AI transcript
It was this kind of great moment where you just kind of
felt like the future was like in front of you.
It’s very important to know that at this point
and all the way up until really 1994,
the overwhelming uniform universal expectation
was the internet would never be a business.
I at the time completely lacked the skill set
and the perspective to navigate, I would say,
interpersonal and in particular bureaucratic situations.
I had no clue how to do any of it.
So much of computer science at that point
was about optimizing scarce resources
because that was all you had at that time.
And they had spent decades figuring out how to do that
and we collectively decided to just break that rule.
– You’ve probably heard of the browser.
In fact, billions of people use browsers
as their gateway to the internet.
And you might even be using one right now
to access this very podcast recording.
Now in today’s episode from the Ben and Mark show,
Mark Andreessen and Ben Horowitz share the real story
behind the creation of Netscape,
a web browser co-created by Mark
that revolutionized the internet
and quite frankly, changed the world.
As Ben notes up top, until today,
this story has never been fully told
either in its entirety or accurately.
In this one-on-one conversation,
Mark and Ben discussed Mark’s early life
and how it shaped his journey into technology,
the pivotal moments at the University of Illinois
that led to the development of Mosaic,
a renegade browser that Mark developed as an undergrad,
which is widely referenced as the first widely used browser
and the fierce competition and legal battles
that ensued as Netscape rose to prominence.
Ben and Mark also reflect on the broader implications
of Netscape’s success, the importance of an open internet,
and the lessons that still resonate
in today’s tech landscape, especially with AI.
That and so much more.
I hope you enjoy.
– Who will decide the future of the internet?
Read Right On, a book by A6NZ General Partner
and author Chris Dixon,
takes on one of the most consequential questions
of our time, which is also the key
to unlocking more entrepreneurship,
more creativity, and more innovation.
From AI that compensates artists to social networks
that reward you for participating,
Read Right On shares a playbook
for building the next era of the internet.
Learn more at readrighton.com.
– Okay, you idiot, like this giant commercial opportunity
is staring you in the face.
You literally have like inbound sales leads,
like coming out of your ears,
like why don’t you go raise venture capital
and start a company?
And of course the answer was because I had no idea
that there was such a thing as venture capital.
– Yeah, venture capital.
– I literally, you know what a tractor was.
– Yes, exactly.
The content here is for informational purposes only,
should not be taken as legal, business, tax,
or investment advice, or be used to evaluate
any investment or security,
and is not directed at any investor
or potential investors in any A16Z fund.
Please note that A16Z and its affiliates
may maintain investments in the companies
discussed in this podcast.
For more details, including a link to our investments,
please see A16Z.com/disclosures.
– Welcome to the Mark Inventio.
Today is a super special episode
because we are going to talk about the origin
of the web browser and the invention of the web browser.
And we have one of the co-inventors
with us right here in Mark.
So it’s exciting.
It’s also exciting because this story’s never
really been told either in its entirety or accurately.
And so we’re gonna get a chance to do that.
For those of you who are so young
that you’re not quite sure what a web browser is anymore,
it is kind of how most people experience the internet.
So you might call it the internet.
It’s a thing, Chrome.
Let’s start at the very beginning
because one of the things that is kind of
one of the largest disinformation campaigns going
is this whole idea that people, entrepreneurs
and people who invent things are kind of born
with a silver spoon in their mouth.
And almost none of the successful entrepreneurs
we work with is that the case for.
They all come from, you know,
somewhere between like refugee and middle class backgrounds.
And you certainly were not born
with the silver spoon in your mouth.
So tell us a little bit about where you grew up.
You didn’t grow up in a big city.
You grew up in quite a small town.
What was that like?
And then what is it like growing up in?
How did you first encounter the internet?
– Yeah, so let me, if I could start our session today
with two disclaimers, which maybe relate to your question.
So disclaimer number one is we’re gonna be talking
about events that happened over 30 years ago.
– Little memory problems.
– Yeah, so, you know, I’m gonna tell the truth
as I remember it, I may get things wrong
or other people may have different recollections.
And so I have to disclaim that.
It’s ’cause I can’t swear to the factual accuracy
of stuff that was that long ago,
but I’ll tell the stories, I understand it.
And then I’d say the other story is
there are twists and turns along the way
where I would just characterize it as
at the time I was irritated at other people
for things that happened.
I think in the fullness of time,
what I realized is that I just at the time
completely lack the skillset and the perspective
to navigate, I would say interpersonal
and in particular bureaucratic situations.
I had no clue how to do any of it.
– Yeah, well, and so, I think when you get
into your background, people will kind of understand.
– I sometimes describe myself, I was feral
at this point in my life.
And so it’s always this thing,
if you could rerun prior events,
like with the skillset I have today,
I could have navigated it much better
and a bunch of things could have turned out different,
but I certainly did not have the skillset at the time.
So anyway, if it sounds like I’m criticizing other people,
it’s actually not what I intend.
It’s gonna be more ultimately criticizing myself
in the sense of whatever happened that I didn’t like
at the time, I think I was at least partly,
if not wholly responsible for.
– Yeah.
– ‘Cause I-
– You know, growing men can be like that
from time to time, you know?
– Yes, I would say I was raw aggression at that point
with very little, and yes, you’ve been, of course,
remembers this ’cause he met me shortly
after the events we were about to talk about.
So, first of all, the modern cliche is,
Elon Musk’s father had an emerald mind.
– Right, when he showed up in the U.S. with $2,000,
is the actual story, yeah.
– Yeah, exactly.
So there’s all these kind of fake histories
that are kind of retconned into people who grew up,
and in some cases, pretty tough backgrounds, yeah.
So I grew up in the American Midwest and rural Wisconsin,
and for people who haven’t spent time in Wisconsin,
there’s basically three Wisconsin’s.
They’re sort of the big city of Milwaukee,
which is like a, you know, kind of like a big,
almost like a Chicago kind of thing.
That’s its own world.
And then there’s Madison,
which is like a very kind of hippie college town
that was actually kind of a core of activity
in the ’60s, and then there’s the rest of Wisconsin,
which is completely disconnected from those two cities,
which has nothing to do and has no interface
into those two places at all,
and is sort of the rural Midwest,
which is basically a farming country.
And so–
– Probably one of the more grants, actually,
as I understand it.
– Yeah, I think that’s right.
If you get 10 minutes outside of either
Milwaukee or Madison,
you get into a real, real rural territory in a hurry, right?
And so, there were people in the farming world
in the Midwest, out through the 1970s,
that still didn’t have indoor plumbing.
I have memories of outhouses.
– Well, for a while, you didn’t have gas heat,
so you weren’t that far.
– There’s also that, exactly.
So, yeah, see, if you wanna heat your house,
you cut down some wood.
And so, look, it’s up north and it’s very close to Canada,
so it’s extremely cold.
And so, it’s actually ’cause it’s this amazing thing
where it’s sort of frozen tundra for nine months,
and then three months of summer.
You know, but mostly farming, you know,
a lot of dairy farming, a lot of corn to feed the cows,
so corn and cows.
And then, I would say, light manufacturing, light tourism,
a lot of Illinois people vacation up there,
go hunting, fishing, or whatever.
So, a little bit of that, but mostly agricultural.
My town was sort of the sign of the outside of town
forever, population, 1300 and nine.
The sign never changed.
– (indistinct)
whether you had 1308 or 1310.
– Yeah, I don’t think it actually moved around that much.
So, it’s probably more or less accurate the whole time.
And then, of course, the running joke was that’s 1300 and nine,
including the cows.
So, yeah, so very small town environment,
kind of lower middle class context,
and public eight through 12 school.
My school was very small, 25 kids in a class.
So, I feel like, whatever, 300 kids in the whole school.
– So, a lot of people don’t have school choice today.
You didn’t have teacher choice either.
‘Cause here’s, I guess, one teacher for every subject.
– No, no, exactly.
And then, look, this is the 70s and then the 80s.
And so, this not only predates the internet,
but this also predates cable TV.
We had no cable TV.
Long distance phone calls were still a dollar a minute.
We saw actually my neighborhood growing up, actually.
We had a party phone line for the entire neighborhood.
– That’s interesting.
– Which is actually quite an adventure.
And so, there’s a single phone number for the neighborhood.
And so, when your phone rings,
everybody in the neighborhood picks up the phone.
This is true, this is true.
And then, there’s an arbitration process,
a verbal arbitration process for who the call’s actually for.
And then, the expectation is that everybody else hangs up.
But, you know, they don’t have to.
– Well, they say there are no secrets in the small town.
– This is one of the reasons why.
So, yeah, so it’s sort of, I don’t know,
it’s halfway between the 1930s and the 1980s or something.
It just is one of those places where, you know,
a lot of the country was like that at that point,
which is it hadn’t fully adapted to,
certainly the things that we all now take for granted.
And then, you asked me how to discover the internet.
So, I had no idea the internet even existed
until I went to college.
So, the thing I knew that existed,
and this is where I kind of got lucky
in terms of when I grew up and when I came of age,
is I came of age sort of precisely at the moment
when the PC happened.
And so, I was aware of, you know,
there were all these just amazing stories.
This is when Steve Jobs was on the cover of Time Magazine,
and you know, so there was this moment
when the person on the computer
hit the popular consciousness.
It was sort of built in the late ’70s,
and then it sort of catalyzed hard in the early ’80s,
especially around ’82.
And then, you know, our school,
even though it was very small,
started to get a handful of early computers.
And then, there were a wave of consumer computers
at that time that were actually quite inexpensive.
And so, there were computers at that time
as cheap as $200 in currency at that point, which–
– And this is our floppy disk.
So, this is pre-hard drive or post-hard drive
when you got your first computer.
– Pre-floppy disk.
– And tape.
– Cassette tape, exactly, yes.
– It’s a slow loader, bro.
You can power it a load again.
I remember that era.
– Yeah, so, for people who don’t remember,
but before floppy disks,
you would literally hook up a cassette tape player.
And the thing with a cassette tape player
is it didn’t have any kind of seek capability, right?
And so, the way that you loaded the program was,
you had to fast-forward by hand
at the right point in the tape, right?
And then, you were always at risk.
You were gonna write to the tape.
You wrote a program, you wanted to write it out of the tape.
You just ran the risk.
You were gonna overwrite something in the past.
And then, there was this really fundamental trade-off.
If you didn’t have a lot of money,
it’s this very fundamental trade-off,
which is you could buy a short cassette tape
that was high quality or a small amount of stuff,
or you could buy, same price,
you could buy a cassette tape that was much longer
and could record a lot more, but at much lower quality.
And that mattered because the lower quality tapes frequently,
you would not be able to read back what you had written.
And so, there was a real quality-quantity trade-off.
– Yeah, this is a gambling exercise.
– Exactly.
And then, so we didn’t have the internet,
but we had no exposure to the internet.
We’ll talk about the internet prehistory in a little bit,
but we didn’t have that.
What was happening at that time was what were called BBSs,
which was acronym for Bullition Board Systems.
And the thing about these is,
BBSs were kind of pre-social networks in a way,
and pre-internet.
And so, the way this would work is the host of the BBS
would literally set up a set of modems
in their house or apartment,
often like eight or 12 or 20 or something,
to take incoming calls from people with remote computers.
And then, in theory, you could dial into BBSs,
and you just literally used a modem
and you dialed into the phone number for the BBS.
And then, if you got to the BBS, it was really cool
because you had access to early versions of email
and social networking and user profiles
and Bullition Boards and classified ads
and downloading games and playing games and so forth.
And so, it’s kind of pre-internet, pre-AOL,
kind of versions of these things.
The problem that I had was, again,
rural Wisconsin, longest as phone calls are a dollar a minute.
There are no BBSs in my town.
And so, I read about BBSs.
I actually don’t, to this day,
I think I never actually used one
’cause I couldn’t afford it.
And by the way, also, this is also pre-day broadband.
And so, when I first started on this stuff,
this was actually pre-modem, as we understand it today.
So, the form of the modem at the time
was what’s called an acoustic coupler.
And so, you take your old-fashioned telephone handset
and you literally put it in these two…
– Yeah, no, I remember those, yeah, right.
– In the two rubber cups.
And then, it’s literally using your handheld phone
as the receive transmit for the audio signals.
And so, the acoustic coupler modems were 300 bod,
300 bits per second.
– Yes, and very noisy, 300 bod, yeah.
– Yeah, very noisy, exactly.
So, yeah, very slow.
So, you could kind of get a glimpse.
I would say the romance of the personal computer
at that point was very clear.
And that’s what really got me was,
and basically, the way that you’d bought a computer,
you plugged it into your TV set in those days.
And what happened was, you literally,
you got injected into the basic programming language
interpreter, and what that showed up as
is that literally, the screen would say ready,
and then there was a cursor.
And for kind of kids of my age,
it was this invitation to basically do anything, right?
And so, it was this kind of great moment
where you just kind of felt like
the future was like in front of you.
And then, there were all these,
this became a pop kind of culture thing.
And so, there were all these books and magazines
that you could buy or subscribe to that,
you literally subscribed, you know,
hobbyist magazine for what kind of computer you had.
And it would literally have printouts
in the magazine of programs that you could actually sit
and type into your computer,
type into the basic prompt and make work.
And so, there was this incredible sense of adventure
for what you could do on a computer.
And then, there was this additional thing out there,
which was, wow, if you could afford it,
you could be on BBSs and you could talk to other people.
And so, they kind of had that network thing
from the beginning.
It’s just the economics at the time was not feasible
to have it be a mass marketing thing.
– Yeah, yeah, interesting, interesting.
Okay, so then, you get the University of Illinois.
And why did you go there?
Why not Madison or MIT or what have you?
– Financially, the state schools were the options.
And then, Illinois turns out to,
then and now is a great engineering school.
