 where he had all of these variations, 0:58:11 all of these ideas. 0:58:15 And so he gave me a demo where he went through, 0:58:17 he showed me 10, 20 different ideas, 0:58:21 but one of them really made, really struck me, 0:58:25 which was he had a design that showed pretty much 0:58:28 just a shrunk down laptop keyboard to fit in this space. 0:58:32 And so what that meant is that I had two ideas, 0:58:36 is that maybe I could use this larger screen real estate 0:58:40 to make a version of the keyboard that had big keys 0:58:43 that was almost the same size as a laptop keyboard, 0:58:46 but then one that also gave you like the number row 0:58:48 and all of the punctuation keys, 0:58:50 exactly where you would expect to find them 0:58:52 on a laptop keyboard. 0:58:56 And so I figured, well, and I started talking with Basa 0:58:59 and we came up with this demo 0:59:04 where we would have a special key, 0:59:08 we called the zoom key that would take you 0:59:11 from this keyboard that had the small keys 0:59:12 that would zoom up to the larger keys 0:59:15 and then back down to the smaller keys 0:59:19 as a kind of a complement to the globe key 0:59:21 that changes the keyboard language. 0:59:23 So we would have this other key, 0:59:25 this kind of complimentary key 0:59:28 that would change the keyboard layout. 0:59:29 We thought this was a great idea. 0:59:34 And again, the idea of what are we gonna do 0:59:38 with this larger screen real estate for the iPad, right? 0:59:40 – So the idea was give the user choice. 0:59:41 – Give the user choice. 0:59:44 – Give the user choice, use these new pixels 0:59:46 that are available on this new platform, 0:59:51 this new form factor, and have that be the pitch 0:59:53 that we make to people. 0:59:55 And so before, of course, you can make the pitch to people. 0:59:56 You need to make the pitch to Steve. 0:59:57 – To the man. 0:59:58 – That’s right. 1:00:01 And so I got to demo this for Steve. 1:00:04 And so the way that this worked is that 1:00:09 there was a very small team that was like 1:00:14 the chief demo review team, 1:00:17 the small group of people that Steve wanted around him 1:00:19 as he was reviewing demos. 1:00:23 And this was Scott Forstahl, Greg Christie, Henri, 1:00:23 people that I’ve mentioned. 1:00:26 So the chief managers for iOS. 1:00:28 And then a couple of H.I. designers. 1:00:30 It’s like Boss Orting, the fellow that I collaborated with 1:00:34 on this keyboard, was almost always in this meeting. 1:00:37 Another fellow, Steve LeMay, was another H.I. designer, 1:00:39 was often in the meetings. 1:00:42 But as I recall, he wasn’t in this particular one 1:00:44 where I was demoing the keyboard. 1:00:46 – So half a dozen people. 1:00:48 – Half a dozen people in the room. 1:00:51 And so then what would happen is that people like me 1:00:53 who had individual demos, 1:00:55 and so it’s like there were circles inside of circles. 1:00:58 So I was in the circle of people who could demo to Steve. 1:01:01 But then there was this circle inside of that 1:01:03 who would stay for all the demos. 1:01:07 And so my role would be that, or how I would figure 1:01:11 is that I would go in, give my demo, and then leave. 1:01:13 And so, think of that beforehand, 1:01:15 is that I’m sitting there with my iPhone 1:01:19 out down the hallway, waiting for Henri to text me. 1:01:20 – Waiting for my turn. 1:01:21 – That’s right. 1:01:25 And so he sends me a text, go stand outside the door, 1:01:27 and then the door is gonna open. 1:01:29 I’m gonna get invited in. 1:01:31 So I get the text, I go stand outside the door, 1:01:34 and now I’m waiting, and I’m waiting, and I’m waiting, 1:01:35 and it just seemed like, well, he just texted me. 1:01:37 Why did he text me? 1:01:39 And so then the door opens, I get invited in, 1:01:41 and I figure I’m on. 1:01:43 Gonna go do this iPad keyboard demo, 1:01:46 and I come around the corner and turn into the room, 1:01:50 and Steve is over there, and he’s like this. 1:01:52 He’s like, he’s on the phone. 1:01:54 He’s on the phone, staring at the ceiling, 1:01:57 like, you know, going back and forth in his office chair. 1:02:01 And I’m like, gulp, I was like, what do I do? 1:02:05 Like, now I’m eavesdropping on Steve on his phone call. 1:02:06 – Yeah. 1:02:08 – Right, and so, you know, it’s pretty uncomfortable. 1:02:09 – Yeah. 1:02:12 – And I think, I actually do think 1:02:17 that he was talking to Bob Iger, the head of Disney, right? 1:02:20 And so he’s like, yeah, Bob, yeah, yeah, that sounds great. 1:02:21 Yeah, yeah, I’ll call you next week. 1:02:22 Yeah, great talking to you. 1:02:27 Right, so then he hangs up, and so then he does this thing. 1:02:30 He takes his iPhone, he puts his phone back to his pocket, 1:02:34 and then he does this, right? 1:02:36 It’s like, you know, I mean, out of you know, 1:02:39 like the eye of Saran, right, the Lord of the Rings, right? 1:02:42 You know, the great eye turns to focus on you, 1:02:44 and that’s what it feels like. 1:02:48 And so it’s very, very interesting 1:02:52 then how the demos go from that point 1:02:54 in that he didn’t want a lot of words. 1:02:57 He didn’t want a lot of, you know, 1:03:01 used car salesman pitches, right? 