And so, Madison’s very good,
but Champaign-Hurban was one of the top
engineering schools in the country.
And so, it was just, it was a nice coincidence
that that was kind of close enough and inexpensive enough.
– And also having to have national computing,
super computing.
– Yeah, so this is where I got really lucky.
So, I dropped into Illinois as a new student,
started out in double E and then decided
I did not care at all about electrical engineering
and switched into computer science,
which was a much better fit.
But, you know, I showed up as a CS student.
And basically, this was my big stroke of luck was,
this was Illinois, University of Illinois in 1989.
So, this was four years into two federal programs
that basically created the precondition
for everything that followed with the internet.
And the two programs were something,
I think it was called the National Supercomputing Act,
and it was basically this effort to basically fund,
it was funded for what were called
National Supercomputing Centers at four universities,
one of which was Illinois.
And so, the campus as the federal government
just dropped in a ton of money
to basically buy state-of-the-art computers,
including at the time, really big computers
like these big Cray and thinking machines computers
that cost like $25 million at the time
and filled up entire rooms.
The supercomputers in those days were so big
that in some cases you’d actually build a building for them
and you’d build the building,
but you wouldn’t close the roof
and you would lower the computer by a crane
down through the roof into the center of the building
and then you would just use the roof.
And so, the big iron.
Exactly, some very esoteric, expensive, powerful systems.
So, we had those.
And then the other federal program was a program
to build what was called the NSF net.
The NSF there being short for National Science Foundation,
which is the government agency that all the money came through.
And the NSF net basically was the first internet backbone
as we understand it today.
And those programs were joined
because the original purpose of the NSF net
was to connect together these supercomputing centers
and then to allow researchers, scientists
in many other colleges, universities across the country
to be able to remotely access
these large centralized supercomputers.
I want to take a moment here to kind of pay credit to Al Gore
on this who famously gets just like endless shit
for people kind of saying that he said
that he invented the internet.
And so, just to defend Al’s honor for a moment.
A, he never actually said he invented the internet.
What he said is he took the lead in the Senate
in creating the internet.
And what he meant by that was not that he sat down
and wrote the code for it.
What he meant was he was one of the real leaders,
one of the main forces in the Senate
to actually fund these two programs.
And these two programs led directly to the internet
as we know it today.
And so, he and his colleagues at that time
really stepped up at a pivotal moment.
And I think that’s actually very relevant
to kind of what’s happening today with AI.
Like, I think that’s actually the same thing
that needs to happen with AI today.
Well, it’s kind of the opposite of what’s happening
with AI in universities today,
which is they’re not only underfunded to do AI,
but there’s a push among the big tech companies
to enact legislation that would essentially outlaw AI
and universities by eliminating open source.
So, full credit to Al Gore for doing the right thing.
‘Cause it’s clear that that wasn’t obvious.
Yeah, that’s right.
We’ve been spending a lot of time in Washington lately.
And I’ve actually been telling the story
to a lot of current senators
and encouraging them to basically do the same thing.
Yeah.
Democrats love it ’cause it rehabilitates Al Gore.
The Republicans, I gotta get them through the Gore part,
but–
Everything partisan in 2020.
But they also seem to think it’s a good idea.
So, I hope that will happen.
So, basically my great luck was I showed up at Illinois in ’89
and basically four years into these federal programs.
And so, I showed up basically just got blasted
into the future in one step.
‘Cause when I showed up there,
there was, University of Illinois was actually wired.
It was one of the hub nodes of the internet backbone.
And the campus was getting wired for broadband.
And there were computers and computer labs
with state of the art equipment
all the way up to these giant Craig supercomputers
that the computer science department had access to.
It was just there.
It was like being beamed into the future.
Now, the twist on that is the assumption in those days
was you would use this stuff while you’re in school.
And so, they had started to give out email addresses
to undergrads and things like that.
But the assumption was that you would use these systems
while you were in school.
And then if you stayed and became a faculty member
or something, you would use these systems
for your research.
But if you graduated and just went out
and went into the real world,
you would leave it all behind.
– Right, there’s access to the internet, right?
There’s not access to the internet chains, right?
Maybe you could kind of describe what the internet was
at that point.
‘Cause when we say internet,
people imagine a lot of things,
but that’s not what it was then
in terms of a user experience.
– Yeah, that’s right.
And so a couple of things.
So one is it’s very important to know
that at this point and all the way up until really 1994,
the overwhelming uniform universal expectation
was the internet would never be a business.
There would never be a business.
There would never be an industry.
There was never going to be money to be made.
There was never going to be a commerce.
There was never going to be streaming video.
There was never going to be stores, any of the stuff.
By the way, even the idea of having like newspapers online
was considered bizarre.
It wasn’t even going to be that.
It was supposed to be like scientific research papers
and experimental data and things like that.
And so it was very much not viewed
as like a commercial opportunity.
It was viewed very much not that way.
And basically, I think, correct me if I’m wrong,
it had been up until like ’94.
I think zero of the big tech companies of that era
took it seriously.
– Yeah, zero.
And in fact, well, in fact, the opposite,
they were building kind of parallel systems to the internet,
often referred to as the information superhighway.
Bill Gates was a huge kind of champion
of the information superhighway
and specifically not the internet.
So yeah, and he was kind of the biggest figure
and for sure in software
and probably in the industry at the time.
– Yes, so the big computer companies
wanted to build proprietary networks
and they were doing that.
And by the way, AOL was up and running by ’94.
AOL kind of got going around ’89,
kind of the same time I showed up at Illinois,
but it really kind of hit critical mass.
AOL basically was a consumer-scaled version
of the BBS idea that we described.
And then in ’93, it famously interconnected itself
with the internet.
And so all of a sudden, all the AOL subscribers
became internet users.
And so there was that,
but that didn’t even happen until ’93.
There was certainly no vision for that,
I think in the late ’80s
and there were no consumer ISPs
and then there were no normal businesses online.
And in fact, the internet up until 1993,
what was the NSF net, which then turned into the internet,
the operator under something that the federal government
dictated called the acceptable use policy,
the AUP and because the NSF net was federally funded,
commercial activity on the internet was actually banned.
‘Cause it was viewed as a certain inappropriate use
of federal research dollars.
And so it actually would not have been legal
to engage in commercial activity.
And so there basically was none.
And then yeah, and then the big phone companies
and the big media companies at that time
didn’t even want to build like BBSs or anything,
internet-related.
What they wanted to do was basically,
what we now know as streaming,
they wanted to do what they called
at the time, interactive television.
And the big killer app for internet television
was called video on demand.
And so sort of the revolutionary idea at that time
that instead of watching whatever was on a TV channel
at that moment, you could watch whatever you want
by clicking a button and then maybe you could order a pizza.
– Interestingly, there is a small minor bandwidth problem
with that idea, if I recall it correctly.
– Yeah, it was actually an idea
that was ahead of its time, right?
Streaming video didn’t really work
in the way that we understand it today
until probably 15 years later, right?
– Yeah, yeah, yeah, definitely.
I mean, well really when Netflix made the cutover
from CDs to streaming, which was the late 2000s, right?
– Yeah, I remember meeting with Reed Hastings in,
I think 2004 and Netflix was up and running
and it was very successful doing DVD rental by mail
and Reed’s a technical genius
in addition to being a business genius.
And he said, “I’m thinking about doing streaming.”
And my first reaction was that’s crazy, it’ll never work
because even in 2004, like most people on the internet,
they didn’t have broadband connections fast enough
to do like TV quality.
So the video at that point
was actually these little postage stamp size videos.
And I was like, oh, I don’t understand
who’s gonna wanna sit there
and watch a little postage stamp size thing.
And Reed had correctly extrapolated
that the broadband wave in the 2000s
was gonna result in streaming working.
But just give you a sense of the delay there, right?
So even a decade later, even a decade after the founding
of Netscape, development of Mosaic,
and founding of Netscape in a decade later,
it was still considered weird and bizarre
to turn to stream videos.
Yeah, so the media companies in the early 90s
were not being run by technologists.
And so they had a hard time, I think mapping.
There was a famous interactive television
information super highway trial in the early 90s
around this time, which was to do this video on demand.
So to do this thing where you’d have a remote
and you could press a button and watch
whatever movie you wanted.
And I remember it was a trial.
They were trying to figure out if there would be
consumer demand for this.
And so one of these companies,
they wired a neighborhood to do the streaming of a video,
but it wasn’t digital switched, it was analog switched.
And so they had a dedicated long,
basically analog line wired to each house.
And then in the back office, they had a bank of ECRs,
video tape players, and they had a videotape player
for each house.
And then they had a wall of video cassettes
with all the movies that were optioned.
And then they had a guy on roller skates.
– Yeah, roller skates to get to them quickly.
– To get there quick enough.
Cause the user expectation was you click the button,
you watch the movie.
And so the guy on roller skates had to like shoot over
to the wall of video tapes, pull down the right tape
and then shoot down the hall to the right VCR
and get the tape and the VCR and press play
before the couch potato was like giving up
cause the stream business started.
– Oh my God.
– And so yeah, that idea was a bit early.
But on the University of Illinois campus,
like broadband existed, like I said, email existed.
You asked how do people use the internet in those days?
So sort of pre-web, it was mostly,
well, there was the leading apps at that point.
There was an app called Telnet that you would use
to basically log into another computer on the network.
And that was actually very important
cause that’s how the scientists would use the super computers.
And actually the group I was in at Illinois
actually built one of the main Telnet apps.
There was an app called FTP
that was a file downloading app.
And so you could upload and download files.
There was early email.
So that worked.
There was early what were called news groups,
which is like basically forums,
kind of early social networking.
But I think at the time those were probably the four
main things that people did.
– And it was all scientists
and computer science majors on the internet, if I recall.
I mean, there was really nobody else.
– Yeah, so this is at the time 89.
I’m gonna guess there were somewhere between 500,000
to a million people total online.
And yeah, it was basically the,
it was basically the faculty, staff and students
at these four supercomputing centers.
It was the remote users.
And then it was like the defense contractors
got wired up early.
And then there were branches of the government
that got wired up early.
And then there was like the national labs.
And there were, and then a handful of hobbyists
would figure out a way to get online.
And so yeah, so basically it was,
first of all, it was like 100% people in the West,
overwhelmingly the US and Europe.
It was very heavily obviously English dominated
from the very beginning.
It was extremely technical scientific oriented.
Almost everybody on it had a scientific or technical degree.
It was also very, as a consequence of all that,
the, it was this incredible, brilliant,
this is like a million of the smartest people on the planet.
So the caliber of the people
and the quality of the discussions was like sky high.
– Oh yeah, I remember being,
the old news groups were unbelievable.
I remember like, if there was like a bug in a compiler,
like you could find out about it
and you know, there would be workarounds
and like the level of expertise on those things
was absolutely astounding.
– And look, many of the smartest people
in the scientific and technical world at that point
were in there and they would talk to you
if you had something interesting to say.
And so if you posted on a news group,
they would respond.
And so it was like this distributed community
of like, you know,
the smartest scientific technical minds in the planet.
It was really special.
And then also because there was no money,
you know, there was, there were no ads,
you know, there were, there were no scams.
There was no fraud.
There was no spam, you know, they’re like,
I remember there was actually a scandal
that there was a guy who figured out
that this was like a ripe for, you know,
basically scam, you know, kind of thing.
And he started, did the first spam emails
and news group messages.
And it was like a big scandal at the time
that somebody would actually do that.
Cause like a guy just literally started to do that, right?
And, but you know, it had run for years
without anybody even trying that.
Yeah, that’s what a community.
That’s a true meaning of community, right?
Like you have all people of the same culture in one place.
That scale, that’s amazing.
Yeah. So people who were on that at the time
kind of always look back at that and they miss it
because that has never been reconstituted.
You know, like a lot, a lot of the,
a lot of those people in their equivalents today
are like on X or they’re on the other social platforms,
but they’re, you know,
they’re a minority population
in a much larger, you know, context everywhere now.
Whereas at the time they were the entire population.
Yeah. So that, that, that was a super magical thing.
But, but yeah, I mean, look,
the actual functional use cases were quite limited.
And yeah, so yeah, that’s, that’s sort of,
that’s sort of what I saw when I got there.
Maybe it’d be helpful just cause I think it’s really relevant
both to the, the, the, what followed,
but also the AI discussion.
Maybe if I could, maybe I could go back in history now
to kind of where the internet came from.
Yeah. Yeah. Go back to like the late sixties.
Yeah. So, so the idea of the internet was sort of famously
this idea of what was called a packet switch network, right?
So the, the reason the internet works
is because it’s this peer to peer system in which computer,
you know, anybody can kind of plug a computer
into the internet and then you kind of have messages
that are able to go around and, and, and route.
And so, you know, famously this is an idea
that actually was developed originally
by the Defense Department in the 1960s called packet switching.
And, and in particular, there’s a guy, Paul Baran,
who’s kind of the original, you know,
kind of true founding father, you know,
godfather of the, of this idea.
And actually he’s a great, he’s a great story on this,
going back to your silver spoon thing.
So he was born, he’s a, he was a Jewish,
Jewish Polish immigrant to the US.
And so his parents came, brought him as a small child
of the US in the 1920s, sort of classic American
immigrant success story.
His father opened a grocery store
and then was able to make enough money
to send his kid to college.
Baran, you know, was a super genius.
He got an engineering degree.
And then he actually went to your alma mater.
He went to UCLA for a master’s degree,
which he got in 1959 in computer science.
By the way, his master’s degree in 1959
in computer science was on character recognition.
– How amazing, AI.
– And so he was actually, so it’s like,
he tried to do AI first and, you know,
he was early on that.
Yeah, you know, he got part way there,
but you know, he was already at that point trying to do AI.