1:03:03 All he really wanted to know was what was next. 1:03:06 And so what happened is he hung up the phone, 1:03:09 he turns towards me, and then Scott Forstall 1:03:10 was the one who then stepped up. 1:03:14 He goes, and the iPad was already in the room, 1:03:17 and so he goes and wakes it up and brings my demo up, 1:03:19 and says, Steve, we’re gonna be looking 1:03:20 at iPad keyboard options. 1:03:23 Now Ken, he did work on the iPhone keyboard, 1:03:25 and now he’s got ideas for the iPad keyboard. 1:03:28 So Ken, and so I said, yes, Steve, 1:03:31 go and look at the demo, it’s on the screen now, 1:03:33 try the zoom button. 1:03:36 And that’s it? 1:03:38 That’s it, that was the intro. 1:03:43 And so then Steve goes, he slides his office chair over, 1:03:48 and he starts looking at the iPad screen. 1:03:51 And what was up was one of the two keyboards, 1:03:53 let’s say it was the big key keyboard, 1:03:56 the one that was more suitable for touch typing. 1:04:00 And he’s looking at it, he took a long time to look at it. 1:04:03 It’s like, he even did this little thing 1:04:07 where he was turning his head to see what it looked like, 1:04:09 like in his peripheral vision. 1:04:14 It’s like, he’s just incredible to see what does Steve do 1:04:16 when he evaluates a product. 1:04:18 Okay, so this is what Dan, that’s what he did. 1:04:20 And so he hadn’t even touched it yet, 1:04:21 he’s just looking at it. 1:04:24 – Yeah, and this is going on for a long time. 1:04:26 – It seems, it’s like one of those things 1:04:28 where it was probably maybe 20 or 30 seconds 1:04:31 that’s felt like 20 minutes, right? 1:04:33 But he took a long time to study, 1:04:37 and then eventually he goes out and touches the zoom button, 1:04:40 and this zoom button to change between the two keyboards, 1:04:42 in this case shrinking the keys down 1:04:46 to be the more laptop-like keyboard layout. 1:04:49 The animation that Boss Orting had designed 1:04:51 was one of the most beautiful things I’d ever seen. 1:04:53 I mean, it really looked like they were, 1:04:56 like the keys were just like morphing. 1:04:57 It was absolutely beautiful. 1:05:01 But Steve just was like, no reaction. 1:05:03 He does the zoom and then he does this study again. 1:05:05 He’s like, look at all the, 1:05:08 look at all the keys, looking at how the screen changed. 1:05:09 Then he does the zoom again, 1:05:12 and it goes back to the state that it was in the beginning. 1:05:15 And then he studied a little bit more 1:05:20 and tapped the zoom button again to see that it’s like, 1:05:22 okay, there are just two states that we’re going here 1:05:24 between, right? 1:05:26 We’ve got two keyboards. 1:05:29 I see the animation, go between one, then the other, 1:05:31 back to the first one. 1:05:35 He satisfies himself that he’s seen what there is to see. 1:05:38 And so then he turns to me and he says, 1:05:40 we only need one of these things, right? 1:05:44 And you’re like, I’m on the hot seat. 1:05:47 – Yeah, I guess so. 1:05:49 And then he says, I mean, this is again, 1:05:51 the interesting part. 1:05:54 He asks me, which one do you think we should use? 1:05:56 He asks me. 1:05:58 He doesn’t ask, you know, Scott Forstall, 1:06:00 who was, you know, he knows much better. 1:06:03 He doesn’t ask, you know, any of the other people in there. 1:06:05 He asks me, the individual contributor, 1:06:07 you know, just coming in. 1:06:09 But I’m the DRI, you see, that’s the thing. 1:06:11 He wanted the answer from me. 1:06:15 Now the thing was, I had to give an answer. 1:06:16 – Yeah. 1:06:17 – You know, if I didn’t give a good answer, 1:06:19 maybe I would never be invited back again. 1:06:21 – Not the DRI anymore, without answering. 1:06:24 – See, but you know, and I had no idea 1:06:26 that this is what he was going to ask in. 1:06:28 But in that moment, I came up with an answer. 1:06:30 Because I thought about my experience 1:06:32 with these two keyboards, and I thought that, you know, 1:06:35 the one with the bigger key is I found more comfortable. 1:06:38 I was getting to be, you know, that maybe with, you know, 1:06:41 like four or five fingers that I could touch type. 1:06:42 And auto correction was helping. 1:06:44 So that’s why I said to Steve, I said, 1:06:45 well, I like the bigger one. 1:06:46 You know, the auto correction is kind of helping. 1:06:49 And I’m starting to get a feel for touch typing. 1:06:53 And he says, okay, we’ll go with that one. 1:06:56 – Wow. 1:06:57 – Demo over. 1:07:00 And you know, the interesting thing is that then 1:07:02 that’s the keyboard that chipped on the product 1:07:06 with the slight modification of taking away the zoom button, 1:07:09 which was now no longer needed, right? 1:07:14 And so Steve had this amazing ability to simplify 1:07:19 and to rely on his people to have a good enough idea 1:07:26 about what they were doing and to be involved enough 1:07:31 in the work that even when you get asked difficult questions, 1:07:33 you know, about it, that you’ve been thinking about it. 1:07:38 You have this background of just context 1:07:40 of having been thinking about the problem 1:07:45 for weeks and weeks that that experience was then 1:07:47 something he was interested in topping into 1:07:50 to provide a way forward for the product. 1:07:51 – What was going through your head 1:07:54 when you were just watching him sort of head tilt 1:07:57 in silence, were you like tempted to like explain things? 