And then he went, he went to work for the Rand Corporation,
which did a lot of work for the Defense Department
on military, you know, kind of strategy topics.
And there was a huge, this is the height of the Cold War.
So this is in the early 60s, Cuban Missile Crisis,
you know, where there was a real feeling that, you know,
there might be nuclear war at any moment.
And one of the big concerns
the Defense Department had was in a nuclear strike,
the way telecom systems worked at that point
is if you took out the central office,
you took out an entire telecom network.
And so the fear of the Defense Department was the Soviets
presumably knew where the central switching offices were
for like the AT&T network.
And so they would bomb those, you know,
in a nuclear strike.
And then basically what would happen is the US
would lose command and control of its nuclear weapons.
And so basically it was a way,
the fear was it was a way for the Soviets
to do a decapitation strike.
They take out the central switching office from AT&T
and then the US can’t retaliate.
Literally the US would not be able to fight,
you know, to fire its nukes
’cause they couldn’t send the commands
to actually fire the nukes.
And so it was this existential kind of thing at the moment.
And so this guy, Paul Baran said,
well, what if we build a network
that basically is designed for packet switch
instead of being circuit switch
or everything’s going through a central place
for packet switch where the packets can flow around.
And if part of the network gets bombed or destroyed
or taken offline or, you know, power cut or whatever,
you know, the network kind of reallocates.
And the significance of this idea
is not just that it led to the internet.
The other significance is AT&T thought
it was the craziest idea they’d ever heard.
Yeah, yeah, right.
‘Cause you need control.
You need control.
Control, there’s a central control.
Yeah, yeah.
And I was reading just before this,
I was refreshing myself
when I read Paul Baran’s obituary in the New York Times
and Vince Turf has quoted in the obituary saying that,
you know, Paul Baran was basically a laughed out of AT&T
when he proposed this idea, right?
Because it was such a heretical idea.
So anyway, so the point being is the internet
was a heretical idea from the very beginning.
And I thought, and both in that it would never work
’cause it would be like entirely too slow
and the packet reassembly and all that would never work.
And then also that it was a dumb idea
because of course you want central control.
So like they derided him in every direction possible.
Yeah, yeah.
Well, as late, so that was 1964, 20 years later.
A horrible idea that would never work.
Horrible idea that will never work, exactly right.
So that was 1964 when he proposed this.
As late 20 years later in 1984,
a federal judge went to break up AT&T,
which at that time was the national telecom monopoly.
They owned and controlled everything.
And AT&T actually got the secretary of defense
in 1984, 20 years later to testify
that if the federal judge broke up AT&T,
it would permanently cripple the U.S.’s command
and control capability for nuclear weapons, right?
And so even 20 years later, people didn’t believe it.
It was still a heretical idea.
And by the way, 84 is significant
because of course the very next year in ’85
is when the NSF net was funded, right?
And so it was like a 20 year journey
to get from that original heretical idea
with resistance all the way through
to ultimately get to the point where Al Gore
and his colleagues figured out that actually,
no, it was actually a good idea
and they should actually put money in it.
So what I’d really like to know,
and I think a lot of people would is,
so you have this network with some supercomputers on it
and a bunch of scientists and some news groups,
like, how did you get to this idea?
‘Cause nobody else had the idea.
I’d say like, first of all, nobody else had the idea.
And then secondly, if you had not had the idea
when you had it, the internet as we know it probably
doesn’t happen in that the kind of Microsoft alternative,
the oracle alternative would have had an opportunity
to gain a network effect.
And so the chance of all this getting built,
I mean, maybe if it was invented six months later,
but four years later, definitely not.
And so what happened?
– Yeah, so there were serious efforts underway.
You alluded to this, but there were serious efforts at times.
Let’s just itemize the efforts.
And so there were three basically consumer online services
that came out of the 80s, AOL, CompuServe and Prodigy.
AOL became famous later, much larger.
CompuServe kind of petered out at one point.
Prodigy was actually an IBM joint venture.
So they were actually kind of clued into that part of it
early.
And then, those systems existed in the early 90s.
And those were all these proprietary,
sort of proprietary stove pipes not interconnected,
not open, these are by definition closed systems.
And for people who don’t remember this,
if you wanted to like put content up on AOL,
you had to pay AOL, like you had to get their permission,
their approval and they could take it down.
And so it was, sort of any of these stove pipe
proprietary things, somebody really is in charge.
And the internet is the opposite of that.
And so those systems ran like that.
And then there were a set of companies
that then we’re going to do, that you’re alluding to,
that we’re going to do the leapfrog on that
and kind of do the modern, gooey version of that.
And that was specifically Microsoft with MSN.
The time was called MSN.
And then Apple had something at the time called eWorld.
And then who else was running around?
A whole bunch of these other companies were running.
And then the media companies were doing these
proprietary video interaction TV things
that would also be centralized controlled.
But yeah, in particular, I think probably at the time,
it was really the big ones would have been AOL
getting really big.
It would have been Microsoft establishing its own,
kind of permanent proprietary online service
as an alternative to the internet.
And then it would have been probably Apple
with its own proprietary system.
Probably would have been the big three.
And look, those companies would have loved for that to happen.
Like all three of those companies would have been much better
off had that happened.
Yeah, you get a big on every transaction.
Yeah, this was actually the famous,
the Ben just used the word big.
So there was a famous interview with Microsoft CTO
at the time that they were trying to make MSN work.
They were a proprietary system and interesting guy.
And he said, yeah, he said,
and he actually to his credit, he kind of said it out loud.
He said, yeah, the goal of this program
is to get a big of every online transaction,
big being the mafia term for your slice of the pie.
Yeah, vigorous, vigorous.
Exactly so.
So, and yeah, they would have had,
they would have had total control.
And so if you think about the level of control
that big tech has today,
like it would have been like that times 10.
And that really was where the industry was headed.
And those companies had a big advantage at the time,
’cause one is they just had tremendous resources,
like they were funded to do this.
And then the other thing is that at the time,
look to just get this stuff to work was hard.
And they could marshal thousands of engineers
and they could design everything to work
in a completely integrated manner.
And they had all these graphic designers
to make it beautiful.
And they had all these performance engineers
to make it fast.
And they could run big advertising campaigns
and do consumer support.
And I’ll tell the story later
of how I became the consumer support.
I became the user support desk
for the entire internet for about a year and a half myself.
– It’s an amazing job.
– But you know, amazing job.
They would have had the ability to,
they had a lot of natural advantages
to be able to do it in the proprietary way that they wanted.
And so this was a critical period for that.
Yeah, the internet as we know it today
didn’t have to happen.
Yeah, so basically, I think in retrospect,
what just happened was a couple of things.
So one is just the generation of super geniuses
like Paul Baran and your friend Len Kleinrock
and Vint Cerf and all these really bright guys
who had created the internet as kind of
the network side of it.
You know, they just, they were networking people
and they just didn’t, they didn’t,
their natural, you know, kind of world
was not user interfaces and consumer services
and contents and media and, you know, gaming
and, you know, all these, all these application level things.
You know, they just, they, the way these systems are built
is they just assume somebody else is gonna do all that.
And that hadn’t really happened yet.
And so, yeah, so just, part of it was people,
they hadn’t tried.
Part of it was it wasn’t a business.
And so there was no business motivation to try to do it.
And then also part of it was,
there was another coincidental thing that happened
which was the arrival of the, of the graphical PC.
And so the arrivals, the arrival specifically
of the Macintosh and then followed by that,
the arrival of Windows, Windows version three
and the, and the first graphical PCs.
And so the, you know, before about 1992 or so,
you weren’t gonna have a graphical user interface
to anything ’cause you didn’t have graphical user interfaces
at all.
And so there was also a moment in time thing
that happened there.
So there was all that.
Yeah. And so then my, my part of the story was,
I was, I had a bunch of jobs in college
and was getting my computer science degree.
And then I ended up working for,
was called NCSA, which was the National Center
for Supercomputing Applications.
And you’re a freshman at the time
or a sophomore when you got that job?
No, so I actually didn’t get,
I actually just started working there as a junior.
So I worked, when I was a freshman,
I worked in a physics lab called the Materials Research Lab
there, which was actually a great entry point for me
’cause that was one of the main labs
using the big supercomputers.
Yeah.
I kind of got plugged into that world very early.
And then I, and then my sophomore year,
I spent nine months actually as a co-op student
working for IBM in Austin.
And I worked on the workstations at the time,
which was again, very, very helpful for this
’cause these were kind of the leading edge user interface.
You know, so like I worked on graphic systems.
Well, I’m an NA at TCPIP, right?
The workstations, yeah.
They were built in and then IBM and Austin at the time,
you know, this is when IBM was on top of the world.
It was, you know, by far the most important tech company
still at that point.
And, you know, we had this,
we had a 6,000 person division in Austin
working on these Unix workstations
at the time, graphical workstations.
And again, they had the resources.
Everybody there was also wired,
everybody was on the internet.
These workstations were designed to be used on the internet.
Right, right.
And I was, I was.
At the time did not have any internet capability.
You know, there was no, in the early 90s,
there was no TCPIP, there was never none of it.
Yeah, well, computers, you recall this.
Yeah, computers, PCs and Macs up until ’93, ’94
didn’t even come with TCPIP built into the computer,
built into the operating system.
Right, right.
And you actually had to buy it,
what was called the TCPIP stack is a separate thing.
Windsock.
Windsock and these things.
And so, yeah, but the Unix workstations of that era,
you know, the problem with the Unix workstations
is they cost like $50,000.
And so these were not consumer products.
But if you had one,
you had internet networking built into it.
And then if you were at IBM, like I was,
or at Illinois, like I was, you were also on the internet.
And so, you know, I kind of got to see, you know,
I kind of saw the bricks being put in place,
you know, for what followed.
And then I knew how it all worked.
‘Cause, you know, my job was to do engineering
on all these things.
And then basically there was this moment in,
basically I think it was ’92, ’91, ’92.
There was this moment where there were basically three
online efforts to kind of do a front-end,
new kinds of sort of user interfaces,
interaction models for the internet at that point.
And so, and it was famously, it was three of them.
There was one called Gopher,
there was one called Waze,
and then there was the World Wide Web.
Tim Berners-Lee.
And so, and these were, in the very beginning,
these were actually in a real bake-off with each other.
There were a lot of people who had different opinions
about which of these we’re gonna win.
Gopher was actually based on the user interfaces
of the BBS system in the ’80s.
And so, it was a menuing system.
And so, you could go down all these different menus
and download content and so forth.
And then Waze, W-A-I-S,
I think it was called Wide Area Internet Search.
Waze was like a pre-Google search engine.
And so, it was sort of the idea that you would have,
you know, type in search keywords and get back results.
And then this guy, Tim Berners-Lee,
in Switzerland, an English guy working at CERN in Switzerland,
had this kind of really, at the time, radical idea,
which was to take an old idea called hypertext
and bring it onto the internet
and basically be able to have documents
that can link the point to other documents.
And this is an idea that goes back to the ’50s.
A guy named Doug Engelbart and other guy, Ted Nelson,
you know, had kind of conceived of this idea decades earlier,
but the computer systems in the ’50s, ’60s,
were not quite capable of doing it yet.
And so, Tim basically said, he was sitting at CERN,
kind of doing related kinds of work that, you know,
he was working in kind of support of the physicists at CERN
in the same way that I was working in,
support of the physicists at Illinois.
So kind of a similar universe.
And, you know, he had this idea basically,
okay, we’re gonna put hypertext,
we’re gonna put hypertext on the internet
in the form of the web.
But I would describe this at the time,
as all three of these were like very,
I would say nascent experimental efforts.
And then really critically, all three were text-based.
And again, the assumption here was the internet basically is,
the assumption was the internet’s slow,
which for most people at that time it was.
And so the assumption was the internet’s slow,
your computer’s slow,
your network connection is slow.
And so Gopher was, you know, literally text-based menus.
Waze was type in a text keyword
and then get back text results.
And then the web was hypertext,
and it was, there’s the text document,
and then it contains links to other documents.
But like just as an example, the web,
and when it was originally conceived, didn’t have images.
It’s just, ’cause the idea that the network would have
the capacity to be able to do images
was just still too much of a reach.
And then basically, a bunch of people online
started to play with this.
And then we talked about what I was doing at the time,
but I was working on a semi-related project
and then figured out that with a bunch of my colleagues
there at the time that there was a,
we had the ultimate idea that led to Mosaic.
– So what was your other job?
– Yeah, so what I got hired to do at NCSA,
what I got hired to do is I got hired into a group
called the Software Development Group,
which was the group that was basically supposed to make,
it was again funded by the National Science Foundation,
supposed to make tools, specifically open-source tools,
that would make it easy for scientists to use the NSFnet
and to use the supercomputers, right?
And so those tools I mentioned earlier,
this thing called Telnet.
So we made this, we made NCSA Telnet,
which was the main way you would log into remote computers.
We had, I think at the time,
I think we had an FTP client server.
We had, so we had like a variety of these kinds of tools
that you would use for these things.
By the way, we also were doing early work in VR at the time,
’cause there was this whole focus,
oh, there was this whole focus,
what was at the time called scientific visualization.
And this is sort of,
and this is sort of what later became
like special effects in movies,
but this was actually pre-Jurassic Park
and pre-Terminator 2.
And so the idea was to like,
the supercomputers would do these like black hole simulations
or weather simulations or something.
And then you could actually use these graphical workstations
to actually render movies
and you could actually show scientific results
in visual form.
And so the group did a lot of that.
Actually, a lot of those guys actually went on
and actually ultimately then created
the computer graphics industry
in both the computer industry
and then also in the, in the, in film and television.
So that was also a thing that was happening then.
And then actually the VR idea
was actually already present at the time.
And so there were attempts to do VR.
And our sister campus at University of Illinois, Chicago
actually had something called the cave,
which was, it was an alternate vision of VR.
So the main VR idea, of course,
was a headset strapped to your face,
which is what people have today.
At Chicago, they had the idea of the cave,
which was, no, you’re actually in a physical space
and you have giant monitors around you, right?
And so you’re actually in a, you’re actually in a,
– We’re in Las Vegas.
– Like the, like the sphere in Las Vegas,
like the sphere in Las Vegas.
And also like the way that a lot of these new movies
and TV shows are filmed now
and something they call the volume,
which are sound stages that are literally made up
of walls and ceilings that are giant display panels
showing, you know, graphic rendered scenes and imagery.
– And so in my race, that’s the,
become the most practical idea.
– Yeah, yeah, yeah, that works really well.
So the first TV show that used that technique
was called the Star Wars show, The Mandalorian,
which is a huge success.
And if you watch The Mandalorian,
it’s actually really, they did a great job on it.
If you watch it, it seems like they’re outside
all the time and they’re not.
The most of that, most of that series was filmed
when it seems like they’re outside.
That was filmed in a very small sound stage
in an environment with giant LCD displays on all sides.
And then with all the software,
it’s the control software they have
where they could literally shift the perspective
of the, of the, of like the background scenes
to match like the motions of the actors.
And they’d have like, they have overhead lights
so they can like replicate the sun or like sunset.
And so actually, so anyway, so that cave idea in 1992
actually is now a state of the art in Hollywood.
– Yeah.
– You know, it was too early.
We didn’t, you know, we didn’t have the quality
of the screens back then or quality of the graphics.
So it wasn’t ready yet, but like now it is ready.
So it’s another one of these back to the future things.
Yeah, so anyway, so that’s what the group at,
at Illinois was doing.
And then the specific project I was on
was a project called Collage.
And the idea for Collage today,
you describe it as sort of a forerunner to zoom.
Or to, you know, maybe Skype or something like that.
And it did have the idea of doing audio
and maybe hopefully doing video conferencing.
But the main thing was like a shared whiteboard
and then shared documents.
And so specifically the idea was real-time collaboration.
And so, you know, you and I are scientists
in two different locations.
We’re writing a paper together.
We want to be able to look at the paper at the same time
and be able to make edits such that we can,
you know, see each other’s edits like the Google Docs,
like the way Google Docs works today.
Or to have a whiteboard where you could, you know,
you could look at, you know, imagery
or you could look at, you know, draw diagrams
and you could share them and work on them together
and annotate them like you had a shared whiteboard.
And, you know, I think that was, that was like a good,
I mean, that was a good idea.
And like all of that stuff has happened
and it’s very important today.
It was just, I think it was in retrospect,
it was just before it’s time,
which is you just like the internet, what’s that?
– Out of order and what you should build first, for sure.
– Out of order.
Yeah, well, there were two problems.
Which is one is it was just hard to get it to work
’cause you just, you needed a certain speed of, you know,
you needed a certain speed in network performance
and graphics capability on the computers
to make it work and it was kind of choppy.
And then the other problem was
to get a real-time collaborative system to work,
people have to be online at the same time, right?
And so you and I are, we’re collaborating,
we have to be online at the same time
and we might be in totally different time zones
and, you know, like it’s just,
so it’s hard to get critical mass for a network effect
if you have to be online at the same time.
Whereas, you know, things like email worked
if, you know, regardless of when you’re online,
you know, so-called asynchronous.
And so, yeah, collage was, it was a good idea.
It just wasn’t quite clicking.
And then it just, it kind of became clear to me
and a few of the other folks that I worked with there
at the time that it’s just like, okay,
something else is going to pop here
and it’s going to pop hard.
And it’s going to be something involving like this,
you know, the web go for ways like this confluence
of basically new thinking of user interfaces
is going to take place.
And then, by the way, it’s basically two big things,
the two big things that sort of we insisted on,
the two big leaps was one is we’re just going to assume
that everybody has a graphical computer.
We’re just going to assume that everybody has like Windows
or a Mac or a Unix workstation.
We’re not going to support not DOS, right?
And all systems up until that point, you know,
including by the way, the early, you know,
the first web browser, the first web browser
was a tech space, tech space browser,
you know, the Tim Berners-Lee browser.
It was a browser that actually was a tech space browser
that ran on the next cube,
of which there were maybe 5,000 of the world at that point.
– Right, because that was like one
of the most graphical machines ever.
– But he had this problem.
He had this problem is he had the problem.
So first of all, the problem of just like,
there was no graphical content, there was no graphical,
you know, you just like, just the assumption was
that it was going to be text-based.
And then the other problem was we just assumed
that the internet was going to be fast.
And that was a, again, a heretical assumption.
That was a heretical assumption at the time,
’cause at the time the internet was really slow.
And most people run very slow connections.
And so, you know, the experience a lot of people had
the first time they used Mosaic on,
even on a broadband connection, the first time they had it
is you would literally watch the page load line by line.
And then you would watch the images load line by line, right?
And so, but it was a heretical idea at that point
to say, no, we’re just going to assume everybody’s
on a graphical interface and we’re going to assume
that everybody’s on a fast broadband connection
and we’re just not going to compromise.
We’re going to build the correct user interface
for that new world on those two fronts.
And we’re not going to compromise to try to be backward
compatible with the old text-based UIs
or with the old narrowband connections.
– And in a way that you were a university student
with no company, no need to sell anything in the beginning.
So it was like, fair enough.
– Yeah, in my computer, because I worked at IBM
and then I worked at NCSA and we had all this money
for the government at that point.
My computer was an SGI Silicon Graphics
at the time company, leading a Unix computer company
at the time, you know, an amazing company,
but they, you know, they made these workstations
and the workstations cost $50,000 in 1992 dollars.
You know, it’s like a hundred and some thousand today.
And, but that, you know, my computer was one of those.
And so, and on a fast connection.
And so I’m just like, look, I’m just going to build it
for that.
And then my colleagues built it versions for Windows and Mac,
but like, we’re just not going to compromise
for the old hardware that everybody else is on.
We’re just going to assume that in the future,
everybody gets something like this.
– Yeah.
– And then yeah, we, at your point,
like we were running on federal research money.
So we had no commercial, we had no commercial incentive.
We had no reason to go for, you know,
large numbers of users or, you know, try to, you know,
make money or whatever at the time.
So we, so we just basically, again,
and the heresy we just designed for the future.
And then there was a little bit,
I had a little bit of a glimmer.
I wouldn’t say I was confident on this,
but I had a little bit of a glimmer at the time.
That was like, look, if we designed for,
if we designed for broadband, like the,
if it’s a compelling enough user interface,
it will actually cause broadband to happen.
– That would be aggressive.
– Right.
This is a, my, my favorite philosopher,
Nicollan has this term called hyperstition,
which is the idea of sort of, you know,
sort of willing an idea into existence,
just by proposing it.
It’s sort of like pulling the future forward.
And it’s basic.
And the idea basically was if people could just see
what was possible with a modern, you know,
Unix workstation on a modern broadband network,
with, you know, with what we then built with,
if they could just see that with Mosaic,
they would be like, wow, I need that.
And then they would price it and they would be like,
oh my God, I can’t afford that.
But then they would say, well,
I need a version of that that I can afford.
And then that would be a motivation for the phone companies
to start to offer broadband and for the, you know,
for the PC, for, you know, for the PCs
to start to get built in internet connectivity
and for people to upgrade from DOS to Windows
and all these other things that followed.
And so I, as I said, I wasn’t confident about that,
but I had a glimmer of it.
Cause I was like, look, like if,
if you could get through this not whole,
and if you could get the world to the other side
where everybody has a GUI and everybody has broadband,
then all of a sudden it’s just very clear
that you just, you have all of these incredibly
compelling things that you can do that are impossible otherwise.
And so it was kind of a hard shove in that direction.
And then the other, the other, I would say big breakthrough
or that I would not break through the other really important
conceptual rule that we had at the time, which was,
which was sort of consistent with the internet philosophy
of the time was it had to be an open platform.
And specifically it had to be whatever it was,
it had to be where anybody could create servers
and anybody could create content.
And so it had to be very easy to do that.
And so, and you remember in those days,
it was sort of famous that you could implement a web server
and four lines of Perl script, right?
To do whatever you wanted.
And so, and you could create a webpage
just by writing HTML by hand.
– And then by the way, people did
and there were scaling issues with those four lines.
– That’s how a lot of the big internet companies
started out that way, yes.
And then that’s one of the reasons
why the sites always crashed is exactly.
But the point was, the point was to optimize for,
it was to optimize for the quality experience
and then optimize for the openness
and the creativity that would follow.
And again, there was a leap there, right?
And we got, you remember we got a lot of criticism
at the time, which was, wow,
a lot of computer scientists at the time were like,
wow, these guys are building the most inefficient,
computer systems have ever been built.
This thing is incredibly inefficient.
It’s unoptimized.
It’s wasting network bandwidth.
– Where’s the ace and one encoding?
Like this is strings.
You guys are crazy.
You’re wasteful.
– Yeah, we were doing wasteful.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Big environmental arguments and wasting.
You’re burning power, causing pollution.
Yeah, these are all text-based protocols.
So one of the design principles was all protocols
have to be text-based.
There were no binary protocols.
Text-based protocols are much less efficient,
much, much slower.
But the enormous advantage is you can program
a text-based protocol by writing text.
And you can read it by reading text.
Whereas if it’s in a binary format,
you’re always dealing with an intermediary system
and it’s just harder to develop for
and harder to understand.
The source, you know–
– So as a little counter to the belief
of the computer science world at the time,
I mean, everybody read on ASM-1 encoding
is that you have to do that.
– Yeah, any CS professor of that era
who looked at this said they’re doing it wrong, 100%.
They said they’re absolutely doing it wrong
’cause it’s not optimized.
I mean, so much of computer science at that point
was about optimizing scarce resources
’cause that was all you had at that time.
And they had spent decades figuring out how to do that.
And we collectively decided to just break that rule.
And again, it was not to break the rule just to break it.
It was because what was on the other side of breaking
that rule was openness and creativity and empowerment.
And anybody can do anything and then–
– Inclusivity, right?
You didn’t have to be a computer scientist,
networking expert to build a web server.
– Yeah, that’s right.
And the experience people had,
the killer version of this that ended up working really well
was this idea of View Source.
So there was this feature we built into Mosaic
and it was built into browsers,
which was, I forget exactly when it popped up,
but View Source, the idea basically was
you’re looking at a web page,
you’re looking at the rendered version of a web page,
but you could click on View Source
and it would show you the HTML source code for the page.
And so anytime you wanted to see how a web page
had been created to accomplish something that you wanted to do,
you could just look at it
and then it made it easy to learn and replicate.
And again, that was like, that was not,
that was like, there was no View Source
for like network protocols before that.
That was like, that was a new idea.
– That created so many web design jobs.
It was crazy, like, which could never have come about.
It’d be, you know, like that little
or a seemingly small thing was a massive thing.
– Yeah, no, look, I meet people.
I met people, I met somebody just the other day
who, you know, literally it’s like that.
It’s like, you know, they first got access to the browser
and, you know, from their high school or whatever
and college and then they literally,
they literally do the View Source thing
and they’re like, oh, I can write HTML
and then they got a job as a web designer.
– Yeah.
– And then that paid their way through, you know, whatever
to, you know, get to the career going
or start their company and yeah, so that was,
yeah, economic empowerment, yeah, inclusivity,
yeah, maximal, I would say maximal inclusivity, you know,
and then look, you know, technical whizzes could do more,
but like, you did not have to be a technical whizz
to get started and get going.
And then it gave you a very powerful motivation
to learn more and a very easy way to learn more.
Yeah, and so that worked out really well.
And then basically the mosaic idea basically was,
okay, pull all this stuff together.
So build basically the unified visual interface
and mosaic out of the gate actually supported all three
of the systems that I described.
So we support it out of the gate with, you know,
the web in a sort of text form at the time
and then Gopher and then Waste.
We actually also support FTP.
We supported actually native support
for internet news groups.
And so it was sort of a single graphical user interface,
you know, to rule them all.
So we had support for all this and then, you know,
the web obviously is the one that took off.
And then the other part of it for mosaic was
to then make the web graphical.
And so to transition it from a text-based, you know,
kind of text prompt DOS kind of situation
to be full graphic web pages.
And that was, of course, you know,
that was then the thing that really, you know,
kind of just got lit on fire.
Yeah, you famously invented the image tag, if I recall.
So there was a big dispute.
There was a big dispute early on.
So there was a big dispute.
So there was opposition early on
within the internet community.
And I won’t name names, but within the set of people
who were into this kind of thing, working on it,
there was actually a lot of controversy
around the idea of adding images.
And there was a big argument.
There are actually multiple arguments to not add images.
And by the way, to not images means not make it graphical,
right?
Not bring it into the gooey world.
And, you know, one argument was just efficiency.
Again, network optimization, use of resources, you know,
not, you know, and by the way, you know,
sort of an equality argument, you know,
not everybody has a graphical workstation.
Yeah, right, yeah.
Right, it would be unfair to them
if there’s web pages that they can’t view.
So that was part of the argument.
You know, there was certainly a speed performance,
you know, waste argument to it.
And then there was also a cultural argument.
And this was around the time
that the internet was starting to really open up.
And, you know, that kind of nirvana I was mentioning
where everybody is like, you know, CS degree holder,
you know, is starting to become a consumer thing early on.
And there was a lot of anxiety around that.
And so there was an argument at the time
that content of the internet
should remain only scientific and technical, right?
And if you add features and capabilities
like images and graphics,
then you are encouraging the creation
of sort of mass market content, right?
And if you have mass market content,
that’s going to draw more of the wrong kinds of users.
A valid argument.