1:07:58 Were you? 1:07:59 – Yeah, well, you just know that you, 1:08:00 that’s not what you’re. 1:08:01 – That you’re not supposed to do that. 1:08:02 – That you’re not supposed to do that. 1:08:03 – Yeah. 1:08:04 – Yeah. 1:08:06 I mean, I would imagine that if he had done so, 1:08:08 he would have been in no uncertain terms. 1:08:09 He’s like, let me look at the thing. 1:08:10 – Yeah. 1:08:14 – Because now he’s like, what was he doing? 1:08:17 He was in my view, in my view, 1:08:19 I don’t know what’s going on inside his head, 1:08:22 but just having seen him do that, 1:08:25 having at least enough experience with him 1:08:28 and his approach to evaluating work 1:08:33 is that he was putting himself in the position of a customer. 1:08:38 He was envisioning himself that being in an Apple store, 1:08:40 as a customer walking up to a table, 1:08:43 seeing this new iPad thing for the first time, 1:08:44 what’s gonna be my impression of it? 1:08:48 So he pictured himself as customer number one. 1:08:52 And so, you know, I don’t want anybody, 1:08:53 I don’t want the engineers, 1:08:55 the engineers aren’t gonna be there 1:08:58 to be whispering in the ear of the person in the Apple store. 1:09:00 Sure, they can maybe get the help of one 1:09:04 of the nice people working in the Apple store, 1:09:07 but gosh, wouldn’t it be better 1:09:09 if I can figure this thing out for myself 1:09:14 and decide for myself and see the evidence of the care 1:09:18 that the engineers and designers had put into the work, 1:09:19 I can decide for myself. 1:09:22 Yeah, this is the thing I want to take home with me, right? 1:09:26 Yeah, so obviously if you have a leader like Steve 1:09:30 that’s that into being able to emulate the user 1:09:33 who has great taste, like you want to make this person 1:09:35 benevolent design dictator for life, right? 1:09:37 Now the downside of that, you know, 1:09:39 Silicon Valley is getting a lot of criticism 1:09:42 for these sort of super charismatic reality distortion 1:09:46 field generating CEOs where like, 1:09:47 you might not agree with them, right? 1:09:50 And, you know, in the sort of ultimate downside case, 1:09:53 there’s sort of just too much hero worship of CEOs. 1:09:55 Like, do you think that ever became part 1:09:58 of the Apple culture, right? 1:10:01 Sort of the blind obedience to the fearless leader. 1:10:06 Yeah, I think the Steve’s reputation 1:10:11 and his success causes people to draw the wrong conclusions, 1:10:14 to take away the wrong lessons. 1:10:20 I think that if you go back and look on YouTube 1:10:22 of old videos with Steve, maybe, you know, 1:10:25 on stage with Walt Mossberg and Kara Swisher 1:10:28 at their, you know, All Things D conference, 1:10:33 or I just had a reason to go back 1:10:36 and look at the antenna gate. 1:10:37 Oh, right? 1:10:38 I forgot about that. 1:10:40 Because I, and the reason that I did this 1:10:43 is because this, you know, it’s current now 1:10:46 that there was a bug in group FaceTime 1:10:48 and Apple issued an apology. 1:10:50 They were sorry that we had this problem 1:10:52 and that we’re gonna be fixing it, whatever. 1:10:53 And so I wanted to go back and say, 1:10:56 well, what did Steve say about antenna gate? 1:10:59 You know, which was the issue with the iPhone 4 1:11:01 where you’re holding it wrong 1:11:03 and the signal strength would go down. 1:11:04 And I wanted to see what he said. 1:11:06 And it was, it’s really interesting. 1:11:06 This is on YouTube. 1:11:08 You can go and look at it. 1:11:10 And Steve held a little press event. 1:11:14 And, you know, he was just very, very clear, 1:11:16 very, very upfront saying, 1:11:18 our goal is to make our customers happy. 1:11:23 And so that’s the kind of lesson 1:11:24 that people should be taking away. 1:11:26 It’s not that he was domineering. 1:11:30 Not that he was this, you know, absolute monarch, 1:11:33 you know, 21st century absolute monarch now 1:11:35 in a company rather than a government. 1:11:39 All of that, you know, that he had this, yeah, 1:11:41 reality distortion field personality 1:11:44 is that he had this focus on doing great work 1:11:46 and making customers happy. 1:11:48 That’s really what he cared about. 1:11:49 – Yeah. 1:11:52 And then sort of how did the organization morph itself 1:11:54 to sort of reflect that you had this, you know, 1:11:57 great taste maker who wanted to make these decisions 1:12:00 at a sort of very granular level in the design. 1:12:03 So there was an example where you were designing 1:12:06 an animation, I think it’s sort of the scrunch zooming demo 1:12:08 and you got to the point where like Steve 1:12:11 and Scott Forstall actually disagreed. 1:12:12 – Right. 1:12:13 – So maybe tell us a little bit about that. 1:12:17 – Yeah, and so this was for iOS 5. 1:12:20 So this was, you know, maybe the second version, 1:12:22 second or third version of iPad software. 1:12:25 And we wanted to come up with multitasking gestures 1:12:26 is what we called them. 1:12:28 So that you would have some way of interacting 1:12:30 with your whole hand on the screen. 1:12:32 Well, obviously from the beginning, 1:12:34 even though multi-touch was something 1:12:36 that shipped even in the first Apple product, 1:12:38 there was no way that you could have 1:12:41 sophisticated gestures, multi-finger gestures 1:12:43 on a screen that size, but with the iPad, 1:12:44 we thought that you could. 1:12:47 And so you have this idea of, well, 1:12:49 what if you’ve got the home button that way, 1:12:51 you still maybe want some gestures to interact 1:12:54 with the device to control going between app to app. 1:12:59 So I came up with this idea of using this five finger gesture 1:13:01 like you take a sheet of paper and crumple it up 1:13:06 and throw it away to go from an app back to the home screen. 1:13:09 There was then this other interaction 1:13:11 where you would swipe side to side 1:13:15 to just go between one app directly to some other app. 1:13:20 So you launch mail and then you launch Safari. 1:13:23 Well, then I can just swipe to go from Safari back to mail. 1:13:24 So that the system would keep track 1:13:28 of the history of apps that you launched. 1:13:31 So now here’s the part that Scott didn’t like. 1:13:36 So let’s say you start up your iPad from nothing, right? 1:13:38 Yeah, you know, you take it out of the box 1:13:39 and you bring it home. 1:13:42 And yeah, you launch mail and you launch Safari. 1:13:43 You’ve only ever launched two apps. 1:13:46 So you swipe to go from Safari back to mail. 1:13:48 Well, what happens if you continue swiping 1:13:50 in that direction, right? 1:13:51 There’s no other apps. 1:13:52 – End of list. 1:13:53 – End of list. 1:13:56 And so what I came up with was this sort of 1:14:00 morphing, stretching, rubbery distortion of the app 1:14:03 to show you that you were at the end of the list. 1:14:05 And it would kind of do this bloop, bloop, bloop, 1:14:08 sort of animation when you let your fingers up 1:14:09 off the screen. 1:14:12 And Scott Forstall hated it. 1:14:14 He hated it. 1:14:16 And his argument went like this. 1:14:18 He said, you know, that’s not fair 1:14:20 to the designers of the apps 1:14:24 because they really didn’t design for 1:14:28 what their apps would look like when you stretched them. 1:14:29 – That’s super interesting. 1:14:31 They didn’t have a say in what it’s gonna look like. 1:14:31 – That’s right. 1:14:32 – So you’ve taken away their taste. 1:14:35 – And it’s an interesting aspect to what happens 1:14:37 as you evolve a product. 1:14:40 They would then, for the subsequent version, 1:14:41 but we would be shipping a version 1:14:44 that added a new feature, multitasking gestures. 1:14:45 And it would have to work with all the apps 1:14:47 that were already in the world. 1:14:49 Of course, there was a huge ecosystem by that point. 1:14:52 So this was Scott’s argument is that the designers, 1:14:54 you’ve done something to the designers 1:14:56 that they couldn’t really have accounted for 1:14:58 in the design of their apps. 1:15:01 Okay, so I got the chance to demo this to Steve too. 1:15:03 And I remember that Steve, what he did was 1:15:06 he had the iPad in his lap. 1:15:08 So he was sitting like this 1:15:12 and doing the gestures, trying them side to side 1:15:13 and whatever. 1:15:16 And when he just discovered by himself 1:15:21 this rubbery animation, end of list animation, 1:15:25 he did it, he did it again, and he didn’t look up. 1:15:29 He said, “This is Apple.” 1:15:31 – Oh, awesome. 1:15:33 – Yeah, so it was a pretty good moment for me. 1:15:35 – And you just stopped yourself doing the victory lap. 1:15:37 (laughing) 1:15:39 – He thought that it was, 1:15:44 you know, sort of tapping into the, excuse me, 1:15:47 the little sort of whimsical aspect 1:15:49 that went all the way back to sort of like 1:15:52 the happy Mac on the original Macintosh. 1:15:54 Right, that it was this whimsical little animation 1:15:58 that showed that the system has this playful character to it. 1:16:00 And that was an aspect that he really loved. 1:16:05 And so, and it also just goes to show 1:16:09 that there could be disputes even up at the highest level. 1:16:11 Scott knew that I was very excited about this feature 1:16:14 and wanted to show Steve, so he let me. 1:16:17 And Steve was the one who had the final vote. 1:16:21 And he sided with me, and then that instance. 1:16:24 – And do you feel like that slowed decision-making down 1:16:26 at all in the org, where basically, 1:16:27 we’re just gonna wait for Steve to decide 1:16:30 so like why bother making a decision? 1:16:33 – See, but again, the DRIs were responsible. 1:16:38 You needed to bring him proposals, right? 1:16:46 You might think of that keyboard demo example was, 1:16:47 well, we were bringing him two keyboards 1:16:49 and we wanted him to pick which one. 1:16:51 No, that wasn’t it. 1:16:55 We were presenting him with a design 1:16:57 we wanted to ship in the product. 1:17:01 The design was going to have these two keyboards. 1:17:04 He was the one who unpacked it. 1:17:06 And to say we only wanted one of these. 1:17:11 So no, and the point is that if you brought him shoddy work, 1:17:15 that was like the equivalent of a shoulder shrug. 1:17:16 Yeah, Steve, we’ve got five things 1:17:19 we don’t really know which one we think we like. 1:17:23 That was a way to– 1:17:24 – Never get invited back to a demo, right? 