It turns out that argument was correct.
But, well, yes, it was correct.
The people that made that argument
were correct based on their own presuppositions.
Yeah.
I was on the other side of that argument.
And I was on the other side
of each of those arguments.
But specifically on that argument
is I just always thought
everybody should be able to use this.
I was very much on the side of, this is amazing.
Everybody on the planet should be on the internet.
Everybody on the internet should be on the web.
Everybody on the web should be graphical.
Like there should, yes, there should be content
all over the internet that’s graphical.
There should be, you know,
all kinds of pictures and movies,
animations and streaming and games.
And like, yes, you should have all this
and everybody should be on it.
And we should maximize this.
And that may, and again, heretical idea.
That was, there were a lot of people at the time
who were very important at the time
who were very anxious about that.
And then, and basically we just,
so there was a big fight argument around that
and we weren’t making progress on it.
And then I just did a,
’cause I controlled, you know,
I controlled Mosaic at that point.
So I just did a fade of complete
and I just declared it and I created the image tag.
Yeah, and people put up images.
And we were just, yes, I won though.
What’s the, I won the,
I won the de facto argument.
It’s just through sheer authoritarian action.
Yeah, you were a king of the internet.
And then as well, tell us about like,
okay, how did it take off?
When did the press recognize it?
And then, how did you become,
go from king of the internet
to customer support for the entire internet?
That’s the same thing.
It’s the same thing.
Also the main blogger,
maybe the first blogger,
depending on how you score it.
So it was also the sort of,
I was the front page for a while.
So yeah, so we started basically a group of us at NCSA
basically kind of went rogue in 1991
and, you know, started kind of working on this idea
on nights and weekends.
And in particular, my partner at the time,
Eric Bina and myself,
you know, we were the first two to kind of work on this.
And just a full kind of acknowledgement here,
Eric and I co-wrote the first version of Mosaic,
which was for UNIX workstations.
And then we had other colleagues who, you know,
who are, you know, very famous in the history
who developed the Windows version
and developed the Mac version.
And so, you know, we did develop
for all three of those platforms,
but the first version was the UNIX version.
Eric and I built it.
I always, I always credit it as I did the front end
and then Eric did all the hard work.
– Yeah, yeah, yeah.
He was a great programmer, I guess, yeah.
– He was fantastic, absolutely outstanding programmer.
He is an outstanding programmer.
And so I did the UI and Eric did the rendering engine.
And so Eric built,
the rendering engine is the core of it.
Like the rendering engine is the thing
that actually renders the page
and has all the user interface elements
and makes the links work and displays the images
and all this stuff.
And that was definitely the harder,
the harder half of it from a programming standpoint.
So I give Eric, you know,
I give Eric like at least half the credit,
if not more for that.
And then my role was the front end.
So it’s kind of everything around the rendering engine.
And so it was the rest of the UI.
And then it was the other, you know,
I did the networking protocols and all the, you know,
user, everything, user preferences and all the cache,
you know, sort of caching in all the things
to kind of make the rendering engine work.
So it was the two of us.
And it was really like the core of work
was sort of a crash renegade project kind of off books.
And for me, it was like off books in two ways.
It was not what I was supposed to be doing at work,
but it was also, I was doing this instead of going to class.
This is when I almost got kicked out of college also.
Yeah, so we sort of a crash course over the course
of I guess the fourth quarter of ’92.
And then, you know, we kind of worked really hard
over the holiday break of ’92 to kind of get it working.
And then I forget the exact sequence,
but we put out the first kind of acceptable version,
which I think was the 0.9 version.
And like around Christmas or a little bit after ’92.
And then I think got to quote 1.0
and kind of the spring of ’93.
And yeah, and basically it went vertical
basically out of the gate with the 0.9 version.
So it was basically a, yeah.
So it’s sort of a year of preparatory work in ’92,
and then it was sort of ’93 was the vertical takeoff.
And ’93 was a very important year for me
because it was my senior year in college also.
And so, and I was off a semester,
I was off cycle by semester for reasons.
And then, and so anyway, so January to December in ’93
where my, that was my senior year in college.
And so this was like my chance to like really do that.
And then, ’cause I just assumed I was gonna graduate
and you know, leave and get a job at the end of the year.
So I had about a 12 month run there
where the thing really took off.
And then yeah, look, it was the tiger.
Oh, and then we had other colleagues who did the,
did the, what was the, not the first web server,
but the first kind of widely used,
I would say robust scalable web server.
And again, that also again gave us a lot of ability
to move quickly ’cause we actually controlled for that period.
We controlled both the client and the server.
– Yeah.
– And so we can move very fast.
Yeah, so that, yeah.
So the two of them came out and then people started
to figure this out and it started to get, you know,
widely used among existing internet users.
And then it was an immediate reason
for people to get online at home.
And it was really the first reason for a lot of people
to try to get online at home.
And so it also I think helped catalyze the boom
in what were called at the time consumer ISPs
and for people to upgrade their PCs to be graphical
and then have network, you know, have the network stack.
And so the 93 was like this upward, you know,
the straight kind of upward hurricane.
But again, it was in this context of we’re working
for a research institute funded by the federal government.
And so, you know, we have, you know, we have no money.
We have no revenue.
We have no business model, you know,
– ‘Cause we got a product out there that’s taken off.
– It’s taken off like crazy.
And then we put it out as open source,
but under what’s called a hybrid license.
We put it under a hybrid license that says it’s free for,
it’s all free for academic and individual use
and not profit use.
But if you want to use it for commercial applications,
you have to come talk to us.
– Oh, right.
– And then I had the mailbox
for the incoming commercial queries.
And I remember when it hit like 400 of basic companies,
you know, like general councils and, you know,
procurement officers at big companies saying, you know,
we want to deploy this throughout our company.
You know, who do we pay?
And we had no way to take the money.
We didn’t even have like a price sheet.
We didn’t have any of this.
And then very critically, we didn’t have any support, right?
So we didn’t have any customer support resources.
And so we had the support email address
and I also had that email box.
– Yeah.
– And so in my spare time between coding sessions,
I would literally just like answer questions.
– Yeah.
– And, but it was literally, it was, you know,
it was supposed to be tech support for Mosaic,
but it turned into tech support for the entire internet.
So I, I helped a lot of people.
– I think all the difference between that was the internet
for everybody, you know, and a lot of ways still is.
– Exactly. And so, so it really started to take,
it then sort of became a formal project.
It kind of got, got embraced and became a real project
and got more resources.
And then, but we were, you know,
we were kind of just dying from the overhead
and, you know, we needed more servers
and we needed more people and the whole thing.
And so we wrote, I remember we wrote a proposal to,
for a grant, we wanted an incremental grant
from the National Science Foundation
and it was to staff a customer support desk
so that we could support as we could hire, like,
you know, whatever people.
– Customer support.
– Yeah, so this is actually my first trip to Washington DC
as we, we, we, we issued this grant.
We sent it to Dan and, and it,
and the National Science Foundation, people to their credit,
they were fascinated by this whole thing
and they were glad that it was working.
But, you know, we sent in this grant,
it was the only place we had any sense of where to get money
and we sent in this grant
and literally it came back denied.
You know, the National, the National Science Foundation
is not in the business of, you know,
funding customer support.
One of the, one of the sort of fun twists here is,
okay, you idiot, like this, like giant commercial
opportunity is staring you in the face.
Like you’ve, you literally have like inbound sales leads
like coming out of your ears.
Like why don’t you go raise venture capital
and start a company?
– Yeah.
– And of course the answer was
because I had no idea that there was such a thing
as venture capital.
– Yeah, venture capital.
– I literally,
– Yeah, you know what a tractor was.
– Yes, exactly.
You know, I had no conception whatsoever for, you know,
for, I had just no clue at the time
that it was actually a tractable thing
that you could, you could, you could do that.
And that was like something that like, you know, really,
you know, rich, famous, fancy people did.
Or, you know, I don’t know,
people got lucky or people in Silicon Valley or something,
but like people in Illinois,
certainly we’re not doing that.
And so, you know,
and there was no venture capital in Champaign-Urban
at that point.
And then there was exactly,
there was exactly one software startup at that point
called Spyglass,
which is a name that will come up later in the story.
– Yeah.
– But, but it was not doing well.
And so it was like, it was more of a cautionary tale.
And so we basically just, yeah,
we had the tiger by the tail and then we just kind of held on,
held on for dear life kind of through that year.
– Incredible.
– And then when did they kind of,
when did the kind of media and the press get wind of it?
– So this is a funny story.
So, so there was a Wall Street Journal reporter
named Jared Sandberg.
– Yeah.
Well, yeah, yeah, I remember Jared Sandberg.
He was a funny guy.
– He was a great guy.
He was a great guy.
You know, this is 30 years ago.
So we’re using the was here for people who were still
in perfectly good health.
– Yeah, yeah, yeah.
He was a great character.
– Yeah, yeah.
And it wasn’t as a great writer, a great reporter.
And so he had sort of the tech beat
at the Wall Street Journal at the time.
And he figured this out early and called me up
to the blue probably in, I don’t know,
late ’92, early ’93, like super early.
And he had the story ready to go.
And he was intensely frustrated
because he could not get his editors to run it
because it was not an important story.
– Yeah, of course Simon.
You know, everybody’s talking about it.
It’s just a bunch of idiot kids with bad grades.
Can’t do writing software.
– Yeah, yeah.
On this internet thing that nobody cares about,
that’s never gonna be a thing that’s about to get quashed,
you know, squashed by MSN and AOL
and interactive television.
And like, I tell you again,
to talk about the heresy aspect of this.
Like, this is why I’m so distrustful of experts.
Like, this is my origin story
for why I don’t trust anybody with credentials
or anything anymore.
So I remember, another one.
So I was working on, I remember working,
it must have been, it was like December of ’92
or January ’93.
So I’m like working around the clock
in my little office at NCSA.
And you know, this is at Urbana-Champaign.
It’s also, you know, it’s a little further south
where I grew up, but it’s still frozen tundra
most of the year.
And the wind comes whipping over the Illinois plains
and everything is frozen.
And you know, you’re slipping fall every 10 feet,
you know, in the middle of winter.
And it’s just this kind of crazy thing.
And I’d be working in the middle of the night,
none of the restaurants are open and I’d get hungry.
And so I’d walk down to the one convenience store
that was open 24 hours and I’d buy my,
whatever my hot dog or my cookies and something to drink.
And I remember walking in one night
and there was this new magazine on the newsstand called Wired.
And it was Wired issue number one.
And I was like, oh, that’s interesting.
It’s a magazine about, it appears to be a magazine
that’s about things that I’m interested in,
which was a novel concept at the time.
And so I bought it and I took it back to my office
and I read it cover to cover.
And they did not have the word internet in it once.
And I was like, okay, you know, I was like, okay, like,
I guess, I don’t count, you know, I guess, I, you know,
I don’t count, we don’t count.
This whole thing doesn’t count.
You know, these are the experts,
like they have a magazine, right?
– They’re pros. – You know, these,
yeah, these are the pros.
And like, you know, what we’re working on
is clearly not important enough to merit the magazine.
And so I was just like, okay,
I guess we’re just gonna keep working on our thing.
But like, you know, it’s sort of like this constant message
from the media, which is like, this is not important.
This is not important.
This is not important.
So anyway, so Jared had this whole story is ready to go
and he could not get his editors to run it.
And then later in ’93,
John Markoff at the New York Times figured this out.
– Oh, a good tech reporter.
I mean, John Markoff’s smart guy, yeah.
– And a legendary, legendary, you know, tech reporter
going back, you know, quite, quite a bit, you know,
still very active, but at the time he was like a veteran
and was very well respected in the industry
and wrote a bunch of good books and so forth.
And so he wrote a story for the New York Times.
So the good news is he wrote a story.
The bad news is it featured my boss and my boss’s boss.
– Who had nothing to do with the project?
Who had you work on something entirely else?
– My boss at the time too, his credit, you know,
he was aware and he, you know, he kind of, you know,
he kind of, you know, he didn’t vigorously oppose us
and then he supported us
and then he ultimately sort of adopted as a project.
And so he kind of used his way into it,
but he ultimately was very supportive.
And then, but my boss’s boss was the director of NTSA
at the time.
And look, this is one of those things where I like,
I owe these guys a tremendous amount
because they created this environment
that I was able to do my work in.
And I wouldn’t be here today if not for them, but, you know,
you know, I kind of,
I kind of a little bit of an iffy relationship
with my boss to start with.
And then I had never met my boss’s boss, right?
And there was no reason for me to meet my boss’s boss
’cause I’m like an undergraduate like staff member.
Like, you know, he’s a big, like a huge,
he’s like a huge important researcher,
astrophysicist and, you know,
directing this huge supercomputing center.
So he had no reason to meet me.
But, you know, the story shows of the New York Times
and it’s smiling photos of the two of them
and not, you know, Eric and me.
And I’m like, oh, okay, I see how this works.
– And how did you feel at the time?
‘Cause I know how you would feel now if that had happened.
Like, how did you feel then?
– It was just a little bit,
I don’t know, it was a little bit,
it was a little bit annoying,
but it was also a little bit of like,
look, it’s the New York Times.
Like, I don’t know, you know,
I don’t, I guess they write about important people, right?
And these are important people
’cause they’re running this thing.
And I’m not an important person
’cause I’m only writing code.
– Yeah, yeah.
– And, you know, it’s like the project is important enough
where they write about the project,
but like the people actually writing the code
are not important enough to talk about.
And so it’s like,
it’s kind of the same reaction I had to “Wired Magazine”,
which is a little bit annoying,
but I guess it means I just need to go back to work.
‘Cause there’s nothing else to be,
it’s not like I can call the,
it would never occur to me to call the editor
the New York Times and complain.
– One screen rather.