1:17:26 – It’s a way to get invited, not invited back to the demo. 1:17:28 And that was the way that Scott Forstall then 1:17:32 would have gotten blowback from Steve Offline 1:17:35 to say, Scott, why aren’t you presenting me 1:17:37 with solid designs? 1:17:39 I’m not here wasting my time. 1:17:44 I wanna see the full result of that bottom-up process 1:17:48 so that he could then give his top-down approval, 1:17:51 disapproval, no, send this back for more work 1:17:54 with specific feedback on what to change. 1:17:56 That was the outcome of every demo with Steve. 1:18:01 Approved, not approved, bring me something different 1:18:06 next time, or not approved, give me these specific changes. 1:18:08 It was one of those three things. 1:18:11 – So Steve himself is sort of legendary 1:18:14 for sort of fusing liberal arts and engineering thinking. 1:18:17 And if you think about the classic Silicon Valley stereotype, 1:18:19 companies are a lot more about 1:18:22 the pedigreed computer science engineer, right? 1:18:23 Like, that’s the stereotype of like, 1:18:25 that’s what we’re looking for now. 1:18:28 But your own background and other people at Apple 1:18:31 who’ve sort of had the valued liberal arts 1:18:33 and engineering degree talk about like, 1:18:36 what are the advantages of sort of melding the traditions? 1:18:38 What’s an example of a decision they got made 1:18:39 that was a better decision? 1:18:40 Because you’re sort of– 1:18:45 – Well, I mean, it’s all the process 1:18:49 of designing experiences for people 1:18:52 that are useful and meaningful, right? 1:18:54 And I think that how do we define 1:18:56 what’s useful and meaningful? 1:18:59 Well, we look to literature, right? 1:19:01 We look to philosophy, right? 1:19:06 We look to art, we look to the creative media, right? 1:19:08 To decide what’s useful and meaningful. 1:19:11 And so, you know, I think, and you know, 1:19:14 I don’t know, I didn’t know Steve well enough 1:19:15 to know what he thought. 1:19:20 But the culture that he helped to create 1:19:24 and that I found my place in that culture 1:19:25 was, you know, the part of the approach 1:19:30 was that these devices are part of people’s lives, right? 1:19:34 More and more now, to the extent that now, right, 1:19:36 we think that there’s a problem 1:19:37 with the number of amount of time 1:19:40 that we’re spending looking at these screens, right? 1:19:43 That we need apps and features on the phone 1:19:45 to help us track, right? 1:19:47 Too much screen time, right? 1:19:51 And so, if we’re going to have this object, 1:19:54 this device, these experiences that are so important to us, 1:19:59 so deeply ingrained, well, then it requires, 1:20:01 I think, the care and attention 1:20:05 and the thought about it’s not just a technology artifact, 1:20:08 it’s a social artifact, right? 1:20:12 It’s a human artifact, right? 1:20:15 And so, that’s where liberal arts comes in. 1:20:18 Yes, you do need to have the technological background 1:20:22 to come up with the hardware and the software 1:20:24 and the networking and the services 1:20:26 to get everything packed together 1:20:28 so that a product like this is possible. 1:20:32 But if you’re gonna ask, well, what is it good for? 1:20:34 You know, why do we do this feature 1:20:35 rather than that feature? 1:20:39 I think that, yeah, that’s a liberal arts process. 1:20:40 – Tell the story, if you would, 1:20:45 of how you guys arrived at the homescreen app icon size. 1:20:49 Right, there’s a fun liberal arts twist to this. 1:20:51 – Yeah, so, okay, so now, you know, 1:20:55 going back to a phone that looks more like this 1:20:58 is my original iPhone that I still have. 1:21:00 So, you know, this is the screen size 1:21:02 that we were dealing with. 1:21:05 Now, one of the, you know, again, 1:21:08 now jumping back all the way to 2005, 1:21:12 18 months out from the, you know, the product announcement, 1:21:14 we were still in the early stages 1:21:16 of trying to figure out, well, 1:21:20 what is the homescreen of apps gonna look like 1:21:21 and how is it going to work? 1:21:24 And one of the fundamental questions that we had was, 1:21:26 well, how big should the icons be? 1:21:28 And again, I mentioned before this apprehension 1:21:31 of touching targets that were smaller than your finger. 1:21:32 And we were still in the phase 1:21:37 where we didn’t know how big on-screen objects should be. 1:21:39 And so we had some experiments, 1:21:42 but this was still, we didn’t have a good handle on it. 1:21:46 And so one of the engineers on the hallway had an idea. 1:21:48 And his name was Scott Herz. 1:21:50 He was doing work on Springboard, 1:21:53 the icon launching program himself. 1:21:56 And so he had this idea is I’m gonna make a game. 1:22:00 It’s the first ever iPhone game, right? 1:22:04 Truly, because this is a point where we didn’t even have 1:22:07 all of our units still needed to be tethered to a Mac. 1:22:11 We didn’t have standalone enclosures yet. 1:22:14 So we were still at this phase where we had touch screens 1:22:17 that still needed to have a wire tether to it. 1:22:19 But still we were trying to figure out, 1:22:21 well, what the ideal size is. 1:22:23 And the game was the solution. 1:22:24 And the game went like this. 1:22:26 You would launch the game 1:22:28 and there was a minimal user interface. 1:22:31 All it was was a rectangle on the screen 1:22:34 that was a random size and a random position. 