– Nor would he have taken my call, you know?
And so he certainly didn’t know who I was
’cause it certainly wasn’t in the story.
So, you know, it was just like, it was like whatever,
but it’s like this weird, you know,
it’s like the Play-Doh shadows on a cave wall thing.
Just like, okay, there’s all these things
that people believe, right?
Including up to the internet is like doomed
and it’s never gonna be a thing
and it’s gonna get swamped and all these things.
And then we’re just like, okay,
no, we just have this stuff in front of us
and it just plainly works and we believe in it.
And I guess we’re just gonna keep working on it.
And maybe people will figure out maybe they won’t.
Anyway, so Jared Samberg calls me up.
I remember the day that story broke in the New York Times.
Jared Samberg calls me up and he’s just absolutely livid.
And he told me that he got the morning paper.
And you know, this is like six months later
or something after he, you know,
he would have had the scoop.
He would have had the first story on basically
on all of this stuff.
And he literally told me the story.
He said he charged into his office that morning
and slapped the New York Times down at the desk
in one of these dramatic moments and said, you know,
“See, I told you so, you know,
“John Markov front page of the business section.
“I told you this was actually a story.”
And his boss was like, “Oh yeah, I guess you were right.”
– Oh my God, that’s so crazy.
– So that’s how, again, the heresy,
like that’s how heretical it was.
It was like actually, it was actually hard
to get it in print.
And I think the only reason it showed up in the New York Times
is John Markov was such a legend.
He was just a legendary,
he was further along in his career at that point.
So 93 was a phenomenal year
’cause it was the take-off year for the web,
for the browser, for all this stuff, for Mosaic.
Yeah, and so it was, and then, you know,
the other part of it was just the ping pong effect
was very interesting, which was, it was basically was,
you know, it started out with like a few people with browsers
and then a few people with web servers
putting up these little individual pieces of content.
But then you got in this kind of feedback loop
back and forth, kind of ping pong thing
where basically every time there was a new
compelling piece of content put online,
there was a reason for people to start using the browser.
And then every time more people started using the browser,
there was an additional incentive
to put more content online, right?
And so it was like the writers,
you needed writers and readers.
And so more writers meant more readers,
more readers meant more writers.
And so, and this is what our partner Andrew Chen
refers to as the cold start problem, right?
Is by default, if you have a situation like that
where you’re gonna have a network, you know,
at scale it’s gonna be great,
but like to actually get it to scale
is actually really hard.
And most things that need to have that kind of network effect
never get passed the cold start problem, right?
They just, they strangle early because, you know,
there’s just not enough, not enough writers,
which means there’s not enough readers,
there’s not enough readers, there’s not enough writers.
– But this, the openness completely was a winner for you.
Yeah.
– That’s right.
And so what happened from the very beginning
was people all over the world started creating web servers
and started putting up content.
And they either used NCSA Mosaic, NCSA web server,
which actually later became Apache.
So it’s actually still kind of in use today.
You know, it’s, you know, this derivation is much later.
Or, you know, they literally could write their own web servers
for the reasons we described earlier.
And so there was no content arriving online.
Just to give people a sense of this,
in the early 93, it was like one new website a day.
And by the way, by one new website,
I don’t mean like one new website,
I don’t mean like a new eBay a day or something.
I mean like a new web page.
Yeah, I remember it was a big day,
the first restaurant menu came online.
It was like a big, it was like an Indian restaurant
and like some second tier city in England
just decided to, somebody put the menu online.
And then it was, I remember the first webcam.
So the first streaming video, first webcam was a coffee pot.
And it was literally a coffee pot
’cause the guy had actually rigged up a camera,
an early webcam at the time, camera at the time,
with the coffee pot down the hall
in some computer science department somewhere
so that he could see when the coffee pot was empty
and go refill it.
And then he basically just,
so just pure utility for him.
And then he put the coffee pot online.
It was the first webcam.
And so we all sat for like a week
and just watched the coffee pot.
Yeah, yeah, well I put it around the land
when I can put it on the internet.
Yeah, exactly.
And then, you know, you can see it from home, right?
And so, you know, we all watched the communal coffee pot.
And so, you know, there was that.
And anyway, so then one of the features built into Mosaic
was what was called the what’s new page.
And that was another, something that I had at the time,
which was basically, it was sort of one of the first blogs
or maybe the first one where it was every day, it was okay.
It was literally, here are the new web pages for that day.
And it was this period doubling thing
where it started out being,
here’s the new web page for today, right?
And then it was a big deal when it started to be to a day,
right? And then four a day, and then six a day,
and then eight a day.
And then, you know, by the end of the year,
you know, I couldn’t keep up anymore.
Yeah, the what’s cool web page.
Well, then we added the what’s cool page, right?
And the what’s cool page was the good stuff,
exactly the editorial function.
So yeah, so that was, yeah, that was a key moment.
Getting to the windows and the Mac versions were key moment
’cause, you know, they followed
and those guys did a great job on those.
And that really opened things up.
And then, and again, this was leading up to, I guess,
AOL formally interconnected into the internet in September 93.
So this was leading up to that period.
And they, I don’t remember in AOL released their first
built in, I don’t remember that when they first built in
a web browser into AOL.
Yeah, that was right, I think, yeah.
I think it was, yeah.
But you could kind of, you could kind of get a sense,
you know, it started to become clear that number one,
that they were going to interconnect to the internet,
that they were going to bring their users out of the internet.
And then it seemed inevitable that they would build
in a web browser so that you started to get momentum
from that.
And then, oh, and then the NSF basically this coincided
with the NSF handing off the NSF net
to the commercial telecom companies.
So this was what happened where, so all of this activity,
like Mosaic, was driving the network bandwidth, right,
on the backbone, crushing the backbone.
The NSF was not in the business of providing
commercial backbone services.
And so they did a handoff to the three big telcos
at the time and, you know, did the handoff as part of that.
The acceptable use policy was revoked.
And so then commercial use of the internet became legal.
Immediately after that happened,
there was a really pivotal moment in history,
which is there was a big computer company
at the time, you’ll remember called DEC,
and they had a research lab in Palo Alto
called the DEC Western Research Lab.
And there was a guy there whose name I’m blanking on,
but he, I think it was Brian Reed, if I remember correctly.
And he was a computer science guy there
and he was into this stuff.
And there was a cult science fiction book retail store,
tiny little hole in the wall bookstore on El Camino Real
in I think Mountain View called Future Fantasy Books.
And it was a cult retailer of like obscure science fiction
and fantasy novels.
And it was, it had, you know, it’s local clientele,
but it also had a lot of, especially Japanese
and German tourists, when they were in town,
they would go by and they would buy all these science fiction
novels that they couldn’t get back in their own countries.
And so he had this international clientele.
And so this guy at DEC, I remember went and talked to the,
you know, kind of very hippie, you know,
kind of, you know, ponytail old school,
you know, owner of the Future Fantasy bookstore and said,
oh, you know, let’s put your bookstore, you know,
on the internet.
And the guy’s like, I have no idea what any of those words meant.
Could you please explain each of them to me in sequence?
And Brian basically described, he’s like,
we’re going to put your, we’ll create a website for you.
We’ll put a catalog online and we’ll let people,
you know, all these people, all these foreign buyers
will be able to buy books from, you know,
Japan and Germany.
They’ll be able to see the catalog on the web
and they can click and buy, which was a new idea.
And then, you know, you can ship to the books
and your business will grow so much.
And the guy’s like, that’s great.
He said, the problem is I don’t actually own a computer.
And Brian’s like, well, what do you have?
And he said, well, I do have a fax machine.
And Brian said, let me get back to you.
And so the, the deck guys literally created
the future fantasy website and they, they got,
they figured out how to digitize his inventory
and they created the first e-commerce site,
at least for books.
– It’s the original Amazon.
– Amazon and, and then they set up a fax gateway
where you would order on the web
and then it would fire off a fax message
to this guy’s store and then he would ship you the book.
And then, and then of course in sequence,
you can imagine what happened next.
So, so step one, his business doubled overnight.
– Yeah.
– It’s like the best thing that ever happened.
And then of course step two is Jeff started Amazon
and then, you know, destroyed, destroyed, you know,
destroyed, destroyed, destroyed him and that’s like him.
But there was like a year there
where he had like the best year of his life.
– Yeah.
– Shipping books all over the world.
And so that was the, that was the,
I think that may have been the first e-commerce,
like the, at least the first like formally commerce,
e-commerce thing.
And so that, that was in that period.
– Wow, wow, wow.
– Okay. So then you graduate.
So what do you do?
– Yeah. So, yeah.
So I, and I just, look, this was like a, this was,
I was an undergrad staff member.
I was getting paid $6 and 25 cents an hour,
capped, I think at 30 hours a week.
It was fun, you know, it’s fine.
I was having a great time, you know,
and I just assumed as graduating with a computer science degree,
I’d go get a job.
I, you know, I didn’t, I didn’t know where or what,
but I figured I’d do it.
And again, that like, it was weird.
It was like a schizophrenic experience.
Cause like all of this stuff was, it was just like, you know,
like all day long, I was just dealing with like this,
just tremendous cascade of incoming, you know,
stuff and seeing all this like activity,
but like there was no money in it.
There was no funding.
There was no venture.
There was no startups.
There was no business.
There was no nothing.
And then the media was telling me, it’s, you know,
primarily it’s stupid and the magazines, you know,
and all this stuff and it just, and so again,
I was sort of still, I was sort of halfway between this,
like I’m seeing the future in front of me,
but also it was like the rest of the world
is not taking it seriously.
And so maybe I’m just like, you know,
I just like smoking my own exhaust.
And maybe this is just like all gonna get crushed next year
by MSN and it’s just all gonna be over.
And like, it’s just like some weird, you know,
it’s like, like I said, it’s just like the assumption was
you left this stuff behind when you, when you graduated.
And so I had like the advanced version of that conundrum.
And so I was just like, well, you know,
I guess I need to get a job.
I talked to the NCSA guys about staying there.
They did offer me a job to stay there,
but you know, to kind of keep doing what I was doing,
but it would have been a, you know,
would have been a staff programming job
and, you know, staying in Urbana.
And I kind of wanted to get to,
I wanted to get to A coast.
I was somewhat ambivalent as to which coast,
but I definitely wanted to get to A coast.
And so I decided I needed a job.
And so I, one of the things I had control of
was the about page for the web browser.
And so I added to the about page for the web browser
that everybody used at the time.
I added saying, by the way, you know,
one of the primary authors of this browser
is graduating and is available to be hired.
– Good classifier.
– Please send job offers to, you know, this mailbox.
And I got, you know, to my credit,
I got about a dozen job offers and a bunch of offers
in the East coast, a bunch of offers in the West coast.
And they got an offer from a little software company
out in California.
I got two, basically two offers in Silicon Valley
that I strongly considered.
One was a little software company that I joined.
And then the other was,
I got an offer actually from Sun at the time,
which had a unit, they had a software unit of Sun
at the time called First Person,
which was creating what became Java later
with James Gosling.
It was his project.
And they, I almost went there,
but they had a phantom stock option program.
– That doesn’t sound good.
– I didn’t know much,
but like if you’re applying the word phantom
to your stock option program, that’s not a good sign.
Well, they had a classic problem,
which is they had a software group
that they wanted to give an incentive to
and they wanted to kind of have-
– Hardware company where you have small stock options, right?
– And so they wanted this thing
to be like a separate research thing,
but they didn’t want to spin it off.
They wanted to retain control of it.
And so they were creating basically a shadow,
a shadow stock option program.
And I was just like, I don’t understand this.
This sounds like a scam.
So I turned that down
and then I went to this little software company called EIT.
So yeah, so I literally got a job.
And yeah, and then moved out to California
in basically January ’94.
Yeah, so basically I went to work for,
you know, there’s this little software company called EIT
and they were sort of a,
they were a little basic contract research organization,
very smart, like CS people in Palo Alto,
doing like work for the government,
for companies, you know, kind of very leading edge stuff.
And then they just had, you know, to their credit,
they were on the internet idea early.
And so, you know, they wanted to kind of create,
see if they could create like internet software products,
which was a very kind of new idea at the time.
And so, you know, they made me an offer
and they flew me out and I moved out and it was great.
And I went to work there.
And, you know, I was like, okay, you know,
I’ll work on some internet,
it gives you a way to make money on internet software.
And then, you know, what happened was just,
I just kept having this kind of out-of-body experience though,
which was just like, and then at that point,
the internet started to get like serious media coverage.
And, you know, if you remember those days,
the books started to show up.
And so, you know, before people had the internet,
what happened was there were books about the internet.
And this is where the O’Reilly Publishing Company
became famous at the time and so forth,
is you’d have, actually at the peak of this in ’94, ’95,
you’d have walls and walls of books about the internet
in bookstores and they’d be like guides to the internet,
how to use the internet,
how to write web pages, how to do all these things.
And then there would often be like a floppy disk
in the back of the book
which would have the software, you know,
get the TCP/IP stack.
– That your TCP/IP stack for Windows all that, yeah, yeah.
– Yeah, and then they’d have Mosaic
or they’d have, you know, whatever on the disk.
And so, you know, this started to become a thing
and people started to figure this out
and the press started to take it seriously
and there started to be more interesting content.
And so it’s like, okay, the thing is going
and I’m like, you know, I kind of like,
I left Mosaic behind and so I, you know,
I didn’t have the, you know,
the email addresses anymore and so forth
but I knew how much commercial demand there was.
And so, it was just like really schizophrenic thing.
It was just like very unclear.
And again, like I said, I had never heard of venture capital
so I didn’t really have a sense that you could start a company.
I didn’t really know what to do.
And then, you know, another great kind of stroke of luck
in my life was I got a call from Jim Clark
who’s the, you know, co-founder of our company Netscape,
you know, who was this legendary figure.
And I won’t do the full version of all this
because this gets into stuff that has already been,
people have talked about it a lot in the past.
He’s already plenty well documented.
But, you know, he had been a co-founder
of the founder of this company, Silicon Graphics,
which was one of the leading tech companies of the era.
And then he got sideways with the CEO there.
He decided to leave and start his second company
but he had a non solicit agreement with, you know,
all the great people that he had, you know,
he couldn’t hire the people at SGI.
– Yeah, SGI was an amazing team that he had put together.
– Amazing team, but he had a formal, you know,
he had a formal agreement that he couldn’t hire them.
So, and he had stock SGI with every smart person he knew.
So he, you know, most of the people
who he wanted to work with were, he couldn’t get.
And so he basically was like,
he was literally like sniffing around for talent
and a guy who worked for him, Bill Foss,
who later joined Netscape.
Apparently, I mentioned to Jim one day is like, you know,
one of the guys who made this mosaic browser is like,
apparently he just like moved to Silicon Valley.
And he likes, you know, the about page that the browser says,
he’s available, you know, maybe you should go talk to him.
And so Jim called me up and we had breakfast
and which was a very traumatic experience for me
because I was not eating breakfast in those days
because I was not getting up early enough to have breakfast.
– Yeah, yeah, I remember those.
He used to wake up much later.
– Yeah, I was like programmer hours.
And so I had to be up at seven in the morning
to meet Jim for breakfast at El Farnayo
in Palo Alto at seven a.m. on Sunday.
So I had to recalibrate my entire sleeping schedule
that week to try to make the meeting.
And I was still blurry when I got there,
but they had good coffee.
And so anyway, so Jim and I, you know, again,
without belaboring it, Jim and I decided to start a company,
but it was still this weird thing where,
and Jim knew all about the internet, the browser,
and, you know, I was still watching everything,
but it was still this thing of like,
it’s just not, it’s not a,
it’s just the overwhelming assumption in the industry was,
this is not a serious thing.
This is not a real thing.
This is a momentary thing.
It’s going to go away.
The big companies are going to take over.
This is not going to be a,
the internet’s not going to be a commercial medium.
It’s not going to happen.
And so our first two business plans for our company
actually were not this.
It was, we had a business plan.
We had, our first business plan was to do
interactive software for interactive television.
So the, to build software to replace the guy
on the roller skates that I told you about.
Jim had, because Silicon,
Jim’s company had been one of the main companies
building those systems.
And so he had the insight on that.
And so we were going to do that,
but then we sort of priced out like what, you know,
we sort of modeled out sort of how interactive TV was going,
what it was going to cost and how it was going to work.
And we actually concluded it wasn’t going to work.
It was, it was, it was, it was too expensive
and the technology wasn’t ready.
So we gave up on that idea.
And then, and then plan number two was Jim had
a really good relationship with the CEO of Nintendo,
because SGI had done this deal to do
the first 3D graphics chip for a game console,
which is the Nintendo 64.
And so he went to visit the guy in Japan who ran Nintendo.
This is super genius guy, Yama Ushisan,
who ran, basically built modern Nintendo,
as we know it today.
And basically struck a handshake deal to basically build,
you know, the online service for the Nintendo gaming machines.
And so to build basically what today you would call
Xbox Live or the PlayStation Network,
but to do that, you know.
– That’s probably a little early for that idea.
– Also too early.
– Yeah, that was closer though.
– It was closer, but like, again, it was modems, right?
It would have been all dial-up.
And so you would have,
you would have been doing interactive gaming
on dial-up modems with like 14, 14 kilobit modems
and with low latency.
And so it, and actually Nintendo actually had
had an online service on their earlier devices in Japan.
And they actually had an early online,
Nintendo online or whatever they called it
that had like, it had like early e-commerce
and it was a proprietary system,
but it had like early e-commerce
and I think it had food delivery in the 80s.
And so there was like an early version of this,
but it didn’t quite take.
And so this idea was to do the modern version of it.
But we, again, we modeled the whole thing out.
I like built all the spreadsheets
and all the modem banks you would need and all this stuff.
And we just, we figured out that it couldn’t quite work.
And so literally we took a walk
and it was like, it was like, it was like a discouraging thing
’cause it’s like we had these two ideas they didn’t pan out.
And it’s like, you know, should we like, you know,
should we still, is there still anything to do together?
And, you know, and I remember saying on the walk,
I was like, you know, well, this internet thing
keeps going, right?
Like it’s going.
And think about what we had just experienced there
between Jim and I, which was like, okay,
what basically what the press was telling everybody
and all the experts were telling us was,
it was either gonna be the big companies
were gonna do interactive television
or it was gonna be these, you know, home,
you know, sort of video game like service.
It was gonna be, the assumption was it was gonna be
one of those, but those were gonna replace the internet
when this stuff got serious for consumers.
And then, and we basically concluded that the,
when daddy comes home,
you little kids can go play in your room.
– Oh yeah.
Yeah, if you read, if you look at the magazines
and I keep bringing up the magazines
’cause at the time, again,
this is like the internet’s getting started.
And so the way people got their news
was literally reading one of the three big news magazines
or reading one of the three big newspapers.
Like that’s how you learned about things.
And that’s where all the experts showed up.
And if you just go back and look at the magazine covers
from that era, it’s basically all these big company CEOs
just pouring scorn on the internet
and declaring that it’s a joke and a toy.
And the thing that they’re gonna come out with
their proprietary thing is gonna be so much better.
And so we literally had this moment where it was just like,
well, if we have proven to ourselves
that interactive TV is not gonna work,
and if we’ve proven to ourselves
that you can’t build this based on these video game boxes,
then by process elimination,
it kind of has to be the internet.
It’s the only thing that works, right?
And it’s like, and yes, it has every issue
that people complain about.
It’s slow, it’s inefficient, it’s insecure.
There’s no business on it.
There’s no this and that and the other.
And it’s hard to get online and all this stuff.
There’s all these reasons to believe it wasn’t gonna work,
but we literally knocked out all the other ideas
and said, okay, this thing, it has to be the thing.
It’s the only thing that works.
And Jim is a total whiz on these things
and knew all about this stuff.
And so we sat down and said,
well, what if we did this incredible heretical idea?
And he had very heretical as late as, this is April 94.
So still very far into this, but still very heretical,
which is like, how about we build a software company
to make internet software?
And that was just like, wow, that seems like a risky,
crazy idea.
Now in retrospect, it was like the most obvious idea
of all time at that moment.
But that’s the true story of how we actually got
to that idea.
So anyway, we ended up basically commercializing,
we ended up basically building the commercial version
of everything that we had built at Illinois.
It just, we got through the hard way.
It was not the obvious idea.
– Counter-programming conventional wisdom
and media advice is still works now.
It’s amazing.
– It’s incredible.
I just, I have this constant,
I live in this constant state of out-of-body,
kind of experience amazement where these people
just show up on TV or in the papers or whatever.
And they’re just, they have all these credentials
and they’ve got all these degrees.
They’ve got all these initials after their names
and they’ve got these incredible resumes
and they’ve got all these publication credits.
And they’ve got all this stuff and these government grants
and like on like every possible credential
and Harvard at MIT and like all this stuff.
And they just, they say shit.
And I just, I’m, and I’m just like, like, okay.
Like maybe they’re right, but like if they’re wrong
and they’re wrong like a lot of the time, like, okay.
What consequences do they bear for being wrong?
And the answer is none at all.
– Zero, yeah.
And they’re just back on tomorrow.
– On tomorrow with some new line of bullshit.
And, and they, there’s this great book.
I often tell friends, it’s this great book.
This guy Phil Tetlock who’s a professor
who studies this exact topic.
And it’s this great book called,
it’s called expert political judgment.
And he did this comprehensive study of the,
he came at it through political predictions.
So basically, you know, experts showing up in, you know,
columns in the newspaper and on TV talking about like,
is there going to be, you know, war here, you know,
what’s going to happen with Israel or whatever,
all these predictions.
And he, he goes through and he basically,
he basically, the conclusion of it is the, the sort of
average, well-credential expert in the media on any topic
evolving sort of politics or global affairs
is somewhat less, is somewhat less than random,
likely to be correct.
So, so, so the, right, the credentialed experts
to score it like 40% and a monkey flinging,
you know, shit at a dartboard is like 50%.
Right?
And the big thing that he points out is there,
there’s no, there are no repercussions for being wrong.
There are no, there’s no career damage.
There’s no economic damage.
There’s no nothing.
And then he says the thing, if they were,
if they were being, if they were being epistemically
honest, the thing that they would do is like when,
when the talking heads on TV talking about something,
there would be a scoreboard and it would show like
their last 20 predictions and then it would have like,
you know, red or green, were they right or wrong?
It’s ’cause it’d be the only way to ever have a sense
of whether you’re talking to somebody who knows
what they’re talking about.
And that scoreboard, of course, never appears.
– Never materialized, yeah.
– You never, ever, ever, ever see it.
And he pointed, he wrote this book like 20 years ago
and like everybody read it and they’re like,
yeah, that’s right.
And then everybody just completely ignored it
and kept doing things the same way that they’re doing it.
And so I just, I had this like, I had this experience
where I just feel, I just feel like a complete,
like, I, I mean, you know, it worked out,
but like I, I still feel dumb is in the sense of like,
I read all this stuff, I believed it all at the time.
It caused me to be insecure about the thing
that I was actually doing, that I saw was actually working.
I knew it was working like, and I knew why it was working
and I knew why it would keep working.
And even still it was just this wall of, wall of doubt
and skepticism that kind of kept, kept, kept eating away
at me.
So yes.
– The good news is we’ve used that to our advantage,
you know, many times since then.
I remember when, when we made the Coinbase investment,
I guess Bitcoin, which was the, the, the one cryptocurrency
at the time was, I don’t know, was some number
of hundreds of dollars and everybody, economists,
everybody was writing that it was a complete scam
and total bullshit and never be worth anything.
And here it is, I don’t know what it’s worth today,
like $63, $64,000, something like that.
And all you had to do is just listen to the experts
and do the opposite and you make so much money.
– Yeah, it’s amazing.
Yep, it’s amazing, but I tell you, it’s hard.
Like, I, you know, I don’t know about you, like,
I feel like I still have this problem.
Like I, I, I now have like 30 years of evidence
that this, this is all the case and, and, and even still,
it’s just like, I still have this problem where I’m like,
okay, the experts say it’s still like a real effort of will.
You know, it’s basically, they don’t actually know
what they’re talking about.
They don’t actually have any predictive capability.
They’re, they’re in a system where the incentives
are absolutely terrible.
– Well, I always find like, if somebody’s super dismissive
about something, that’s a great thing to study.
Cause it’s almost surely not a dead zero, right?
Like it may not work, but there’s no way it’s as bad
as they’re, you know, saying it, if somebody says something
is like a scam or a Ponzi scheme or a bullshit or this,
then that’s almost always worth looking into.
So you started Netscape with Jim Clark.
It was actually called Mosaic, right?
At the time.
– Mosaic, Mosaic.
Yeah, so, so we, so we, you know, again, I had graduated.
We, you know, the other people, you know, the other,
our other colleagues at Illinois were, you know,
working either, they were either students
or staff members there.
Everybody was working under federal research funding
on a specifically non-commercial project, you know,
which was open source, you know, there’s, and so,
and you know, like I said, there was no, you know,
there was no, the university didn’t have,
there was no commercial anything, you know, of value,
at least according to what everybody thought at the time.
And so we, we start Netscape, we, we actually go out,
Jim and I actually flew back out to Urbana in the middle,
and it was still an incredible snowstorm
and hired, you know, I think basically all but one,
I think of the original Mosaic team members
to join us in Netscape.
So that was the original, the original thing.
Most of them were able to move out to California
and were core members of, of what followed at Netscape.
And so, and then we booted up the company.
We, and then we, we named it Mosaic.
And, and that was sort of the first issue
that got us in trouble.
And the reason we named it Mosaic was not because we planned
to literally like offer Mosaic as a product.
We, we very specifically decided we were going to leave
the source code behind.
– Hey, you, you wrote it like when you were skipping class.
– Really?
– Yes.
We knew it was not a commercial,
we knew it was not commercial grade.
We knew it had all, you know, just had, it had just issues.
It had issue performance issues.
It had, you know, you just, you create one of these things,
you know all the issues.
And so we, we just knew it had all these issues.
And so we knew we needed to start from,
we wanted to start from scratch and build kind of the correct
commercial product.
And we, and we, and we knew what we needed to do to do that.
And so we, we, we very specifically did not bring
the source code with us, but you know, all the, all the
stand HTML and HTTP and all these standards were open,
open standards and they were all free to, you know,
people on the internet were able to use them
and do whatever they wanted.
So, so we’re like, okay, we, we have no like,
we have no copyright issues here, but you know,
we’re not taking the code.
And then on the, on the trademark side, you know,
we, we, there, there’s a long history and Silicon Valley
of companies that are sort of named after the projects
that spawn them, often out of a university setting
or some other setting.
And so there were two, two famous examples,
Sun Micro, Sun Microsystems at the time,
which was a, you know, a huge, a huge successful company.
The name Sun actually came from the project at Stanford,
which was Stanford University Network, S-U-N.
And so that was like that, the name of that company was
like an homage to the Stanford environments
that those guys came out of.
And then Oracle was the code name of a project
that Larry Ellison had done for the government
in the 1970s, right?
And so there was this like, what I thought at the time
was like a time-honored tradition of like,
you can basically use the name as an homage and, you know,
Illinois does, they don’t have a commercial, you know,
interest in this and so what we’ll just do it.
But in retrospect, that was sort of the crack.
You know, we sort of introduced a crack in the armor
from the very beginning by doing that.