1:22:37 And the game was tap the rectangle. 1:22:38 And as soon as you did, 1:22:41 it didn’t tell you if you succeeded or failed 1:22:44 because the idea was just go tap the rectangle 1:22:45 as quickly as possible. 1:22:48 You tap the rectangle, the next one would show up 1:22:49 at some other random size 1:22:51 and some other random position on the screen. 1:22:54 And the idea was to just go as quickly as possible 1:22:56 without, again, being sort of weighed down 1:22:59 by the feedback of whether you were succeeding or failing. 1:23:01 And you would get then 20 of them 1:23:04 and then it would give you your score, right? 1:23:06 And so it was fun, right? 1:23:08 – Before Angry Birds. 1:23:10 – Before Angry Birds, we had the little– 1:23:11 – Random rectangles. 1:23:13 – Angry rectangles as you’re going around. 1:23:15 Now, naturally what he was doing, 1:23:17 he also wrote the software so that he was tracking 1:23:22 rectangle by rectangle, 1:23:24 whether people were succeeding or failing 1:23:27 and also based on where the rectangles showed up 1:23:29 on the screen. 1:23:30 And within a couple of days, 1:23:32 of course, the game was actually fun, right? 1:23:35 I finally got 20 out of 20, right? 1:23:42 We determined that if you made a rectangle 1:23:45 that was 57 pixels square, 1:23:50 that pretty much everybody could tap it 100% of the time. 1:23:51 No matter where it was, again, 1:23:53 since you were going quickly, 1:23:55 you could tap it comfortably. 1:23:58 And that number, he just then, 1:24:01 since he was working on Springboard and it was his game, 1:24:04 it was his app, he put that number into the app, 1:24:07 he made the pixels 57 pixels square. 1:24:09 And since that was a good number, we never changed it. 1:24:12 And so that’s what wound up shipping on the iPhone. 1:24:14 – Yeah, I love that story, 1:24:16 that it was sort of a game that led to it, 1:24:17 as opposed to, all right, 1:24:20 we’re just gonna do every possible pixel variation, 1:24:22 we’re gonna bring people in to test it 1:24:23 and we’ll see what works. 1:24:26 – Yeah, no, it was, again, he was the DRI for Springboard. 1:24:29 It was his job to figure out how big the pixels should be. 1:24:32 And he came up with a good solution so we didn’t change it. 1:24:34 – Yeah, yeah. 1:24:37 So let’s switch gears a little bit 1:24:39 and talk about sort of your advice for young people 1:24:42 who are thinking about getting into the computer industry, 1:24:45 sort of, you know, a broad degree, 1:24:47 computer science degree, what set of life experiences, 1:24:49 like what’s your general advice 1:24:52 for people who want to join a tech company? 1:24:55 – Yeah, I think it needs to be a mix. 1:24:59 I think if you’re going to be a programmer, 1:25:00 yeah, go write programs. 1:25:02 I mean, the only way to get better 1:25:04 at things is to do them. 1:25:05 You know, and one of the wonderful things 1:25:09 we mentioned, open source, a bit earlier, 1:25:14 the barriers now have never been lower to get involved. 1:25:19 I knew that when I was a young person in college, 1:25:22 I actually started in college in 1984, 1:25:24 I couldn’t afford a Mac, right? 1:25:26 I wanted one. 1:25:27 – Yeah, they were thousands of dollars. 1:25:28 – Thousands of dollars. 1:25:32 There was no way that I could afford one. 1:25:36 And so now the barrier to entry is much lower. 1:25:41 So if you’re interested in making projects, 1:25:44 well, just go out and join a community 1:25:45 and start making them. 1:25:47 Or maybe you don’t even, you can even lurk in the community. 1:25:49 You can download the software 1:25:51 and try to make something of it yourself. 1:25:57 So I think that, again, if you want to do something, 1:25:59 just start doing it. 1:26:00 So that’s one piece of advice. 1:26:02 And then the other piece of advice is, 1:26:07 yeah, you do need to look at more than technology. 1:26:10 Again, for the reason that I said a few minutes ago, 1:26:13 which is these technological artifacts 1:26:17 that we’re making now have become so important to people 1:26:19 that if you don’t know anything about people, right? 1:26:24 I don’t think that you’re going to be successful 1:26:25 in the long term. 1:26:30 And so, yeah, read books, read books, 1:26:36 study, philosophy, go to art museums, 1:26:42 learn about what’s beautiful and meaningful to you. 1:26:46 Answer those questions for yourself. 1:26:47 I don’t think, you know, 1:26:49 if you can’t answer those questions for yourself, 1:26:53 it would be then hard as, say, a product designer 1:26:54 to then take on the responsibility 1:26:57 of answering those questions for other people. 1:27:00 Because that’s what you do when you’re a technologist 1:27:02 and say a product company like Apple, 1:27:06 you’re going to be making decisions on products 1:27:07 that are then going to go out in the world 1:27:08 and it’d be affecting other people. 1:27:10 Other people are going to be putting those things 1:27:12 and bringing them into their lives. 1:27:14 And so, how do you know what’s good? 1:27:18 And so that’s a question that you should be prepared 1:27:19 to answer for yourself. 1:27:21 What do you like? 1:27:22 And why? 1:27:23 What are your goals? 