And then basically what happened was as, as, as I was leaving
moving to California, the other people at Illinois
started to figure out that there was actually, you know,
they got access to the commercial mailbox
that had all the commercial inbound licensing requests.
And so they started to get a sense
that there might be money in it.
And so the founders of this, that company,
Spyglass I mentioned, which was like the one software company
in Champaign Urbana actually approached,
without me having any awareness of this,
they approached the University of Illinois Administration
and they basically struck a deal to license the Mosaic,
our code to license the Mosaic software code
that we had written for commercial sales.
And they, they started offering a commercial product
called Spyglass Mosaic, you know, and totally within rights
of the University to do this and within Spyglass to do this
and that deal was great and off they went.
But, but then we, we then announced Netscape.
And of course we were the team that had written
all that code and then this started to become, you know,
by now the press has started to take it seriously.
So we started to become, you know, famous and well-known
and Clark was this legend.
And so we started to get all this press coverage.
And so Spyglass started to get really worried
that we were going to, you know, snuff them, you know,
and we were going to lap them with the products.
And so Spyglass enlisted the administration
of the University of Illinois to basically try to kill us.
And the form of, the form of the murder attempt was to,
they didn’t receive, they didn’t sue us.
And they didn’t sue us because they didn’t have a good claim
because like we weren’t actually violating copyright
and you know, the trademark, you could just change the name.
So they didn’t actually have like a good legal case to sue us.
And so instead of suing us, what they did instead
was they called Spyglass any situation we were in
where we were competing with Spyglass for a sale,
they, the University of Illinois administrators
would call the customer and tell them
that they were going to sue us.
– Good Lord.
– That’s a thing to do to a startup.
That’s like the dirtiest thing you can do to a startup.
– It’s like a super nefarious, you know,
and you know, cause like who wants to, you know,
any big company doesn’t, you know, is already kind of,
you know, worried about doing business
with the startup to start with.
And if the startups literally about to get sued,
like why, why take the risk?
And so our whole sales pipeline froze up and you know,
we’re running on, you know, we’re running a venture capital
and like, you know, money’s getting, you know,
and so like we don’t have that, you know,
so not, you know, VC wasn’t in those days,
what it is today, we didn’t have that long of a runway.
And so we needed revenue.
And, and so this, this became a big problem.
And so we, we kind of got everybody together
and talked about it.
And so we, we then decide,
and I’m very proud of this decision.
We preemptively sued the University of Illinois on this case.
And we sued them for, you know,
certain interference of trade.
There’s these, there’s these sort of laws
that are not great laws to sue on,
but they worked in this case,
which is this thing called torturous interference.
You can kind of, you can, in theory,
it’s illegal to like just gratuitously interfere
in somebody else’s business,
try to unhook other people’s contracts.
It’s, it’s not great law that doesn’t often get enforced,
but like at least it is on the books.
And so we sued Illinois.
They, furious negotiation followed.
We offered them at the time $4 million worth of stock
in the company when the company was worth,
I don’t know, 20 million or something.
– And most of you youngsters eventually sold for 10 billion.
So you can do that matter.
– Yeah. So it was, yeah, it was a billion,
you know, it was a billion plus or, you know,
some depending on exactly what, but, you know,
but it would have been, it would have been a lot of money.
And they turned that down and instead they demanded cash.
And so-
– One thing you didn’t have.
– We didn’t, we didn’t have.
Although, you know, we, we, at that point,
it was starting to work.
And so we raised money from Kleiner Perkins
and we had other investor interests.
And so we, we, and we had sales, you know, starting to come in.
And so we, we, we, we, we paid them the cash
and did the settlement and got them off our backs.
Yeah, that decision on their part,
yeah, it costs them at least a billion dollars
in direct stock, plus all the downstream philanthropy
from me, plus, plus all the downstream philanthropy
from Jim Clark, plus all the other founding engineers.
– They lost a few buildings, I would thank you.
– They lost, I think, a campus.
– Yeah.
– You know, I, I, I’m just going to speculate.
They lost probably $3 billion in, you know,
1990s dollars with that decision.
Now, again, this is why I gave the disclaimer up front.
Like, you know, look, like the alternate universe,
Mark, with a different skill set would have,
you would have had a very different way of dealing with us.
– Yeah.
– But like Mark, as he actually existed on earth one,
like, I never met the University of Illinois administrators.
Like, I didn’t, you know,
I didn’t know the president of the university.
– Yeah.
– I’m like a random undergrad, right?
And so like, I didn’t know the president of the university.
I, you know, I could have called him, you know.
– Yeah, that’s true, that’s true.
Although it’s still like, you know,
the calculus that they made, but it’s a bureaucracy
to, to harass their own students and side with like,
somebody who wrote him a check is,
is still a little on the evil side, I would say.
– Yeah, I thought it was really bad.
I get really upset.
I was really upset for a long time.
To be totally honest, I’m still upset.
Every, every subsequent administration,
every subsequent new administration at the university
has attempted to reach out and repair the bridge.
I have not returned the calls.
– Yeah, no, you’re a grudge holder.
You and my biggest grudge holders, I know.
– I greatly value my grudges, they’re very important to me.
So, yeah, so, yeah.
And, you know, the broader point, Ben,
that you brought up is really key,
which is like, look, there are a small number
of universities in the world that,
and you’d put certainly Stanford in this category
and MIT and a bunch of others,
but, you know, there’s a certain number of them
that really understand, and this is maybe Stanford’s
great genius over the last 50 years.
As an institution is, you kind of understand
that it’s actually really good.
If this kind of thing happens, like if your students
or even your faculty, you know, go off and do something new
and are successful in business.
And then the, you know, the money that you’ll get,
the money that you’ll get back in philanthropy
is going to be orders of magnitude higher
than whatever technology licensing fee you could extract
or whatever threat you could extract people, you know,
money you could extract people out of or whatever.
– Well, it goes back to the original mosaic story, you know,
like it seems like you’re giving a lot up by being open,
but, you know, you’re actually opening the whole world to you.
It’s actually a great metaphor for life,
which is, you know, if you’ve lived in abundance,
you will get abundance.
And if you live in scarcity, you’ll screw yourself.
And I think good that those universities are abundant
and it’s good that you are abundant with the internet.
And that’s how we live in the world we are in today.
So what an amazing.
Yeah, I often think about the alternate universe.
If, you know, if you don’t write mosaic,
if it doesn’t work, if you don’t start Netscape,
like it does seem like we would have had an elect.
Most systems or many systems are proprietary, right?
Like the smartphones are, you know, everybody pays a tax
to download their app from the app store
’cause Apple alone said it’s not open.
And, you know, Google is an extremely powerful company
because, you know, if you want to search something,
that’s where you have to go and so forth.
And these, you know, it was just such an amazing anomaly
in the industry that the internet happened
and that anybody could join
and anybody could put up a website
and anybody could build a great business.
And, you know, in fact, including Google,
including, you know, some of the big tech today
was all created because of the openness of the internet.
So, thank you for that.
And thank you for the conversation.
What a good start.
– Oh, I’m not done yet.
– Oh, we got one more, nevermind.
Pause.
– I got more, I got to bring it, I got to bring it,
I got a great climax to the whole thing.
– Okay, okay.
Climates.
– So let me just start with, you know,
Ben, I’m glad you just went through what you just went
through, I totally agree.
And specifically look like this has a lot to do
with the debate raging around AI right now,
which is, you know, these big companies,
you know, the big companies in those days
had every reason, you know, they had all these stories.
By the way, a lot of the story,
the big companies told about the internet early on
was it’s unsafe.
– Unsafe.
And it was.
And it wasn’t true to that.
It was, you know, but it was literally going to be,
I mean, there was an, it took a long time
for e-commerce to take off in retrospect,
relative to how fast it could have taken off,
’cause people literally just were worried
that their credit card was going to get stolen.
Like you had to get over that hump.
And there was just this constant fear of like cybercrime
and this and that and then spam and like abuse
and like all these things.
And so, and so the big companies always had like
all these reasons why they needed to have total control.
And, you know, the government needed to protect them
and they needed to have all these regulations
and they needed to have, you know,
that it just, the world needed to be a world
not of open systems like the internet,
it needed to be a world of proprietary systems.
And look, a lot of the way the world works today
is for proprietary systems.
You know, the banking system is not open, right?
You know, you’re just, if the bank decides to debank you,
they debank you or whatever it is.
Or if they don’t want to let the money go through,
they don’t let the money go through.
And so, you know, most of the world,
most of the economy is with these big companies
with total control.
And so, yeah, I think it’s, I wanted to go through that
’cause I think it’s a major miracle
when you’re able to actually get one of these open systems
to work and it’s like, and then years later,
you’re just like, oh my God, I can’t believe
we almost have the much worse world
where the big companies ran everything,
but it is amazing how the pattern keeps repeating
and it’s specifically repeating again today with AI.
Again, ironically, and to your point,
ironically, some of the companies that are lobbying hardest
for regulatory capture and cartel, you know,
kind of government cartel status for AI
are companies that exist today
because the internet was open.
And so, they are engaged in a particularly
advanced form of hypocrisy and mental gymnastics.
– I think the founders are gone.
So, been taken over by the other people.
– The other people, although I still blame the founders.
Anyway, so, okay, so the climax of the story,
’cause I just can’t resist ’cause I just think
this is so amazing given what happened, what followed.
So, okay, so then we settled with Illinois,
we get underway, we’re shipping our products,
we’re starting to get revenue, we’re starting to work.
This is around, I think, you know, the time you joined us
kind of during this period.
And so, but we’re competing.
We’re competing with, you know,
there’s a bunch of other companies that are starting,
you know, people figured out that this was actually a,
the internet was gonna be a thing.
And so, a bunch of other software companies
got funded and started.
And then, this company, Spyglass, was still out there.
And Spyglass was selling, they were selling,
Spyglass was like, they were selling our own code against us.
– Yeah.
– Right?
– It’s a little maddening.
– Yeah, it’s a little frustrating.
But, you know, again, they have the legal right to do it,
but like, it’s a little frustrating.
And, you know, it’s fine.
And we’re, you know, we’re competing with them whatever,
but it’s a little bit fine.
You know, there’s like price war going on and, you know,
we’ll, you know, the sort of back and forth going on.
And then Spyglass gets this call from Microsoft
and said, the Microsoft guys call Spyglass.
And they’re like, yeah, we wanna license Spyglass Mosaic.
So we can build it into Windows.
And the Spyglass guys say, you know, yeah, that sounds great.
You know, basically how much per, you know,
how much per copy are you gonna, you know, pay us for that?
And Microsoft says, you don’t understand,
we’re gonna pay you a flat fee.
You know, which is the same, you know,
which is the same, you know,
the same thing that Microsoft did when they originally
licensed DOS way back when.
And so, but Microsoft said, you know,
basically, or at least my understanding
of what Microsoft said was, you know, don’t worry about it.
Like, you know, we’re gonna sell it as an add-on to Windows.
And, you know, so we’ll have like Microsoft, you know,
Mosaic and then you’ll still have Spyglass Mosaic
and you can sell it on, you know,
other operating systems or compete with us
or whatever, do whatever you want.
And so they, they struck the deal.
I think it was like a million dollar one-time payment.
And the Spyglass guys thought they had struck gold
’cause they had this like massive endorsement, you know,
the big blow to us ’cause we didn’t get the Microsoft deal.
And then they were gonna, you know, sort of, you know,
the whole industry is gonna benefit from this
and then they’re gonna go out and sell lots of other versions
of Spyglass Mosaic.
And then there was this,
Microsoft had the press conference
where they originally announced Internet Explorer,
their browser, which was Spyglass Mosaic,
again, our code, re-labeled.
And there’s a famous, famous moment
where the Microsoft guys are on stage
and then they do the, you know, the one more thing part.
And then, oh, by the way, we’re gonna make it free.
And there’s a famous moment, you know,
the Spyglass CEO with his head in his hands
in the front row, you know, of the press conference,
you know, realizing that his business had just ended.
You just, you know, he sold out his entire business
for a million dollars.
So that was the end of Spyglass.
So, you know, all’s well that ends well.
– Yeah, happy ending.
– Not that I’m competitive
and not that I don’t hold grudges.
– Well, that’s hilarious.
Thank you all for listening to the Mark and Ben Show.
We won’t tell the Netscape story,
which is also a good story, but, you know,
maybe if you reply in the comments, you wanna hear it.
Well, we’ll consider that one too.
But thank you again, and we enjoyed it.
We hope you did too.
“The Ben & Marc Show,” featuring a16z co-founders Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz.
In this special episode, Marc and Ben dive deep into the REAL story behind the creation of Netscape—a web browser co-created by Marc that revolutionized the internet and changed the world. As Ben notes at the top, until today, this story has never been fully told either in its entirety or accurately.
In this one-on-one conversation, Marc and Ben discuss Marc’s early life and how it shaped his journey into technology, the pivotal moments at the University of Illinois that led to the development of Mosaic (a renegade browser that Marc developed as an undergrad), and the fierce competition and legal battles that ensued as Netscape rose to prominence.
Ben and Marc also reflect on the broader implications of Netscape’s success, the importance of an open internet, and the lessons learned that still resonate in today’s tech landscape (especially with AI). That and much more. Enjoy!
Watch the FULL Episode on YouTune: https://youtu.be/8aTjA_bGZO4
Resources:
Marc on X: https://twitter.com/pmarca
Marc’s Substack: https://pmarca.substack.com/
Ben on X: https://twitter.com/bhorowitz
Book mentioned on this episode:
– “Expert Political Judgment” by Philip E. Tetlock https://bit.ly/45KzP6M
TV Series mentioned on this episode:
– “The Mandalorian” (Disney+) https://bit.ly/3W0Zyoq
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