1:27:26 Why do you make a choice to make the product turn like this 1:27:27 rather than that? 1:27:31 And so, it’s this combination of learning about the technology 1:27:34 so that you can actually implement your ideas. 1:27:38 But then you’ve got to actually have good ideas. 1:27:40 And again, it’s the liberal arts 1:27:42 that provides the grounding for that. 1:27:43 – Super, and that’s counterintuitive 1:27:44 in Silicon Valley, right? 1:27:47 The suite of interview questions you typically encounter 1:27:50 when you’re interviewing for jobs are about linked lists. 1:27:51 And do you know TensorFlow? 1:27:54 And can you program in Python or whatever 1:27:55 as opposed to what’s good? 1:27:58 – Okay, and really, it’s unfortunate 1:28:00 that there are so many questions like that. 1:28:03 Well, obviously linked lists we’re still going to have 1:28:05 need for those as we go into the future. 1:28:10 But the work that, much of the work that I did in my life, 1:28:14 there was no way that I could have predicted, right? 1:28:18 When I was handed a piece of hardware like this 1:28:20 and it’s like making a touchscreen operating system 1:28:25 for a smartphone, well, there were precious few examples 1:28:27 that we could have looked at. 1:28:30 And so, how do you have experience in that thing? 1:28:33 So again, I think getting a flexibility 1:28:36 and being able to answer the sort of more general questions 1:28:37 about what you like and what’s good 1:28:41 and what your higher level goals are, 1:28:43 ’cause technology is gonna change. 1:28:48 – Yeah, and then sort of thinking about a company, 1:28:51 like how important do you think it is 1:28:52 if you’re thinking about joining a company 1:28:55 that there be a figure like a Steve Jobs 1:28:58 who has a trusted new tenant like a Scott Forstall? 1:29:00 Like, is the absence of those ingredients 1:29:02 like I’m not gonna join that company? 1:29:06 Or, right, how universal is the Apple experience 1:29:08 is another way of asking this question 1:29:11 versus how sort of specific to a set of characters 1:29:13 and a time in history? 1:29:16 – Yeah, it’s a hard question, right? 1:29:18 I mean, Steve was unique, right? 1:29:21 And unfortunately, he’s not around anymore. 1:29:26 And so, I think it’s kind of a fool’s errand 1:29:31 to go out and find who is the direct successor 1:29:32 to Steve Jobs. 1:29:35 It’s just like the questions are always changing. 1:29:41 And so, I think it’s a matter of finding a place 1:29:42 where you feel comfortable, 1:29:45 where you feel some sort of connection 1:29:48 to what the organization is trying to accomplish 1:29:51 and that you like the people 1:29:54 and that you feel that you’re bringing something, 1:29:55 you know, it’s, again, 1:29:58 this kind of this interesting contrast of both fitting in, 1:30:02 but then also, I think, providing more diversity. 1:30:04 I mean, that’s an ongoing challenge 1:30:07 for our high-tech companies is that, again, 1:30:09 as the products become more and more important 1:30:13 for our culture, the people who are making the products 1:30:18 need to be a better reflection of the world as it is, right? 1:30:23 That it’s not just a bunch of computer geeks 1:30:28 who went to maybe just a few high-powered schools 1:30:30 that have good computer science departments. 1:30:33 – In your book, there’s sort of a couple key ingredients 1:30:35 that you would sort of distilled 1:30:37 the Apple experience down to. 1:30:40 Like this is basically, in reflection, 1:30:43 this is what made the iPhone team so productive 1:30:45 and you talk about things like collaboration 1:30:47 and taste and decisiveness. 1:30:50 So we’ll pick up sort of a few of these things 1:30:53 as we sort of finish up the segment. 1:30:55 So collaboration, right? 1:30:58 Every company says we have a collaborative culture. 1:31:00 What do you think made Apple’s unique? 1:31:05 – Yeah, well, it’s interesting that we were very, very good 1:31:09 at combining complimentary strengths, right? 1:31:13 So we had this human interface design team 1:31:16 and I worked very, very closely over time 1:31:19 with a couple of the folks in there. 1:31:22 Of course, there were only a few folks in there in total. 1:31:26 And what we would do is, let’s say, 1:31:28 the example of me working with boss ordering 1:31:30 on the iPhone keyboard. 1:31:33 And so I was coming from the project 1:31:35 primarily from an engineering direction. 1:31:36 He was coming from the project 1:31:38 primarily from a design direction, 1:31:41 but boss was pretty good at writing code. 1:31:43 And I would fire up Photoshop and Illustrator. 1:31:46 And so we would come up with these ideas 1:31:48 and we would compliment each other. 1:31:51 And to the extent, and again, 1:31:53 whatever you think of software patents, 1:31:55 we got them for the work that we did in Apple. 1:31:57 And one of the constraints that you have 1:31:58 when you apply for patents 1:31:59 is that you need to list the inventors. 1:32:01 You actually need to be honest 1:32:04 about who contributed to the specific invention. 1:32:05 And so they would ask us, 1:32:09 well, which one of you two came up with this specific idea 1:32:11 so that we could write it into the claim language? 1:32:13 And maybe if we’re gonna take that claim 1:32:14 and move it to a separate patent, 1:32:17 we know we have to know who to put as the inventor. 1:32:19 And we would, boss and I would look at each other 1:32:20 and we would go, I don’t know, 1:32:21 we both came up with it. 1:32:24 And so that’s the sign of collaboration, 1:32:27 is that where the collaboration is so good 1:32:30 that you don’t know where it begins and where it ends. 1:32:33 You’re complimenting each other so well 1:32:38 that we did it and there is no other way to describe it. 1:32:44 And part of, as a sort of concrete piece of advice 1:32:51 or maybe a way of describing that more at Apple 1:32:54 is that we didn’t have a lot of politics. 1:32:58 When boss came up with the idea, I came up with an idea, 1:33:00 it just didn’t matter. 1:33:02 – Was it a strong attribution culture? 1:33:05 – Oh, that’s his idea and like, how dare you claim it. 1:33:06 – And I can’t work on that. 1:33:08 And now my manager is gonna get involved 1:33:12 because now I’m not gonna get the credit for it 1:33:15 and whatever, it just wasn’t like that. 1:33:17 – But you still had to have strong DRIs, right? 1:33:19 – Yeah, right. 1:33:21 – But that is also one of the ways 1:33:26 that just made it clear about if I was collaborating 1:33:30 with someone like Boss or just some other engineer 1:33:35 on the iOS engineering hallway, 1:33:37 if I was the DRI for the keyboard, 1:33:39 well, I was the one making the calls. 1:33:43 And as long as I kept making good calls, right? 1:33:45 I mean, if somebody else had an idea 1:33:47 that they really, really thought 1:33:48 they were gonna go to the mat and they’re gonna say, 1:33:52 “No, I think Ken made the wrong call on this.” 1:33:56 Yeah, they could buck that up, the management hierarchy, 1:33:58 but that was relatively unusual. 1:34:01 Because again, part of being a DRI 1:34:03 is recognizing strong ideas that are coming 1:34:05 from other people and including them in the work. 1:34:09 And so that helps to describe some of the character 1:34:11 of the collaboration that we had. 1:34:14 – Well, Ken, it’s been a fascinating conversation. 1:34:17 Thanks so much for taking us inside the chocolate factory. 1:34:19 Look, the chocolate factory did not have very many people. 1:34:23 So I feel really blessed that one of those people made it out 1:34:26 and is willing to lead the tour and talk to us. 1:34:29 And maybe that’ll be the last question I asked you, 1:34:33 which is famously secretive Apple corporation, right? 1:34:35 Did you have to get their approval 1:34:37 to actually write the book and tell the stories? 1:34:40 – Well, no, I didn’t. 1:34:43 I don’t know if I was supposed to, but I didn’t. 1:34:46 And I took a certain approach to it, 1:34:51 which is that it’s a positive take on Apple. 1:34:53 I loved my career at Apple. 1:34:55 So I didn’t throw anybody under the bus 1:35:00 because there was nobody that I thought deserved it. 1:35:06 And I limited myself to the Steve Jobs era, 1:35:09 which is now sadly, or for good or for bad, 1:35:11 passing into history. 1:35:12 And again, I was one of the few people 1:35:17 who had this perspective, this opportunity to be there 1:35:21 during the time that some of these products 1:35:22 were getting made. 1:35:26 And so again, with my background being in history 1:35:27 and being in the liberal arts, 1:35:29 I thought that it would be good 1:35:33 if I collected these recollections 1:35:38 while I still do remember them well and tell the story. 1:35:43 And so I thought that it was really more of a personal story. 1:35:50 And so no, I didn’t, I was imagining that maybe 1:35:53 I would ask forgiveness if somehow 1:35:55 they didn’t really approve, 1:35:59 but I thought that I wouldn’t really run into trouble. 1:35:59 – Well, that’s great. 1:36:01 Thank you for taking the time here 1:36:03 and for putting the stories down 1:36:06 so they don’t fade into the mists of history. 1:36:07 It’s been great having you. 1:36:09 – Well, I’ve had a great time, thank you. 1:36:10 – Great. 1:36:13 So for those in the YouTube audience, 1:36:16 if you liked what you saw, go ahead and subscribe. 1:36:18 And then in the comments thread on this video, 1:36:21 let’s talk about things that you might wanna try 1:36:22 in your own culture. 1:36:25 And now having listened to sort of Ken describe 1:36:27 what it was Apple, what Apple did, 1:36:29 sort of what would work in your environment 1:36:31 and what wouldn’t work in your environment. 1:36:32 We’d love to have a conversation 1:36:35 about how would you implement some of the ideas 1:36:36 that we talked about 1:36:38 in your own software development life cycle. 1:36:40 So see you next episode.
Join longtime Apple software engineer Ken Kocienda in conversation with a16z Deal and Research operating partner Frank Chen for an insider’s account of how Apple designed software in the golden age of Steve Jobs, spanning products like the first release of Safari on MacOS to the first few releases of the iPhone and iOS (very first codename: ”Purple”). Ken vividly shares about the creative process, how teams were organized, what it was like demo’ing to Steve Jobs, and many other fun stories. This episode originally aired as a YouTube video, and throughout, we repeatedly probe the question: is Apple’s obsession with secrecy during the product development process a feature or a bug?